Posts by Cassius

Bailey: 37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

**TΟ ΜEΝ EΠΙΜAΡTΥΡΟΥΜEΝΟΝ ****ΟTΙ ΣΥΜΦEΡEΙ ****EΝ TAΙΣ**

**ΧΡEΙAΙΣ ****TΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΣ ****EXEI TON TOY**

**ΔΙΚAΙΟΥ XARAKTHPA ****EAΝ TE TΟ AΥTΟ ΠAΣΙ ΓEΝΗTAΙ ****EAΝ**

**TE ΜΗ TΟ AΥTΟ· EAΝ ΔE ΝΟΜΟΝ ****ΘΗTAΙ TΙΣ ΜΗ AΠΟΒAΙΝῌ**

**ΔE ΚATA TΟ ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ****TΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΣ**

**ΟΥΚETΙ ****TΟΥTΟ TΗΝ TΟΥ ΔΙΚAΙΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΝ ****EΧEΙ· ΚAΝ**

**ΜETAΠΙΠTῌ ****TΟ ΚATA TΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ****ΔE**

**TΙΝA EΙΣ TΗΝ ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ EΝAΡΜΟTTῌ ΟΥΔEΝ ****ΗTTΟΝ**

**EΚEΙΝΟΝ ****TΟΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ****ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****TΟΙΣ ΜΗ ΦΩΝAΙΣ**

**ΚEΝAΙΣ ****EAΥTΟΥΣ ΣΥΝTAΡATTΟΥΣΙΝ ****AΛΛ' EΙΣ TA**

**ΠΡAΓΜATA ΒΛEΠΟΥΣΙΝ. **

“From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not. But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for social relations, then it is not just; and if that which was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having been for some time considered so, it is not less true that during that time it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex themselves about vain words, but who prefer in every case, examining and judging for themselves.” Yonge (1853)

“Whatever in conventional law is attested to be expedient in the needs arising out of mutual intercourse is by its nature just, whether the same for all or not, and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediency of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the notion of justice, nevertheless, for the time being, it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty terms but look broadly at facts.” Hicks (1910)

“Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.” Hicks (1925)

“Among some actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved on examination to be of advantage in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is none the less just for that period in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds but look to the actual facts.” Bailey (1926)

“Among the things commonly held just, that which has proved itself useful in men's mutual relationship has the stamp of justice whether or not it be the same for all; if anyone makes a law and it does not prove useful in men's relationships with each other, it is no longer just in its essence. If, however, the law's usefulness in the matter of justice should change and it should meet men's expectations only for a short time, nonetheless during that short time it was just in the eyes of those who look simply at facts and do not confuse themselves with empty words.” Geer (1964)

“What is legally deemed to be just has its existence in the domain of justice whenever it is attested to be useful in the requirements of social relationships, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in the sphere of justice changes but fits the preconception for some time, it was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves with empty utterances but simply look at the facts.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Among the measures regarded as just, that which is proven to be beneficial in the business of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice whether it is the same for all or not. If someone makes a law which does not result in advantage for men's dealings with each other, it no longer has the nature of justice. Even if advantage in the matter of justice is variable but nonetheless conforms for a certain length of time to the common notion people have of it, no less for that period is it just in the opinion of those who do not confuse themselves with words but look straight at the facts.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of actions believed to be just, that whose usefulness in circumstances of mutual associations is supported by the testimony [of experience] has the attribute of serving as just whether it is the same for everyone or not. And if someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. And if what is useful in the sense of being just changes, but for a while fts our basic grasp [of justice], nevertheless it was just for that length of time, [at least] for those who do not disturb themselves with empty words but simply look to the facts.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Among actions legally recognized as just, that which is confirmed by experience as mutually beneficial has the virtue of justice, whether it is the same for all peoples or not. But if a law is made which results in no such advantage, then it no longer carries the hallmark of justice. And if something that used to be mutually beneficial changes, though for some time it conformed to our concept of justice, it is still true that it really was just during that time – at least for those who do not fret about technicalities and instead prefer to examine and judge each case for themselves.” Anderson (2004)

“Among those things that are conventionally accepted as just, whatever is universally acknowledged to be conducive to the purpose of maintaining civic society is necessarily adjudged to be a patently just thing, whether it is the same for all people or not. But if one stipulates something as the law even though it is at cross purposes with the interest of maintaining civic society—such an ordinance does not partake of natural justice in any way. In addition, if and to the extent that the interests which are in accordance with natural justice prove variable, so that concepts of justice can remain harmonious with natural interests only for a certain period of time: we must say that such concepts of justice [though short lived] are no less just within their corresponding frames of time.” Makridis (2005)

“Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In the case of actions that are legally regarded as just, those that are of tested utility in meeting the needs of human society have the hallmark of justice, whether they turn out to be equally just in all cases or not. On the other hand, if somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice. And even if the element of utility should undergo a change after harmonizing for a time with the conception of justice, the law was still just during that period, in the judgment of those who are not confused by meaningless words but who look at the actualities.” Strodach (2012)

“That which has been considered just by convention because it benefits our mutual intercourse is therefore stamped as just, whether or not it is so in all instances; and if a law is made and does not prove beneficial to our intercourse, then it is no longer just.

