Posts by Cassius

Thanks Bryan. OK - so that's maybe where I got the idea that no atom has ever been perceived by sensation, unless it's also buried somewhere in Lucretius (and my gut tells me it is, at least in passing, or implied in the discussion of images).

The "never has an atom been perceived by sensation" strikes me as interesting, as I presume that would be an example of an inference that would appear to me less certain than the inference that none are so large as to consume the universe. THAT one is clear, but I am not sure that it would be safe to conclude that nothing we have ever perceived is a large atom. I don't think Epicurus is suggesting that we have to have perceived an example of something here on earth in order for such a thing to exist elsewhere (so long as it is consistent with other basic physical principals).

"An atom cannot be so large as to be perceived directly by a human" does not strike me as a fundamental of physics. Does it seem that way to anyone? If so, why?

I suppose that we can observe that everything perceptible to us can be divided into smaller particles til a perceptible smallest is reached, but I am not sure why a perceptible smallest could not be an atom itself. Maybe Diogenes Laertius is talking about something in the books we no longer have that was more in the line of speculation, because it doesn't seem to be basic enough to have made it into Herodotus, unless maybe by implication.

None of this is difficult physics, it's all just common sense observation and deduction. But going through it I think gets us closer to the logical way Epicurus was thinking (not only about physics but I would bet everything else as well including "pleasure").

As to largest possible size, there is this from Book 2 of Lucretius. This seems to be the upper limit related to the idea that if an atom were of unlimited size then it would be "of unbounded bulk" which I presume means it would crowd everything else out. So this is one way of looking at the limit, but I thought I remembered somewhere a statement to the effect that we could not conceive of an atom being so large as to be detectable to our senses. If that was said somewhere, I am not sure what the reasoning would be. At any rate, the point I think is worth emphasizing is that this isn't reasoning that we identify so much as hypertechnical "science," but mostly mental logic based on common sense directly referring to what our senses tell us without any mathematics or instrumentation of any kind.

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[478] And since I have taught this much, I will hasten to link on a truth which holds to this and wins belief from it, that the first-beginnings of things are limited in the tale of their varying shapes. If it were not to be so, then once again certain seeds must needs be of unbounded bulk of body. For, within the same tiny frame of any one single seed, the shapes of the body cannot be very diverse. For suppose the first-bodies to be of three least parts, or if you will, make them larger by a few more; in truth when you have tried all those parts of one body in every way, shifting top and bottom, changing right with left, to see what outline of form in that whole body each arrangement gives, beyond that, if by chance you wish to make the shapes different, you must needs add other parts; thence it will follow that in like manner the arrangement will ask for other parts, if by chance you still wish to make the shapes different: and so greater bulk in the body follows on newness of forms. Wherefore it is not possible that you can believe that there are seeds with unbounded difference of forms, lest you constrain certain of them to be of huge vastness, which I have taught above cannot be approved.

[500] At once you would see barbaric robes and gleaming Meliboean purple, dyed with the colour of Thessalian shells, and the golden tribes of peacocks, steeped in smiling beauty, lie neglected and surpassed by the new colours in things; and the smell of myrrh and the taste of honey would be despised, and the swan’s song and the many-toned melodies on Phoebus’s strings would in like manner be smothered and mute: for something more excellent than all else would ever be arising. Likewise, all things would sink back on the worse side, just as we have told that they would rise towards the better. For, on the other hand, something would be more loathly too than all else to nostrils and ears and eyes, and the taste of the mouth. And since these things are not so, but a fixed limit to things marks the extreme on either side, you must needs confess that the first-matter too has a limited difference in shapes.

[515] Again from fire right on to the icy frost of winter is but a limited way, and in like manner is the way measured back again. For all heat and cold and tepid warmths in the middle lie between the two, filling up the sum in due order. And so they are brought to being differing with limited degrees, since they are marked off at either end by the twin points, beset on this side by flames, on that by stiffening frosts.

[522] And since I have taught this much, I will hasten to link on a truth which holds to it and wins belief from it, that the first-beginnings of things, which are formed with a shape like to one another, are in number infinite. For since the difference of forms is limited, it must needs be that those which are alike are unlimited, or else that the sum of matter is created limited, which I have proved not to be, showing in my verses that the tiny bodies of matter from everlasting always keep up the sum of things, as the team of blows is harnessed on unbroken on every side.

