Posts by Cassius

Don and Bryan that site Elli is linking to looks interesting. Quite possibly we've seen it before but my memory doesn't recall at the moment, just wanted to be sure you saw it -

From Elli Pensa:

First of all, I would like to express my warm congratulations to all Epicurean friends who will participate in this special livestream! Indeed, this will be a great opportunity to clear up many misunderstandings surrounding the name of our beloved philosopher Epicurus.

I would also like to suggest an idea to our friends: as an introduction and just before this special livestream begins, there could be a nice "sound effect", for example, with this paragraph from Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus, which has been reconstructed in the ancient Greek-Attic dialect by Mr. Ioannis Stratakis.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO2A01oI_ic

Also, as a conclusion and at the end of the livestream, we could ask our friend Bryan to read a small excerpt from Lucretius' DRN in Latin. In my opinion, it will be like hearing these two great figures, Epicurus and Lucretius, speaking to us live in their own languages!

The presentation by me will indeed be short!

Actually however the reason for the topic was intended to be related to "new year resolutions" -- setting goals for ourselves and similar "ambitions"

Here's a search result which gives some of Cicero's approach to translation that we need to keep in mind in reading his renderings of Epicurean material.

1. Literal versus Sense-for-Sense Translation

In De Optimo Genere Oratorum (14), Cicero famously contrasts verbum pro verbo (word-for-word) translation with his own approach:

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"Nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator; sententiis isdem et earum formis, tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis." Translation: "I did not translate as an interpreter but as an orator, preserving the ideas and their forms, as it were, but using language suited to our way of speaking."

Cicero insists that the translator must aim to render the spirit and essence of the text, ensuring that the translation resonates within the linguistic and cultural framework of the target audience. His purpose was not to reproduce the exact wording but to capture the rhetorical force of the original.

2. Adaptation of Greek Philosophical Terms

In Tusculanae Disputationes (Book 1), Cicero demonstrates the challenges of translating complex Greek philosophical terms into Latin. For example, he often struggles with terms like katastematicos (pleasure as a state of rest) and kinetikos (pleasure involving movement). Rather than force awkward direct translations, Cicero invents or adapts Latin terms, such as voluptas and tranquillitas, to approximate the Greek concepts while making them more accessible to Roman readers.

This principle reflects his belief that the translator should create terminology that aligns with the target language's intellectual and cultural framework.

3. Clarity and Accessibility

In De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Book 1.1), Cicero justifies his translations of Greek philosophical texts by emphasizing his desire to make these works accessible to Roman audiences:

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"Graecos libros Latine vertere non ut interpres, sed ut auctor, ut tamquam aliud ex alia re formarem." Translation: "To translate Greek books into Latin, not as an interpreter but as an author, as though creating something new from the original."

Cicero saw translation as an act of creation, wherein the translator becomes a co-author who molds the source material into a new literary and cultural artifact.

Sometimes people are tempted to deal with conflicting translations of text by throwing up their hands and concluding that no certainty is possible. While that is definitely the right conclusion in some cases (such as texts which are clearly fragmentary or corrupted) it's not at all always true. Many times there are many texts making a similar point in a the different language, and the general point from many statements becomes so clear that you can be very confident what is being said even when a particular text is somewhat corrupted. At some point also the existence of many translators - especially those who are trained academics who compete against each other for accuracy and fluency - begin to converge on a consensus in which you can have confidence. It's necessary for us to have a reasonable approach on what can be trusted to be true and what cannot. To a large extent this is what "canonics" is all about.

If it were true that we had to be proficient in speaking a language ourselves before we could comment on a text, then no one could ever comment on a language that they did not grow up learning themselves. We're all relying on translators. Even when we take the trouble to learn a language ourselves, we're relying on the compiler's of the dictionaries. The compilers of the dictionaries we use today relied on generations of translators who came before themselves. We're all relying on what is essentially "hearsay" evidence - and that really applies to children learning, as well, because they are learning to use words as others tell them the words should be used.

This topic is dealt with in Lucretius and probably other places as well because it is o important. We are always relying to some extent on people more knowledgeable than ourselves.

We therefore need a logical system for approaching language or anything else that we don't already know ourselves. Just like with atoms, which we never see or touch, we have to make logical deductions from what evidence is available to us.

Especially in the case of relying on translations, we have to decide who we trust and who we don't. With translations, it seems to me that the general method is to validate as best we can what we're told by comparing translations against each other and against things we can validate -- perhaps for example against inscriptions where a picture accompanies a word. We never take anything totally on faith, but that means we have to compare translations and observations to see which are consistent and which are not and how everything compares with facts that we can observe ourselves. Ultimately that is as much a test as anything else for what we choose to believe.