And if what the law considers expedient changes, and only corresponds for a time to the preconception, it was nonetheless just for that time, if we do not trouble ourselves about empty forms but simply examine the facts.” Mensch (2018)

“If established norms of justice are attested to promote the mutual interactions of a community, then it has the status of justice, whether it is the same for everyone or not the same. But if someone establishes a law and the result does not promote the community’s relations, then it no longer has the nature of justice. And if what does promote justice changes, then as long as it did align with the preconception [sc. of justice] for a time, it was no less just during that period of time, provided people do not get confused by distracting themselves with empty expressions and instead look at the actual facts.” White (2021)

Bailey: 36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

**ΚATA ΜEΝ [TΟ] ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΠAΣΙ ****TΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****TΟ AΥTΟ**

**ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ****ΓAΡ TΙ ΗΝ EΝ Tῌ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙᾼ·**

**ΚATA ΔE TΟ ΙΔΙΟΝ ΧΩΡAΣ ****ΚAΙ ΟΣΩΝ ΔΗ ΠΟTE AΙTΙΩΝ ****ΟΥ**

**ΠAΣΙ ΣΥΝEΠETAΙ ****TΟ AΥTΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and diverse other circumstances, make justice vary.” Yonge (1853)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, but in its application to particular cases of territory or the like, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1910)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found expedient in mutual intercourse; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1925)

“In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the same things does not turn out to be just for all.” Bailey (1926)

“So far as the universal concept is concerned, Justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of advantage in the life they share with one another, but in respect of the particulars of place and all affecting circumstances whatsoever it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 296 (1954)

“In general, justice is the same for all, a thing found useful by men in their relations with each other; but it does not follow that it is the same for all in each individual place and circumstance.” Geer (1964)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships. But in the light of what is peculiar to a region and to the whole range of determinants, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Broadly considered, justice is the same for all, because it is a kind of mutual benefit in men's interactions with one another. But in individual countries and circumstances, justice turns out not to be the same for all.” O'Connor (1993)

“In general outline justice is the same for everyone; for it was something useful in mutual associations. But with respect to the peculiarities of a region or of other [relevant] causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Justice is essentially the same for all peoples insofar as it benefits human interaction. But the details of how justice is applied in particular countries or circumstances may vary.” Anderson (2004)

“Generally speaking, justice is one and the same for all: i.e., justice is something or other that is to one's interest in mutual intercourse. But, speaking on a case-by-case basis, justice is not the same for all as it depends on [specific] regions and factors.” Makridis (2005)

“In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specifc application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Strodach (2012)

“In general, justice is the same for everyone, namely something that facilitates mutual intercourse; but in light of the peculiarities of a region and all sorts of other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Mensch (2018)

“In general, what is just is the same for all: it was something that promotes relations within a community. But by differences in territory and any number of other causes, the same thing does not turn out just for all.” White (2021)

Bailey: 35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

**ΟΥΚ EΣTΙ TΟΝ ΛAΘΡᾼ ****TΙ KINOYNTA ΩΝ ΣΥΝEΘEΝTΟ ****ΠΡΟΣ**

**AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ****EΙΣ TΟ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ ΜΗΔE ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ**

**ΠIΣTEΥEΙΝ ****ΟTΙ ΛΗΣEΙ ****ΚAΝ ΜΥΡΙAΚΙΣ ****EΠΙ TΟΥ ΠAΡΟΝTΟΣ**

**ΛAΘAΝῌ·**** ΜEΧΡΙ ΓAΡ ΚATAΣTΡΟΦΗΣ AΔΗΛΟΝ ****EΙ ΚAΙ**

**ΛΗΣEΙ. **

“It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in contravention of the agreement which men have made with one another, to guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he shall always escape notice, even if he has escaped notice already ten thousand times; for till his death, it is uncertain whether he will not be detected.” Yonge (1853)

“It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure he will not be detected.” Hicks (1910)

“It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected.” Hicks (1925)

“It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed, to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible for the man who does one of those things which they have covenanted with one another not to do, in order to avoid injuring and being injured, to be confident he will escape, even though for the moment he shall escape numberless times, for till the end it will be uncertain if he will really escape." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 297 (1954)

“If a man has secretly violated any of the terms of the mutual compact not to injure or be injured, he cannot feel confident that he will be undetected in the future even if he has escaped ten thousand times in the past; for until his death it will remain uncertain whether he will escape.” Geer (1964)

“No one who secretly infringes any of the terms of a mutual contract made with a view to not harming and not being harmed can be confident that he will escape detection even if he does so countless times. For right up to his death it is unclear whether he will actually escape.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“It is impossible for the one who commits some act in secret violation of the compacts made among men not to do harm or to be harmed, to remain confident that he will escape notice, even if for the present he escapes detection a thousand times. For right up to the day of his death, it remains unclear whether he will escape detection.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible for someone who secretly does something which men agreed [not to do] in order to avoid harming one another or being harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if in current circumstances he escapes detection ten thousand times. For until his death it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape detection.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“It is not possible for one who secretly violates the provisos of the agreement not to inflict nor allow harm to be confident that he won't get caught, even if he has gotten away with it a thousand times before. For up until the time of death, there is no certainty that he will indeed escape detection.” Anderson (2004)

“And it is not possible for someone to be confident that he will not be detected if one has acted surreptitiously in violating any one of the provisions of the social contract, which consists in [an agreement] to refrain from harming for the sake of avoiding harm for oneself; not even if one has escaped detection a myriad times until the present: for even to the moment of one's fnal demise, there can be no sure sign or assurance that one will continue to escape detection.” Makridis (2005)

