Posts by Cassius

As always, ifanyone has any issues, comments, or questions about any changes please let us know.

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During the course of the Trojan War, Ares, who had sided with the Trojans, was wounded by the Greek hero Diomedes who drove a spear into his side, sending him flying back to Olympos bellowing in pain. <<More>>

I don't think I was aware that Mars sided with the Trojans. I presume that would be a major point in his favor in the eyes of the Romans (and therefore Lucretius and Memmius).

That web site has a ton of interesting material. I don't get the idea that Mars was viewed as demonic in any way, as Abrahamists might view "Satan." He certainly appears to be as subject to doing weird things as are the other Greek gods, but I also don't get the idea that he was any more "irrational" than they were either.

I think I'm mainly looking at this in perspective of the recent material we've discussed in the podcast as to whether pain is "evil," and/or whether a "god of war" would be viewed as "evil" vs Venus being viewed as "good." I gather from these anecdotes that Venus was far from being Ms. Goody-Two-Shoes herself.

Quote from Don

You can't have Venus without Mars. Old things must be destroyed, must die, for new things to be created. Otherwise, nothing would change; everything would be static.

Yes I am thinking in that direction. The depictions I am seeing in Greek and Roman art show Mars as a warrior but not necessarily an "ogre" or "ugly" or "horrible" as we might do today in portraying some kind of monster. Along the lines of death not being something to fear, then we might also see Mars as what you are saying - a necessary part of nature whose presence we need to understand more subtly, rather than something that is acting "maliciously" toward us.

This whole line of thought is fairly specialized and not of immediate significance to me, but over in the Facebook group a user wrote:

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"But as an Epicurean, I see it plainly: war is the collapse of reason and the triumph of unnecessary desire."

While I would think in many cases that statement is probably true, I am thinking it is probably overbroad, as it would be overbroad (I think) to characterize Mars as a wholly negative figure. To some extent Mars might be analogizable to a "gun" -- something very dangerous and to be handled carefully but sometimes having beneficial uses. No doubt the circumstances are going to override everything else, but in the it is only pain that is in itself always undesirable (even though we sometimes choose it) and a "god of war" might be also in the same category.

Quote from Joshua

Mars, less complex, represents:

Whole world systems hurtling into ruin
Death, pain, strife, war, disease (like the plague with which Lucretius ends his poem), and so on

As to Mars, that's the type of conclusion I am questioning. The tendency now is to see Mars as wholly negative, whereas it does not appear that he was viewed in such a wholly negative way in Greco-Roman mythology. Are these conclusions about Mars what we are reading into Lucretius because of our current views, or did Lucretius view Mars exactly the same way we do? Is Mars something always to be feared and hated, or something to be accepted and viewed as natural, and channeled into productive ways when possible, as Venus apparently sometimes worked with Mars in mythology?

Links to various Aphrodite myths, including "The Trojan War in which she supported her favourites Paris and Aeneas and was wounded in the fighting. <<More>> (which stikes me as particularly relevant to Lucretius given that the poem starts out referring to Venus as "mother of the Roman line":

https://www.theoi.com/Olympios/Aphrodite.html

"I. THE ILIAD : PERSUADES ARES TO SUPPORT THE TROJANS

At the outset of the Trojan War the gods took sides. Ares promised his mother Hera and Athena that he would side with them and support the Greeks, but Aphrodite persuaded him otherwise and he joined the Trojan faction."

In regard to the opening of Lucretius referring to interaction between Mars and Venus, I know personally that I've always associated the allusion to mean something like "Venus - good / Mars - bad." However I now see that the original Greek mythology behind their relationship appears to be more subtle, with Venus being at one point in love with Mars, and that they were sometimes cooperative in ancient artwork.

I've collected several references, and I'm starting this thread to discuss whether there are subtleties in this relationship which would give us a deeper understanding of Lucretius' depiction of their relationship. I would especially appreciate comment by Elli or others who are more well-read on Greek mythology.

Ares & Aphrodite - Ancient Greek Vase Painting

https://www.theoi.com/image/K9.1Ares.jpg

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century AD. Archaeological Museum of Naples

Representation of Ares and Aphrodite, accompanied by loves playing with the weapons of the god. Fresco from the Villa de Mars and Venus in Pompei. 1st century…

www.meisterdrucke.us

https://www.meisterdrucke.us/kunstwerke/1260px/Roman_-_Representation_of_Ares_and_Aphrodite_accompanied_by_loves_playing_with_the_weapo_-_%28MeisterDrucke-946356%29.jpg

This wikipedia article in particular is helpful:

"Aphrodite The Warlike"

Aphrodite Areia (Ancient Greek: Ἀφροδίτη Ἀρεία) or "Aphrodite the Warlike" was a cult epithet of the Greek goddess Aphrodite, in which she was depicted in full armor like the war god Ares.^[1] This representation was found in Sparta and Taras (modern Taranto). There were other, similarly martial interpretations of the goddess, such as at her Sanctuary at Kythira, where she was worshiped under the epithet Aphrodite Urania, who was also represented as being armed. The epithet "Areia", meaning "warlike", was applied to other gods in addition to Aphrodite, such as Athena, Zeus, and possibly Hermes.^[1]

Aphrodite Areia - Wikipedia

https://ancientrome.ru/art/img/7/7684.jpg

Welcome to Episode 287 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

Today we close in on the ending of Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's argument that all we should face pain "like a man," focusing most of his attention on soldiers and military analogies. This week, Cicero turns his attention to examples of wise men facing pain, and he begins to summarize his argument. We'll pick up with Section XXV.

Maybe there's a "preprint" available somewhere that we can search for....

Episode 286 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Confronting Pain With Reason Rather Than With 'Virtue.'"

Due to a quirk in the forum software I am not sure that everyone gets notified when a new "blog" article is published. I suspect many people navigate by looking to see what new threads are posted, so this thread is for purposes of being sure people are aware of her latest article:

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Fanaticism and the Danger of Dogmatism in Political and Religious Thought: An Epicurean Reading

PD 40: “As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.”

The 21st century bears not only the marks of technological progress and communicative speed; it also carries the heavy shadow of resurgent fanaticism, religious…

Elli

June 19, 2025 at 11:15 AM

Excellent contribution Bryan! So given that Epicurus was likely aware of this statement by Aristotle, which tracks the reasoning of Cosma Raimondi, by the way, what do we make of Diogenes Laertius' and Cicero's statements which seem to stake Epicurus out on the opposite position?

At the moment i am still of the opinion that Epicurus DID say something about the wise man still being happy while under extreme pain, given the statements of Diogenes Laertius and Cicero to that same effect.

I personally then am inclined to conclude that this is going to be more evidence that Epicurus was using words in non-standard ways, and that he did the same to happiness as he did to pleasure and virtue and gods. Clearly if Epicurus held himself to be happy in the midst of last-phase kidney disease, then he is working with a definition of happiness that does not exclude extreme pain. Aristotle and Cosma Raimondi may think that makes no sense, if they are focusing solely on the "stimulative pleasure" side of happiness, but given that Epicurus was expanding the scope of the word "pleasure" I think it's entirely possible that he in fact considered himself to be "happy" and expected his students to understand why.

And that's where I am on "crying out" too. Yes it makes total sense that Epicurus or anyone else would "cry out" when under extreme pain. But on the other hand I do not think it would make sense for Epicurus to compose a book of "Lamentations" to devote his mind to wailing or waxing at length on how much pain he was in.

Leading me to conclude that the best interpretations are probably:

(1) Epicurean happiness does not totally exclude the experience of great pain (mental and bodily). We'll certainly do what is possible to avoid that, but we will bear it by deeming our pleasure to outweigh that pain up until the moment we deem it time to "exit the stage" (because we have rationally concluded that the future will be unavoidably worse);

(2) An Epicurean like any other person going to "cry out" when under torture, but as long as his actions are within his control, an Epicurean won't wail and gnash teeth and compose length lamentations about the pain of life. And in fact an Epicurean will plan ahead to the extent possible to make sure that he does not degenerate into an out-of-control condition before taking events into his own hands.

Ok. You're proposing about 15 acres.

Don this subject came up in the zoom last night. Do we have any indication whatever to your knowledge as to the size of the garden in terms of acres? Kochie was thinking pretty large, and it would probably be enlightening - if there is any basis for it - to start making clear the "size," just as the "location" is significant.

Quote from Rolf

Any suggestions for audio readings?

Joshua's response to this is my view too.

Were it not for the Charlton Griffin rendering on Audible, this forum might well not exist. It was *the* turning point for me in my decision to devote more time to studying Lucretius. I'd rank the Dewitt book up there in the same category of major influences, but it turns out that I needed the motivation of hearing Lucretius read in Griffin's booming voice to really motivate me.

I can't recommend the Griffin audio (which is a reading of the Rolfe Humphries translation) highly enough.

And as a comment on the Humphries verse rendering, I've found that one the best for me too. Even his rending of the title: "The Way Things Are" strikes me as the best "tone" to reflect how forceful Epicurean philosophy can be.

Don is correct. I think most people would agree that the current leading translation by one of the foremost leading scholars is Martin Ferguson Smith's Hackett Publishing version. You can find that lots of places inexpensively.

I know you're looking for a printed edition so I won't focus on the three we have here.

Also check here, and let's add further longer comments there to add to that discussion:

Versions of the Text of Lucretius

Quote from DaveT

I'm reminded of Thomas Jefferson's language in the American Declaration of Independence that we are entitled to the "Pursuit of Happiness". It's not a static state

I think that's exactly right! Certainly happiness can be used to refer to a feeling that exists in the moment, but also happiness can be more of an evaluative judgment as well, and it's important to distinguish which one we are talking about.

Yes that's the interesting part. Regardless of Laertius, CR pretty clearly had Cicero, and Cicero clearly says that Epicurus held that the wise man can be happy when in the bull. Did CR simply not believe him?

And there's a note in the Martin Davies' introduction to the letter to the effect that CR was reputed to be something of an expert in Cicero.

It would be interesting to look at the Latin / Italian of CR's original letter.

Quote from Don

Even if the wise one is under torture - stretched on the rack, he is experiencing eudaimonia."

I recall in my college philosophy class that the professor generally translated that as having a "good spirit."

It seems like the usage in English of "happy" over time has changed, but regardless of that there's no doubt that a normal person today hearing the word "happy" is going to understand at first glance something much different than what was being talked about by Epicurus and the others as well.

Having a good spirit would also appear to be something of an idiom even then - certainly Epicurus did not consider there to be anything supernatural involved in it, regardless of what Socrates might have implied about having a "daemon" talking to him.

What does that lead to? Probably to the continuous need for up-front and early discussion of what "happiness" really means when describing Epicurean philosophy, just like explanations are needed for "pleasure" and "gods" and "virtue."

Epicurus has probably given us the best example possible by writing that letter on his last day. That makes it unmistakeable that happiness does not require total absence of and separation from pain.

That's another very good observation about reading things together. Which takes us back to some degree to the related question of "How did Cosma Raimondi get this wrong?". Is this point Don just made what he failed to appreciate?

I might recombine these two threads given that they may be more closely related than I anticipated, but for the time being I'll keep them separate and just crossreference. Cosma Raimondi is probably an example of the interpretation problem, but the problem is much bigger than him.

And I think the same mistaken estimation of Epicurus ' views of "happiness" is why Cosma Raimondi apparently failed to recognize that Epicurus was taking the same position as the Stoics took, albeit with drastically different definitions of the term "happiness."

It's going to take a lot of adjustment in the minds of many people who think that Epicurus' highest priority was to exclude every pain from life, and that their way to happiness is to live minimally and ascetically so as to never let any pain intrude.

Instead, it appears to me that the fragments we have remaining on this issue point the way to seeing that Epicurus fully recognized that all pain cannot be removed from life in practice, and that in fact he was prepared to find happiness even during periods of great mental and physical pain.

We all know that it was important to Epicurus to emphasize that the goal is happiness rather than "virtue," but this understanding blows a hole in the superficial analysis that happiness is to be found in finding some kind of ambiguous "absence of pain." It points to a much deeper analysis of how pleasure and pain form the basis of happiness. As Diogenes of Oinoanda said, the question is not "what is the means to happiness" but "What is happiness?" And many writers on Epicurus have never really articulated what happiness really means and how it doesn't equate to "absence of pain."

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Fragment 32:

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.