Here's a section in Book 1 of Lucretius describing the lower limit in size of atoms. Seems to me as noted before that this is not an assertion of a particular size, but that whatever the lower limit in size is, it must be sufficient to carry on these requirements.

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[551] Again, if nature had ordained no limit to the breaking of things, by now the bodies of matter would have been so far brought low by the breaking of ages past, that nothing could be conceived out of them within a fixed time, and pass on to the full measure of its life; for we see that anything you will is more easily broken up than put together again. Wherefore what the long limitless age of days, the age of all time that is gone by, had broken ere now, disordering and dissolving, could never be renewed in all time that remains. But as it is, a set limit to breaking has, we may be sure, been appointed, since we see each thing put together again, and at the same time fixed seasons ordained for all things after their kind, in the which they may be able to reach the flower of their life.

[565] There is this too that, though the first-bodies of matter are quite solid, yet we can give account of all the soft things that come to be, air, water, earth, fires, by what means they come to being, and by what force each goes on its way, when once void has been mingled in things. But on the other hand, if the first-beginnings of things were to be soft, it will not be possible to give account whence hard flints and iron can be created; for from the first all nature will lack a first-beginning of foundation. There are then bodies that prevail in their solid singleness, by whose more close-packed union all things can be riveted and reveal their stalwart strength.

[577] Moreover, if no limit has been appointed to the breaking of things, still it must needs be that all the bodies of things survive even now from time everlasting, such that they cannot yet have been assailed by any danger. But since they exist endowed with a frail nature, it is not in harmony with this that they have been able to abide for everlasting time harried through all the ages by countless blows.

[584] Once again, since there has been appointed for all things after their kind a limit of growing and of maintaining life, and inasmuch as it stands ordained what all things severally can do by the laws of nature, and what too they cannot, nor is anything so changed, but that all things stand so fast that the diverse birds all in their due order show that the marks of their kind are on their body, they must also, we may be sure, have a body of unchanging substance. For if the first-beginnings of things could be vanquished in any way and changed, then, too, would it be doubtful what might come to being, what might not, yea, in what way each thing has its power limited and its deepset boundary-stone, nor could the tribes each after their kind so often recall the nature, habits, manner of life and movements of the parents.

[599] Then, further, since there are extreme points, one after another \[on bodies, which are the least things we can see, likewise, too, there must be a least point\] on that body, which our senses can no longer descry; that point, we may be sure, exists without parts and is endowed with the least nature, nor was it ever sundered apart by itself nor can it so be hereafter, since it is itself but a part of another and that the first single part: then other like parts and again others in order in close array make up the nature of the first body, and since they cannot exist by themselves, it must needs be that they stay fast there whence they cannot by any means be torn away. The first-beginnings then are of solid singleness; for they are a close dense mass of least parts, never put together out of a union of those parts, but rather prevailing in everlasting singleness; from them nature, keeping safe the seeds of things, suffers not anything to be torn away, nor ever to be removed.

[615] Moreover, if there be not a least thing, all the tiniest bodies will be composed of infinite parts, since indeed the half of a half will always have a half, nor will anything set a limit. What difference then will there be between the sum of things and the least of things? There will be no difference; for however completely the whole sum be infinite, yet things that are tiniest will be composed of infinite parts just the same. And since true reasoning cries out against this, and denies that the mind can believe it, you must be vanquished and confess that there are those things which consist of no parts at all and are of the least nature. And since these exist, those first-beginnings too you must needs own are solid and everlasting.

[628] And again, if nature, the creatress, had been used to constrain all things to be dissolved into their least parts, then she could not again renew aught of them, for the reason that things which are not enlarged by any parts, have not those powers which must belong to creative matter, the diverse fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, by which all things are carried on.

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I am becoming more convinced of the importance of following Epicurus' advice to Pythocles to "most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them..."

As to infinity at the larger scale, it is the boundless size of the universe (and the amount of atoms and void) that makes possible the coming together of all that we see around us to come together, and this makes it possible for us to understand the creation of our worlds without divine intervention. Epicurus was reasoning that if the universe were not infinite in size but either atoms or void were infinite, then things would be tight-packed or would never come together in the first place.

As to infinity at the smaller scale, it is the fact that division is *not* boundless that forms the basis of confidence that the atoms are the transmission and regulation method by which the things that we see around us work in repeated patterns. Epicurus was reasoning that the minimum size of atoms is what makes it possible for the world to operate on a regular basis without divine supervision.