“It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape.” Strodach (2012)

“It is not possible for the man who secretly violates the compact to prevent the inflicting or suffering of harm to feel sure that he will escape notice, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times. For right to the end it is not clear whether he will escape.” Mensch (2018)

“When someone secretly violates a mutual agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is not possible for him to be sure he won't be found out, even if he is not found out a thousand times so far; for up until his demise it is unsure whether he will eventually be found out.” White (2021)

Bailey: 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

**Η AΔΙΚΙA ****ΟΥ ΚAΘ' EAΥTΗΝ ΚAΚΟΝ ****AΛΛ' EΝ Tῼ ΚATA TΗΝ**

**ΥΠΟΨΙAΝ ΦΟΒῼ ****EΙ ΜΗ ΛΗΣEΙ ****TΟΥΣ ΥΠEΡ TΩΝ TΟΙΟΥTΩΝ**

**EΦEΣTΗΚΟTAΣ ΚΟΛAΣTAΣ. **

“Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions of this character.” Yonge (1853)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz., the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice.” Hicks (1910)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offences will discover the injustice.” Hicks (1925)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.” Bailey (1926)

“Wrong-doing is not an evil in and by itself; the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, amounting to fear, that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 153 (1954)

“Injustice is not an evil in and by itself but the evil lies in the fear arising out of the uncertainty that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 296 (1954)

“Violating the law is not an evil in itself but the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, of the nature of fear, that he may not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus, 122 (1954)

“Injustice is not evil in itself, but only in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape those who have been set up to punish the offense.” Geer (1964)

“Injustice is something bad not per se in the fear that arises from the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those who have the authority to punish such things.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, but in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape from those appointed to punish such actions.” O'Connor (1993)

“Injustice is not a bad thing in its own right, but [only] because of the fear produced by the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish such actions.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the accompanying fear of being unable to escape those assigned to punish unjust acts.” Anderson (2004)

“Injustice is not a moral evil in itself: what is bad about injustice consists in the wearying apprehension that one might fail to escape detection by those who mete out punishments.” Makridis (2005)

“Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself. Its evil lies in the anxious fear that you will not elude those who have authority to punish such misdeeds.” Strodach (2012)

“Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the terror aroused by the suspicion that it will be detected by its punishers.” Mensch (2018)

“Injustice is a bad thing not in its own right but rather on account of the fear in worrying about being found out by those assigned to punish such things.” White (2021)

Bailey: 31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

**TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****EΣTΙ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ ****TΟΥ**

**ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝTΟΣ ****EΙΣ TΟ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΜΗΔE**

**ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ. **

“Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable for leading men to avoid injuring on another, and being injured.” Yonge (1853)

“Natural justice is a contract of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1910)

“Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1925)

“The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” Bailey (1926)

“The justice of Nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another nor be injured.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 147 (1954)

“Natural justice is a compact resulting from expediency by which men seek to prevent one man from injuring others and to protect him from being injured by them.” Geer (1964)

“Nature's justice is a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Natural justice is a pledge guaranteeing mutual advantage, to prevent one from harming others and to keep oneself from being harmed.” O'Connor (1993)

“The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor be harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Natural justice is the advantage conferred by mutual agreements not to inflict nor allow harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Natural justice is an expression of the [natural] interest [everyone has] and consists in both: a) not causing harm to others, and b) not suffering harm for oneself.” Makridis (2005)

“Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The justice that seeks nature's goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed.” Strodach (2012)

“Natural justice is a pledge of the advantage associated with preventing men from harming or being harmed by one another.” Mensch (2018)

“Nature's justice is a token [or pledge] of something that promotes not harming one another or being harmed.” White (2021)

Bailey: 30. Wherever, in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination; and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.

**EΝ AΙΣ TΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ EΠΙΘΜΙΩΝ ****ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ ****ΔE**

**EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΩΝ ****EAΝ ΜΗ ΣΥΝTEΛEΣΘΩΣΙΝ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****Η**

**ΣΠΟΥΔΗ ΣΥΝTΟΝΟΣ ****ΠAΡA ΚEΝΗΝ ΔΟΞAΝ ****AΥTAΙ**

**ΓΙΝΟΝTAΙ ****ΚAΙ ΟΥ ΠAΡA TΗΝ EAΥTΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΝ ****ΟΥ**

**ΔΙAΧEΟΝTAΙ ****AΛΛA ΠAΡA TΗΝ TΟΥ AΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ**

**ΚEΝΟΔΟΞΙAΝ. **

“When those natural desires, which do not lead to pain if they are not satisfied, are violent and insistent, it is a proof that there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not arise from their own nature, but from the vain opinions of men.” Yonge (1853)

“Some natural desires, again, entail no pain when not gratified, though the objects are vehemently pursued. These desires also are due to groundless opinion, and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's groundless opinion.” Hicks (1910)

“Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“Wherever in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination, and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.” Bailey (1926)

“Among the bodily desires, those rest on empty opinion that are eagerly pursued although if unsatisfied they bring no pain. That they are not got rid of is because of man's empty opinion, not because of their own nature.” Geer (1964)

“Whenever intense passion is present in natural desires which do not lead to pain if they are unfulfilled, these have their origin in empty opinion; and the reason for their persistence is not their own nature but the empty opinion of the person.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If there is intense striving after those physical desires that do not lead to pain if unfulfilled, this is because they arise from idle opinion; they fail to be dispelled, not because of their own nature but because of the vain fancies of humankind.” O'Connor (1993)

