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Rolfe you have not been exposed to my deep reservations about the Tetrapharmakon, which you can read here.
So I'd phrase the question: Does the phrase accurately reflect Epicurean philosophy?
With that intro I'd say "enjoy what you can" seems correct to me, but "accept what you cannot" strikes me as too ambiguous -- cannot what? Cannot enjoy? Why?
I think I'd have to ask "why can't you enjoy it? Because it was totally beyond your power? Or because you didn't try?
Great suggestions DaveT thank you very much!
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This cuts into dinner time and PBS Newshour time for some
What about starting same time and just going longer?
Rolf I have to apologize that I haven't seen this movie but if I recall at the very least Eikadistes is a big fan of it!
While we may want to extend the time frame of the Monday night meeting, and set it up for Principal doctrines of other introductory material (as if the PD's can be fully appreciated by a brand new beginner!! 
) that isn't going to solve our need for something to offer people who can't make our eastern-US centered time zone.
I'm pretty much ready to commit to a regular early-Sunday-afternoon session, which would be workable for most of the Western Hemisphere, because I really want to expand our forum participation into Europe. Even if many of our current participants aren't able to make it, I'm ok with starting largely from scratch with just a few people as we did in the past with our earlier meetings.
So let me figure out which weekend makes sense to get started, and we'll see what we can put together.
Referenced in today's episode as to the end of Lucretius Book VI and the Thucydides version:
it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.
but that seems to put desire in quite pleasurable company..... But it seems worth pointing out.
Excellent point Godfrey!
I left out an important point in my prior point when I was talking about no matter how the word is translated.
What I should have said there is that I think Bailey ended up calling it concept instead of preconcept because what Diogenes Laertius is describing (at least it seems to me) is clearly conceptual reasoning, which I gather you and I both think is very distinct from prolepsis.
Which means that I am siding with DeWitt's analysis of this section from Diogenes Laertius, and I think Diogenes Laertius is wrong in describing this process as prolepetic.
DeWitt sees conflict between Diogenes Laertius' understanding of prolepsis:
And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept.
.... vs Velleius' (Cicero's) explanation of prolepsis in "On The Nature of The Gods":
“Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men is there but possesses untaught some ‘preconception’ of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgment.
.... and DeWitt thinks Velleius' explanation is more consistent with Epicurus' use of the term,
So I'm going at present with the view that what DL is explaining is not prolepsis but ordinary conceptual reasoning, involving comparing one opinion against another. In contrast what Velleius is explaining is something "nature-imprinted" and "without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed." This latter statement seems to me to describe something that deserves to be considered as "canonical."
I would distinguish that from: "I've seen five cows and horses now I have a picture in my mind to which I am going to attach the name 'cow' and 'horse' (or any number of other words in other languages). Certainly that's related to how the mind words, and I would say that prolepsis is involved in even getting the mind working, but by the time you are talking about "cows" and "horses," and we apply those words when we see other animals, you are in my view in the realm of comparing opinions against each other, and i think we agree that opinions are not preconceptions.
I believe Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans were firmly rooted in physical reality. When you say "concepts" I hear "Platonic ideals that exist outside the physical world." And the word that he uses is consistent for pleasure - hedone - although different words for pain are sometimes used to juxtapose against pleasure.
I think the issue here is that I distinguish firmly between "ideal forms" which are a fantasy that does not exist, and "concepts" which is basically a definition or a picture in our minds or other product of rational thinking.
I think that concepts are what Diogenes Laertius is referring to when he says (Bailey):
[33] The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’
Now I know that we debate whether the word used there should be "concepts" as Baily does it or "preconcepts," but regardless of word choice here I think this description involves considering something and forming an opinion about it, and this is a process that very definitely does happen. It's also a process that I don't think anyone argues is the same as Plato's ideal forms.
