Posts by Cassius

Welcome michelepinto !

I have been meaning to improve (1) our ability to keep track of Facebook discussions, and (2) our ability to keep track of recent posts on our main ("core") pages, and (3) our ability to find major articles in a central location. So today I set up https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…NYNjPb-mUXbSPyw using a format many of you will find familiar, and hopefully quick and easy to navigate. For the moment it won't have much more than a running feed of the latest posts at NewEpicurean, Society Of Epicurus, Menoeceus Blog, and the EpicurusPhilosophy page, but I will migrate the Facebook post index over to this page, where it should be much easier to maintain and access. I will also work to include a Twitter feed and other "news" features.

I also hope this will go some ways toward replacing the weekly newsletter that I did for several years. Not sure it that will work, but we'll see - in the meantime I hope you find this useful because it should already be a good place to check for the latest updates to the major blogs which I think give you the most reliable interpretation and application of Epicurean philosophy you can find anywhere on the internet. Carpe Diem!

It is very hard to discuss justice without referring to contemporary politics and therefore causing more harm in lost friendships than good that comes from discussing issues. I want to continue to hold back from jumping into today's headlines as much as possible, but while I am thinking about it I wanted to post this as a topic that might be discussable because the heat of the moment has now passed by 2000 years.

I'm referring to Cicero's conundrum in dealing with the conflict between (1) his professed allegiance to ideal unchanging justice (here, in the form of the Roman Sempronian law that Roman citizens not be executed - or is it executed without trial?) and (2) his conviction that if he did not execute the Cataline conspirators quickly, the Cataline Conspiracy would win, he and much of the Senate would be killed, and the Roman Republic and with it the Sempronian law would be destroyed. If anything should have convinced Cicero that there is in fact no absolute justice, this situation should have done it! But in fact I gather this conflict apparently had no influence in lightening up Cicero's view of Epicuruean justice.

Here is a link to a blog that discusses the issue facing Cicero, but I am afraid it does a poor job of covering the philosophical issue of justice. I remember reading much more detail back when I was studying Cicero much more closely, and this is a topic that has been debated for 2000 years so there is much better stuff out there.

If we need an example for debating the limits of "rule of law," this is probably a good one, and I doubt too many people will lose friendships over it

https://thecatilineconspiracy.wordpress.com/2013/04/22/the…ian-executions/

Thanks for the reply and best wishes!

It will be a good idea at least for a while to welcome new users individually and provide a thread for them to say hello if they wish. So here's hello to Mvaughn. Thanks for dropping by! I think the forum has a "tagging" feature so I will try that and see if Mvaughn sees it. Mvaughn if you do get a notification that you were tagged in this thread I would appreciate your saying so. thanks!

If you've ever asked yourself why Epicurus recommends at the end of the letter to Pythocles that we should give ourselves to a "study of the beginnings, and of infinity and of things that are akin to them," take a look at video at the link I will post in the first comment below and see if you have a ready response to the seductive infinity-based argument for the existence of a supernatural god made by "VenomFangX." This kind of glib argument for the existence of god is difficult to refute unless you have considered these principles before. I am not sure myself I could type it up quickly and easily, but the exercise gives me a greater appreciation of why Epicurus rejected the doctrine of infinite divisibilty (see letter to Herodotus around line 56 for one direct reference).

A seductive argument for the existence of god based on "infinity":

1) He accepts that it is correct to hold that nothing comes from nothing (the Epicurean position).

2) 1:30 He says that the universe cannot always have existed because we cannot apply properties of infinity to the universe.

3)1:49 Matter time and space cannot be eternal/infinite

4) Time is the measure of changes in matter, and therefore nothing could ever happen if an infinite time happened before any event. Can't have an infinite amount of finite things.

5) 3:00 Could there be an infinite amount of changes between two events? No.

6) Therefore time must be finite.

7) 3:32. You cannot have an infinite amount of finite things because infinite divisibility can never be reached. That proves there is only a finite amount of matter.