“Among natural desires, those which do not lead to a feeling of pain if not fulfilled and about which there is an intense effort, these are produced by a groundless opinion and they fail to be dissolved not because of their own nature but because of the groundless opinions of mankind.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Those natural desires which create no pain when unfulfilled, though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to baseless opinion; and if they are not dispelled, it is not because of their own nature, but because of human vanity.” Anderson (2004)

“Certain natural desires, which do not reduce one to pain if they are not satisfied, have, nevertheless, a commensurate inherent need for satisfaction. Such desires are born, indeed, of empty belief: the reason they are not defused is not to be traced to their intrinsic nature but to the person's vacuity.” Makridis (2005)

“Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.” Saint-Andre

“If interest is intense in the case of those natural desires that do not lead to physical pain when they are not satisfied, then such desires are generated by idle fancy, and it is not because of their own nature that they are not dissipated but because of the person's own senseless whims.” Strodach (2012)

“Natural desires that afford no pain if they are not indulged, though they are eagerly pursued, arise from groundless opinion; and when they are not dispelled it is not because of their own nature but because of the man's groundless opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“Among natural desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled, those that possess sustained intensity arise from empty belief, and their persistence is due not to their own nature but rather to the person's empty belief.” White (2021)

Bailey: 29. Among desires, some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****AΙ ΜEΝ EΙΣΙ ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ ****[ΚAΙ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ·**** AΙ**

**ΔE ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ] **** KAI ΟΥΚ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΙ ΔE ΟΥTE ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ**

**ΟΥTE AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛA ΠAΡA ΚEΝΗΝ ΔΟΞAΝ ΓΙΝΟΜEΝAΙ. **

“Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but owe their existence to vain opinions.” Yonge (1853)

“Of our desires, some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless opinion.” Hicks (1910)

“Of our desires some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“Among desires some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination. ” Bailey (1926)

“Of the desires some are natural and necessary; some are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary.” DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 18 (1954)

“Of the desires, some are natural (and necessary; some are natural) but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary but arise from empty opinion.” Geer (1964)

“Of the desires some are natural and necessary while others are natural but unnecessary. And there are desires that are neither natural nor necessary but arise from idle opinion.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as a result of a groundless opinion.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Among desires some are natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to baseless opinion.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, some are natural and (necessary; some are natural and) not necessary; some are neither natural nor necessary and are only created by empty belief.” Makridis (2005)

“Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Some desires are ( 1 ) natural and necessary, others (2) natural but not necessary, still others (3 ) neither natural nor necessary but generated by senseless whims.” Strodach (2012)

“Some of our desires are natural and necessary; others are natural but unnecessary; still others are neither natural nor necessary, but arise from unwarranted opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“Some desires are natural and [necessary, some natural and] unnecessary, and some neither natural or necessary, arising instead from empty belief.” White (2021)

Essential Epicurus (Eugene O'Connor): 28. The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship.

**Η AΥTΗ ΓΝΩΜΗ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ****TE EΠΟΙΗΣEΝ ****ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗΘEΝ**

**AΙΩΝΙΟΝ ****EΙΝAΙ ΔEΙΝΟΝ Μ**

**ΗΔE ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΗΝ EΝ**

**AΥTΟΙΣ TΟΙΣ ΩΡΙΣΜEΝΟΙΣ AΣΦAΛEΙAΝ ΦΙΛΙAΣ ΜAΛΙΣTA**

**ΚATEΙΔE ΣΥΝTEΛΟΥΜEΝΗΝ. **

“The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees that, in the space of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and trustworthy.” Yonge (1853)

“The same conviction, which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Hicks (1910)

“The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Hicks (1925)

“The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.” Bailey (1926)

“The same argument that assures us of nothing terrible lasting forever or even very long discerns the protection furnished by friendship in this brief life of ours as being the most dependable of all." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 293-294 (1954)

“The same conviction that makes us feel confident of nothing terrible being either eternal or even of long duration discerns the assurance of safety within the narrow limits of this life itself as being most perfectly effected by friendship." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 188 (1954)

“The same wisdom that permits us to be confident that no evil is eternal or even of long duration also recognizes that in our limited state the security that can be most perfectly gained is that of friendship.” Geer (1964)

“Confidence that nothing terrible lasts for ever or even for a long time is produced by the same judgment that also achieves the insight that friendship's security within those very limitations is perfectly complete.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting, also recognizes in the face of these limited evils the security afforded by friendship.” O'Connor (1993)

“The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal or [even] long-lasting and has also realized that security amid even these limited [bad things] is most easily achieved through friendship.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing terrible lasts forever, or even for long, also enables us to see that in the midst of life's limited evils, nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Anderson (2004)

“The same (judgment) which enables us to wax confident in contemplating that no dreadful thing is eternal, or even of long duration, also knows well that, in these our constrained circumstances, security depends on having friends more than on anything else.” Makridis (2005)

“The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is the same judgment that has made us feel confident that nothing fearful is of long duration or everlasting, and that has seen personal security during our limited span of life most nearly perfected by friendship.” Strodach (2012)

“The same attitude that inspires confidence that nothing we dread is eternal or even long-lasting also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing affords us greater security than friendship.” Mensch (2018)

“The same insight that made us confident that nothing terrible is either everlasting or long-lasting also noticed security within these boundaries resulting especially in friendship.” White (2021)

