Posts by Cassius

In looking to turn that post in a more optimistic direction I would first start by focusing on the "ambiguity" part, because I think that could be stated better. I don't admit that Epicurus is ambiguous about the things listed in the post about the nature of the universe. Epicurus very precisely says that there are no supernatural gods and there's no existence after death, no eternal ideal forms, etc.

While we do have lists here and I think it is important to see how they are derived, I very much agree that it is not a good idea to focus on things like "THE four cures" to imply strict formulas which we today package as headliners but which are not well founded in the literature in that kind of way. There are all sorts of combinations that apply in different contexts.

I would say that even if a person were only to embrace the "no supernatural gods", "no life after death," "no eternal forms/essences," "not virtue but pleasure," and "ground reasoning in the senses (and maybe one or two more I am forgetting) then even a simple set of views like that would be ample to serve as a unifying perspective for considering oneself an Epicurean fellow-traveler. Even this list could be shortened - you have to start somewhere.

At least from my own perspective, having friends with those general viewpoints would be more than sufficient reward for the effort we put into studying Epicurus.

As to the bracelets and symbolism I see that as useful but differing widely by context.

Early in our discussion of the text in this episode, Cicero brings up the very interesting case of Hieronymous the Rhodian. Cicero overall seems to live Hieronymous more than Epicurus, because Hieronymous holds "absence of pain" to be the chief good, and not "pleasure" as does Epicurus.

The example of how dramatically differently Hieronymous and Epicurus viewed "absence of pain" and "pleasure," and how Cicero recognized that they were viewed differently in ancient philosophy - is in my view one of the most compelling pieces of evidence that we today need to be very careful not to assume that we know what "absence of pain" meant to Epicurus. Hieronymous clearly understood "absence of pain" to be something different than pleasure, and in fact Hieronymous denounced pleasure. Epicurus takes the opposite approach, praising pleasure, and considering pleasure, not "absence of pain" as the correct term for the goal of life.

Past discussion of this is here:

Thread

Are You Epicurean Or Hieronymian?

According to Doctrine 3, Epicurus held that the limit of quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain. This is a function of the truism / premise that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain - which means that in quantity, the measurement that describes the "absence" of the one is the same measurement as the "presence" of the other. But this observation is limited to quantity - it has nothing to do with the quality or the detail of the type of pleasure (or pain) that is being…

Cassius

October 1, 2019 at 2:08 PM

We'll take up this question (what does "evil" really mean to Epicurus and to us?) near the beginning of the next episode, so any comments or suggestions will be appreciated.

Great looking site, Eikadistes!

I adjusted the title of the podcast to better address what we're about to cover. There are lots of implications in considering pain to be "the greatest evil" or even "an evil at all." In this first episode we don't dive headlong into what "evil" is supposed to be, mainly because I was absent and a slow-witted impersonator did not realize that we ought to start quickly with that question. However we'll come back to that in future episodes, and we'll want to consider how Epicurus is using the term "evil" in statements such as:

PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

PD28. The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship.

PD34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

Menoeceus:

[124] For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien. Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.

But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

[129] Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

[130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. - (Can we presume here "bad" = "evil" ?)

[134] For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it.

Quote from Don

Although, the more Epicureans; the more likelihood of schisms and denominations. Three vs four legs is just the tip of the iceberg.

Very possibly true, but there is also "strength in numbers"

And I doubt any of us here already have to worry too much. Most of us are probably natural born contrarians anyway so we'll always find reasons for schism no matter how few or many of us there are

I liked the last post, and I think the final sentence is correct as of the moment - that's what we're doing at this forum.

Quote from Don

The most we can do is try to get a deeper understanding of the philosophy out there and encourage sincere students of Epicurus.

But I would hope and expect that to change in the future. All roads point back to Epicurus as the best of the ancient philosophers, and it is only natural and identified by Epicurus that living our happiest lives requires us to find and live among friends of Epicurean outlook.