I suspect that there's a parallel here with how "code-breakers" unravel encryption - they look for clues in the text and compare the text to experience on frequency of words and the like.

If we can't have some degree of confidence in our conclusions about translations and everything else, then we devolve into radical skeptics.

So I started this thread to discuss whether we can suggest a general approach to deciding what to have confidence in and what not to trust. Obviously the more time we spend trying to learn a language from standard dictionaries, the better off we are likely to be, because we have more points of contact by which we can check a translator's choices against literal text. On the other hand, i gather that it is widely recognized that familiarity with idiomatic terminology means that literal translation can sometimes be laughably off from the real meaning that was intended. Sarcasm and irony and all sorts of literary constructions cause meanings to shift.

Given that we are so heavily reliant on translators and the work of commentators who have come before us, is there any way we can develop a general approach that makes sense and responds to feelings of hopelessness that no conclusions we reach can be reliable?

Happy birthday Julia! Thanks for your many contributions in 2024!

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This would be one instance where I might not give Cicero's proximity in time quite so much credit. I am with DeWitt that Cicero probably had superior "knowledge" of Epicurus, on issues like prolepsis and images, given the proximity in time and probably number of teachers. But something like the name of an addressee of a letter doesn't require philosophic attention, and could more likely be a "slip of the pen" that wouldn't be reviewed so closely. \

But reading the comments above I am very strongly in the middle on what the real answer is and i have no confidence which is the right answer.

Happy new year to all EpicureanFriends. We're closing 2024 with one of our most detailed episodes on one of the most important Epicurean doctrines: "Death Is Nothing To Us." Thanks to all who tuned in this year, and we're looking forward to another strong year here at EpicureanFriends.com.

Would it make sense that Hermarchus was present and would not need a letter, while Idomeneus may have lived somewhere else?

Great catch!

The conversation has moved on somewhat from this point, but I just started another thread on a particular excerpt from Lucretius as to the logical possibilities as to how anything can be "eternal." I think that excerpt is relevant to this "gods" discussion as well, because if they are to be deathless they must somehow relate to one of those categories.

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The Logical Possibilities As To What Can Be Eternal (Applicable to Gods As Well)

In podcast 262 I was going through the ways that Lucretius was proving that the soul cannot be eternal, and came across this section in which Lucretius sets out the logical ways in which something could be eternal. In addition to the soul aspect I think this is helpful in the way it describes (1) the universe as a whole is eternal - by deduction from the fact that there is nothing "outside" the universe, and (2) that the atoms and void are eternal because they are able to "beat back assaults"…

Cassius

December 30, 2024 at 10:26 AM

Quote from Kalosyni

For me, I would take this to mean that god cannot be experienced apart from thought. ---> God exists only as a mental construct.

Just for clarity to lurkers, I think most everyone agrees with the first sentence, at least as having something to do with "images."

But as to the second sentence, that's the idealist position, and others take the realist position that they exist regardless of whether we think about them.

In podcast 262 I was going through the ways that Lucretius was proving that the soul cannot be eternal, and came across this section in which Lucretius sets out the logical ways in which something could be eternal. In addition to the soul aspect I think this is helpful in the way it describes (1) the universe as a whole is eternal - by deduction from the fact that there is nothing "outside" the universe, and (2) that the atoms and void are eternal because they are able to "beat back assaults" and suffer nothing from have anything come into contact with them.

In regard to Epicurean gods I find particular interesting the possibility that this section applies: "because it is fortified and protected from things fatal to life, or because things harmful to its life come not at all, or because such as come in some way depart defeated before we can feel what harm they do us..." Of course that's not the case for us as humans, but I would presume that the speculation about the location and makeup of the gods was intended to let them do exactly that.

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[800] Nay, indeed, to link the mortal with the everlasting, and to think that they can feel together and act one upon the other, is but foolishness. For what can be pictured more at variance, more estranged within itself and inharmonious, than that what is mortal should be linked in union with the immortal and everlasting to brave raging storms?

[806] Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter whose nature we have declared before; or that they are able to continue throughout all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched, nor suffers a whit from assault; or else because there is no supply of room all around, into which, as it were, things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may scatter, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow.

