Posts by Cassius

Elli Pensa

September 22 at 11:31am
Doctrine 7. For the sake of feeling confidence and security in regard to other men, some men wish to be eminent and powerful, failing to remember the limits of kingly power. If such men happen to achieve a life of safety, then they have attained their goal, which is a good. But if their lives are not in fact safe, they have failed in obtaining the goal for the sake of which they originally desired power, and that is the result that generally occurs according to Nature.
E.S. 67. A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors.
E.S. 81. The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with or caused by unlimited desire.
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"Darius", by C.P. Cavafy
The poet Phernazes is at work
upon an important passage in his epic poem;
how the Kingdom of Persia
is secured by Darius, son of Hystaspes
(from whom is descended our glorious king
Mithradates Dionysus Eupator).
The passage is philosophic. He has to describe
the feelings that animated Darius:
“arrogance” perhaps and “exultation”; or no—
more probably a sense of the vanity of human greatness.
The poet is meditating deeply on his theme.
Running in, his servant interrupts him,
and brings a most serious piece of news.
The war with the Romans has begun.
Our army in full force has crossed the frontier.
The poet is speechless. What a misfortune!
How will our glorious king
Mithradates Dionysus Eupator
find time to listen to Greek poetry now?
In the middle of a war —Greek poetry, indeed!
Phernazes is in despair. Alas, alas!
His “Darius” was certain to bring him fame
and silence once for all those envious detractors.
What a set-back, what a set-back to his plans!
Were it only a set-back, no matter,
but shall we be quite safe at Amisus?
The city walls are none of the strongest,
the Romans are most terrible enemies.
Can we hold our own against them,
we Cappadocians? Is it likely?
Can we make a stand against the legions?
Help! Help! O ye Great Gods, protectors of Asia, defend us.
Yet through all his distress and anxiety
the poetic obsession still comes and goes;
surely “arrogance” and “exultation” are more probable;
yes, “arrogance” and “exultation” were the feelings that animated Darius.
Analysis of the poem “Darius”, by C.P. Cavafy
The poet Phernazes is concerned to write an epic poem for Darius thinking what position he should keep on the way that he took the power. Does he write honestly what happened (Darius killed his brother to reap the power) assigning arrogance and drunkenness of power and displease the current king Mithridates, as he considered descendant of Darius, or embellish the reality in order to win the favor of the king ?
He decides to become likeable to Mithridates and reap the benefit of its own priorities as a poet. Thus, it is an opportunistic and selfish driven by his own personal interest. A slimy flatterer who is "selling out" and even his art to secure the favor of the powerful king and to be grown among his competitors, the other poets . Even though he learns that the war was starting, he does not lament, for the evil that finds his country, but only just because his plans were canceled.
However, the poet Phernazes will change his attitude when he would realize the change of historical and real circumstances. The initial disappointment at the cancellation of his poetic projects succeeded by uncertainty of the fate of the city but also of his own. He considers now that the city of Amisus is not a sufficiently fortified city and the Romans are the most terrible enemies. His agitation from fear, and as his despair is been escalated, he invokes the gods ("gods, great protectors of Asia, defend us"). From this point we conclude that his Asian descent prevails in his thought, while his Greek culture has been marginalized. The Cavafy irony discharges the dramatic intensity of the lyrics.
"The poetic idea comes and goes despite the turmoil and trouble.
The defeat and the end of Mithridates is near; and now Phernazes will decide without fear, to serve his poetic art from the path of truth (perhaps thinking that with this, he will win the favor of the Romans who now are taking the power in his conquered country) Thus, Phernazes is honest when the new world order will entrain him just we to understand this honesty as alignment with this new order.
However Phernazes becomes poet again influenced by the war climate, and he adjusts his poetic thought. In such crucial times of agitation and poor reflective of thought "like an understanding of the vanity of greatness" does not match, while the attribution of arrogance and drunkenness of power fit and to Darius ; and to Mithridates ; and to the Romans and all executers of an arrogant power.
Cavafy seems to believe that the poetic activity can not be suspended, even under such adverse conditions; when the poetic practice can be adapted, influenced by the surrounding historical and social facts.

Cassius Amicus
September 20 at 10:32am

THE LEAKY CASK HYPOTHETICAL: In Gorgias, Socrates sets up the following hypo by which he seeks to prove that the better life is one without desire. Callicles disagrees, but Socrates slants the arguments in his own favor by disparaging pleasure as "scratching an itch" and the like. I think it would be helpful to discuss: "What else should Callicles have explained, and what presumptions of Socrates should he have rejected, in order to show that Socrates' analogy is ineffective as an argument against pleasure? Would it have been helpful for Callicles to have said: "But honey and wine aren't the kind of pleasures we are talking about Socrates, pleasure is the absence of pain, so we restrain our desires and we don't fill our casks with anything!" Would that have been a helpful answer?

SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.

SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must be large for the liquid to escape.

CALLICLES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

CALLICLES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?

CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness?

Cassius Amicus It seems to be a common technique that the best way to attack "pleasure" is to talk as if pleasure="scratching your nose" or the like, and to contrast it with something high-brow like "reading literature" so as to imply that pleasure is always embarrassing and high-brow is always admirable. But this hides the fact that the reason we pursue the highbrow (art, etc) is the pleasure that it gives us, not because there is something "good" about it in itself.

And so the attack frequently turns to dividing "good pleasures" against "bad pleasures," and in order to know the difference you have to have some standard other than pleasure itself. So THAT standard becomes the highest good.

So anytime there is discussion of "good pleasures" and "bad pleasures" you can bet that pleasure in general is going to come out the loser.

Cassius Amicus Also "but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them." This obscures the question of why the person filled them in the first place - as if "god told him too" or something was the cause. But the question is "why were the casks filled in the first place" and "to what use are the contents of the cask being employed"?

No wonder these guys are so fond of "infinite indivisibility." Their favorite technique is to apply artificial/abstract divisions and then act as if those divisions were handed down by god, or exist in themselves, and then those divisions become more important than the reality that is being divided.

If you give into the suggestion that the artificial divisions have a reality in themselves then the dialectical game is lost.

Cassius Amicus "- moderation in all things is the true way to happiness. " No I would politely but strongly disagree! The issue of investigating the "greatest good" makes some degree of sense in that we are looking for the standard by which to guide our lives. If there is one contestant for that standard that miserably fails in every respect, it is "moderation" because that never gives you any idea of the direction your want to go - it just advises us to stay in the middle and never take a position on anything being better than anything else. We frequently see "moderation" cited here as a proper goal but I see nothing in Epicurus that sanctions that and much that opposes it. Once we decide what the guide/goal is, in my view we should use very bit of our strength to achieve it.

Cassius Amicus I think that's the point, Michael, that Socrates is making in saying that whatever our goal is, it must have limit, because if you can't achieve it then your life will be constant frustration. So therefore it is important to decide how to meet the objection. One way to set a goal that can be met is to drastically limit one's goal to pure survival, and then one can be happy that one is surviving. That's essentially what the Stoics advise, but is that what Epicurus advised? A thousand times no! "VS63. There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance."

So the argument is an important one, and it demands a response, and Epicurus gave it in the form of the limit of pleasure being the elimination of all pain. But by sleight of hand ("absence of pain is all you need to know!") our Stoic friends turn Epicurus' answer into the elimination of pleasure itself!

RW VS63 there doesn't sound too different from "moderation in all things". What am I missing?

Cassius Amicus NO! Why does one shoot for the middle? Why would one shoot for any less pleasure than is available without an undue penalty in pain? Everyone's circumstances are going to be different, and the amount of pleasure they can reach is going to be di...See More
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Cassius Amicus Ronald Warrick I would appreciate any further comments you have that would help us all get a handle on the issue of the "limit of pleasure." I very much want to improve my description of this issue because I believe it is so important to what Epicurus discussed and why he said it. I agree totally that the issue seems very unimportant (at least to us today) and therefore it is confusing at best to discuss it.

But apparently the ancient Greeks thought that it was a killer argument to say "the greatest good must have an upper limit / be achievable in full / be measurable as complete / be pure / be full." And if you step back and put yourself in this world where syllogisms and formulas are everything, and words can become almost sacred in meaning, then the argument can make some sense. After all, if you want to say that a thing is "the highest" or "the best" then you can never admit that something else could be "higher" or "better." And so your highest and best therefore has to be defined as a quantity (complete) or a quality (pure) which cannot be improved.

Plato and his Stoic descendants therefore took the position that words like "moral worth" and "virtue" are complete in themselves, and got comfortable with it, just like we are comfortable in saying a "full glass of water" can't hold anything else.

And so any philosophical school which was going to oppose Plato and the Stoics, and which wanted to argue that "Pleasure" and not "virtue" or "moral worth" as the goal, had to show that pleasure does indeed have this quality of having a "limit" beyond which nothing could be higher or better. So how does Epicurus answer them? By using the flask / leaky flask analogy to illustrate that a life of pleasure does indeed have a point of fullness / completeness / highest capacity and purity. And that point is reached not by draining the flask until it is empty of pleasure (asceticism) nor by constantly pouring in new pleasures once the flask is full (that would be wasteful).

So this analogy / illustration answers the Platonists by providing a description of the goal of life which does "have a limit." I am beginning to detest that word "limit" because it has so many connotations in English that are negative, but we can also use more positive terms like "fullness" of "completeness" to show that the analogy makes a lot of sense.

And to repeat once more, if the goal is a flask full of pleasure that is not leaking and does not need replenishing, then your goal is not to seek "moderation" (fill the flask half full???) but to intelligently choose ones actions so that the flask does indeed become full of pleasure, (physical and mental pleasures as we ordinarily understand the word), which has been obtained without creating conditions of undue pain or expectation of pain. That's where Torquatus correctly emphasizes that:

"The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; ***where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain.***" All pleasure is desirable and all pain is undesirable, so actions have to be chosen solely on the criteria of what those actions produce. Sometimes "moderation" may in fact be the proper choice, but often choosing "the middle" is of no logical relationship at all to the desired goal of filling the flask with pleasure while eliminating pain or at least keeping it to a minimum.

This issue divides fans of Epicurus probably more than any other. Any illustrations, charts, diagrams, analogies, etc that we can use to make it more clear would be tremendously helpful.

Cassius Amicus Presuming "you" refers to me, Michael Stibbs, it is Plato who is trying to reduce the argument against pleasure to a formula, and Epicurus who realized that there was a need to be able to refute the argument. Torquatus: "Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them."

I fully agree with Epicurus that an elaborate argument is not necessary, but the circumstances of the world are that the Platonic approach has been entrenched for 2000 years, and those who are trained in these issues are taught that the Platonic "limits" argument is correct, so it must be answered, just as Epicurus did.

What's worse than that is that Epicurus' explanation, tailored to show the fallacy of the Platonic approach, has been taken out of that context and twisted into an argument for asceticism (absence of pain as the statement of the goal). A seemingly logical but out of context interpretation now undermines the whole Epicurean approach. The only way to undo the damage, prevent the twisting, and move things back in the right direction is to dig back into the context of 300BC to understand why things were said in the way they were.

MS Yes I agree. Its very hard though to step away from the formulaistic approach which we have all been taught to think in. But what do I know? I am just a humble lawyer. Plato I found fascinating as a boy because I was looking for rational certainties. As I grew older I realised that such certainies are just as much a myth as the divinities of the ancient world.

Elli Pensa
hi! I wonder how someone could find rational certainties in Plato, when Plato is famous that he based the most of his works on myths ? And I also wonder why all the ancient greek world is reflected only to Plato ? If there was a possibility to be taught in school for Epicurus and his philosophy, won't someone find some of the same certainties you were looking for ? Thanks !

Elli Pensa

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Elli Pensa

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Elli Pensa

"Without pleasure, not even the life of the gods is enviable." Simonides (Greek lyric poet c. 500 BC)

https://www.facebook.com/groups/Epicure…93375460711413/

In further support of interpreting Epicurus' teachings to mean that life will be generally pleasurable (in an understandably pleasurable kind of way) when pain is absent, I think we can cite the following from Theophrastus, who cataloged the various Greek opinions on the senses, and included pleasure and pain in the discussion. This of course was prior to Epicurus, and as it seems consistent with the rest of Epicurean doctrine it is reasonable to think that Epicurus would have incorporated explanations like this in his own positions: "For as a rule we take pleasure in things, and perception itself is something sought by us, apart from any desire we might have for the particular <object perceived>" Here is the full context with several important points:

https://archive.org/details/theophrastusgree00stra

Thank you A!