I would expect as people get more motivated to take action in various ways of life, more people will see that emulating the formation of multiple centers of Epicurean cooperation will happen too. So I write just to emphasize that the "all we can" is limited to "under the present state of affairs," and that "present state of affairs" will almost certainly change. And hopefully multiple people reading these discussions will help change that!

1 - It's good to hear from Onenski!

2 - I agree with most everything Don and Onenski have written.

3 - I want to emphasize the underlined part of the wikipedia entry:

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No true Scotsman or appeal to purity is an informal fallacy in which one modifies a prior claim in response to a counterexample by asserting the counterexample is excluded by definition. Rather than admitting error or providing evidence to disprove the counterexample, the original claim is changed by using a non-substantive modifier such as "true", "pure", "genuine", "authentic", "real", or other similar terms.

As I see it, it's important to see that the "no true Scotsman fallacy" does not mean that the thrust of the position being taken is not statistically true. All this "fallacy" is saying is that if you want to be precise about your assertion, you should explain and be prepared to prove - more than just asserting it to be true - why the counterexample being thrown in your face is an exception to the generalization.

Just because your uncle Angus puts sugar on his porridge does not prove that as a cultural generalization, 99% of Scotsmen do not put sugar on their porridge. The only thing that the "fallacy" says is that if someone can point to an exception, then the "rule" is not true 100% of the time, and so if one wants to be precisely accurate, what needs to say is "the great majority of Scotsmen do not put sugar on their porridge."

BOTH can be true at the same time: (1) your uncle DOES put sugar on his porridge, and (2) 99% of Scotsmen do not. There is no conflict between those two positions, but to say "No true Scotsman" or "No Scotsman" puts sugar on his porridge is overbroad.

Some cases call for precision more than do others, and asserting the Scotsman fallacy can sometimes be ridiculous itself when everyone knows that the person is stating a generalization rather than really meaning that there are no exceptions. However it's always good to be precise when issues are complex, such as when Onenski wrote:

Quote from Onenski

It’s possible that Epicurus also thought that we all act in pursuit of pleasure (i.e., hedonistically), and if we acknowledged this, we’d avoid many mistakes and sufferings by directly seeking what brings us the most long-term pleasure.

I commonly say that myself, and I think it's sometimes or even often true. But I think it's important to remember that in the letter to Menoeceus Epicurus said specifically that time is not only or overriding factor, thus "long-term" is not quite right. It's "the greatest pleasure" which might or might not necessarily be the "long-term" choice.

[126] ... And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

So precision is generally a good idea. No true Epicurean would want to be less than clear!

Quote from Kalosyni

lives neither as a secluded ascetic, nor as sleepy sluggard or addict, nor as a wild bohemian party animal, nor as a work-aholic -- but instead finds a pleasing and pleasant sense of a well functioning life.

All of which are theoretically perfectly acceptable lifestyles, and in fact in some instances may be a rational choice, but which we also recognize as generally leading to unhappy / unpleasant results including sickness, disease, isolation, and earlier-than-otherwise death, for which reason it is generally good advice to avoid them.

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PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

Please note: If you are new and interested in attending Sunday Zooms, visit this other thread to post your RSVP and to receive the link.

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I'm going to add an announcement box that I'll conduct a Zoom meeting this Sunday the 18th at 12:30 PM Eastern Time. I don't expect that most of our regulars will be there but they are of course welcome, and anyone who's new who would like to attend can post here or message me to ask for the link. I think Rolf will be there and we probably need one more session to deal getting to know people who don't regularly attend our existing zooms, with general discussion and questions, and then we'll work up a structure to go over an outline of the main topics in the future.

Quote from Rolf

What kind of “clinical issues” would discount somebody from achieving a proper grasp on Epicurean philosophy, in your view?

I don't know that it makes sense to try to come up with a distinct list, but I would analogize this with saying that someone born blind is not likely in the nature of things to become a good airline pilot or brain surgeon. Of course that's through no fault of their own, but in the absence of highly advanced technology such a goal for someone born blind would be as unrealistic as it would be for us to hope to live forever. Likewise some people are born with diseases or limitations of brain function that makes it highly unlikely for them to be able to understand anything of complicated intellectual nature.