8)Therefore matter and time are finite and that means that they were created and that means that space cannot be infinite because space is only the measure of the distance between matter and if matter ceased to exist there would be a vacuum so there would be no space.

9) 4:30 Therefore since matter is finite then space is finite before there is only a finite distance between the two furthest pieces of matter in all reality.

10) Therefore matter and time and space are not infinite and therefore they are not eternal, That means they had a beginning.

11) 4:50 Whatever created them therefore existed without matter, time and space. Something without time is therefore an eternal NOW and unchanging, and that is why the Bible says that God never changes. To god the past present and future are all one.

12)5:30 If you exist without matter then you are immaterial and without space so you are omnipresent.

13)5:55 Something that is eternal, omnipresent, and immaterial are the attributes of God.

Does anyone have a PDF facsimile of an old/ancient Greek manuscript of Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius? I would like to see how the Principal Doctrines are formatted at the end. I get the impression from my reading that the division into 40 dates no more than a few hundred years at most, and maybe less than that. One of the standard references I use, by Charles Yonge, divides them up into 43 instead of 40, and I'd like to check this against the oldest available facsimile to see if there is any foundation for a division at all, or whether the "Authorized Maxims" were originally just in letter/narrative format. For example, this Greek / Latin edition from 1739 uses numbering, but it goes to 44 and thus appears closer to the Yonge format than to the modern "standard" format.

https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001844364

This is a link to the page where the Principal Doctrines start. It does look like the Greek side is divided into sections but with letters rather than numbers.

https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001844364

This version has PD6 broken down into two separate Maxims, so that "no pleasure is intrinsically bad..." is PD8 rather than PD7

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.…q=1311;size=125

One more comparison: the "modern" 20 starting with the flesh perceiving that pleasure is unlimited and going all the way through "as if it fell short of the best life" is broken down into two separate passages https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.…q=1315;size=125

We support friends not by lamentation, but taking care of them.

translated by Takis Panagiotopoulos.

LXVI.(66) Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

Discussion of the meme

One more comment I'd like to preserve here is the observation that the scheme of dividing the Doctrines up into 40 separate items does not seem to go back to the ancient world, and was added somewhere along the way. If the doctrines were written more in "letter" form, with no intent that each of the 40 stand alone, then it would make sense to read six and seven together (as Elli points out). Also, I think I have seen it argued that Epicurus and Lucretius sometimes used the writing device of repetition - saying the same thing several times in different ways in quick succession - for purposes of emphasis and clarity. Maybe what we have as PD 6 is just a warm-up for the main point, which is in PD 7, and the thoughts were never intended by Epicurus to be separated but to be one long flowing single thought.

I am informed by Elli P. that there are serious issues with the standard English translation of PD6. The versions we most commonly see are:

Bailey: "To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end." (note the strangely-placed comma)

Hicks/Loeb: "In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good."

But Hicks notes a problem:

Elli cites this version of the ancient Greek text by Archontia Liontaki, who is a philologist οf the ancient and new Greek language, and a member of the current Garden of Epicurus in Athens :

VI. 6 Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν͵ ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ΄ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

And this is Liontaki's translation from the ancient to new Greek:

VI.(6) Με σκοπό την απόκτηση ασφάλειας απέναντι στους ανθρώπους, υπήρχε (πάντα) το φυσικό αγαθό της κυριαρχίας και της βασιλείας, μέσω των οποίων (κάποιος) μπορούσε κάποτε να το καταφέρει αυτό.

Elli translates this new Greek into English as follows:

VI. (6) In order to obtain security from other people, there was (always) the natural good of sovereignty and kingship, through which (someone) once could have accomplished this.

Elli also notes that Eric Anderson translates:

PD 6 That natural benefit of kingship and high office is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men.

What a tangled web.

If specific words such as kingship are there, it would seem they should be included. But some of the best academic minds of the 20th century decided that they had good reason for leaving it out. I would think a fair discussion of which translation is best would have to discuss why Bailey / Bignone / Usener came to the conclusion they did, even if in the end it was wrong. No doubt they had a reason, and they were not just being sloppy. Just saying "they were wrong" doesn't seem like the best approach, or else we call into question everything else they decided (which probably should be done, but can't practically be attempted without a strong foundation).

Which brings up another topic- many of the ancient texts are translated in very "stilted" and unwieldy English, which is probably not necessarily the way it would be translated by a scholar starting from scratch today. And so we are left with texts written in very hard-to-read fashion that are not necessarily the most accurate in communicating the message intended. We desperately need a full rewrite done by someone who is both (1) competent, and (2) friendly to Epicurus, so as to avoid contamination from Stoic/Platonist preconceptions.

Elli tells me that such a work is being planned by leaders of the Athenian Garden of Epicurus. As I find out more I will update that information here.

Discussion of article Epicurean v Stoic - A Comparison Chart With Citations:

Quote

A work in progress summarizing the key differences between Epicurean and Stoic Philosophies

Also in regard to Forum purpose and standards, here is a video which lists the general Epicurean viewpoint on a series of important issues. A text version is below:

A PDF version of this printed list is available by clicking the graphic below.

Major Characteristics of the Epicurean View of Life

The ancient Epicurean viewpoint emphasizes the following:

1 - A Universe that operates by and contains only Natural, not supernatural, forces.

2 - A Universe with nothing divine, mystical, or imaginary outside it, but only a reality within it that is endless in extent.

3 - A Universe neither created by gods nor springing into existence at a single moment in time, but eternal, with nothing coming from or going to nothing.

4 - A Universe where the only eternal things are the ultimate particles which comprise it, with no eternal Platonic forms, Aristotelian essences, or rationalistic ideals constituting a "higher truth."

5 - A Universe neither ordered nor chaotic, but operating on Natural principles derived from the properties of the ultimate particles and the qualities that emerge from their movements and combinations.

6 - A Universe which contains life that is neither mystical nor unique to Earth, but plentiful throughout eternal time and boundless space.

7 - A Universe in which individual consciousness exists to experience Pleasure and Pain only for a single lifetime, not before birth or after death.

_____

8 - Knowledge that is based on observation through natural faculties, not abstract logic or rationalism.

9 - Knowledge that embraces emotions as things to be felt, not suppressed.

10 - Knowledge that holds with confidence that facts which are based on clear evidence are true, rejecting both radical skepticism and belief that is contrary to or without evidence.

_____

11 - Ethics holding that the goal of life is Pleasure, not virtue or religious piety.

12 - Ethics holding virtue, wisdom, and friendship to be valuable tools for producing Pleasure, but not ends in themselves.

13 - Ethics in which desires are evaluated as to whether they are natural or necessary, not so as to choose only what is necessary or to reduce desires to a minimum, but so that those desires which are chosen will maximize Pleasure and minimize Pain.

14 - Ethics in which the goal of life is to fill experience with Pleasures and to reduce Pains to a minimum, not to set up paradoxical abstractions such as "detachment" or "tranquility" or "absence of pain" in the place of Pleasure as ordinarily understood.

15 - Ethics based on achieving Pleasure within a society of friends, protected and separated from enemies, with political involvement, whether of engagement or withdrawal, chosen or avoided according to its efficacy in achieving Pleasurable living.

16 - Ethics based on embracing free will as core to human existence, rejecting both determinism and wishful thinking that all things are possible.

17 - Ethics in which the decision to engage in sexual love is evaluated - as are all choices and avoidances - according to the total amount of Pleasure and Pain the choice will bring, not as an illusory ideal to be pursued under the intoxication of the moment.

18 - Ethics which does not seek for “meaning” in false religion or idealism, but in living for the goal of experiencing the most Pleasure and the least Pain that our personal circumstances will allow.