Bailey: 27. Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

**ΩΝ Η ΣΟΦΙA ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΖETAΙ ****EΙΣ TΗΝ TΟΥ ΟΛΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ**

**ΜAΚAΡΙΟTΗTA ****ΠΟΛΥ ΜEΓΙΣTΟΝ ****EΣTΙΝ Η TΗΣ ΦΙΛΙAΣ**

**ΚTΗΣΙΣ. **

“Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.” Yonge (1853)

“Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to insure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.” Hicks (1910)

“Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.” Hicks (1925)

“Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Bailey (1926)

“Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life by far the most precious is the acquisition of friendship.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 190 (1954)

“Of all the preparations which wisdom makes for the blessedness of the complete life by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 308 (1954)

“Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus, 188 (1954)

“Of the things that wisdom prepares for insuring lifelong happiness, by far the greatest is the possession of friends.” Geer (1964)

“Of the things wisdom acquires for the blessedness of life as a whole, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Of all the things which wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Of all things that wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship.” Anderson (2004)

“Of all those things by means of which wisdom can procure blessed bliss to last for an entire life, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friends.” Makridis (2005)

“Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole man, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.” Strodach (2012)

“Of the things wisdom contributes to happiness over the course of one's life, the greatest by far is friendship.” Mensch (2018)

“Of all that wisdom provides for a whole life of bliss, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” White (2021)

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)

“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)

“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)

“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)

“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)

“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)

“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)

“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)

Bailey: 25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

**EΙ ΜΗ ΠAΡA ΠAΝTA ΚAΙΡΟΝ EΠAΝΟΙΣEΙΣ EΚAΣTΟΝ ****TΩΝ*

**ΠΡATTΟΜEΝΩΝ ****EΠΙ TΟ TEΛΟΣ ****TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ****AΛΛA**

**ΠΡΟΚATAΣTΡEΨEΙΣ ****EΙTE ΦΥΓΗΝ ****EΙ TE ΔΙΩΞΙΝ**

**ΠΟΙΟΥΜEΝΟΣ ****EΙΣ AΛΛΟ TΙ ΟΥΚ EΣΟΝTAΙ ΣΟΙ TΟΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ**

**AΙ ΠΡAΞEΙΣ AΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙ. **

“If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions.” Yonge (1853)

“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the chief end of nature, but if instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance you swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1910)

“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1925)

“If on each occasion instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other nearer standard when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.” Bailey (1926)

“If you do not at all times refer each of your actions to the natural end, but fall short of this and turn aside to something else in choosing and avoiding, your deeds will not agree with your words.” Geer (1964)

“If you fail to refer each of your actions on every occasion to nature's end, and stop short at something else in choosing or avoiding, your actions will not be consequential upon your theories.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 116 (1987)

“If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the end ordained by nature, but instead stop short at something else when considering whether to go after something or avoid it, your actions will not be in keeping with the principles you profess.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you do not reconcile your behavior with the goal of nature, but instead use some other criterion in matters of choice and avoidance, then there will be a confict between theory and practice.” Anderson (2004)

“If you don't judge every one of your actions by reference to the end and goal dictated by nature, in accordance also with the proper natural timing for each action, but, instead, second guessing [nature,] you veer off ahead of time attempting either to pursue or to fee [goals,] then your acts will not be turning out to be consistent with your rationalizations.” Makridis (2005)

“If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature's standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed.” Strodach (2012)

“If on every occasion you do not refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead divert your attention in the act of choice or avoidance toward something else, your actions will not accord with your theories.” Mensch (2018)

“If you're not on every occasion referring each thing you do back to our nature's end, and if you're instead of proceeding directly to something else when you make a decision to avoid or pursue something, then your actions will not be consistent with your reasons.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

Ι TΙΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ ****AΠΛΩΣ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ ΜΗ ΔΙAΙΡΗΣEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΟΞAΖΟΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠAΡΟΝ ΗΔΗ**

**ΚATA TΗΝ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ TA ΠAΘΗ ****ΚAΙ ΠAΣAΝ**

**ΦAΝTAΣTΙΚΗΝ EΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ****TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ ΣΥΝTAΡAΞEΙΣ**

**ΚAΙ TAΣ ΛΟΙΠAΣ AΙΣΘΗΣEΙΣ Tῌ ΜATAΙῼ ΔΟΞῌ ****ΩΣTE TΟ**

**ΚΡΙTΗΡΙΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ·**** EΙ ΔE ΒEΒAΙΩΣEΙΣ ****ΚAΙ TΟ**

**ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΝ TAΙΣ ΔΟΞAΣTΙΚAΙΣ EΝΝΟΙAΙΣ ****ΚAΙ**

**TΟ ΜΗ TΗΝ EΠΙΜAΡTΥΡΗΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΚΛEΙΨEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΙEΨEΥΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΩΣT' ANῌPHKΩΣ EΣῌ ΠAΣAΝ**

**AΜΦΙΣΒΗTΗΣΙΝ ****KAI ΠAΣAΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΝ ****TΟΥ ΟΡΘΩΣ ****Η ΜΗ**

**ΟΡΘΩΣ. **

“If you simply discard a sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to know on the one hand, the opinion which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and immediate notion, the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which arise from the observable representation; you will be imputing trouble into the other senses, and destroying in that quarter every species of criterion. But if you allow equal authority to the ideas, which being only an opinion, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character.” Yonge (1853)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate between that which is matter of opinion and awaits further confirmation and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feeling or in any mental apprehension, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief, so as to reject the truth altogether. If you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation in ideas based on opinion, as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be taking sides in every question involving truth and error.” Hicks (1910)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgments. And if among the mental images created by your opinions you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.” Bailey (1926)