Cassius Amicus 09-19-2016 0 Comments
Peace and Safety to the Epicureans of today, no matter where you might be - Happy Twentieth! It is my view that one of the most important things we can do to better understand Epicurus is to study the majority opinion of the leading philosophers who came before him. Epicurus would have done so himself, and prepared his doctrines in response to them and to vaccinate his students against the errors of those who found "the good" in something other than the faculty given to us by Nature for choice: pleasure. There are a number of key sources by which we can determine the issues that confronted Epicurus, and among the most important of them are the works of Plato (especially Gorgias, Philebus, and Timaeus). As a secondary source we can also refer to the summaries compiled later by Cicero in "On Ends." Over time I hope to go through these in detail, and link to the responses in the Epicurean texts, but for this post I have only been able to start - this time with a brief outline of major points of relevance made by Plato in Gorgias. Here we find a number of Plato's main attacks on pleasure. These very same arguments would have been before Epicurus, and he must have been compelled time and again to address them. For this post I only have time to provide a list of references to locations where the points are made in the text. Given what we know of Plato's own opinions and goals, whenever we see points like these being made, we should be suspicious that they constitute the bricks in the wall mainstream philosophy has erected against Epicurean doctrines:

• Socrates' Definition of "flattery"
• Everything is either good or evil or indifferent (a neutral state)
• The Greatest Evil is Doing Injustice
• A thing is good when just and evil when unjust.
• Good people are happy and evil people are miserable.
• The unjust are more miserable if they are not punished.
• The beautiful as the standard.
• He who is punished suffers what is good.
• Evil in the soul is the most disgraceful thing
• Injustice and intemperance are the greatest of evils
• Justice gives the greatest pleasure.
• Injustice is the greatest of evils
• To suffer punishment is to be released from evil.
• To do wrong and not be punished is the greatest evil.
• The better is the wiser.
• The leaky cask analogy.
• It is shameful not to distinguish between good and bad pleasures.
• Pleasure is not good because it requires pain (drinking requires thirst)
• Good is not the same as pleasant and pain is not the same as evil.
• All actions are done for the sake of the good.
• Pleasure ought to be sought for the sake of the good.
• It is agreed that good and pleasure are different.
• Order is good and disorder is evil.
• Health is regular order of the body (harmony)
• Restraint is better for the soul than intemperance.
• The good man must be temperate and just.
• To do evil is worse for the doer than to suffer evil for sufferer.
• To advocate pursuit of pleasure is vulgar flattery.
• Good men should try to make other citizens as good as possible - not please them.
• No man becomes good by pursuing pleasure.
• After death we will be judged according to our virtue.

I hope you find this list of links useful, as thinking about the Epicurean response to each of these would be a great exercise. ________ As Seneca recorded: Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus! So do all things as though watching were Epicurus! And as Philodemus wrote: “I will be faithful to Epicurus, according to whom it has been my choice to live." Additional discussion of this post and other Epicurean ideas can be found at the Epicurean Philosophy Facebook Group and EpicureanFriends.com

Cassius Amicus
11 hrs

In one of the nearby threads there is an ongoing discussion of "absence of pain." Thanks to ES I was recently rereading Cicero's On Ends, and there is a passage there that those interested in this topic ought to know about. In this criticism of Epicurus by Cicero I think we can see that there is more going on than what meets the eye when people pull out a line that is translated as "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul" and elevate it to imply that the ordinary definition of pleasure has been eradicated. Had this been true, Cicero could not have written the following (note particularly **as he in fact does**):

Cicero: "Had Epicurus cleared up the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen into such confusion. Either he would have upheld pleasure in the same sense as Aristippus, that is, an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure; or, if he preferred to use an idiom of his own, instead of speaking the language of the Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, Scions of Athens, and the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, he might have confined the name of pleasure to this state of freedom from pain, and despised pleasure as Aristippus understands it; or else, if he approved of both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, then he ought to combine together pleasure and absence of pain, and profess two ultimate Goods. Many distinguished philosophers have as a matter of fact thus interpreted the ultimate good as composite. For instance, Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime; Callipho united pleasure with moral worth; Diodorus to moral worth added freedom from pain. Epicurus would have followed their example, had he coupled the view we are now discussing, which as it is belongs to Hieronymus, with the old doctrine of Aristippus. For there is a real difference of opinion between them, and accordingly each sets up his own separate End; and as both speak unimpeachable Greek, Aristippus, who calls pleasure the Chief Good, does not count absence of pain as pleasure, while Hieronymus, who makes the Chief Good absence of pain, never employs the name pleasure to denote this negation of pain, and in fact does not reckon pleasure among things desirable at all."

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Whether or not you agree with my "full cup" argument as presented on my newepicurean.com page, it is clear from this passage that Cicero understood Epicurus to have embraced pleasure as ordinarily understood by all men, including Aristippus. It's a very important point also to see that Epicurus had rejected the position of Hieronymus, who according to Cicero had in fact erected "absence of pain" as the goal and specifically rejected ordinary pleasure in so doing. This passage shows that Epicurus would have been fully aware of this different arguments, and he clearly rejected the archtypical "absence of pain" argument, or Cicero would have explained how Epicurus and Hieronymus were the same.

So while we have to make an educated guess at the truth, in the absence of Epicurus' own words explaining this, whatever theory we follow cannot eject "ordinary pleasure" from the good / end of life, or else we end up embracing Hieronymus, who Epicurus rejected.

Personally, I think the key to unlocking this is to realize that Epicurus was dealing with an existing battlefield of ideas that included not only Hieronymus and Aristippus but Plato and others who employed the "limits" argument to argue that pleasure could not be the goal of life as it (in their view) has no limit. In order to meet this argument, Epicurus had to show that pleasure *does* have a limit, so he pointed out that the pleasures of life cannot be increased beyond our capacity to experience them, and our capacity to experience more pleasure is gone when we fill our experience with pleasure and succeed in ejecting all pain from our experience. There's nothing extraordinary about this state of pure pleasure that results - no new or unusual type of pleasure is involved - but being able to identify this theoretical state as possible essential for meeting the Platonic argument that the highest good must have a limit. {Note: In Epicurean theory this state is not only possible, but actual -- at least for "gods." One way of stating our goal in life is that we work toward the goal of becoming "gods among men."}

It seems to me that is why the "absence of pain" passage is there, and this also explains the similar reference that we have no need of [further] pleasure when all pain has been eliminated.

But I readily confess that the letter to Menoecus can appear to us to be confusing. But I also suggest that the letter as written was *not* confusing to Menoeceus, because any student of Epicurus in 300 BC would have been fully familiar with the existing anti-pleasure majority position. Any educated Epicurean reading the letter would instantly have understood it as a complete refutation of the anti-pleasure/pain position, and an explanation of why the other philosophers were wrong. Our disability is that we no longer have the instant recognition of the anti-pleasure arguments. But that is something that those of us in this group and elsewhere who support Epicurean philosophy can work to remedy.
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ES
ES "The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which directly affects our physical being with a delightful feeling,—a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification. But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place. Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree."

-Torquatus
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Yes, that's the passage in issue. No doubt it was written by Epicurus for an important purpose, but that purpose could not reasonably have been to upend and invert everything else he had previously taught about pleasure. Just like a contract in a court of law, or interpretation of a statute, if there is a way to harmonize the totality to give effect to every provision of what is written, that is the way to the preferred conclusion - at least as long as we think that the writer was a consistent thinker!
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus And that is exactly what Cicero, lawyer that he is, refuses to do - which is the technique of a lawyer seeking victory over his opponent, not someone who is trying to harmonize words that may seem to conflict, but do not in fact conflict when read in a certain way.
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ES
ES So are you arguing that the pleasure in which Epicurus promoted was something more or different than absence of emotional and physical pain? If so how is pleasure different and why is it important and can you show me textual evidence please.
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EB
EB Pleasure is not the abscence of pain. However, absence of pain is the highest limit of pleasure.
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EB
EB In my understanding of Epicurus
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ES
ES I'm sorry that just doesn't make sense to me.
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ES
ES I'd also like to point out that pleasure as I understand Epicurus is predominantly absence of EMOTIONAL Pain. It's apparent that tetrapharmakon is about easing all forms of anxiety-gods, death, sustenance and pain
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EB
EB I meant that there are different forms of pleasure. To say pleasure is the absence of pain would mean there aren't other forms of pleasure that aren't the absence of pain, which would be false. The distinguishing characteristic of pleasure as an absence of pain is that it doesn't get better than that.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus I agree with this statement largely, but the "it" in "it doesn't get any better than that" still leaves a little wiggle room for ambiguity."
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Cassius Amicus
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ES
ES Right, but I'd like to see where Epicurus defines it as such
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ES
ES I think I have far weightier evidence
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EB
EB When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual lust, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.
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EB
EB " By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."
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ES
ES Yes and even more that it is sober reasoning that BANISHES beliefs that cause anxiety !
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ES
ES What are those false beliefs? Superstitions, religion, Malevolent and intervening gods, that life and basic goods are hard to procure and that pain is difficult to bear.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus I think this is well stated EB: "I meant that there are different forms of pleasure. To say pleasure is the absence of pain would mean there aren't other forms of pleasure that aren't the absence of pain, which would be false." Even in philosophy classes the "replenishment theory is acknowledged to be incomplete. Were we in pain from not smelling a rose before we smelled the rose? Was that smelling not a substantive pleasure? Yes, removal of pain is pleasurable, and provides space for pleasure as we ordinarily understand all its mental and physical variations, to fill in. But just like matter and void are opposites with real properties of their own, pleasure has a real existence with real positive properties, and these are not described by saying "absence of pain" any more than matter is sufficiently described as "absence of void."

Also, Eric, while mental pleasures and pains are held to be more intense than physical ones, I think there is no reason to think that Epicurus was focused on one at the expense of the other
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Eric what is a positive description of what you think is being described as "absence of pain." in this case, simply saying "that's pleasure" would be thought by most people (in my view) to be playing a word game, so what positive substantive definition would you give of that experience?
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ES
ES I'm not disagreeing that pleasure is varied and positive. I'm just arguing that Epicurus defined it as an absence of emotional pain. I'd like to see textual evidence that Epicurus meant something more than what he said
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IV
IV Menoeceus 131:
"By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."
Both the body and mind need to be pain-free for there to be a total lack of pain. If either one is in pain, the absence isn't complete.
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EP
EP Cassius, Ilkka, Hiram and friends, Epicurus is so clear to understand what he is saying and means in Menoeceus 131 : <<When we say that pleasure is the goal of life we mean ..."AND TO NOT" [=in greek he uses the word "μήτε" ] ACHING THE BODY “AND ΤΟ ΝΟΤ” DISTURBING THE SOUL>>. Where did the translators find the word "ABSENCE" ?? There is not such a meaning in the text “that pleasure, as the goal of life, is the absence of pain”. This description of what is the GOAL, is not accurate in any way and at all.

The ancient greek text from Menoeceus 131 Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν͵ οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν͵ ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν͵ ἀλλὰ τὸ **μήτε** ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα **μήτε** ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν.

New greek : Όταν, λοιπόν, υποστηρίζουμε ότι ο σκοπός της ζωής είναι η ηδονή, δεν εννοούμε τις ηδονές των ασώτων και τις αισθησιακές απολαύσεις, όπως από άγνοια ορισμένοι νομίζουν, και επειδή διαφωνούν μαζί μας ή παρερμηνεύουν αυτά που λέμε, αλλά εννοούμε το να μη πονά το σώμα και να μην ταράσσεται η ψυχή.