[819] But if by chance the soul is rather to be held immortal for this reason, because it is fortified and protected from things fatal to life, or because things harmful to its life come not at all, or because such as come in some way depart defeated before we can feel what harm they do us \[clear facts show us that this is not so\]. For besides that it falls sick along with the diseases of the body, there comes to it that which often torments it about things that are to be, and makes it ill at ease with fear, and wears it out with care; and when its evil deeds are past and gone, yet sin brings remorse. There is too the peculiar frenzy of the mind and forgetfulness of the past, yes, and it is plunged into the dark waters of lethargy.

I was looking for something today on my NewEpicurean page, and I came across this reference to a person who I don't think we have discussed here. Therefore I am adding the reference in case someone is interested in looking further into this:

Here is a reference to a work with strong Epicurean overtones by Aonius Palearius, who was executed for heresy in July, 1570. I hesitate to trust the accuracy of the following summary, especially as to the comment on ease and tranquility, but in order to be sure we will need to access the full original work. Anyone know where this can be found (preferably with English translation)? Here’s the summary:

“The end of man, says Palearius, is to live pleasantly; hence man must know that pleasure arises from the cooperation of the body and the mind. The fleshly pleasures are essential to contemplation and right living, and philosophers who deny this are not philosophers. The very fact that all sensual pleasures are readily available suggests that they have a purpose. We have health that we may think more vigorously, beauty that we may be loved, strength that we may fight, and wealth that we may know God, who is quite well-to-do Himself. It is difficult to define pleasure because people do not agree. Craftsmen will find the highest pleasure in work well done; scholars get so much pleasure out of research that they work during vacations. …. In one respect, Palaerius differs from the master; he does not think ease and tranquility true pleasures; for him pleasure is active, felt in the nerves and the heart.”

Source: The Rehabilitation of Epicurus and His Theory of Pleasure in the Early Renaissance, by Don Cameron Allen, Studies in Philology, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1944), pp. 1-15

Good source for info on Palearius: A General Dictionary….

I just watched the miniseries adaptation (with which I was not particularly impressed) of "The Martian Chronicles" and so maybe my comment is colored by my reaction to that movie. I'm referring to the third installment of that show, where the Martians were portrayed as implicitly "ghosts," or at the very least time or dimension travelers without solid existence that the earth astronaut (Rock Hudson) could touch. If I recall correctly, the Martian seemed to be viewing Rock Hudson as similarly "ghostlike."

I know you're likely speaking figuratively in including the word "ghost," and that you take the ideas here very seriously. But when that term is used those opposed to Epicurus' views to disparage the theory (as if it is no more substantive than children making up ghosts for Halloween) I don't think it's giving Epicurus proper credit at all.

I think you're right that there's no necessary reason that such beings would have to live "between worlds." The only logical requirement is that they have as means of self-regenerating in whatever environment in which they might exist.

And I'll bet we'll eventually find what you are looking for in terms of additional text references, and my wager is that when we do we'll see them being treated like atoms or the swerve -- as things that we deduce "must" exist due to things that we do observe. But I would expect that the analysis will recognize that for the same reason that we think that atoms have a limit in size (the reason is at least in part that we have never observed one), the Epicureans thought that these gods live either (1) very far away in the "intermundia," or(2) in that "parallel dimension" you're talking about (again for the reason that ourfive senses give us no direct feedback of them).

I am adding this here as additional background both on Gyges and for Cicero's commentary on hypotheticals. Its from On Duties Book 3:

LacusCurtius • Cicero — De Officiis III.35‑95

37 Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere consideration of which is itself morally wrong. Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice, of lust or of intemperance.

9 38 By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes, a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his hand, he became invisible to everyone, while he himself saw everything; but as often as he turned p307 it back to its proper position, he became visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that he was free to do wrongly any more than if he did not have it; for good men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.

39 And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was actually true or even possible! But the force of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or sovereignty or sensual gratification — if your act should be hidden for ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy, they assert that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, p309 that would be a confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.

But let us now return to our theme.

Welcome to Episode 262 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our review of the key doctrines of Epicurus that are featured here at Epicureansfriends on the front page of our website.

This week we will address "He Who Says 'Nothing Can Be Known' Knows Nothing"

Discussion Outline (work in progress!) - "He Who Says 'Nothing Can Be Known' Knows Nothing"

FWIW here is a link to page 75 in the text where that appears:

Philodemus On Methods Of Inference De Lacey : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

On Methods of Inference or On Signs

archive.org

There's a lot more context but here is part of it:

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Thus we shall use successfully the inference from living beings, when we consider that nothing prevents god from being similar in body to man since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought. For god cannot be conceived apart from thought; and even though god was not born, yet he is composed of soul and body and with this nature he is necessarily a living creature.