“If you reject any sensations, and if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation and evidence given by the senses, by the feelings, and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts, you will confuse the other sensations with unfounded conjecture and thus destroy the whole basis for judgment. If among all opinions you accept as equally valid both those that await confirmation and those that have been confirmed, you will not free yourself from error, since you will have preserved all the uncertainty about every judgment of what is true and what is not true.” Geer (1964)

“(1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to [earn] attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 87 (1987)

“If you reject any sensation that you do not distinguish between the opinion based on what awaits confirmation and evidence already available based on the senses, the feelings, and every intuitive faculty of the mind, you will send the remaining sensations into a turmoil with your foolish opinions, thus driving out every standard for judging. And if, among the perceptions based on opinion, you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will fail to escape from error, since you will have retained every ground for dispute in judgment concerning right and wrong.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you reject unqualifiedly any sense-perception and do not distinguish the opinion about what awaits confirmation, and what is already present in the sense-perception, and the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations, you will also disturb the rest of your sense-perceptions with your pointless opinion; as a result you will reject every criterion. If, on the other hand, in your conceptions formed by opinion, you affirm everything that awaits confirmation as well as what does not, you will not avoid falsehood, so that you will be in the position of maintaining every disputable point in every decision about what is and is not correct.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you arbitrarily reject any one sensory experience and fail to differentiate between an opinion awaiting confirmation and what is already perceived by the senses, feelings, and every intuitive faculty of mind, you will impute trouble to all other sensory experiences, thereby rejecting every criterion. And if you concurrently affirm what awaits confirmation as well as actual sensory experience, you will still blunder, because you will foster equal reasons to doubt the truth and falsehood of everything.” Anderson (2004)

“If you expel each and every sensation without qualification, and fail to draw [fitting] distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as between what is present already and what is anticipated; or if you fail to draw distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as to whether such opinions are according to sense perception, the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind: you will, then, confound also the rest of your sensations [in addition to the ones you are trying to expel directly] because of this ineffective way of judging, so that you will also have expelled all criteria for judging what is true and what is false.” Makridis (2005)

“If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If you summarily rule out any single sensation and do not make a distinction between the element of belief that is superimposed on a percept that awaits verification and what is actually present in sensation or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself, you will cast doubt on all other sensations by your unfounded interpretation and consequently abandon all the criteria of truth. On the other hand, in cases of interpreted data, if you accept as true those that need verification as well as those that do not, you will still be in error, since the whole question at issue in every judgment of what is true or not true will be left intact.” Strodach (2012)

“If you reject any sensation absolutely, and do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, [. . .] you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgment between right and wrong opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“If you're going to reject any particular sense-perception outright and not distinguish beliefs about anything deferred from what is already present in sense-perception or feelings or any presentational application of thought, then you're going to throw the rest of your sense-perceptions into turmoil too by this pointless belief, an you'll end up rejecting every standard. On the other hand, if you're going to affirm not only whatever is deferred in your concepts and beliefs but also what [has] no attestation, then you will not evade falsehood, and you will find yourself upholding every challenge on every decision about what is correct or incorrect.” White (2021)

Bailey: 23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

**EΙ ΜAΧῌ ΠAΣAΙΣ ****TAΙΣ AΙΣΘΗΣEΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΧ EΞEΙΣ ****ΟΥΔ AΣ AΝ**

**ΦῌΣ ****AΥTΩΝ ΔΙEΨEΥΣΘAΙ ****ΠΡΟΣ TΙ ΠΟΙΟΥΜEΝΟΣ ****TΗΝ**

**AΓΩΓΗΝ ΚΡΙΝῌΣ. **

“If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.” Yonge (1853)

“If you fight against all your sensations you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those sensations which you pronounce false.” Hicks (1910)

“If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false.” Hicks (1925)

“If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.” Bailey (1926)

“If you are going to make war on all the sensations, you will not even have a standard by reference to which you shall judge those of them which you say are deceptive.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 140-141 (1954)

“If you struggle against all your sensations, you will have no standard of comparison by which to measure even the sensations you judge false.” Geer (1964)

“If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 80 (1987)

“If you do battle with all your sensations, you will be unable to form a standard for judging even which of them you judge to be false.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you quarrel with all your sense-perceptions you will have nothing to refer to in judging even those sense-perceptions which you claim are false.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you argue against all your sensations, you will then have no criterion to declare any of them false.” Anderson (2004)

“If you wage battle against all the sensations, [not only will you lose those you are directly fighting against but, also] you won't even have those sensations left, by reference to which alone you could claim to have won your case.” Makridis (2005)

“If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If you reject all sensations, you will not have any point of reference by which to judge even the ones you claim are false.” Strodach (2012)

“If you fight against all your sensations, you will not have a standard by which to judge the ones that you claim are false.” Mensch (2018)

“If you battle against all sense-perceptions, you will not have any basis for assessing even those you claim are false.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