And in english : Thus, when we say that the goal of life is pleasure, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal and sensual pleasures, such of an ignorance some think, and because they disagree with us or misinterpret what we say, but we mean and to not aching the body and not disturbing the soul.
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Epicurus uses two times the word “μήτε» «AND TO NOT». And he uses this negative conjunction of “μήτε» , because he wants to "conjunct" SIMILAR TERMS or SIMILAR SENTENCES. Since, it is similar "and to not" aching the BODY "and to not" disturbing THE SOUL. SOUL AND BODY is the similar issue.See Translation
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EP
EP Yes, Epicurus tried to give a description what is "pleasure", because it is well known this word , as the goal of life, WAS, IS AND WILL BE misinterpreted and misunderstood TOTALLY. I am sorry but we realize Epicurus was forced to describe the BIG PIC...See More
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Cassius Amicus
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EB
EB I believe part of the reason absence of pain was very important for Epicurus was that it set the limit to the good we called "pleasure." If pleasure was just some positive thing, then adding more pleasure would always be possible, but by saying pleasure is the absence of pain it is implied that the limit exists. And during that time the great good was expected to have some limit.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus “It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms : “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

– Diogenes Laertius, Book X
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ES
ES That's fine. I find that acceptable. We can say that Epicurus defined pleasure as an absence of emotional and physical pain and additive and positive experiences mitigated by hedonic calculus
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Well Eric here I think Ekshesh is focusing on a distinction that is very important. "Absence of ..." is not a susbstantive description of anything - it is a "limit" of something, but it is not a description of anything. So I cannot say that i agree that pleasure IS an "absence of pain" in any respect but in that of "measurement." Measurement of quantity or quality is of course significant, but it is far from a complete description of the thing being measured.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus So in the end if someone is going to suggest that "pleasure" means something that we all experience ordinarily through our mind and senses, and that all of us recognize, then I would really like to know how that experience is to be defined. Because any description I can think of about a mental or physical state , even "wellbeing" is something I would say, well OK that is what everyone understands by pleasure and you are saying nothing new. It's only if someone could describe something totally out of the ordinary that we can't all immediately understand through experience that I would say would be cause for acknowledging that something unusual is being discussed.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus And what really is at stake here, as I think many of us realize, is that stoicism and other philosophies are accused (rightly or wrongly) of seeking to suppress all emotion. And Epicurus is said to specifically have stated that the wise man feels emotion MORE deeply than others, not less, which is not tranqiility in the stoic sense..
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ES
ES The experience is defined by tranquility
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ES
ES And I acquiesce that there are additive pleasures
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ES
ES You would be in gross error to not understand that much of Epicurus is helping mankind be freed from anxieties
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Oh I completely agree with that! I do agree that banishing anxiety is one of the huge aspects of the philosophy which is made necessary by many reasons, not the least of which is false religion and other philosophies. We are totally agreed there!
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ES
ES Cassius Amicus tranquility is the absence of mental pain
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ES
ES If we agree there id be happy
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ES
ES I just feel that both Stoics and Epicureans seem to dismiss or minimize this to detriment
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus ES I am not so sure of that Why do you believe it is so? Cannot an ocean be both powerful and calm at the same time?
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ES
ES You're not sure that Epicurus has anxieties in mind in much of what he addresses???
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus While we are discussing let me emphasize that I do consider calmness to be desirable! I am just not sure of all of the implications when people use the word tranqility, as that sounds too much like getting hit with a tranquilizer dart for me!
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ES
ES No no I understand your concern...
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ES
ES Epicurus again in his tetrapharmakon **IS** addressing anxieties and is aiming at peace of mind/tranquility/ataraxia
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Yes I agree that relief from anxiety is a key goal, but I worry that relief from anxiety should never be read to be a complete statement of the goal, because I do believe life requires exertion to attain pleasure in the short time we are alive
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ES
ES Fair enough. I believe my reformulation in an earlier point entails both our concerns
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Also while we are discussing this I need to emphasize that I acknowledge that there are many people in many situations for whom unloading mental anxieties is such an immense task that it seems like all that is needed, and I greatly sympathize and understand that - been there myself.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus Without necessarily tagging anyone as the problem (well ok, I will tag many religions, but just not call any philosopher's names) I just always want to be aware of the ongoing campaign against pleasure as something that is dirty and disreputable and against gods will. That is a huge issue that will not go away as long as we live, unfortunately.....
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Cassius Amicus
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EB
EB I have 1 question thought. If the limit of pleasure is the absence of pain. If we have two people x and y. and both expereince no physical pain nor trouble of the soul, but y indulges in sex, listens to pleasurable music, eats tasty food, is it a folly to claim Y's life is more pleasurable than x's?
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IV
IV The absolute absence of pain cannot be more pain-free with additional pleasures. At that point the pleasures only vary. For example, person x will also eat food, and if it's nutritious it will be tasty.
Menoeceus 130: "Plain fare gives as much pleasure...See More
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EB
EB Happiness is a tricky word here though. One could experience much pain and still claim to have lived a happy life, according to the Stoics at least. Would that be a happy life for Epicurus?
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Cassius Amicus
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus A good question and this gets to the purity arguments. An experience of pure pleasure once pure can only be varied, but is not variation desirable when it is possible without pain? I think the answer here is related to how we would judge living 10 days as a "god among men" vs living 100 days. Given the choice I think it is clear that we would prefer to live 100 days, but the reason is not necessarily that the 100 days was "more pleasurable" in EVERY respect. The reason for the preference has to be carefully considered.
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus This is an excellent question EB and I can't "remember that we have discussed it recently. I think I will tag some of our other regulars like Hiram Crespo and AR and IV and EP to be sure they see this on and have a chance to comment if they like. "I have 1 question though. If the limit of pleasure is the absence of pain. If we have two people x and y. and both experience no physical pain nor trouble of the soul, but y indulges in sex, listens to pleasurable music, eats tasty food, is it a folly to claim Y's life is more pleasurable than x's?"
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RW
RW OK, if a neutral state is the absence of both pain and pleasure, and Epicurus denies the possibility of such a state, then the mere absence of pain is not sufficient for pleasure. There must be actual positive pleasure. But it is also true that pleasure must follow from removal of pain, because, again, there is no neutral state. I think this becomes clear when we look at how we actually go about removing pain - by eating, by drinking, having sex, etc., positive pleasures all.
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IV
IV Menoeceus 128.
"He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all o...See More
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RW
RW I guess what we are both saying is that absence of pain and presence of pleasure are not a dichotomy. They go hand in hand. So to say that one or the other or both are THE goal is rather unnecessary. They are just two ways of describing the same phenomenon.
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Cassius Amicus
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AR
AR Another way to understand this, "limit of pleasure is the absence of pain" bit is to get back to particle physics.
Analogy.

Particles/void in motion through space in time colliding with the spatial surface of a sensor.

For the sake of simple arithmetic we'll assume the sensor surface is fixed at 100. 100 units of surface area.

At every point in time that surface is occupied, with different proportions of particles and/or void.

If at some instant of time that sensor surface has 40 units of void occupying its surface, then what remains for particles is 60. The maximum of particles is determined by subtracting the void.

Now substitue:
1. pleasure for particle
2. pain for void
3. sensor surface for sensory orifice

How do we make more sensory surface available for particles, when we cannot change the sensor surface area?

By removing the void. The void occupies surface area as much as particles occupy surface area. If we want to fill the surface with 70 particles, at an instant of time, then we must reduce the void to 30.

Now let us suppose that the sensor surface was receiving 65 particles/35 void, for a long time, and so the surface shape due to collision reaction has stabilized, and is not changing. Let me repeat, the shape of the surface is not changing becaus it has been receiving collisions at the same rate for a long time. It sustains a shape that we can call the "65/35" shape.

Then suppose we suddenly decrease the flow rate to 55/45 and maintain that. How will the sensor respond?

The sensor surface will adjust its shape over some time, not suddenly, then it will assume a new shape. The span of time involved in that adjustment is a measure of the sensor's latency. The adjustment in shape over time, a measure if its reactivity at that rate.

Now suppose we smoothly increase the rate to 80/20. The shape of the surface of the sensor will once again adjust and settle on a new shape. A shape that we can associate to the new rate. The "80/20" shape.

In engineering terms we say that the sensor surface has a static response and a dynamic response. The static response depends on the rate and is revealed in its shape.

The dynamic response is revealed by the amount of latency involved in changing shape to accommodate a sudden change of rate. We call a sudden change of rate a pulse.

How else could we adjust the system? We can dampen the sensor, and then later undampen it.

Note that if we flow a rate of 99/1 we have a shape that can adjust up to 100/0 but not to more than that. In engineering we say the sensor has become saturated. It has reached its dynamic limit, and can only adjust down. Likewise if we flow a rate of 0/100 the shape can only adjust up, and not down.

Most sensors are most reactive, and most true to proportion in the middle of their range.
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EP
EP AR my friend, you left me astonished and speechless !

Can we assume that "the surface area" is our body and soul ?
And can we say it like this ? "when we say that pleasure is the goal, we mean that we feel it AS MUCH AS the pain is reducing ? Or we say it : "the more the pleasure we feel, so much more the pain is reducing" ? Did I understand correct this issue Alexander or not ?
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Cassius Amicus
Cassius Amicus AR I agree that there is a good analogy here between pleasure/pain and the space relationship between bodies and void. However I suppose there are limits to the analogy in the same way that we see the trouble with saying that pleasure "is" the absence of pain - we are looking at pleasure and pain, and bodies and void, in only one respect, which I think is "quantity." Of course pleasure and pain and bodies and void (at least bodies) have many other qualities besides "quantity." Is that not the real problem we are running into, that "X is absence of Y" is in one respect only (quantity)? And that the stumbling block is that people are not recognizing that we are talking only in one respect, and not even attempting to give a full overview of the topic?

When we say the word "orange" in the context of describing the fruit, we know what we are talking about because we know the orange-colored fruit that grows on trees. But if we did not know what that fruit was, the word "orange" would tell us about it only in respect to its color, and leave us totally in the dark as to its other qualities.

That's what we seem to be doing here. Epicurus is concerned about quantity and quality because the existing philosophical discussion about the goal of life requires that discussion (the goal is thought to be something that cannot be increased or purified). And the "X is absence of Y" or "we only need X when Y is present" is terminology that derives from that quantity/quality context, presuming that we understand that the pleasures and pains involved are real and have many other attributes BESIDES their quantity and quality.
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Cassius Amicus
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Torquatus, from "On Ends": "Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature."

The fact that Epicurean philosophy rejects' Stoicism's fascination with the seductiveness of "virtue" is a major theme of Francis Wright's "A Few Days in Athens." Sometimes I think it is helpful to look the monster directly in the face so we can see the threat can be seen directly and identify it. Art can be very helpful in doing that. I woke up this morning thinking of examples of the "Virtue" mindset that might be appealing on first glance, and for some reason this clip comes to mind. Beautiful, or deadly, or both?

CA: I think that clip comes to mind as an illustration of this: "“True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, although neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal a part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly called punishment .” . .” — Marcus Tullius Cicero, Republic, The Laws, 59 – 47 B.C.

http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…amp;h=CAQEpRj4t

CA: How best to respond to the seductiveness of virtue and reason and logic as ends in themselves? I certainly don't think reason alone is the key - that would be very close to losing the war without fighting. The power of pleasure is not in reason or logic. If pleasure, which entails emotion, is the end of life, then pleasure and emotion are surely necessary for the defeat of the error of Stoic/Platonic "virtue" and "logic." Here is the most explicit artistic musical debate between the power of pleasure and the power of "virtue" that I am know about. Prevailing attitudes did not allow pleasure to win out in the story line, but I think pleasure clearly wins in the force of the performance, and the artist (Wagner) intended us to see that:

https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…amp;h=bAQEGANFl

MC While like you I think it's incorrect, why does it necessarily entail being a Javert or other fanatic if you do believe it?"

CA: If one believes that there is only one truth, one way of life, one goal for all, then oppression and force and suppression of other points of view are baked in the cake. And ironically that will be pursued for the "best interest" of those who don't see it, just as Javert illustrates here, and just as Plato concluded with his elevation of the "golden" as Epicurus himself observed."}

MC Yet it seems the Epicureans too believe in universal truths (pleasure is the highest good, etc.) This does not mean they use force or oppression."}"

CA: Yes but the nature of that truth makes all the difference, as not stemming from a single source, but from the properties of the innumerable atoms. Without a single source of universal logic and reason that applies at all times and all places and to all people (reference the Cicero quote for the opposite point of view) Epicurean philosophy leads to justice that is the same for all only to the extent that it is conducive to the happiness of those concerned, and it is not the same for all people at all times and all places."}" class="UFILikeLink">Like · Reply · 9 hrs

MC Yet it seems that the truths of Epicureanism apply universally as well, unless I am quite mistaken. I agree that Epicurean justice has great strength in encompassing many ways of existing. However it seems to me that many conceptions of natural law also allow for diversity. Forgive my ignorance if this is not the case here with the Stoic view."

CA: don't think we are in disagreement about Epicurean philosophy, but I think history shows that natural law which
is based not on nature, but on some single prime mover/divine fire/jehovah brings with it a tendency toward absolutism while Epicurean views naturally lead toward freedom."}"

MC: Well perhaps that is the problem then. So do you think in a way Epicureanism has it's "natural law"? In the sense that pleasure and so on are "laws of nature""

CA: Yes I do believe it is appropriate to talk about "laws of nature" in Epicurean terms. The essential difference is that Epicurean laws of nature derive from the properties of the elements, which most other concepts of natural law presuppose a deity or some kind putting things in motion, if not superintending it closely. But just because the two terms have dramatically different meanings does not mean that it is inappropriate to talk about laws of nature. Epicurus embraced reason and did not argue against it - he emphasized that the *basis* of reason has to be in reality, however, and not in abstraction. (And here's another good place to cite A A Long's Article "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism") http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…amp;h=2AQER2at9

CA: Your points are excellent, Michael, for highlighting the issues for someone trying to scrutinize the difference between Epicurus and Plato/Aristotle/Zeno. I also think that there is an even bigger challenge and distinction that some people don't see at first - the distinction between Epicurus and the "random universe" crowd (for lack of a better term at the moment).

The AA Long article is excellent for pointing out what I think is a danger bigger than the Stoic argument:: the danger of thinking that there is no "natural law" in the universe at all, and that "anything" can happen at "any time." That's a view that often leads to nihilism.

Not everyone, but some seem to think that the Epicurean swerve leads in the same direction of concluding that the universe is essentially "random." Long emphasizes and shows that this is not the effect or logical conclusion of the "swerve" as such a conclusion would totally contradict the rest of Epicurean physics. This is obvious from the chain argument in Book 1 of Lucretius that deduces the existence of the elements in the first place from the reliability of the things we see arising from the elements. If the swerve were the type of mechanism that led to major random and unpredictable events at **any** moment or place, then Lucretius' argument here would be nonsense.

As further evidence, Long points out that the ancient attackers of Epicurus (especially Cicero) never argued that the Epicurean scheme of nature is based on randomness, and this would have been the logical obvious line of attack if Epicurus had really held such a view. Even the fragmentary texts we have left are enough to establish that the swerve is limited in effect, and that while we can see the effects of the existence of the swerve by observing free will in higher life forms, the theory of the swerve does not undercut the essential "natural law" basis on which the universe operates.

CA: As I rewatch the Tannahuaser music duel, and read the words of the transcript, I think I would nominate Wagner (at least in this clip) as being the most clear-sighted Epicurean philosopher in at least 1500 years. Every passage, every contrast, almost every word, is as if he has studied Platonism, Stoicism, and Epicurean philosophy and distilled their differences down to the very heart of the matter.

I agree with you, Leonard, in disagreeing with the interpretation of 4. I also disagree with the interpretation of 3. In this case my disagreement is not mainly with Cyril (though that is there too) as much as it is with the T. itself. I do not blame this on Epicurus, but on whoever decided that 3 and 4
were adequate summaries of PD3 and PD4. Of course we don't know what else that person wrote in context to explain it, so I blame the situation mainly onVesuvius.

Cassius Amicus

The full PD3 and PD4 are of course:

3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When such pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.

4 "Continuous bodily pain does not last long; instead, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which slightly exceeds bodily pleasure does not last for many days at once. Diseases of long duration allow an excess of bodily pleasure over pain."

If one wants to use these to make a polemical (stoic) point about how the mind alone can overcome bad circumstances, so be it, because in some cases that is true. But we should not forget that there is alternative way of looking at PD 3 and 4: Epicurus was a philosophy teacher, and as such he was teaching his students the proper response to the establishment philosophers who taught that pleasure had no limit, and that continuous pleasure was impossible.

How to decide which interpretation is correct? Everyone can draw their own conclusions, but as for me, I ask whether Epicurus was the kind of teacher who would say to people in distressed circumstances that the good life is "easy" to get, or to people in the worst kind of pain from sickness and injury that pain is "easy" to avoid."

I believe these sentiments are accurately picked up by people like Leonard W Martin as ringing false, and therefore not what Epicurus taught. That's why I think the T. has to be carefully used, and kept in context of the rest of the teachings.

CJ What is this alternative interpretation? That Good Is hard to

MC So what do you think it means then?

Cassius Amicus I am doing nothing other that restating what DeWitt has explained exhaustively. Epicurus did not live and teach in a vacuum. He was dealing with and refuting claims made by generations of philosophers before him, especially Plato and Aristotle, and Plato in particular had taught that pleasure could not be the goal of life because it has no limit, and that pleasure could also not be the goal because it was not continuously present as our guide. These issues are in Phaedo and other Platonic works and well documented by DeWitt, which is one of the reasons that the mainstream doesn't like his work.

These issues were as important to a philosophic movement based on pleasure as was death and religion. And in order to refute them, just as PD1 and PD2 refute popular religion and fear of death, it is necessary to show the logical fallacy in the arguments. PD3 and other citations establish that pleasure DOES have a limit, and therefore there is nothing that is "higher" or "more worthy" or need
be "added" to pleasure to constitute the logical goal of life. This doctrine inoculates Epicurean students against the Platonic argument (repeated by Seneca and discussed here recently) showing that a life of full pleasure is possible.

PD4 does the same to refute the argument that pleasure cannot be the goal because it is not continuously present. Epicurus famously said that he calls us to a life of "continuous pleasure" and that is the context of the philosophical dispute. Pleasure IS constantly our guide because pain never overwhelms it to extinction.

These are common sense but crucial logical refutations of Platonic arguments. They are NOT the basis of flippant dismissal of the reality of pain, or the difficulty of achieving a peaceful and safe life.

We have NOTHING about the context of the tetrapharmakon to establish who the author was or what he said before or after that passage - even whether he was stating that this was a true doctrine of Epicurus.

This is much like the falsehood that is spread that ancient Epicureans lived in Communes. Where is the authority that establishes that ANY Epicurean ever referred in the ancient world to this formulation as helpful or authoritative? I have not seen any references to it in the texts anywhere, and the way it is used today reeks of anti-Epicurean sentiment that has infected the world since long before this parchment was discovered. Does anyone have ANY proof that an acknowledged faithful Epicurean cited it in an existing text? I haven't seen it - if someone has, please let us know.

Check the references here and you'll see that the authoritative use of this formulation (in a pro-Epicurean text in the ancient world, I mean) as a complete summary of PD3 and PD4 is non-existent.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetrapharmakos#cite_note-2

The issue that arises endlessly is whether we are discussing pleasure as a term that ordinary people understand when they hear the word "pleasure" or whether we are discussing "something else" which is what an ordinary person is going to query when he or she hears "absence of pain." In normal everyday conversation a thing is never fully described as "absence of something else." Now Epicurus had a very good reason for doing so in describing a measurement situation between 100% and 0%, and in stressing that one characterizes our feelings when the other is absent. That is exactly the kind of discussion that is necessary when we want to reply to Plato and show that pleasure DOES have a limit (as Plato famously argued in Phaedo does not exist) by establishing that it is not possible to exceed 100% or to drop below 0%.

That is the context in which the issue of "two states of feeling" comes up. Epicurus argued clearly that pleasure is the guide of life, and that "virtue" is an abstraction empty of real meaning except insofar as it describes a tool for us to achieve pleasant living. In that context hypothetical claims of "more than two states of feeling" are then seen to be an attack on the point of view that by nature we only have the faculty of pleasure and pain as a guide to life. For if there are more states that pleasure and pain, how do we know them, and how do we rank them? Does our reasoning about them supersede the ultimate guidance of pleasure and pain given us by nature?

The letter to Menoeceus was written to a student familiar with the doctrine and the debate with Plato, as all Epicurean students would have been. But this measurement/limit issue is not what the vast majority of people rightly understand the conversation to be about. They rightly (since the debate with Plato is long forgotten, and the goal is practical results and not just speculation) understand the conversation to be "what is pleasure?" and "is there something else or higher than pleasure that I really should be aiming at?"

And that is the only question that makes any difference to ordinary people uncorrupted by the word games of philosophy. They understand the issue to be: "Is pleasurable living the highest goal of life, or is there some god to which I need to kneel, or some 'virtue' or "worthy living" that can be defined and should be my goal?"

As you presumably well know, the Stoics attack pleasure in general as at best a distraction from worthy living, and they specifically attack the idea that pleasure is the guide of life (they substitute "virtue" or "wisdom"). It is essential in responding to that attack to show that the faculty of pleasure is indeed the guide of life. Yes, as part of an academic discussion of the background of pleasure it is important to show that pleasure and pain operate reciprocally and that the sum total can never exceed 100%. Stated differently, it is important to show that our total experience is always composed of either pleasures or pains such that the two always total the same 100%. But that is a background issue that arises only when dialecticians like Plato posit that there are "higher" states, and that pleasure cannot be the goal of life because there is always "more" to look for.

The real **foreground issue** that takes precedence in the discussion is the definition of the word "pleasure." Is it a word that means what we ordinarily understand it to mean- as it is given to us by the faculty of nature to understand - or is it something else. Does pleasure include sex, drugs and rock and roll (if one wants to be graphic), or does "pleasure" have some abstract meaning that it is necessary to logically factor out like the geometric theorems that Plato loved so much. Does "pleasure" refer to something as attainable and reachable as dancing and eating and enjoying picnics with friends, or does it mean "flourshing" and "living well" and require wealth and status as the Aristotelians and their progeny insist?

Epicurus identified that the faculty of perceiving pleasure and pain is the starting point of all thinking about ethics and how we should live our lives. It is to the faculty of pleasure and pain, and not to man-made abstractions, to which in the end we should reconcile all our choices and avoidances. Opponents of this theory don't always attack it head on - they seek to undermine it through logical nitpicking, and we have to be alert to put arguments in context so that we apply them in the appropriate context.

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http://newepicurean.com/happy-twentiet…-overcome-pain/Peace and Safety to the Epicureans of today, no matter where you might be - Happy Twentieth!

On this Twentieth of June I want to introduce you to the newest member of the Cassius family, pictured nearby. He (as yet unnamed) brings with him the unusual feature that he is blind. We found him three weeks ago among the mostly-feral barn cats that run near where we live, with his eyes already in terrible shape. When we took him to the vet we were told that he might well not live, and he certainly wouldn't live if we returned him to live outside. We also knew that with his blindness he'd be next to impossible to adopt out, but we made the decision to nurse him back to health and let the future take care of itself.

On a regular basis I like to drop back and summarize what I understand to be some of the key differences between Epicurean and other philosophies. This weekend I put together the following brief chart. There should be nothing on it new of different from things I have discussed on my blog before, but this format might be helpful for discussion and fine-tuning some of the terminology. As usual, there will be those who dispute my characterization of Stoic philosophy. Some of those challenges may be more or less valid - if you have a challenge to any of my formulations, please comment in the Epicurean Philosophy Facebook Group. If you do, it would be helpful if you would cite a reference to a recognized Stoic authority to show why you believe my summary is not accurate.

Everything here is a summary or paraphrase so no doubt much of it could be improved. If the chart serves as food for productive thought on these topics, then it has achieved its goal.

Click to view full size:

Cassius Amicus

May 8 at 10:22am

As we parse true and false definitions of "god" in the Epicurean context, there is a very explicit section near the end of Book 2 of "On The Nature of Things" to consider. Here, Lucretius calls Epicurean physics (eternal and infinite universe) to the task of overthrowing the standard definition of universe-creating supernatural gods. He then applies another physics principle (nature never creates only one single thing of a kind) to establish that the universe as a whole is teeming with life. Having set the context that there are boundless life forms in the boundless universe, Lucretius then sums up his argument that supernatural gods do *not* exist by appealing to the calm and undisturbed nature of the *true* Epicurean gods which *do* exist. Here are three different translations for comparison:

Munro:

Yet how little, you know, wearied as all are to satiety with seeing, any one now cares to look up into heaven’s glittering quarters! Cease therefore to be dismayed by the mere novelty and so to reject reason from your mind with loathing: weigh the questions rather with keen judgment and if they seem to you to be true, surrender, or if they are a falsehood, gird yourself to the encounter.

For since the sum of space is unlimited outside beyond these walls of the world, the mind seeks to apprehend what there is yonder there, to which the spirit ever yearns to look forward, and to which the mind’s emission reaches in free and unembarrassed flight. In the first place we see that round in all directions, about above and underneath, throughout the universe there is no bound, as I have shown and as the thing of itself proclaims with loud voice and as clearly shines out in the nature of bottomless space. In no wise then can it be deemed probable, when space yawns illimitable towards all points and seeds in number numberless and sum unfathomable fly about in manifold ways driven on in ceaseless motion, that this single earth and heaven have been brought into being, that those bodies of matter so many in number do nothing outside them; the more so that this world has been made by nature, just as the seeds of things have chanced spontaneously to clash, after being brought together in manifold wise without purpose, without foresight, without result, and at last have filtered through such seeds as, suddenly thrown together, were fitted to become on each occasion the rudiments of great things, of earth sea and heaven and the race of living things. Wherefore again and again I say you must admit that there are elsewhere other combinations of matter like to this with ether holds in its greedy grasp.

Again when much matter is at hand, when room is there and there is no thing, no cause to hinder, things sure enough must go on and be completed. Well, then, if on the one hand there is so great a store of seeds as the whole life of living creatures cannot reckon up, and if the same force and nature abide in them and have the power to throw the seeds of things together into their several places in the same way as they are thrown together into our world, you must admit that in other parts of space there -are other earths and various races of men and kinds of wild beasts.

Moreover in the sum of all there is no one thing which is begotten single in its kind and grows up single and sole of its kind; but a thing always belongs to some class and there are many other things in the same kind. First, in the case of living things, most noble Memmius, you will find that in this sort has been begotten the mountain-ranging race of wild beasts, in this sort the breed of men, in this sort too the mute shoals of scaly creatures and all bodies of fowls. Therefore on a like principle you must admit that earth, and sun, moon, sea, and all things else that are, are not single in their kind, but rather in number past numbering; since the deep-set boundary-mark of life just as much awaits these and they are just as much of a body that had birth, as any class of things which here on earth abounds in samples of its kind.

If you well apprehend and keep in mind these things, nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods. For I appeal to the holy breasts of the gods who in tranquil peace pass a calm time and an unruffled existence, who can rule the sum, who can hold in his hand with controlling force the strong reins, of the immeasurable deep?

Humphries:

And yet, a sight like this, Marvelous as it is, now draws no man To lift his gaze to heaven's bright areas. We are a jaded lot. But even so Don't be too shocked by something new, too scared To use your reasoning sense, to weigh and balance, So that if in the end a thing seems true, You welcome it with open arms; if false, You do your very best to strike it down.

The sum of space is infinite, reaching far Beyond the ramparts of the world; the mind Persists in questioning: what can be there?

What is there so far off, toward which the urge Of the free spirit flies?There is no end, No limit to the cosmos, above, below, Around, about, stretching on every side. This I have proven, but the fact itself Cries loud in proclamation, nature's deep Is luminous with proof. The universe Is infinitely wide; its vastness holds Innumerable seeds, beyond all count, Beyond all possibility of number, Flying along their everlasting ways. So it must be unthinkable that our sky And our round world are precious and unique While all those other motes of matter flit In idleness, achieve, accomplish nothing, Especially since this world of ours was made By natural process, as the atoms came Together, willy-nilly, quite by chance, Quite casually and quite intentionless Knocking against each other, massed, or spaced So as to colander others through, and cause Such combinations and conglomerates As form the origin of mighty things, Earth, sea and sky, and animals and men.

Face up to this, acknowledge it. I tell you Over and over - out beyond our world There are, elsewhere, other assemblages Of matter, making other worlds. Oh, ours Is not the only one in air's embrace. With infinite matter available, infinite space, And infinite lack of any interference, Things certainly ought to happen. If we have More seeds, right now, than any man can count, More than all men of all time past could reckon, And if we have, in nature, the same power To cast them anywhere at all, as once They were cast here together, let's admit - We really have to - there are other worlds, More than one race of men, and many kinds Of animal generations.

Furthermore, Adding up all the sum, you'll never find One single thing completely different From all the rest, alone, apart, unique,

Sole product, single specimen of its kind. Look at the animals: is this not true Of mountain-ranging species, and of men, Of the silent schools of fish, of flying things? Likewise you must admit that earth, sun, moon, Ocean, and all the rest, are not unique, But beyond reckoning or estimate. Their term of life is definitely set And so remains, their substance is of stuff No less ephemeral than what we see In the teeming multitudes of our own earth.

Holding this knowledge, you can't help but see That nature has no tyrants over her, But always acts of her own will; she has No part of any godhead whatsoever. By all that's holy in the tranquil calm Where the gods pass serene eternal days I ask you - which of them is strong enough To rule the sum of things, to hold the reins Of absolute profundity, or move the skies To turn together? Who can warm the lands To fruitfulness with fire sent down from heaven? Who can be immanent in every time, In every place - to cloud the world in dark, To shake the quiet areas of sky With terrible sound? Who sends the lightning's blast Even at his own temples? Who departs To wilderness, but as he goes, in wrath, Lets fly the bolts that pass the guilty by And murder undeserving innocents?

Bailey:

Yet think how no one now, wearied with satiety of seeing, deigns to gaze up at the shining quarters of the sky! Wherefore cease to spew out reason from your mind, struck with terror at mere newness, but rather with eager judgement weigh things, and, if you see them true, lift your hands and yield, or, if it is false, gird yourself to battle.

For our mind now seeks to reason, since the sum of space is boundless out beyond the walls of this world, what there is far out there, whither the spirit desires always to look forward, and whither the unfettered projection of our mind flies on unchecked. First of all, we find that in every direction everywhere, and on either side, above and below, through all the universe, there is no limit, as I have shown, and indeed the truth cries out for itself and the nature of the deep shines clear. Now in no way must we think it likely, since towards every side is infinite empty space, and seeds in unnumbered numbers in the deep universe fly about in many ways driven on in everlasting motion, that this one world and sky was brought to birth, but that beyond it all those bodies of matter do naught; above all, since this world was so made by nature, as the seeds of things themselves of their own accord, jostling from time to time, were driven together in many ways, rashly, idly, and in vain, and at last those united, which, suddenly cast together, might become ever and anon the beginnings of great things, of earth and sea and sky, and the race of living things. Wherefore, again and again, you must needs confess that there are here and there other gatherings of matter, such as is this, which the ether holds in its greedy grip.

Moreover, when there is much matter ready to hand, when space is there, and no thing, no cause delays, things must, we may be sure, be carried on and completed. As it is, if there is so great a store of seeds as the whole life of living things could not number, and if the same force and nature abides which could throw together the seeds of things, each into their place in like manner as they are thrown together here, it must needs be that you confess that there are other worlds in other regions, and diverse races of men and tribes of wild beasts.

This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.

And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods. For by the holy hearts of the gods, which in their tranquil peace pass placid years, and a life of calm, who can avail to rule the whole sum of the boundless, who to hold in his guiding hand the mighty reins of the deep, who to turn round all firmaments at once, and warm all fruitful lands with heavenly fires, or to be at all times present in all places, so as to make darkness with clouds, and shake the calm tracts of heaven with thunder, and then shoot thunderbolts, and often make havoc of his own temples, or moving away into deserts rage furiously there, plying the bolt, which often passes by the guilty and does to death the innocent and undeserving?

JS

JS Cassius Amicus Are you saying that " *true* Epicurean gods which *do* exist" as ACTUAL LIVING DEITIES or what follows from the ETERNAL LAWS OF NATURE? I see no proof of living gods. Naturalism only holds the sovereignty of natural principles (e.g. gravitational constant, mu, fine structure constant and other real and scientifically proven fixed values...).

Like · Reply · May 9 at 12:18pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus First and foremost, I am saying that we can't clearly discuss the issue until we are clear on what the Epicureans actually believed and taught. Despite the immense hurdles involved given our own prejudices and definitions, I think we owe the Epicureans the respect to take them at their words and accept their definitions before we pronounce them "wrong."

Virtually every discussion, even here, seems to ignore the Epicurean definition of "god" in preference to the standard Jude-Christian-Islamic definition of the term. So for instance when you say "I see no proof of living gods" are you saying that you reject the probability of life outside of Earth? If you accept that life exists in other places besides Earth, do you reject the probability of there being life forms of greater lifespan and intelligence and technology (including ability to experience undiluted pleasure) than our own?

This selection from Lucretius is very clear as to the basis for arguing that forms of life "higher" than humans can with confidence be expected to exist elsewhere in the universe. That's not to say that we will ever find them ourselves, but that is not the fault of the argument, it is a result of our stage of technology.

As I read this, the Epicureans were saying that just as it is necessary (in the experience of most men, anyway) to have an answer to the question "Where did the Earth come from?" it is also necessary to have confidence in the answer to the questions "Are we alone in the universe?" and "Are we the highest life form within the universe?" I get the point that a lot of people think that it is sufficient to say "we don't know" to such questions, but it seems clear that Epicurus was driving toward the view that we should have confidence in those observations that are clear to us. Once the eternal / infinite universe is established by the "nothing from nothing" observation, it is a very short step to the conclusion that "we are not alone" based on the "nature never creates a single thing of a kind" observation.

It is not possible to take these speculations a lot further without descending into "the gods speak Greek" level of speculation, but that does not mean that one should not go as far as the evidence indicates. And what the evidence does clearly indicate to Epicurus seems pretty clear to me - that we are not alone in the universe, nor are we the "highest" form of life possible. Carrying the argument to that point and stopping short of the supernatural would have been within the capability of every ancient Epicurean. I believe it is mainly just our own corruption by Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheism that makes the conclusion so difficult to accept today. But that difficulty is no reason to step back from it, and it is certainly no reason not to respect the Epicureans enough to state their position clearly before one dismisses (or embraces) it.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 9 at 1:26pm · Edited

JS

JS I agree that there is most probably many other life-forms. I intuit from the above you agree in the existence of extra-terrestrials which we deduce rationally by it's probability. However, do you believe these beings as "imperishable" (PD1)? If so, this is as unsupported as the other 5000 gods presently believed with no evidence.

Like · Reply · May 9 at 3:14pm · Edited

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus First of all, again, my goal is not to agree or disagree, but to understand and restate accurately the position of the ancient Epicureans.

Secondly, I think it is important to emphasize not "probability in general" but to cite the specific arguments that support the probability. (Nature never makes only a single one of a kind; also the "isonomia" argument which is considerably more difficult.)

But to deal with your specific question, I again think you are trivializing the argument of Lucretius unnecessarily. I don't care that you disparage whether I agree with it or not, but I do think that people who disparage it ought first to be able to state the Epicurean argument sympathetically before equating it to "5000 gods presently believed in with no evidence."

Neither Lucretius (nor I) have cited any **particular** "god" as imperishable or omnipotent or anything else. That would be the equivalent of asserting that Yahweh or Allah or some specific god exists. The argument is simply that it is probable to the point of effective certainty that there exists, within the natural universe, natural living beings which have reached the ability to regenerate so as to be deathless.

By analogy, I have never and will never see an "atom" (considered properly as an indivisible particle), and yet I organize my life with confidence that they exist. Some might say that it is not necessary to take a position on whether atoms exist, but the Epicureans considered it to be mentally healthy for confident living to be able to identify a mechanism by which the universe functions (1) without supernatural guidance but also (2) with repeatable regularity.

In the same way, I have never and will likely never see a deathless being that is entirely self-sufficient. Yet I can readily see how the Epicureans would have thought it mentally healthy to consider a proper definition of "godhood" in conformity with characteristics that we can understand. Agnosticism is entirely acceptable as an answer to lots of questions, but not when we are discussing the role of gods in nature and everyone around us is suggesting that we pray for rewards or cower in fear. In those cases, and those are the cases most men face, then "I don't know" whether such punishing and rewarding gods exist isn't a good enough response. In that context Epicurean "gods" serve a purpose similar to Epicurean "atoms." We cannot see, touch, taste, smell, or hear them, and yet we organize our lives as if they exist and we understand basic attributes of their nature.

Like · Reply · 4 · May 9 at 6:05pm · Edited

JS

JS

Like · Reply · May 9 at 6:20pm

JS

JS So then you must be convinced in deathless beings or gods. Fair enough. I have to say I'm unconvinced but am now more clear of your position here.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 9 at 6:21pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus In your last reply, you mix "deathless beings" which is a term consistent with the Epicurean position, with the indeterminate term "gods." By doing so you seem to insist on the standard Judeo-Christian-Islamic-monotheistic definition of "gods" - which is most certainly *not* consistent with the Epicurean position. What I am "convinced of" is that the ancient Epicureans were very sharp, and that those who sell them short before they take the time to attempt to understand their position do a disservice to both the ancient Epicureans and to themselves.

Like · Reply · 4 · May 10 at 8:19am

JB

JB Jerry, despite our previous disagreements I am sympathetic to your position on the gods. That said, as I repeatedly mull over the Epicurean concept of gods I find the Abrahamic concept of god becoming uprooted from my preconceptions as it is a deeply unsatisfying construct. The early cultural repetition of such a perverse concept is extremely difficult to let go of, but I'm finding that "... the study of philosophy pleasure accompanies growing knowledge; for pleasure does not follow learning; rather, learning and pleasure advance side by side."

Unlike · Reply · 4 · May 10 at 1:13pm · Edited

JS

JS JB I too have had to uproot theistic beliefs from my life. This has allowed me to truly find a happiness that comes from releasing the dread that comes from unsupported beliefs and opinions. Epicureanism answers the most basic questions of what is, how to think and live. The more obscure issues of physics and causes, I will leave to the province of the natural sciences.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 10 at 2:31pm · Edited

CJ

CJ JS You mention that you see no proof of living gods. In epicurean epistemology there is no need for such a proof, and even delivering such a proof would be unimaginable because gods are non evident. By definition such a proof not exist. Supposition about nonevident things is true when there is a possibility derived from and based on atomistic principles and there is no evidence of our senses that contest it. If we would dissmissed epicurean atomism like you suggest but at the same time we would keep leftovers from epicurean epistemolgy (after all most of it is mended together with physics so it have to go with it) then only HONEST answer would be something similar to answer of Protagoras: "We have no means of knowing whether they exist or not, nor of what sort they may be, because of the obscurity of the subject, and the brevity of human life".

For the record orbiting teapots and spaghetti-monster are evident if there are any,

Unlike · Reply · 2 · May 10 at 2:26pm

JS

JS It is best to leave behind the meer question of a spaghetti monster or deathless being if the question itself creates turmoil in our minds. Tranquility is seated on the bedrock of a clear mind. "A wise man proportions his beliefs to the evidence." - David Hume.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 10 at 2:30pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus This gets to the root of the issue where Jerry and I differ: "It is best to leave behind the mere question of a spaghetti monster or deathless being if the question itself creates turmoil in our minds." I do not believe most people can or should approach life in this way. Most people are constantly confronted with issues which demand our attention and which are not in our power to ignore. Such questions, for most people, not limited to those who live in areas of religious fanaticism (where their very lives depend on understanding the issues) include questions about the origin of the universe and the existence of gods. Taking an "I don't know and I don't care" approach to the questions that vex most normal human beings is itself the trap door to falling into pits of anxiety from which there is no escape. Epicurean philosophy is not about evading questions, it is about finding answers to questions that will allow us to live our lives happily.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 10 at 2:47pm

JS

JS The best way to relieve fear is knowledge. PD 12 "One cannot rid himself of his primal fears if he does not understand the nature of the universe but instead suspects the truth of some mythical story. So without the study of nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure." https://web.archive.org/.../wiki.../Principal_Doctrine_12

Principal Doctrine 12 - Epicurus Wiki

One cannot rid himself of his primal fears if he does not understand the nature of the universe but instead suspects the truth of some mythical story. So without the study of nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure.

WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG

Unlike · Reply · Remove Preview · 2 · May 10 at 2:51pm

JB

JB Jerry, is it the question that causes turmoil or is it the lack of a satisfactory answer?

Epicurus tells us that the gods, as conceived by the many, do not exist and those who hold those beliefs are the ones who are actually impious. Biologically immortal beings exist here on earth, why shouldn't they exist elsewhere in the universe in a state of complete tranquility?

The Epicurean preconception of gods is far more interesting to discuss with someone from the Abrahamic faiths than my usual atheism. I enjoy having an answer to their questions about gods instead of what amounts to a dismissive non-answer from their perspective. The former primes them to think about their conceptions, the latter makes them combative, generally speaking.

Unlike · Reply · 1 · May 10 at 3:35pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Context makes a tremendous difference. I grew up and live now in a very religious area where I am constantly confronted by discussion about "god." Many places in the world are like that. On the other hand, there are apparently places where society has largely deemed talk of religion to be irrelevant, and the majority follow some form of "atheism." For those in such an area I can certainly see that discussion of godhood is largely irrelevant except as a very abstract matter.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 10 at 4:08pm

HD

HD JB

''Biologically immortal beings exist here on earth''. This statement is contrary to the epicurean canon of truth. Do you have any evidence? Otherwise we enter into idealism and in very dangerous waters. Epicurus assumption for their existence has been found false and therefore his conclusion. Do you still believe in the reality of dreams? Or the preconceptions of gods? We live in 2016 not in 300 bc!

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 12:13am

JB

JB Turritopsis dohrnii, for one. Here, I did some Googling: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_immortality

Like · Reply · May 11 at 9:38am

HD

HD This reference is unrelated to gods.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 9:43am

JB

JB Jerry was talking about deathless beings. We have those here, within our local environment. Is it so difficult to think that others may exist elsewhere in the universe in a form more advanced than they do here?

All living things, even hydras and jellyfish, shun pain and pursue pleasure. Is it entirely inconceivable that something like a hydra or jellyfish might fulfill the concept of a perfect being, an Epicurean god, if it were found immortal and in a state of complete tranquility? Forget needing five senses or being a chordate. Why does a god need to resemble humanity in any way to serve as an example to emulate? All it has to possess is the experience of continuous and unperturbed tranquility for eternity, the details are quite irrelevant.

Personally, while I find the Epicurean argument on gods /more/ useful when arguing religion with my Abrahamic friends, I still remain effectively an atheist. Statistically, the chances of us (as a species) ever meeting an extra-terrestrial intelligence, much less encounter one that might meet the definition of an Epicurean god is so vanishingly small that it may well be an impossibility. I suspect that if one or several even exist in our universe that we would never even be able to encounter them because they would have secured themselves to such an extent that it would be impossible.

Gods have always just been a thought experiment Haris, despite any arguments to the contrary. They serve a purpose as such, but are nothing more.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:00am · Edited

HD

HD Thinling is an idealistic attitude in reaching truth. Also the techniques of analogy, induction and so on, are prone to errors. So we need evidence, in the epicurean sense. Otherwise we are mere idealists.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:01am

JB

JB I'm not certain what you mean by "evidence, in the epicurean sense."

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:19am

HD

HD the senses and real life experience.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:21am

JB

JB So, evidence.

There's a lot of analogy and induction used in Epicurean philosophy, I'm not certain that it should be discarded due to being prone to errors. Thinking about gods is an error, but it causes lots of harm to people so it's useful to analogize and use inductive reasoning to ease their suffering when dealing with an idea that is completely imaginary.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:28am

HD

HD No one nowadays excepts the validity of this technique. It is out of the question in the era of scientific explosion.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:33am

JB

JB Supposition is the basis from which we develop testable hypotheses. Analogy (mathematics and geometry are analogs of real phenomena) is useful to explain things that are difficult to grasp when direct observation is difficult due to perspective.

A map with errors still can be useful, particularly when new observations are used to update it. Some times "here be dragons" suffices to mark a place when direct observation isn't currently possible. We know something is there, we just don't know what form it takes but it might still be useful to make an educated guess. Kind of like the recent Kepler announcement about potentially habitable planets.

Like · Reply · May 11 at 10:49am

Cassius Amicus

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Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Haris what is your reasoning behind this statement? "Epicurus assumption for their existence has been found false." What assumption are you referring to specifically, and how has it been "found false"?

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 6:42am · Edited

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus As for biological immortality I know nothing but what is in this wikipedia article so I am interested in Jason's response. It sounds from reading this that it might be better to refer to these examples as "approaching" immortality because they can certainly be killed. However the example of these very-long-lived beings provides observation from real life that life-span is not limited by supernatural forces. Thus in the right environment (speculated reasonably but perhaps primitively to be "between the worlds" by the Epicureans) effective immortality might be achievable. And it is my understanding that the concept of isonomia and/or anticipations in this department would be built on/reinforced by just such observations (that some things have short lifespans but others have long ones, indicating a spectrum from lowest to highest in lifespans).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_immortality

Like · Reply · 2 · May 11 at 6:52am · Edited

HD

HD The conclusion of Epicurus that gods exist (1,2) is based on the assumption that dreams are true and represent reality(3,4). So as long as we the modern humans are concerned to accept the conclusion have to accept the reality of the dreams, which has been rejected. Hence, we have to reject the conclusion for the existence of gods as well.

1. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions;

2. For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; them to be the elements of right life. First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing,

3. For the presentations which, for example, are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.

4. Even the objects presented to madmen and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects—i.e. movements in the mind—which that which is unreal never does.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 11 at 7:01am

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus So you discount totally the statement in Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods":

“But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence. For the divine form we have the hints of nature supplemented by the teachings of reason. From nature all men of all races derive the notion of gods as having human shape and none other; for in what other shape do they ever appear to anyone, awake or asleep? But not to make primary concepts the sole test of all things, reason itself delivers the pronouncement. For it seems appropriate that a being who is the most exalted, whether by reason of his happiness or of his eternity, should also be the most beautiful; but what disposition of the limbs, what cast of features, what shape or outline can be more beautiful than the human form? You Stoics at least, Lucilius, (for my friend Cotta says one thing at one time and another at another) are wont to portray the skill of the divine creator by enlarging on beauty as well as the utility of design displayed in all parts of the human figure. But if the human figure surpasses the form of all other living beings, and god is a living being, god must possess the shape which is the most beautiful of all; and since it is agreed that the gods are supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason is only found in the human shape, it follows that the gods possess the form of man. Yet their form is not corporeal, but only resembles bodily substance; it does not contain blood, but the semblance of blood.

“These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind's eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal.Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals, and if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite.

And you discount also, from Lucretius, this elaboration:

"Moreover in the sum of all there is no one thing which is begotten single in its kind and grows up single and sole of its kind; but a thing always belongs to some class and there are many other things in the same kind. First, in the case of living things, most noble Memmius, you will find that in this sort has been begotten the mountain-ranging race of wild beasts, in this sort the breed of men, in this sort too the mute shoals of scaly creatures and all bodies of fowls. Therefore on a like principle you must admit that earth, and sun, moon, sea, and all things else that are, are not single in their kind, but rather in number past numbering; since the deep-set boundary-mark of life just as much awaits these and they are just as much of a body that had birth, as any class of things which here on earth abounds in samples of its kind."

And in discounting these arguments in the texts, you limit the proof of "gods" to be solely based on "dreams," despite these references and despite Epicurus' citation of anticipations in his letter to Menoeceus?

It seems that the crux of our disagreement is that you limit the proof you are willing to consider of the existence of Epicurean gods to "dreams." And by that I gather you mean the ordinary term of "dreams" and not the "images" discussion. I would maintain that the texts show that the Epicureans did not limit their argument to dreams (arising from images) at all, and that the far more important part of their argument were their natural observations as referenced above.

We will certainly agree to disagree, but it is helpful to everyone to state the relevant positions clearly.

