Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.

At least for now, I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here, although this paragraph I quoted really doesn't express the point in issue. I of course agree with your view of please and pain and feelings. I just also believe that the same words can also be used as concepts to denote the full spectrum of pleasurable feelings (same with pain), and I think that Epicurus is using it both ways in different contexts as needed.

For example i think references to "limit of pleasure" are conceptual. Of course we can prove our concept is accurate by looking to the feelings, and that's why it all makes sense. But the "limit of quantity of pleasure" does not in my mind describe a "particular feeling." I would say that it describes a conceptual total that differs in every way between individuals other than in the conceptual way that it excludes all pains. I see the word "happiness" much the same way - it is certainly possible to "feel happy" but judging a life to be "happy" or "not happy" is mainly a conceptual categorization.

Quote from Don

I find the pose of the Boscoreale pig surprisingly similar to the Herculaneum pig.

agreed and I hadn't noticed that myself. But I am not sure there is much variation in the appearance of pigs(?)

Quote from Julia

Generally, I don't like letters or numbers to be used as symbols. There's too much room for misinterpretion, jokes, etc. I'm not even sure I fully endorse the pig as a symbol. Is Horace the only textual evidence for that? I know the statue is from Herculaneum. T

There's also the Boscoreale cup with the pig at Epicurus' feet, plus the leaping pig from herculaneum, which is probably one of the most definitive connecitons. -

Quote from Godfrey

desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

Quote from Don

Completely, 100% agree with this!!

My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.

I am coming around to the position that this is basically the general and ultimate answer to the question. Desire is neither painful nor pleasurable by definition/necessity. There are certain kinds of desires that we can generalize to more frequently lead to more pain than pleasure, and vice versa, but those desires themselves aren't by definition painful or pleasurable.

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

The feeing of pleasure and pain weighs in on everything, especially in the way Epicurus says that you are always feeling, and expands the meaning of pleasure to encompass all feeling that isn't painful,

But only the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.

Quote from Cassius

Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

Joshua, that's why I included the parenthetical in this sentence. Happiness is a concept so close to pleasure that it's hard or impossible to separate it. There are also going to be things close to pain that aren't the same word but inseparably linked.

For this discussion to make sense i think we have to decide whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.

It gets to looking like a word game, but in the end this is the kind of thing you have to do to communicate.

This week we are going to try to get from Section 42 to the end of Part 1 at Section 49. That means we're going to go very quickly through Cicero's lengthy tails of the deaths of great men from the Roman and Greek past, and focus on any remaining philosophical arguments.

If you see anything in sections 42 to 49 that you'd like to be sure we cover, please be sure to add it to this thread.

Welcome to Episode 280 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in philosophy, with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

1. Is Death An Evil? (Cicero says no and Epicurus says no, but for very different reasons)
2. Is Pain An Evil? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
3. Does the Wise Man Experience Grief and Fear? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
4. Does the Wise Man Experience Joy and Desire? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
5. Is Virtue Sufficient For A Happy Life? (Cicero says yes, Epicurus says no)

As we found in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods," Cicero treated Epicurean Philosophy as a major contender in the battle between the philosophies. In discussing this conflict and explaining Epicurus' answers to these questions, we will deepen our understanding of Epicurus and how he compares to the other major schools.

Today our plan is to wrap up the highlights of Cicero's remaining arguments on death in Part 1, starting with Section XLII.

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Our general discussion guide for Tusculun Disputations is here: https://epicureanfriends.github.io/tusculundisput…lish/section:12

And a side-by-side version with comments is here:

EpicureanFriends SideBySide Commentary on TD

Yes that is what I am asking. It's clear that in many cases a thing that is painful or pleasurable in one situation is the opposite in another situation. Eating the first cup of ice cream when you are hungry is pleasurable. Eating the 100th cup in a continuous sequence is likely painful.

Things which bring pain in one circumstance can bring pleasure in another.

Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

In other words, is "desire" itself a painful feeling that always has its root in pain, or is desire like ice cream, something that is neither intrinsically painful or pleasurable, but which can be painful or pleasurable depending on circumstance.

Episode 279 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "On Dying Before One's Time"

I see this as a significant difference in perspective:

Quote from Don

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain.

Quote from Joshua

Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.

And while I am not ready to state a final formulation myself, I do see my question in the latter light: It's true that pleasure is a feeling, but it is also true that "pleasure" is a word signifying a concept, and we have to be able to deal with both perspectives.

"In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

Cicero Book 2, Section 9:

Quote

IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet?

But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of appetites,—some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus. However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he [pg 138] speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom appetites30 dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own degrees fearlessly.

The Aulus Gellius defense of Epicurus is at the link below, but it does not concern natural and necessary desires.

Gellius • Attic Nights — Book II

This is Torquatus in Book 1, Section 13. I need to find Cicero's criticism:

Quote

And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error, and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find any limit to, or any moderation in them.