So I would say that conceptual reasoning based on concepts is an important part of Epicurean philosophy, and that just as "man" can refer to men in general, or to John Brown of Virgina, "pleasure" can refer to pleasure in general or it can refer to a particular feeling in a particular context. Yes, the reason that it makes sense to refer to a particular feeling as pleasure is because we feel it to be pleasurable, but it is also valid and important to abstract into the single word "pleasure" all possible examples of pleasurable feelings so that we can discuss pleasure conceptually and understand that it is "Pleasure" and not divine will or ideal forms that constitutes the highest good.
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I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.
At least for now, I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here, although this paragraph I quoted really doesn't express the point in issue. I of course agree with your view of please and pain and feelings. I just also believe that the same words can also be used as concepts to denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain), and I think that Epicurus is using it both ways in different contexts as needed.
For example i think references to "limit of pleasure" are conceptual. Of course we can prove our concept is accurate by looking to the feelings, and that's why it all makes sense. But the "limit of quantity of pleasure" does not in my mind describe a "particular feeling." I would say that it describes a conceptual total that differs in every way between individuals other than in the conceptual way that it excludes all pains. I see the word "happiness" much the same way - it is certainly possible to "feel happy" but judging a life to be "happy" or "not happy" is mainly a conceptual categorization.
I find the pose of the Boscoreale pig surprisingly similar to the Herculaneum pig.
agreed and I hadn't noticed that myself. But I am not sure there is much variation in the appearance of pigs(?)
Generally, I don't like letters or numbers to be used as symbols. There's too much room for misinterpretion, jokes, etc. I'm not even sure I fully endorse the pig as a symbol. Is Horace the only textual evidence for that? I know the statue is from Herculaneum. T
There's also the Boscoreale cup with the pig at Epicurus' feet, plus the leaping pig from herculaneum, which is probably one of the most definitive connecitons. -
Quote from Godfreydesires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.
Completely, 100% agree with this!!
My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.
I am coming around to the position that this is basically the general and ultimate answer to the question. Desire is neither painful nor pleasurable by definition/necessity. There are certain kinds of desires that we can generalize to more frequently lead to more pain than pleasure, and vice versa, but those desires themselves aren't by definition painful or pleasurable.
And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.
The feeing of pleasure and pain weighs in on everything, especially in the way Epicurus says that you are always feeling, and expands the meaning of pleasure to encompass all feeling that isn't painful,
But only the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.
Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?
Joshua, that's why I included the parenthetical in this sentence. Happiness is a concept so close to pleasure that it's hard or impossible to separate it. There are also going to be things close to pain that aren't the same word but inseparably linked.
For this discussion to make sense i think we have to decide whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.
It gets to looking like a word game, but in the end this is the kind of thing you have to do to communicate.
This week we are going to try to get from Section 42 to the end of Part 1 at Section 49. That means we're going to go very quickly through Cicero's lengthy tails of the deaths of great men from the Roman and Greek past, and focus on any remaining philosophical arguments.
If you see anything in sections 42 to 49 that you'd like to be sure we cover, please be sure to add it to this thread.
Welcome to Episode 280 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in philosophy, with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
As we found in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods," Cicero treated Epicurean Philosophy as a major contender in the battle between the philosophies. In discussing this conflict and explaining Epicurus' answers to these questions, we will deepen our understanding of Epicurus and how he compares to the other major schools.
Today our plan is to wrap up the highlights of Cicero's remaining arguments on death in Part 1, starting with Section XLII.
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Our general discussion guide for Tusculun Disputations is here: https://epicureanfriends.github.io/tusculundisput…lish/section:12
And a side-by-side version with comments is here:
EpicureanFriends SideBySide Commentary on TD
Yes that is what I am asking. It's clear that in many cases a thing that is painful or pleasurable in one situation is the opposite in another situation. Eating the first cup of ice cream when you are hungry is pleasurable. Eating the 100th cup in a continuous sequence is likely painful.
Things which bring pain in one circumstance can bring pleasure in another.
Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?
In other words, is "desire" itself a painful feeling that always has its root in pain, or is desire like ice cream, something that is neither intrinsically painful or pleasurable, but which can be painful or pleasurable depending on circumstance.
Episode 279 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "On Dying Before One's Time"