So in continuing to try to trace Epicurus' thinking, I think it's any obvious question to ask:

What did the Epicureans think to be the lower limit in size, and the upper limit in size, of an individual atom?

I think there are text references either in Herodotus or Lucretius or both about this which would be worthwhile to collect.

I seem to remember that the upper limit was considered to be either (1) large enough to be visible to us (none are), or (2) so large that a single atom would crowd out the rest of the universe. My memory is wrong there because that's a huge difference in size. I seem to remember (1) being said somewhere, but option (2) makes more logical sense. Maybe there's a way to relate both from different passages.

On the downside of size there is similar discussion. I seem to recall that it all comes back to the smallest size being deduced to be something like "large enough to perform its function of carrying on the eternal characteristics of size, shape, and weight."

Obviously here i am not looking for a discussion of modern scientific theory - that can be done somewhere else.

I am looking for what we can find out about this from the Epicurean texts, because pinning down how the Epicureans reasoned on this would likely give us some important insights into how Epicurus was thinking and developing his philosophy. I'd relate this right up there with "the nature of the gods" in importance, because it's the key to understanding how the universe operates *without* the direction of the gods.

Credit for this goes to Bryan for bring this to our attention:

PDF here: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment…glass-cups-pdf/

Here is a link for the Roman glass reconstructions.

https://www.etsy.com/listing/1588603493/roman-beaker-with-scenes-of-horses-and?show_sold_out_detail=1&ref=nla_listing_details

This one has the name "Metrodoros"

https://www.etsy.com/listing/1573839522/roman-circus-beaker-showing-boxers-049a?show_sold_out_detail=1&ref=nla_listing_details

"(DIODORUS) defeats (POLYNEIKES), who is judged by an arbiter (the only clothed figure), depicted with his rod;

(ACHILLES) and DAMOCRATES box with their guards raised defensively;

(M)ETRODO(RUS) defeats (OLYMPIAC);

a victorious (PO)LYBICUS adjusts his victor's laurel crown;

IS(IDORUS) throws a punch at (FELIX).

The base section features four more laurel crowns alternating with crossed victory palms, which also appear over the tripod tables separating each half of the vessel."

Lastly, pictured below, the "LABE THN NEIKHN" cup translates as: 'Seize the Victory.' The design makes leaves out of the seams.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4984-img-4195-jpg/

one of the theories is that the ‘circus beakers’ were souvenirs that were produced inexpensively and could be purchased at or after games.

In contrast, the productions by the famous ancient glassworker Ennion seems to have been more highly valued.

(https://www.etsy.com/listing/157444…listing_details)

Ennion - Wikipedia

Twentier since you seem to have read into this, any comment on Joseph Campbell and his work? (I've heard of him but know virtually nothing.)

The method Diogenes Laertius used to divide the schools has always seemed to be difficult for a lot of people (including me) to follow. It would be good to assemble the reasoning to the extent possible and see what DL himself aligned with what, and what he considered fundamentally different. Clearly dogmatist vs skeptic is one huge division, but is "ethics" vs "dialectic" another, and if so what does that mean?

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But philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, has had a twofold origin; it started with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes. The one school was called Ionian, because Thales, a Milesian and therefore an Ionian, instructed Anaximander; the other school was called Italian from Pythagoras, who worked for the most part in Italy. [14] And the one school, that of Ionia, terminates with Clitomachus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus, that of Italy with Epicurus. The succession passes from Thales through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, to Socrates, who introduced ethics or moral philosophy; from Socrates to his pupils the Socratics, and especially to Plato, the founder of the Old Academy; from Plato, through Speusippus and Xenocrates, the succession passes to Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, Arcesilaus, founder of the Middle Academy, Lacydes,¹⁰ founder of the New Academy, Carneades, and Clitomachus. This line brings us to Clitomachus.

[15] There is another which ends with Chrysippus, that is to say by passing from Socrates to Antisthenes, then to Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. And yet again another ends with Theophrastus; thus from Plato it passes to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to Theophrastus. In this manner the school of Ionia comes to an end.

In the Italian school the order of succession is as follows: first Pherecydes, next Pythagoras, next his son Telauges, then Xenophanes, Parmenides,¹¹ Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, who had many pupils, in particular Nausiphanes [and Naucydes], who were teachers of Epicurus.

[16] Philosophers may be divided into dogmatists and sceptics: all those who make assertions about things assuming that they can be known are dogmatists; while all who suspend their judgement on the ground that things are unknowable are sceptics. Again, some philosophers left writings behind them, while others wrote nothing at all, as was the case according to some authorities with Socrates, Stilpo, Philippus, Menedemus, Pyrrho, Theodorus, Carneades, Bryson; some add Pythagoras and Aristo of Chios, except that they wrote a few letters. Others wrote no more than one treatise each, as Melissus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras. Many works were written by Zeno, more by Xenophanes, more by Democritus, more by Aristotle, more by Epicurus, and still more by Chrysippus.

[17] Some schools took their name from cities, as the Elians and the Megarians, the Eretrians and the Cyrenaics; others from localities, as the Academics and the Stoics; others from incidental circumstances, as the Peripatetics; others again from derisive nicknames, as the Cynics; others from their temperaments, as the Eudaemonists or Happiness School; others from a conceit they entertained, as Truthlovers, Refutationists, and Reasoners from Analogy; others again from their teachers, as Socratics, Epicureans, and the like; some take the name of Physicists from their investigation of nature, others that of Moralists because they discuss morals; while those who are occupied with verbal jugglery are styled Dialecticians.

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18] Philosophy has three parts, physics, ethics, and dialectic or logic. Physics is the part concerned with the universe and all that it contains; ethics that concerned with life and all that has to do with us; while the processes of reasoning employed by both form the province of dialectic. Physics flourished down to the time of Archelaus; ethics, as we have said, started with Socrates; while dialectic goes as far back as Zeno of Elea. In ethics there have been ten schools: the Academic, the Cyrenaic, the Elian, the Megarian, the Cynic, the Eretrian, the Dialectic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean.

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"ἡ διαλεκτική (sc. τέχνη) dialectic, discussion by question and answer, invented by Zeno of Elea"

Thanks Bryan and Don! I'll correct calling Achilles an Athenian next week. So dialectic was invented by the Eleatics!? Very interesting! So I wonder to what extent, if any, are these paradoxes related to dialectic. So the proper characterization of Zeno is despoiler.or some similar synonym....

Chapter 10. EUCLIDES

[106] Euclides was a native of Megara on the Isthmus,¹or according to some of Gela, as Alexander states in his Successions of Philosophers. He applied himself to the writings of Parmenides, and his followers were called Megarians after him, then Eristics, and at a later date Dialecticians, that name having first been given to them by Dionysius of Chalcedon because they put their arguments into the form of question and answer. Hermodorus tells us that, after the death of Socrates, Plato and the rest of the philosophers came to him, being alarmed at the cruelty of the tyrants. He held the supreme good to be really one, though called by many names, sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and again Mind, and so forth. But all that is contradictory of the good he used to reject, declaring that it had no existence.

[107] When he impugned a demonstration, it was not the premisses but the conclusion that he attacked. He rejected the argument from analogy, declaring that it must be taken either from similars or from dissimilars. If it were drawn from similars, it is with these and not with their analogies that their arguments should deal; if from dissimilars, it is gratuitous to set them side by side. Hence Timon says of him, with a side hit at the other Socratics as well²:

But I care not for these babblers, nor for anyone besides, not for Phaedo whoever he be, nor wrangling Euclides, who inspired the Megarians with a frenzied love of controversy.

Lucretius Today Episode 244 is now available: "Zeno's Paradoxes: Profundity Or Gaslighting?" Transcript is available here. As always with these transcripts, remember that this is AI generated and may contain major errors or differences from the recorded version. If you come across something significant we'll appreciate it if you let us know and we will correct it.

Don -- Some of these old hymns seem to be sung in "unrecognizable" ways nowadays. Do you have a youtube link to the version of the tune you're thinking of?

Erik - Sorry that you missed us tonight. Please respond to your Welcome message and we will get you set up to attend soon! thanks

Erik can you let us know the basis of your interest since you are brand new? we try to avoid Zoom bombing so please identify yourself first.

In addition to whatever comments follow, for those of us who can be with us tonight in our "First Monday" meeting, I suggest we consider this a topic of discussion,

I started this thread and subforum to point to David Furley's book in part because it is useful in discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. There is much more in the book for those who have time to investigate.

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“With Epicurus, the position may have been much simpler [than Aristotle]. His [Epicurus’] view was that the real world of atoms and void was composed of minima. Any account of the basic structure of the world therefore must consist of counting the minima: there is nothing more to it.

What we should expect, therefore, a priori, is that Epicurus would regard geometry as irrelevant to the study of nature, because one of its essential principles (that of infinite divisibility) was contrary to the facts of nature.

There is little evidence for Epicurus’ views about geometry, but such as it is it exactly confirms this expectation. Sextus, at the beginning of his Adversus Mathematicos, reports that the Epicureans regarded the matlzemata (a class of subjects to be learnt which included geometry) as “contributing nothing to the perfection of wisdom.”

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid (Friedlein, p. 199), divides the critics of geometry into two classes: those who object to its principles, and those who complain that its theorems do not follow from the principles as given. The former class is divided into those who criticize the principles of knowledge in general (the Sceptics), and those who criticize the principles of geometry alone (the Epicureans).

The Epicurean theory of minimal parts, if it has been correctly described in this essay, was a typical piece of Epicurean philosophy. We might say that Epicurus was confronted with a choice between infinite divisibility and minimal parts. He thought he saw that the former alternative would lead him into positions inconsistent with experience: for instance, it would be necessary for a man to be able to “reach infinity in thought,” and this was contrary to experience.

There was no counter-evidence against the existence of minimal parts in nature; the analogy of the senses suggested that there was a minimum; so he opted for this alternative, and doggedly worked out the details, in so far as he thought it necessary. But he made no attempt, apparently, to work out a fully systematic mathematical theory to support his physics. On his own premises, there was no reason why he should. His purpose was to teach peace of mind.”

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Quote from Robert

I can see some possible objections. An Epicurean might not use the phrase "becoming more fully human," and "God" here is presumably the Christian version (though perhaps perfect and incorruptible, as an Epicurean deity should be). Still, the idea seems to be that we humans can reach a divine state through a practice of mindful living, as opposed to traveling after death to some mysterious region outside of physics and nature.

i see your point Robert and think you're on the right track. Certainly the embrace of focusing on living now and denying christian distinctions between body and soul ring true to Epicurus.

And as you say the problem would be in the connotations of how "god" is used there, and "saving" life, and becoming "more fully human."

And last but not least, it's always a major red flag in my book when a formulation completely fails to use the word "pleasure." There are lots of people who have lots of good ideas on lots of things, but in my view probably the core trait of something being "Epicurean" is that it is willing to stand up and say straightforwardly that it is the "pleasure" of living that makes life worth living. It can sound like a word game sometime to insist on the word "pleasure," but anyone whose not willing to go all the way to the use of that term, in defiance of all the normal prejudice and peer pressure against it, isn't really in sync with Epicurus. Being willing and unafraid to stand up for "Pleasure," as in Emily Austin's book title "Living for Pleasure," is to me one of the best possible litmus tests to apply.

And sadly this is where a lot of the "atheist" literature out there fails so badly. The "Good without God" approach accepts the Platonic and other premise that there is a "good" other than "pleasure," and in the end that philosophical debate is the real battleground.

Don:

This question cries out for your discussion on the meaning of bread and water, but I am not sure where to point him. Do you happen to know the best place for your longest discussion of it?

Epicurean Philosophy | When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today... | Facebook

When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but…

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John Bramwell
When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but have never given it much thought. I know Epicurus had the occasional drop of wine but was his diet that frugal?

It seems to me that a point I would stress is that we are not "saving reality" by finding mathematical solutions to Zeno's paradoxes.

We're "saving mathematics" (or maybe more specifically, a form of propositional logic) by finding answers, but in the end, what we care about is living life happily, not saving mathematics or propositional logic.

People are harmed if they waste their lives in uncertainty and doubt, taken in by argument that motion is impossible and their senses cannot be trusted. Further, the good reputation of philosophy is harmed when people take these arguments seriously without immediately pointing out the ultimate validity of the senses.

The point to be emphasized is the one made by Seneca about mice and cheese and syllables. Word games can be fine if they are played for fun, or for sharpening our skills with words, but word games are not what life is about, and word games are not beneficial when they start interfering with life rather than enhancing it.

Norton says in the article that we can choose to take a "kinder" view of what Parmenides and Zeno were doing, but I see no reason to be so charitable from the information we have to go on. Much more likely is that they were not massively deluded OR in the grip of a mad fantasy, but testing out ways to gaslight people into doubting the validity of their senses, a path many others have followed.

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It is hard to believe that Parmenides and Zeno really believed that motion is impossible. The evidence of our senses is powerful, unrelenting and, I believe, irrefutable. Someone who genuinely believes that all change in illusion would seem to be massively deluded and in the grip of a mad fantasy.

We can cast a kinder light on Parmenides and Zeno's project if we understand them not to be challenging change, but to be challenging the accounts we give of it. Can we really reason reliably about motion using the concepts we have? We think we can. Zeno says otherwise. Look at them more closely and you will find them to be an internal mess.

The UC Davis article is very helpful. We don't need it for this episode, but at some point we will want to clarify what the writer is asserting in the part i underlined below.

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The totality is said to be unlimited. The argument is that a limitation of the totality would require that it have an end-point or extreme. An end-point can exist only as the beginning of something else. But there is nothing other than the totality (as had already been established), so the totality has no extreme and consequently is unlimited. This lack of limitation applies both to bodies and the void. If the void were limited and bodies were unlimited (in number), there would be no place for all the bodies. On the other hand, if the bodies were limited and the void unlimited, there would be so much space available for bodies that they would not meet with one another to form anything stable, but instead move in a scattered fashion throughout the universe. Note that once again, appeal must be made to sense-perception for the datum that that there are stable bodies which are not in motion (a claim that modern science has since overthrown). This view flies against that of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. In particular, Aristotle believe that the totality of bodies can be limited by something which is not itself body and which lies outside the cosmos, namely the prime mover (Physics, VIII, 10), which he identified with God (Metaphysics XII, 7).

This also to me appears to be a typo:

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Fate

We are told by Cicero that Epicurus introduced the swerve to solve a problem only directly related to that of the motion of bodies: "the necessity of fate" (On Fate, 22). Lucretius describes the reasoning involved

Presumably that should be INdirectly (?)

And the Pittsburgh site is great -- opens with a full characterization of the absurdity of it all!

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Yes, paradoxes can be intellectually demoralizing—almost a type of brain-clearing trick

I should be clear that for those who like them they are fine. I've been known to like math puzzles myself and I recall when I was very young there was something about "magic squares" (I forget) that I was into doing for a while. But the majority of people aren't into those kind of games, and it's a total turnoff to make them think that they should be, and it seems to me that that's what I've witnessed a lot in philosophy over the years (at least in college) - it seemed to me it was being used as a game for the amusement of insiders to confuse and put off the outsiders, rather than for the help to everyone that it should be.

One more comment on Zeno for tonight; Most of the youtube videos seem fixated on explaining the math, and "solving the math problem," as if "saving mathematics" is what is important about the exercise.

To me, that totally misses the point. The point is that Zeno was using math to make normal people doubt the validity of their senses, to try to persuade them to think that "everything is one" and that "void cannot exist" and the motion and change are impossible.

These would be very damaging to human happiness if accepted. And even more damaging to happiness is that they persuade people to think that philosophy is impractical and in fact nonsensical. The truth is, as in Seneca's quote, that people do need philosophy, and they need the kind of philosophy that Epicurus was offering, but people who are made jaded and cynical by being told that "Zeno's paradox" is profound philosophy are going to check out before they finish their first philosophy class. And it's my view that people need to realize that that kind of "turn off" reaction is exactly what was expected and hoped for by Zeno (and his variants after him). They want people to give up looking for a true philosophy that they can understand, and default to give THEM the sole claim to philosophy and wisdom and the right to define was is moral what is desirable in life.

That's why it's important to deal with Zeno's paradoxes and to give them the treatment they deserve. It's a shame they don't seem to be listed specifically in the list given by Diogenes Laertius. I wonder if we should not consider the Eleatics to be under the umbrella of the "Logicians" in this passage. "Destroyers" also makes sense to me as a good term - at least as a start! Or maybe they were related more to Antidorus and deserve the title "Maniac." The two adjectives together seem to me most appropriate.

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"Heraclitus he called ‘The Muddler,’ Democritus [he called] Lerocritus (‘judge of nonsense’), Antidorus he called Sannidorus (‘Maniac’), the Cynics [he called] ‘Enemies of Hellas,’ the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’ and Pyrrho [he called] ‘The uneducated fool.’"