**Ο TA ΠEΡATA ****TΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚATEΙΔΩΣ ΟΙΔEΝ ****ΩΣ EΥΠΟΡΙΣTΟΝ**

**EΣTΙ TΟ [TΟ] AΛΓΟΥΝ ****ΚAT' EΝΔEΙAΝ EΞAΙΡΟΥΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ**

**TΟΝ ΟΛΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΠAΝTEΛΗ ΚAΘΙΣTAΝ·**** ΩΣTE ΟΥΔEΝ**

**ΠΡΟΣΔEΙTAΙ ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ AΓΩNAΣ ΚEΚTΗΜEΝΩΝ ****. **

“He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain which arises from want and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble.” Yonge (1853)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by confict and struggle.” Hicks (1910)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labour and confict.” Hicks (1925)

“He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.” Bailey (1926)

“The man who has discerned the limited needs of life is aware how easy of procurement is that which removes the pain arising from want and renders the whole life perfect, so that he feels no need of adding things that involve competition.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 186 (1954)

“The man who discerns the narrow limits of life's needs will understand how easy it is to procure what removes the discomfort arising from want, so that he feels no necessity of engaging in activities that involve competition." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 72 (1954)

“The man who understands the limits of living knows that it is easy to obtain that which removes the pain caused by want and that which perfects the whole life. Therefore, he has no need of things that involve struggle.” Geer (1964)

“He who knows the limits of life knows how easy it is to obtain that which removes pain caused by want and that which makes the whole of life complete. He therefore has no need for competitive involvements.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to remove the pain that results from want and to make one's whole life complete. As a result, he does not need actions that bring strife in their wake.” O'Connor (1993)

“He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one's whole life perfect. So there's no need for things which involve struggle.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“He who understands the limits of life knows that things which remove pain arising from need are easy to obtain, and furnish a complete and optimal life. Thus he no longer needs things that are troublesome to attain.” Anderson (2004)

“He who knows well the limits of living also knows that to remove pain caused by need is easy—resources for that are not lacking—so that one's entire life can be rendered complete and replete with all possible purposes. It follows that there is no need whatever of things unless they are won by noble struggle.” Makridis (2005)

“One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one's entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“One who understands the limits o f the good life knows that what eliminates the pains brought on by need and what makes the whole of life perfect is easily obtained, so that there is no need for enterprises that entail the struggle for success.” Strodach (2012)

“The man who has discerned the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure what is needed to remove the pain of want and make his whole life perfect; he therefore needs none of the things that cannot be acquired without a struggle.” Mensch (2018)

“The one who understands the limits of life knows that what removes pains caused by need and also what makes the whole life entirely complete are easily obtained; so he has no further need for any endeavors involving struggles.” White (2021)

Bailey: 20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

**Η ΜEΝ ΣAΡΞ AΠEΛAΒE ****TA ΠEΡATA ****TΗΣ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ AΠEΙΡA**

**ΚAΙ AΠEΙΡΟΣ ****AΥTΗΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ APEΣKOI ****AN· Η ΔE ΔΙAΝΟΙA**

**TΟΥ TΗΣ ΣAΡΚΟΣ TEΛΟΥΣ ****ΚAΙ ΠEΡATΟΣ ΛAΒΟΥΣA ****TΟΝ**

**EΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟΥΣ ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ AΙΩΝΟΣ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ**

**EΚΛΥΣAΣA ****TΟΝ ΠAΝTEΛΗ ΒΙΟΝ ΠAΡEΣΚEΥAΣE ****ΚAΙ**

**ΟΥΘEΝ ****ETΙ TΟΥ AΠEΙΡΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΠΡΟΣEΔEΗΘΗ·**** [OY]** **MHN AΛΛ' ΟΥTE EΦΥΓE ****TΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ****ΟΥΔ ΗΝΙΚA ****TΗΝ**

**EΞAΓΩΓΗΝ ****EΚ TΟΥ ΖΗΝ ****TA ΠΡAΓΜATA ΠAΡEΣΚEΥAΖEΝ**

**ΩΣ EΛΛEΙΠΟΥΣA ****TΙ TΟΥ AΡΙΣTΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚATEΣTΡEΨEΝ. **

“The flesh sets no limits to pleasure, and therefore it yearns for an eternity of time. But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the body, and liberating us from the fears relative to eternity, procures for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that we have no further occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage him to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of happiness.” Yonge (1853)

“The flesh assumes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and only infinite time would satisfy it. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life and has no longer any need of infinite time. Nevertheless, it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not fail to enjoy the best life.” Hicks (1910)

“The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.” Hicks (1925)

“The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life.” Bailey (1926)

“It is the flesh that fnds the limits of pleasure boundless and infinite time would have been required to furnish it, but the intelligence, taking into the calculation the end and limit of the flesh and dispelling the fears about eternity, renders the whole life is perfect.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 225 (1954)

“The flesh believes that pleasure is limitless and that it requires unlimited time; but the mind, understanding the end and limit of the flesh and ridding itself of fears of the future, secures a complete life and has no longer any need for unlimited time. It does not, however, avoid pleasure; and when circumstances bring on the end of life, it does not depart as if it still lacked any portion of the good life.” Geer (1964)