19 - Ethics in which "Pleasure" as a thing to be pursued means the experience of any number and combination of mental and physical feelings which to us are pleasurable, and "Pain" as a thing to be avoided means the experience of any number and combination of mental and physical feelings which to us are painful.

20 - Ethics in which "Pleasure" describes the highest goal for each living being, which cannot be improved upon, because Pleasure is the only faculty given by Nature through which we know what to choose, and the highest experience of Pleasure any being is capable of achieving is the complete filling of its experience with Pleasures, undiluted with any mixture of Pains.

21 - Ethics in which in Pains are sometime chosen and Pleasures are sometimes avoided, but for no other purpose than the achievement of the greater pleasure or lesser pain arising from that particular choice or avoidance.

22 - Ethics in which there is no such thing as absolute justice that applies to all people at all times at all places, only relationships which change according to circumstance so as to obtain the most pleasure and the least pain for those who are part of the agreement.

This is an excellent book and well worth being part of a core Epicurean library.

Happy Twentieth of November!

This upcoming week in the United States is one of the primary times that family and friends travel to be with one another and celebrate the things which they most value in their lives. Unfortunately this exercise is bundled with “Thanks-giving” to supposed Judeo/Christian/Islamic divinities (or Stoic “Providence”) which created this world and the good things that exist in it – while most frequently being exempted from responsibility for the bad things).

It is virtually impossible for us to escape completely from this cultural corruption, but here is a reminder from Cicero through Velleius, in addressing Lucilius the Stoic, that there was once an Epicurean time when an alternative cultural worldview existed, and the eternality of the universe as a whole was recognized:

“If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God? But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses. For I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world, as there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons. But how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all Nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.”

Excerpt from Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods

Yes – let’s be thankful this week, and every week, to those who left us a legacy from the Epicurean school to which we can continue to for the path for spending our lives happily.

________

As Seneca recorded: Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus! So do all things as though watching were Epicurus!

And as Philodemus wrote: “I will be faithful to Epicurus, according to whom it has been my choice to live.”

Additional discussion of this post and other Epicurean ideas can be found at the Epicurean Philosophy Facebook Group and EpicureanFriends.com

Bailey: 2. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.

Alternate Translations and Notes:

Ο ΘAΝATΟΣ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ· TΟ ΓAΡ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ AΝAΙΣΘΗTEΙ TΟ Δ' AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ.

“Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.” Yonge (1853)

“Death is nothing to us. That into which dissolution brings us has no feeling or consciousness, and what has no consciousness is nothing to us.” Wallace, Epicureanism 110 (1880)

“Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.” Hicks (1910)

“Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.” Bailey (1926)

“Death is nothing to us, because dissolution means unconsciousness and unconsciousness is nothing to us.” De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us.” Geer (1964)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dispersed has no sensation. And what has no sensation is nothing to us.” O'Connor (1993)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Death is nothing to us, because a body that has been dispersed into elements experiences no sensations, and the absence of sensation is nothing to us.” Anderson (2004)

“Death is nothing to us. Because, what has been dissolved has no sense perception; and, according to us, what has no sense perception is nothing to worry about.” Makridis (2005)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Death means nothing to us, because that which has been broken down into atoms has no sensation and that which has no sensation is no concern of ours.” Strodach (2012)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no feeling; and what has no feeling is nothing to us.” Mensch (2018)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no perception, and what has no perception is nothing to us.” White (2021)

2 Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

Don : Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is without consciousness, and that which is without consciousness is nothing to us.

Saint-Andre translation: Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us.

"As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied." Epicurus PD40 (Bailey)

**ΟΣΟΙ TΗΝ ΔΥΝAΜΙΝ ****EΣΧΟΝ TΟΥ TΟ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ΜAΛΙΣTA ****EΚ**

**TΩΝ ΟΜΟΡΡΟΥΝTΩΝ ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΣAΣΘAΙ ****ΟΥTΟΙ ΚAΙ**

**EΒΙΩΣAΝ ****ΜET' AΛΛΗΛΩΝ ΗΔΙΣTA ****TΟ ΒEΒAΙΟTATΟΝ**

**ΠΙΣTΩΜA EΧΟΝTEΣ ****ΚAΙ ΠΛΗΡEΣTATΗΝ ΟΙΚEΙΟTΗTA**

**AΠΟΛAΒΟΝTEΣ ****ΟΥΚ ΩΔΥΡAΝTΟ ****ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ EΛEΟΝ ****TΗΝ TΟΥ**

**TEΛEΥTΗΣAΝTΟΣ ΠΡΟΚATAΣTΡΟΦΗΝ. **

“The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fullness, and not lamenting as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their friends.” Yonge (1853)

“Those who could best insure the confidence that they would be safe from their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society, and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for pity.” Hicks (1910)

“Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for commiseration.” Hicks (1925)

“As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.” Bailey (1926)

“All those who have best succeeded in building up the ability to feel secure from the attacks of those around them have lived the happiest lives with one another, as having the firmest faith.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 304 (1954)

“Those who were best able to prepare security for themselves in relation to their neighbors lived most pleasantly with their neighbors since they had the most perfect assurance; and enjoying the most complete intimacy, they did not lament the death of one who died before his time as if it were an occasion for sorrow.” Geer (1964)

“Those who had the power to eliminate all fear of their neighbours lived together accordingly in the most pleasurable way, through having the firmest pledge of security, and after enjoying the fullest intimacy, they did not grieve over someone's untimely death as if it called for commiseration.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Those who possess the power of securing themselves completely from their neighbors, live most happily with one another, since they have this constant assurance.

And after partaking of the fullest intimacy, they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as though they were need for pity.” O'Connor (1993)

“All those who had the power to acquire the greatest confidence from [the threats posed by] their neighbours also thereby lived together most pleasantly with the surest guarantee; and since they enjoyed the fullest sense of belonging they did not grieve the early death of the departed, as though it called for pity.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The happiest men are those who enjoy the condition of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live among one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds for confidence in one another, enjoying the benefits of friendship in all their fullness, and they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as if there was a need for pity.” Anderson (2004)

“Those who had the greatest ability to prepare defenses against their neighbors, so they could face up to them, were the ones who lived with each most pleasantly—since they had the most certain guarantee [that they were in no danger in any respect.] And, given that they had once enjoyed the most complete intimacy, they would not lament or cry for mercy if one suffered a premature demise.” Makridis (2005)

“All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All who have the capacity to gain security, especially from those who live around them, live a most agreeable life together, since they have the firm assurance of friendship; and after enjoying their comradeship to the full they do not bewail the early demise of a departed friend as if it were a pitiable thing.” Strodach (2012)

“All who could best obtain security against their neighbors, and thereby possessed the surest guarantee, lived most pleasantly with one another; and since they enjoyed the fullest intimacy they did not lament, as something to be pitied, the death of a member of their circle who predeceased them.” Mensch (2018)

“All who acquired the ability to provide themselves the most reliable confidence in their neighbors thereby lived together most pleasantly, most secure in [their] mutual trust, and by forming the closest affiliation they never mourned in sorrow over anyone's untimely demise.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

**EΝΘA ΜΗ ΚAΙΝΩΝ ΓEΝΟΜEΝΩΝ TΩΝ ΠEΡΙEΣTΩTΩΝ**

**ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ AΝEΦAΝΗ ****ΜΗ AΡΜΟTTΟΝTA ****EΙΣ TΗΝ**

**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ ****TA ΝΟΜΙΣΘEΝTA ΔΙΚAΙA ****EΠ AΥTΩΝ TΩΝ EΡΓΩΝ**

**ΟΥΚ ΗΝ TAΥTA ΔΙΚAΙA·**** EΝΘA ΔE ΚAΙΝΩΝ ΓEΝΟΜEΝΩΝ**

**TΩΝ ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ ΟΥΚETΙ ΣΥΝEΦEΡE ****TA AΥTA ΔΙΚAΙA**

**ΚEΙΜEΝA ****EΝTAΥΘA ΔΗ TΟTE ΜEΝ ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙA ****ΟTE**

**ΣYΝEΦEΡEΝ ****EΙΣ TΗΝ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΝ ****TΩΝ**

**ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙTEΥΟΜEΝΩΝ ****ΥΣTEΡΟΝ Δ ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ETΙ ΔΙΚAΙA ****ΟTE**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΝEΦEΡEΝ. **