Like · Reply · 2 · May 11 at 9:23am

HD

HD There is also the canon of truth regarding the external environment, that introduces the criteria of 1)confirmation and 2) non contradiction. Non of these abide with the existence of gods. By appying the epicurean rules we dissaprove the epicurean claim for the existence of gods. This shows that his assumptions were false.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 9:31am

HC

HC Speaking of immortals... http://www.livescience.com/53178-hydra-may-live-forever.html

Hail the Hydra, an Animal That May Be Immortal

LIVESCIENCE.COM

Like · Reply · Remove Preview · 2 · May 11 at 11:28am

JB replied · 6 Replies

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus It appears to me here, Haris, when you say "There is also the canon of truth regarding the external environment, that introduces the criteria of 1)confirmation and 2) non contradiction. None of these abide with the existence of gods." ...that you are presuming that we have proof of the "external environment" so superior to the ancient Epicureans that we can be certain that they were incorrect. While we certainly have methods of searching out into space that are far superior to those of the ancient Epicureans - presuming that you adhere to the Epicurean boundless universe theorem - then we cannot by definition claim to know what exists in the boundless space that is beyond our ability to pierce even with our current technology.

Second but related, I presume also that you do not believe that we on Earth are the only living beings in the universe. If we are not the only living beings in the universe, are you prepared to say with confidence that none anywhere are higher? Are you prepared to say with confidence that none have achieved deathlessness in their own environments?

An argument is frequently made (it is not my favorite, by the way) that men should keep themselves in perspective because our earth is but a speck in the universe. That is not my favorite argument because it can be used to demean the importance of life too far. But I believe the Epicureans saw (see the Lucretius passage) that it is damaging to believe that Earth is the only location of life in the universe. Such a conclusion is so counter-rational to the infinite/boundless/natural universe theorm that it plays directly into the hands of those who argue that the Earth was created supernaturally for our own benefit.

If for no other reason than the one I just stated, it seems to me to be very important to preserve the Epicurean argument in its purity. As for me, I step back from presuming that our technology, while superior, can claim things that it manifestly cannot claim (to be able to see into "ALL" of the universe and know ALL things that are far out in space, and to therefore establish the counterintuitive - the conclusion no deathless beings exist anywhere.)

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 11:48am

HD

HD Cassius,

We should not use the same arguments both to defend ourselves and attack our idealistic opponents. If someone claims that something exists he has to present his arguments and evidence to support his views and not expect the others that he's wrong.

Epicurus was interested in knowledge that potentially influence human happiness. He showed no interest in knowledge that did not affect directly or indirectly one’s life. If there is sensual or scientific evidence that convince me that a knowledge is related to my happiness then I may be interested in examining it. We are not to study anything without the criterion of utility. So this issue of immortality does not affect my well-being at all. Neither it serves as a convincing proof that other entities of any nature exist.

To me this issue under discussion has to do with our own perceptions and influences and not with any real reason. So Epicurus would advise to look into our own perceptions instead of trying to claim something that has no proof and is only conceptual reasoning.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 12:12pm

JS

JS Asserting infinite beings and asserting in deathless beings are two species of arguments with the later having no other claim then baseless opinion.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 1:21pm

JB

JB Jerry, I concur with infinite beings, no such thing can even exist in a material universe such as ours, given the preconditions. Physical immortality on the other hand isn't beyond the realm of possibility at least to the extent that internal factors aren't the cause of death as evidenced by recent discoveries right here on Earth of creatures that can continually regenerate given sufficient energy input. Perhaps if they were in possession of the ability to defend against chance, as the wise man is exhorted to do, they might achieve a true immortality not dependent on circumstance. There may very well be some sentient creatures out in the infinitude of space that have achieved this particular combination of attributes that also are in a state of perpetual ataraxia.

That's certainly something worthy of emulation, the sole purpose that the concept of gods serve in Epicurean philosophy if I'm not mistaken, contra the Abrahamic conception of gods which forever remains out of reach given the impossibility of a supernatural existence.

Let us not borrow concepts from religious systems. The utility of discussing Epicurean gods is in presuming a conception that is consistent with the evidence at hand and extrapolating from there in order to give us a basis from which to experimentally test for their existence. You cannot test the supernatural. Let's not get stuck on those non-atomistic concepts!

This is why we need to talk about Epicurean gods. Our concept of the gods has been perverted through polluted thinking that has infected our culture. It's far easier to just ignore it and say we're atheists and Epicurus was a closeted atheist, but that shuts down conversation and leaves very real suffering unsalved. Supposition is the cornerstone of discovery and without the study of nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure. I think the idea of extra-terrestrial Epicurean "gods" is an (but not necessarily the only) elegant solution that fits well in an atomistic theory of the universe. How arrogant to think that we're the highest form of life in the infinitude!

Unlike · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 4:57pm · Edited

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Jerry: Who has asserted "infinite beings??" Certainly not me! I realize the difficulty of talking through an issue where the Epicurean definitions are different from the common ones, but it is essential not to track back and forth, and I am trying to be as clear as possible that I am sticking with *Epicurean* definitions of godhood, not the common one.....

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 4:55pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Haris please be assured I mean nothing here as an *attack* on you or anyone who disagrees with me. I find this discussion very helpful because I believe it is an important comment. With that prelude let me comment on a couple of your points. JB has stated several of them, but let me address them too:

" If someone claims that something exists he has to present his arguments and evidence to support his views and not expect the others that he's wrong." >>>

"Epicurus was interested in knowledge that potentially influence human happiness. He showed no interest in knowledge that did not affect directly or indirectly one’s life." >>

"If there is sensual or scientific evidence that convince me that a knowledge is related to my happiness then I may be interested in examining it. We are not to study anything without the criterion of utility. So this issue of immortality does not affect my well-being at all. Neither it serves as a convincing proof that other entities of any nature exist. To me this issue under discussion has to do with our own perceptions and influences and not with any real reason. So Epicurus would advise to look into our own perceptions instead of trying to claim something that has no proof and is only conceptual reasoning."

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 5:16pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Keeping in mind that I think our first and foremost inquiry ought to be that we *understand* what the Epicureans held, before we *judge* what the Epicureans held, here is a section from DeWitt directly on point:

EXISTENCE OF THE GODS

Those who are bound to make an empiricist of Epicurus have been compelled to represent him as finding the evidence for the existence of gods in vision. This is an error and a curious one; it was Eudoxus and Plato who appealed to vision as evidence of the existence of gods.12 The former declared that it mattered little what a man thought of the gods of Greek mythology but it mattered much what he thought about the visible gods, that is, the planets. It was on account of his revulsion from this teaching that Epicurus damned the Eudoxans as "enemies of Hellas." «

So far as vision is concerned, Epicurus denied that the gods were visible to the physical eye, though he did think them visible to the mind when operating as a supersensory organ of vision. The value attached to this evidence, however, was strictly limited. It served two purposes: first, to furnish a hint concerning the form of the gods, and second, to awaken in the minds of men the innate notion of the divine being there residing. This innate notion, Prolepsis or Anticipation, was the prime and primal evidence of the existence of gods. According to this notion the gods enjoyed perfect happiness and were immune to corruption. Add to this the information that they were anthropomorphic, gleaned from visions whether of day or night, and this is the sum total of knowledge attainable without recourse to reason and deduction.

The first approach, as in the letter to the lad Menoeceus, is dogmatic: "For there are gods, because the knowledge of them is manifest." u This is the appeal to the authority of Nature. The recognition of the existence of gods is apparent among all races. Cicero makes the meaning clear: "For what race is there or what breed of men that does not possess what we may call an Anticipation of gods, which Epicurus calls a Prolepsis?"1B This is what Epicurus calls by way of description "the universal idea" of the divine being. Its validity, however, depends only in part upon its universality; its main validity derives from the fact that the human being is believed to be preconditioned by Nature for the reception of the idea in advance of experience. For this reason the idea is called an Anticipation or Prolepsis. This priority to experience is part of its qualification as a criterion.

By Cicero's time, however, the syncretism of Stoic and Epicurean ideas had long been in progress, and he erred in saying that Nature had "stamped" this idea of the divine upon the minds of men as if with a seal upon wax.16 Such a comparison, it is true, was known to Epicurus but he employed it to illustrate the precision of the impression made upon vision by the pressure of the streams of images or idols which account for the sense of sight. Cicero went even farther astray when he wrote of the notion of godhead as "incised" or "engraved" upon the mind.17 The word he employed, insculpsit, could by no interpretation connote faintness or dimness of outline, which was an essential implication of the theory of Epicurus.

The semantic area in which the terminology of Epicurus belongs is that of biology. He thinks of the beginning and growth of the Prolepsis as a genetic process. The newborn infant lacks the use of certain senses, not to say reason; he is only potentially a rational creature. Still, just as the use of the senses exists potentially in the infant and so precedes and anticipates experience, so the capability of apprehending abstract ideas exists potentially from the first and only by degrees becomes actual in pace with experience, instruction, and reflection. As already mentioned, the idea of god is thought of as emerging in the mind just as the network of veins emerges in the embryo, prefiguring and anticipating the development of the whole organism. The mistake of Cicero was to intrude the Stoic idea of the mind as a tablet, capable of receiving impressions. This was not Epicurean.

Once this "universal idea" of the divine being, congenitally existing in the minds of men, has been assumed to precede and anticipate experience, the question that next presents itself is by what agency this potential experience is made actual. Bearing upon this question is the belief of Epicurus that the stimulus to thought and action of necessity comes from without; even the act of walking is believed by him to be preceded by images of the person in the act of walking, a preview of modern gestalt psychology.18 It is consistent with this belief in the external stimulus that Sextus Empiricus, who is a rather careful citator, informs us that according to Epicurus man derived his idea of godhead from the visions of sleep, the assumption being that these correspond to external realities.19 This evidence is confirmed by the testimony of Lucretius.20

In scanning the latter's testimony, however, the reader must be on guard to observe that true religion and false religion took their start from the same experiences, and the poet is chiefly concerned for the moment with false religion. Nevertheless, he is in accord with the evidences above quoted when he heads his list with visions of the gods witnessed by day or more often by night. It was from these that men first learned of the form of the gods, their stature and beauty. The rest of the passage belongs to the story of superstition.

In respect of the evidence afforded by dreams it is timely to issue a general and a specific warning: the general warning is against the assumption that the doctrines of Epicurus are easy to understand; the specific warning is against assigning more than a minimum value to the evidence of dreams. The vision of gods seen in a dream is no more evidence for the existence of gods than a vision of centaurs is evidence for the existence of centaurs. Only two functions are assigned to dreams in the extant authorities: one function, as gleaned from Sextus Empiricus, is to act as a stimulus to the innate Prolepsis of godhead, which up to a point is merely potential, and thus render it actual;21 the other function is to furnish a hint, and no more, of the form of the gods, as Cicero informs us.22 More will be said of this under the heading that next follows.

Confirmatory evidence for the existence of gods was found in logical deduction; this will be discussed in the section on Isonomy and the Gods.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 5:21pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Also from Dewitt:

ISONOMY AND THE GODS (part 1)

In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. He enunciated his Twelve Elementary Principles and adhered to them closely. Two of these, the fifth and sixth, asserted the infinity of the universe in respect of matter and space. To this idea of infinity he ascribed fundamental importance. He exhorted the young Pythocles to study it as one of those master principles which would render easy the recognition of causation in details.68 Cicero must have been recalling some similar exhortation when he wrote: "But of the very greatest importance is the significance of infinity and in the highest degree deserving of intense and diligent contemplation." 69 He was quoting Epicurus.

It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia, a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it aequabilis tributio, "equitable apportionment." 70 The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.

The term isonomia itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word prolepsis. To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to eunomia, government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.

Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 5:24pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Isonomy and the Gods - Part 2

That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed."71 The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." 72 Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.

It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." 73 One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled On Evidences, "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." 74 Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." 75 This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.

The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.

At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.76 The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.77

In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." 78 This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.

It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite."79 This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called intermundia, where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 5:24pm

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Reading over this reminds me how influential Dewitt has been on my thought patterns. I wish I had done a more articulate job of representing these passages, particularly in regard to the important point that Epicurus himself did not call the "gods" "deathless." That observation points out the necessity of being very careful about the word "immortal" too. The principles we are discussing here have sweeping implications far beyond just their use in opposing "false religion."

Like · Reply · 1 · May 11 at 5:30pm · Edited

HD

HD I feel that we disagree to disagree, as we search truth by different means. Your documentation is excellent from an ancient epicurean point of view, which had to employ hypothesizing, reasoning and a lot of phantasy. From the other hand I look for truth by modern means such as science, supported by sensual and empirical data. None of your arguments is based on any of these contemporary criteria, so I cannot agree with them, although I find them interesting out of mere curiosity.

We should be though very considerate when we use reasoning to find truth for this is not the recommendation of the epicurean philosophy. Instead it suggests to use science, the senses and experiences. Logical reasoning was the only means of the ancients that’s why they made some crucial mistakes, such as the size of the sun, or the existence of gods. By employing reasoning today we run the risk to accept the christian god, or afterlife. I don’t see the difference between a humane immortal god and a spiritual Christian god, as long as the proof in both cases is reasoning. To me overuse of reasoning leads to stoicism, Platonism, and in any sort of reasonable philosophy.

The fundamental premise of the epicurean philosophy is to rely on the truth of the senses and not of reasoning. If we cross this line we enter in alien waters.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 12 at 1:29am

JS

JS "Intuition untested and unsupported is an uncertain guarantee of the truth." - Bertrand Russell

Like · Reply · 1 · May 12 at 11:11am

CJ

CJ but russel wasn't sure that it is uncertain because he did "not feel absolutely certain of anything" . And BTW famous people are not certain criteria of truth, that I am certain of" smile emoticon

Unlike · Reply · 1 · May 12 at 2:36pm

JS

JS He was certain there was no teapot revolving around the sun. A good criterion of logic here is venerability and no infinite beings cannot be discerned from the present knowledge of science. For instance rules of Blackbody Radiation and Thermodynamics rules out an "impermanent being."

Like · Reply · May 12 at 5:28pm

CJ

CJ JS And other rules accept that at the beginning there was nothing and then it exploded, that one-dimentional objects exist and that you can drill a hole in space... and accept all this without evidence.

The raven calling the crow black.

But there is other implication in your answer that is intersting. If scientific laws are capable of ruling something out they are themselves criteria of truth. very unsure, sometimes contradictory and changing in time but criteria of truth nevertheless.

Unlike · Reply · 2 · May 12 at 6:41pm · Edited

Cassius Amicus

Cassius Amicus Very profound, IMO, Cyryl, " If scientific laws are capable of ruling something out they are themselves criteria of truth..." and very consistent with DeWitt's interpretations. Your point illustrates why "scientific laws" were *not* listed as part of the Epicurean canon of truth, but the senses/anticipations/feelings of pain-pleasure *were.*

Like · Reply · 2 · May 12 at 8:16pm

JB

JB Science is less a noun than a verb. It's a method of exploring and describing the universe in human-relatable terms. It's the map, not the territory. We see the map and the territory with our eyes, but we don't confuse the two when we're in the midst of the area it depicts. Confusion happens when we get really invested in the map being correct when there's a lack of evidence and we haven't explored the territory.

Talking about scientific laws, Jerry, what do you think of the ongoing kerfuffle over the Cosmological Constant? Have you taken a side? Despite my amateur interest and participation in historic astronomy, I don't know any astronomers personally to ask their professional opinion.

Unlike · Reply · 2 · May 12 at 9:32pm

CJ

CJ Cassius Amicus I would go further and say that in Epicurean Physics there are no scientific laws in modern meaning of the term. There are limits of nature that are reflected by thinking mind by unconceivability. The word unconceivable, unimaginable and similar words are used many, many times in Herodotus, Pythocles and DRN and Philodemus Method of Inference to set natural limits of thing itself, its quality or attribute. Modern scientific laws do not qualify to be criteria of truth. They are from canonical point of view opinions and as such they can be true or false, in contrast to sensations, ideas and feelings which are what they are. This is my take on the issue.

Saying this I really like the metaphore that JB draws with map and territory. It illustrates the essential difference of perspective of philosophy (not just Ep.) and science and our discussion here is really about relation of those two. It brings to mind picture of cartographer and wanderer arguing about what is behind the next hill. Perspective is different but as long as subject is the same this discussion will continue, hopefully without bad feelings but with good will and aprreciation on both sides.

Like · Reply · 1 · May 13 at 4:29pm

JS

JS The cosmological constant was never proven and was the fudge factor Einstein called his major blunder when he visited Mt Palomar and saw proof of an expanding Universe. Einstein hoped to find a static Universe. But present data of distant Quasars shows a repulsive force does exist. We are living in interesting times where our instruments are having us redefine the very existence of energies that we have no clue what they are. I can't wait to see what we learn next!

Like · Reply · 2 · May 13 at 7:10pm

"Happiness is prior to being tranquil"-Is this right?

IV: In terms of the conceptual hierarchy, it's not right. "Happiness" is at the top, as the ultimate goal. Tranquillity is below it.

In practice, they happen at the same time. Happy people are also tranquil. Which is why we sometimes see tranquility equated with happiness.

There is also a certain degree of fuzziness in these words, and only when we talk about the conceptual hierarchy greater precision is usually needed. As an Epicurean I don't usually use "tranquility" because it is so fuzzy...

Cassius Amicus I agree with IV's answer, and would add my personal opinion about the key words in the sentence:

"Happiness" - I believe in Epicurean terms this means "living pleasurably," which can be done in innumerable ways, since there are so many mental and physical possibilities in life. Epicurean happiness is to be contrasted with Arisotelian happiness, which requires much more than pleasure and ends up requiring many types of social and economic goods. It should also be contrasted with Platonic and Stoic happiness, which end up being a rigid and formal set of abstract principles - "virtue," in their terms. And of course you can carry the analogy much further and point out that religions define happiness as serving god, etc. So any discussion of happiness has to first define the word happiness.

"Tranquil" - I believe the focus of meaning here is on "smooth" and "uninterrupted," so that "tranquil" is best seen as an adjective describing the best way to experience pleasure/happiness, rather than as a independent state by itself. "Yellow" cannot be separated from "things that appear yellow." Yellow is neither an ideal form, in Platonic terms, nor an "essence" in Aristotelian terms. So as with "yellow," I don't think "tranquil" describes an independent separate state either. Neither tranquility nor "yellow" exist in the air. Yellow is an attribute of specific things that we perceive in the light to be yellow, and tranquility is an attribute of experiencing specific mental and physical activities smoothly and without disruption. There is no tranquility in death. Personally, I think "aponia" (absence of pain) is in the same category as tranquility. In Epicurean texts, painlessness seems to describe the state of experiencing pleasures (any number or type) **without any pain accompanying that experience.** Neither "tranquility" nor "painlessness" tell you anything about the positive state of what your mind or body are doing - those words simply tell you that whatever you are doing is not accompanied by disruption/turmoil or pain.

"Prior to" - Given the way I've described happiness and tranquility, ranking happiness and tranquility (or painlessness) on the same scale would be like ranking "oranges" (the fruit) with "things that are orange" (the color). "Tranquility" and "painlessness" are not complete states in themselves, but ways of describing the purest experience of pleasure: The purest experience of pleasure (any kind of pleasures) is when pleasures are experienced without disruption/turmoil and without pain.

We frequently get into discussions in which some people contend that the goal of life is to achieve implacable emotionlessness. The Epicurean view of "tranquility" does not require this, because the meaning of tranquility consistent with the rest of Epicurean philosophy is better understood as "unbroken" and "smooth." In support of this we know that Epicurus called his students to "continuous pleasure." Under the influence of Stoic hostility to emotion, however, many people exalt emotionlessness as the goal. They argue that avoidance of pain is the true goal, and that therefore emotionlessness is superior to the joys and ordinary pleasures of life.

In response to those contentions, I frequently cite the following passage on "feelings" from Diogenes Laertius, and it is important to point out how this passage links to even more fundamental Epicurean doctrine. The graphic below shows the Bailey version of two passages, with the Greek original of the payoff passage. Think carefully about the implications of this linkage: Not only should we never forget that emotion (passion / feelings / pleasure / pain) are not a **hindrance** to wisdom -- more importantly, the wise man will experience these passions more deeply than other men! That is because emotions/passions/pleasure/pain are the **guides of life**. OF COURSE Epicureans will take the OPPOSITE view of the Stoics.

Epicureans will experience passions MORE DEEPLY than other men, because emotions/passions/pleasure/pain are Canonical foundation of all that we decide to choose and to avoid!

NewEpicurean post: http://newepicurean.com/emotionlessnes…nce-of-emotion/

Also, every post and comment, no matter how small, helps in understanding how the forum software works and allows me to fine-tune it, so thanks for both the comment and the "likes" so we see how the like mechanism works.

Cassius Amicus J. when your write ""By pleasure, we mean this: freedom from pain in the body and freedom from turmoil in the soul" I would not say you are "misreading" it as much as I am saying that it cannot be taken out of context and treated as if it is disconnected with the rest of the philosophy. There are MANY quotes where Epicurus discusses pleasure in the "normal" sense of that term as sex, food, dancing, etc. And it is clear that Epicurus considered pleasure to be a sensation that we all understand through experience. All of these statements must be reconciled to a coherent whole, and a construction of this particular passage that reads the others out of existence cannot be accepted as logically coherent - and if Epicurus was anything, he was logically coherent, or he would have been laughed off the philosophic stage.

The stoic-sympathetic moderns write off these other passages as unimportant, rather than taking them into account and treating the pleasure= absence of pain as a purely quantitative, not qualitative, measurement. Taken as a quantitative measurement, and starting from the premise that we have only two "passions" - pleasure and pain - then the measure of pleasure is *quantitatively* the absence of pain, just as pain is *quantitatively" the absence of pleasure. And then it has to be remembered that neither calculation has any meaning to the dead, so it must be kept in mind that the entire discussion applies only to those who are living, with all that that entails.

For the reasons I cite in my article (and I am really just pointing back to Gosling and Taylor and other authorities, not saying anything original myself) I believe it is wrong to take the quoted sentence out of context. The best and most authoritative explanation of this comes from "The Greeks on Pleasure", the full text by Gosling and Taylor, but I have done my best to summarize the argument on my page.

Cassius Amicus I am still working to develop new analogies to drive this point home, but I would cite as an analog what Dewitt says in "Epicurus and His Philosophy" about the Canon of Truth. Here is DeWitt pointing out that the canon is the "TEST of truth," not the "CONTENT" of truth.

"It is an even worse mistake to have confused the tests of truth with the content of truth, that is, the tools of precision with the stones of the wall. This was the blunder of Pierre Gassendi, who revived the study of Epicurus in the seventeenth century. It was his finding "that there is nothing in the intellect which has not been in the senses." From this position John Locke, in turn, set out as the founder of modern empiricism. Thus a misunderstanding of Epicurus underlies a main trend of modern philosophy. This astonishing fact begets an even greater concern for a correct interpretation, which may cause Locke to appear slightly naive."

The analogy to the present discussion is that the statement "pleasure = absence of pain" is true **quantitatively** because there are only two "passions/feelings" - pleasure and pain. If we are alive and we feel anything at all, we feel either pleasure or pain, so in quantitative terms of measuring the total of our "feeling experience," the presence of one is the absence of the other. But this statement of quantity tells us nothing about the "content" or the "quality" of the pleasure or pain that is being experienced. That is an entirely different analysis and requires that we enumerate all the normal experiences of pleasure in the form of sex, food, music, dancing, or pain in the form of the many varieties of physical and mental pain.

So as Dewitt points out, the canon of truth is the TEST of truth, but the formula(s) which constitute the canon are not the CONTENT of truth. The "truth" revealed to us through use of the canon varies infinitely with the context of the matter being examined.

I submit we should look at Epicurus' statement by analogy: The formula "pleasure = absence of pain" is an accurate quantitative "test" or measurement of feeling, but it is only a formula. As a formula, the statement does not describe the CONTENT of the pleasure that is being experienced. The content of the experience varies infinitely with the context of the pleasure (or pain) being experienced.

And if we forget that it is the CONTENT that is the really significant thing, we end up obsessing over the tools of precision, and we entirely miss the goal. And the goal is not the tools themselves, but the successful living of life, which is the reason we picked up the tools in the first place.

Thanks and welcome!

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