There's a legal saying that "hard cases make bad law." In other words, the very unusual cases we're talking about don't often lead to useful generalizations, when the great majority of cases aren't really hard cases at all.

In regard to Epicurus, Cicero complained that it was among the simplest of philosophies, and Cicero looked down his nose at the ordinary people who took to it. (We have a graphic on the front page of the forum about that.) In other words, it's my view that the great majority of people can benefit from a philosophy that teaches getting in touch with reality rather than fantasy.

Quote from Rolf

There are many people with chronic physical or mental illnesses that can be mitigated but not removed - would Epicurus say that these people lack the “physical constitution” to be wise?

As regrettable as that might be, I think the answer to that question is clearly "Yes." Now "wise" has many shades to it, and i don't think there's an absolute definition that applies to everyone. But there are in my view clearly lines of clinical issues where it's going to be unreasonable to say that such and such a person is "wise."

Quote from Rolf

This one has always been a bit prickly for me. If Epicureanism is a philosophy that is beneficial for everyone, and wisdom is so vital for prudently pursuing pleasure, then the idea that certain people are involuntarily unable to work towards this feels rather deflating. What is one to do if they lack the “physical constitution” or live in the “wrong nation”? Does Epicureanism still have something to offer such people, or are they better off looking elsewhere for pleasure and the reduction of pain?

The first thing to work to improve the "physical constitution" and get out of the "wrong nation" if at all possible. That in itself is a huge offering because it tells people not to wallow in their bad circumstances (not to "accept" them) if they can be changed.

If those circumstances cannot be changed, then what those people have is an extremely unfortunate situation that is thankfully very rare -- when you have absolutely no way to make things better. Then if there are truly no alternatives, one can exit the stage, but that is not going to be the case for almost anyone except in extreme conditions.

I have seen the argument that this is "deflating" but it is also reality, and it need not be deflating depending on one's attitude toward reality. It seems to me that the problem with thinking that "something has to be doable" when the situation really is beyond repair is a form of mysticism that often combines itself (in my view) with modern "humanism" of the kind that gets into regular debates about things like "all men are equal." Yes we would like them to be, and many of us take action to make things as equal as possible in many respects, but with our current technology there's nothing you can do to change a 100 year old person with terminal cancer into a 20 year old with perfect health. That's the kind of thing that in my view has to be "accepted" for now. If we want to change it, then we do whatever we can to advance medical science to the point where that might be possible. But where it isn't possible, that's the kind of thing we have to "accept."

And one more point: looking for answers to situations that are truly impossible to change seems to be what leads many people to supernatural religion. Would Epicurus suggest that people who refuse to accept reality take up supernatural religion?

I don't think so. That's a discussion worthy to pursue to, but I would say that Epicurus would not suggest that. I would say that Epicurus was so invested (properly) in living with Nature and with reality that he would find it intolerably painful to choose to abandon nature for something fictional.

Quote from Rolf

That said, painful chronic conditions are something I’m still struggling to reconcile with the philosophy. I’ve heard arguments against Epicureanism that “it’s a philosophy only for healthy, happy people”. While I disagree, I’m not entirely sure how I’d respond to the criticism.

I would say that it's not just a philosophy for healthy, happy, people, it's a philosophy that is the best way for anyone in any condition to work toward the greatest health and happiness that is possible for them.

Contrary to the mystical-based Stoicism or Platonism or the rest, Epicurus doesn't offer a magic pill that death is a better place, or that every circumstance in life can be changed. There are indeed many situations where there's no further viable option to reduce pain other than to live with it and recognize that the pleasures of being alive outweigh the pains. When you get to the point that you are certain that there is no possibility of pleasure ever again outweighing pain for you in your circumstances, then and only then is it time to start thinking about "exiting the stage." But as Epicurus also said (VS38) "He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life."

In respect to the main question, Epicurus is reported to have said that:

"A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation." https://handbook.epicureanfriends.com/sbsdlx/#117

I'd be careful about how to apply that, but it only makes sense that Epicurus would recognize that everything that makes up what we think of as "us" is essentially bodily, and therefore sickness, disease, death, or the circumstances in which we live can effectively prevent us from living as we would like to live.

I'd call that realistic rather than pessimistic, and I'd call it much preferable to imagining that there is a better life after death, or a magic pill that overrides nature, becaus those things just don't exist, and I'd rather know the truth about my situation rather than spend whatever time I have under fake pretenses.

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Quote from Cassius

I think I'd have to ask "why can't you enjoy it? Because it was totally beyond your power? Or because you didn't try?

Quote from Rolf

This is a fascinating question, and something I’ve been thinking about a lot lately: The role of reframing and other such “mental tricks” in reducing pain and increasing pleasure, even in tough situations. Do you think that most things are able to be enjoyed with the right effort? I have a few health issues that cause me fairly consistent pain, and I cannot say that I enjoy them, but I have learned and am learning to accept them and thus reduce the associated pain. Interested to hear your further thoughts on this.

On this point, Rolf, I was mainly referring to mental attitudes that cause people to focus on pain when they could by making another choice focus on pleasure. In regard to consistent physical pain, that's what's referenced I think in PD04 as to long term pain being endurable, we have the kind of offsetting that Epicurus was doing on his last day, but not much more in the way of specifics as far as I know.

The other thought that I think it's important that "acceptance" of things always be conditioned on first taking as much action as one can to overturn the problem. I have a general concern in philosophical discussion that - under the influence of Stoicism or similar views - people "accept" far too many things that could be changed with the right effort. Physical problems that truly can't be fixed are an obvious exception to that concern, but even there I'd want to tell someone to be absolutely sure that they had exhausted all reasonable remedies before they "accepted" that the pain could not be fixed.

But of course you're right that when you have a problem that truly cannot be fixed after your best efforts, then you find ways to accept it, generally by distracting yourself from its presence.

Welcome to Episode 281 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

Today we begin Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?," starting with Section V, where the question is posed.

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Our general discussion guide for Tusculun Disputations is here: https://epicureanfriends.github.io/tusculundisput…lish/section:12

And a side-by-side version with comments is here:

EpicureanFriends SideBySide Commentary on TD

Happy Birthday to GilbertoMoncada! Learn more about GilbertoMoncada and say happy birthday on GilbertoMoncada's timeline: GilbertoMoncada

Episode 280 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we complete Part One of Cicero's Tusculun Disputations with an episode entitled: "On Death and Daring To Live"

Godfrey, so as to avoid taking this thread too far on a Tetrapharmakon tangent, let me ask a question here .

Prompted by some comments by Rolf , and then by Godfrey, I have a new question to add to this thread since a long time has passed since it started. I hope this hasn't been covered already but even if so it would be good to revisit this question:

We've had a number of references to statements like "the sun is the size it appears to be" as being in the nature of a "shibboleth" or in-your-face test of whether you understand a doctrine, as expounded by the article by Dr. Gellar-Goad.

I don't recall putting the "easy" wording of the Tetrapharmakon into that mold, but I suppose in thinking about it that the Epicureans might have over time developed such wording as a "test" of understanding, rather than as the kind of thing you'd say to your grandmother dying in the hospital.

I glanced back this morning at the word translated as "easy" and I see that there are also shades such as "readily" which arguably might not be so "in-your-face." And I stand firm in my general reservation that this formulation is not recorded to have been used by Epicurus, and apparently has never been seen other than in the fragment attributed to Philodemus in a book where he is critical of other Epicureans.

However for the sake of argument, to what extent might someone suggest that the "easy" phrasing as to the good and to the terrible was intended as a "make your point dramatically" shibboleth, rather than just a memory device or overgeneralization of PD03 and PD04?