“When, without any fresh circumstances arising a thing which has been declared just in practice does not agree with the impressions of reason, that is a proof that the thing was not really just. In the same way, when in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the moment when it ceases to be useful.” Yonge (1853)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws when judged by their consequences were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just, when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and ceased subsequently to be just when they ceased to be expedient.” Hicks (1910)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just ; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be expedient.” Hicks (1929)

“Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just, have been shown not to accord with the general concept in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, there they were just at the time when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer advantage.” Bailey (1926)

“If, although no new circumstances have arisen, those things that were commonly held just in these matters did not in their actual effects correspond with that conception, they were not just. Whenever, as a result of new circumstances, the same things that had been regarded as just were no longer useful, they were just at the time when they were useful for the relations of citizens to each other; but afterwards, when they were no longer useful, they were no longer just.” Geer (1964)

“Where actions that were considered just are shown not to ft the concept (of justice) in actual practice—provided circumstances are not altered—they are not just. But where, once events have changed, the same actions once held to just are no longer advantageous, they were just at the time when they brought advantage to citizens'

dealings with one another; but later they were no longer just, when they brought no advantage.” O'Connor (1993)

“If objective circumstances have not changed and things believed to be just have been shown in actual practice not to be in accord with our basic grasp [of justice], then those things were not just. And if objective circumstances do change and the same things which had been just turn out to be no longer useful, then those things were just as long as they were useful for mutual associations of fellow citizens; but later, when they were not useful, they were no longer just.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Where, without any change in circumstances, things held to be just by law are revealed to be in conflict with the essence of justice, such laws were never really just. But wherever or whenever laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case or time the laws were just when they benefited human interaction, and ceased to be just only when they were no longer beneficial.” Anderson (2004)

“[This is what we must say] if we are not to perturb ourselves with hollow words but rather take our bearings from the truth about human affairs. In those instances, in which, without any new developments arising, it becomes evident that the accepted concepts of justice are not, after all, in harmony with concrete interests or exertions of human effort: we must, in such cases, admit that those concepts of justice have had nothing to do with justice to begin with. But, in those instances, in which novel developments make it disadvantageous to preserve the same [concepts of] justice: in such cases, we must say that the concepts of justice were true in the past, for as long as they were conducive to the mutual association of fellow citizens, but, subsequently, when they were no longer advantageous, they were no longer just to adhere to.” Makridis (2005)

“When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In cases where the surrounding conditions are not new and where laws regarded as just have been shown to be inconsistent with the conception of justice in their actual workings, such laws are unjust. Again, in cases where the circumstances are new and where the same laws, once deemed to be just, are no longer serviceable, the laws in this case were just as long as they were useful to the community of citizens, but later when they were no longer useful they became unjust.” Strodach (2012)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws were seen not to accord with the preconception when judged by their consequences, such laws were not just. But whenever, in changed circumstances, the existing laws have ceased to be expedient, then they were just when they benefited the mutual intercourse of fellow citizens, but were no longer just later on when they ceased to be expedient.” Mensch (2018)

“Where, even without any change in circumstances, it became obvious from actual practice that the established norms of justice did not align with the preconception [sc. of justice], then they were not just. But where the situation did change and the same norms established as just no longer promoted [sc. what they had previously: the community’s interactions], then in that case they were just for so long as they did promote the community of fellow citizens in their interactions, and later they were no longer just when they no longer promoted that.” White (2021)