This question has come up at least once or more in the past, but I cannot find the prior discussions. If I find them later I will add links to this post.

This came up tonight in our Wednesday Zoom, whether as a general rule all "desire" should be viewed as painful.

We had a close split of opinion on this, so no matter whether the answer is "Yes" or "No," we have some discussion that needs to take place. From an Epicurean perspective, I feel sure that this question has a firm answer, though at present I think I could argue either side equally. So that tells me there's work to be done on this.

The "Yes" camp argument can be summarized for now as something like: All desire indicates a wish that is unmet, and an unmet wish is painful, therefore all desire is painful.

The "No" camp argument is something like "desires can in fact be enjoyable, as on Christmas Eve for presents the next day, and it is only when I desire is in fact unmet and unmeetable that a desire is generally painful."

Also in considering the answer I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

Quote from Rolf

The classifications are like priorities.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I started to just click "like" and move on, but on second thought I am not sure this - even with the rarely caveat - does not just restate the problem. *Are* these classifications priorities, or are they just predictions of the relative cost in pain?

I wanted to make an exception for "those things necessary to remain alive," but even that isn't absolute -- Don't we sometimes give our lives for a friend?

The "rarely, if ever" helps, but isn't that the question you are asking? What is the rule that allows you to know when those exceptions would apply, other than that this is a personal decision involving the way you personal estimate the final outcome in terms of net pleasure of all kinds over net pain of all kinds?

As a generalization I think we all can see that the classification makes sense. However you're asking the right question -- when do the exceptions apply, to to know that you have to know what *really* is the overriding analysis. I don't think we find the ultimate analysis here in this classification alone. The ultimate question is always going to be the external consideration of expected result that isn't stated in full just by stating the classes, or by stating that those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

Maybe another way of stating this is that the Epicureans never stated that the ultimate goal of life is "the pleasures achieved through natural and necessary desires." The goal is "pleasure," and the reason there can be no qualification is that everyone's situation is going to be different. Is it possible to generalize? Yes, definitely. But generalizing is not the same as a hard and fast rule, even of "priorities." I think Don and maybe others have given good examples of the exceptions (such as "holding your breath to dive to get out of the cave" or whatever.)

Quote from Don

Think of empty space, no ground. Beliefs or desires that are kenos have nothing valid underpinning them or supporting them. They're a house built on sand to bring in a biblical metaphor.)

If this is the same word used in regard to atoms, then let me ask this question:

Does "empty space" necessarily have a completely negative connotation in the way we are often interpreting it? Were it not for empty space, the universe could not exist as it is - the atoms would have no place through which to move.

I'm not yet suggesting it - though I might - that being "empty" might not be a 100% negative concept in Epicurus' thinking. It's not like the atoms are "at war" against the void - they are both needed to make the world work, and without void the atoms would be able to do nothing. And if empty were looked at as a concept that has some positive benefit, then maybe that observation would need to be extended to the ethical side as well.

Quote

MIT physicists have captured the first images of individual atoms freely interacting in space. The pictures reveal correlations among the "free-range" particles that until now were predicted but never directly observed. Their findings, appearing in the journal Physical Review Letters, will help scientists visualize never-before-seen quantum phenomena in real space.

The images were taken using a technique developed by the team that first allows a cloud of atoms to move and interact freely. The researchers then turn on a lattice of light that briefly freezes the atoms in their tracks, and apply finely tuned lasers to quickly illuminate the suspended atoms, creating a picture of their positions before the atoms naturally dissipate.

MIT physicists snap the first images of

www.spacedaily.com

DaveT thank you for joining us in our First Monday Zoom last night. As it appears that you have an interest in fiction writing, I thought I would point out the little-known piece of fiction writing by Thomas Jefferson's friend Frances Wright, which we have posted at:

A Few Days In Athens

We have much discussion of it here at the forum which you can look up if interested. Some caution is needed because there are definitely some questions as to whether Ms. Wright was orthodox Epicurean in her treatment of "gods" and perhaps of some aspects of skepticism. And I also usually warn people that the first chapter introducing Epicurus is a little too "flowery" for some people, so be sure to read a couple of chapters before you give up if that's the case for you.

But in general I think it's an extremely well done book which deserves to be a lot better known.

Hopefully at some point A Few Days In Athens will help inspire other fiction writers to try their hand at something similar.

Happy Birthday to Nikos K! Learn more about Nikos K and say happy birthday on Nikos K's timeline: Nikos K

Don that has me thinking too about another comment that was made tonight, I think by Tau Phi to Kalosyni, that in her example of thinking about a "jacket," that -- even for the same person - a "jacket" might one day be natural, might another day be necessary, and another day (possibly) be unnatural or unnecessary.

In other words, that virtually any single concrete desire we could name (excepting only extreme examples like "world dictator" or the like) might migrate between the categories based on circumstances.

If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?