“The flesh places the limits of pleasure at infnity, and needs an infinite time to bring it about. But the intellect, by making a rational calculation of the end and the limit which govern the flesh, and by dispelling the fears about eternity, brings about the complete life, so that we no longer need the infinite time. But neither does it shun pleasure, nor even when circumstances bring about our departure from life does it suppose, as it perishes, that it has in any way fallen short of the best life.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“The flesh considers the limits of pleasure to be boundless, and only infinite time makes it possible. But the mind, having gained a reasonable understanding of the end and limit of the flesh, and having expelled fears about eternity furnishes the complete life, and we no longer has any need for time without end. But the mind does not fee from pleasure nor, when circumstances bring about the departure from life, does it take its leave as though falling short somehow of the best life.” O'Connor (1993)

“The flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited, and [only] an unlimited time would have provided it. But the intellect, reasoning out the goal and limit of the flesh and dissolving the fears of eternity, provided us with the perfect way of life and had no further need of unlimited time. But it [the intellect] did not fee pleasure, and even when circumstances caused an exit from life it did not die as though it were lacking any aspect of the best life.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Bodily pleasure seems unlimited, and to provide it would require unlimited time. But the mind, recognizing the limits of the body, and dismissing apprehensions about eternity, furnishes a complete and optimal life, so we no longer have any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless, the mind does not shun pleasure; moreover, when the end of life approaches, it does not feel remorse, as if it fell short in any way from living the best life possible.” Anderson (2004)

“The body picks out the end points of pleasure as lying beyond any limit, and marks the time needed to procure this [pleasure] as being unlimited. But the mind, grasping the fnal goal and terminating limits of the body by means of comprehending judgment, and obliterating the dread of an eternal afterlife, makes possible a life that reaches all goals within itself and has no need whatever of infinite time. But it should not [be thought] that the mind fees from pleasure—not even at that moment when circumstances bring about the extraction from this life—or that it destroys the pleasures as if they were unworthy of the best life.” Makridis (2005)

“The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time. But the mind, thinking through the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet the mind does not fee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it has missed any aspect of the best life.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The body takes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and infinite time would provide such pleasure. But the mind has provided us with the complete life by a rational examination of the body's goal and limitations and by dispelling our fears about a life after death; and so we no longer need unlimited time. On the other hand, it does not avoid pleasure, nor, when conditions occasion our departure from life, does it come to the end in a manner that would suggest that it had fallen short in any way of the best possible existence.” Strodach (2012)

“The flesh receives the limits of pleasure as if they were unlimited; and an unlimited time is required to provide it. But the mind, grasping in thought the end and limit of the flesh, and ridding itself of fears of eternity, fashions a perfect life and no longer requires unlimited time. Yet it does not avoid pleasure; and even when circumstances bring life to an end, it dies having missed nothing of the best life.” Mensch (2018)

“The flesh assumed the limits of pleasure were endless, which an endless time provided. But thought, by making an appraisal of the end and limit for the flesh, and by dissolving fears about an afterlife, provided the perfect life, and we no longer have any need for endless time. Yet neither did thought spurn pleasure, nor when the situation provided an exit from life, did it depart in any way deprived of the best life.” White (2021)

Bailey: 19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

Ο AΠEΙΡΟΣ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ****ΙΣΗΝ EΧEΙ TΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ****ΚAΙ Ο**

**ΠEΠEΡAΣΜEΝΟΣ ****EAΝ TΙΣ AΥTΗΣ TA ΠEΡATA**

**ΚATAΜETΡΗΣῌ Tῼ ΛΟΓΙΣΜῼ. **

“Infinite and fnite time both have equal pleasure, if any one measures its limits by reason.” Yonge (1853)

“Infinite time and fnite time hold an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.” Hicks (1910)

“Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.” Hicks (1925)

“Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure.” Bailey (1926)

“Infinite time and fnite time are characterized by equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 229 (1954)

“Time that is unlimited and time that is limited afford equal pleasure if one measures pleasure's extent by reason.” Geer (1964)

“Infinite time and fnite time contain equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reasoning.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as fnite time, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason.” O'Connor (1993)

“Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Infinite and fnite time afford equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reason.” Anderson (2004)

“Time without limit affords the same amount of pleasure as does limited time—if one measures the limits of pleasure precisely and by using reasoned judgment.” Makridis (2005)

“Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than does fnite time, if one determines the limits of pleasure rationally.” Strodach (2012)

“Limited and unlimited time furnish an equal amount of pleasure if the limits of pleasure are measured by reason.” Mensch (2018)

“Endless time and a limited time afford equal pleasure, if you measure out the limits of pleasure by reasoning.” White (2021)

**Ο ΔΙΚAΙΟΣ ATAΡAΚTΟTATΟΣ ****Ο Δ' AΔΙΚΟΣ ΠΛEΙΣTΗΣ**

**TAΡAΧΗΣ ΓΗΜΩΝ. **

“The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.” Yonge (1853)

“The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.” Hicks (1925)

“The just man is most free from trouble, the unjust most full of trouble.” Bailey (1926)

“The just man is least disturbed; the unjust man is filled with the greatest turmoil.” Geer (1964)

“The just [life] is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“The just man is the most free of perturbation, while the unjust man is full of the greatest disturbance.” O'Connor (1993)

“The just life is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The just man is the freest of anyone from anxiety; but the unjust man is perpetually haunted by it.” Anderson (2004)

“The just person is the most imperturbable; but the unjust is filled with ample distress.” Makridis (2005)

“One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The just man is the least disturbed by passion, the unjust man the most highly disturbed.” Strodach (2012)

“The just man is utterly imperturbable, while the unjust is full of the utmost perturbation.” Mensch (2018)

“The just one has the very least turmoil, but the unjust one teems with the very most.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations