Posts by Cassius

Wow Godfrey, I just read this for the first time and probably need to reread to see if there is anything I disagree with, but wow this seems to me to be directly on point. Thank you!

Might be good to collect some relevant links:

https://www.amazon.com/Welcome-Your-W…=gateway&sr=8-1

http://sarahwilliamsgoldhagen.com/

Martin's post reminds me of that fragment which has always been one of the murkiest to me - I think people say that the original text is mutilated -

VS 62. If the anger of parents against their children is justified, it is quite pointless for the children to resist it and to fail to ask forgiveness. If the anger is not justified but is unreasonable, it is folly for an irrational child to appeal to someone deaf to appeals and not to try to turn it aside in other directions by a display of good will.

A book on children will also probably want to address the dispute over whether Laertius should be translated "the wise man will marry...according to circumstances..." or "the wise man will NOT marry.." I strongly think that the first is the correct one, as illustrated in Epicurus' will making provision for the marriage of Metrodorus' daughter, but a reader of Epicurus is going to come up on this issues elsewhere so might be a good idea to address it.

Some of my notes on that are collected here - https://newepicurean.com/love-marriage-…e-modern-world/

Excellent - I will read and comment in detail asap but looks great!

Good graphic, but I would be concerned not to go too far -- depending on whether the translation is accurate, I've always been concerned that the "of my slaves" indicated that he had others who he did not free. Maybe we can get greater clarity on the last line of the will over time - this version from Epicurus.net (emphasis added):

In this manner I give and bequeath all my property to Amynomachus, son of Philocrates of Bate and Timocrates, son of Demetrius of Potamus, to each severally according to the items of the deed of gift registered in the Metroon, on condition that they shall place the garden and all that pertains to it at the disposal of Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, of Mitylene, and the members of his society, and those whom Hermarchus may leave as his successors, to live and study in. And I entrust to my School in perpetuity the task of aiding Amynomachus and Timocrates and their heirs to preserve to the best of their power the common life in the garden in whatever way is best, and that these may help to maintain the garden in the same way as those to whom our successors in the School may bequeath it. And let Amynomachus and Timocrates permit Hermarchus and his associates to live in the house in Melite for the lifetime of Hermarchus.

And from the revenues made over by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates let them to the best of their power in consultation with Hermarchus make separate provision for the funeral offerings to my father, mother, and brothers, and for the customary celebration of my birthday on the tenth day of Gamelion in each year, and for the meeting of all my School held every month on the twentieth day to commemorate Metrodorus and myself according to the rules now in force. Let them also join in celebrating the day in Poseideon which commemorates my brothers, and likewise the day in Metageitnion which commemorates Polyaenus, as I have done previously.

And let Amynomachus and Timocrates take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyaenus, so long as they study and live with Hermarchus. Let them likewise provide for he maintenance of Metrodorus's daughters so long as she is well-ordered and obedient to Hermarchus; and, when she comes of age, give her in marriage to a husband selected by Hermarchus from among the members of the School; and out of the revenues accruing to me let Amynomachus and Timocrates in consultation with Hermarchus give to them as much as they think proper for their maintenance year by year.

Let them make Hermarchus trustee of the funds along with themselves, in order that everything may be done in concert with him, who has grown old with me in philosophy and is left at the head of the School. And when the girl comes of age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates pay her dowry, taking from the property as much as circumstances allow, subject to the approval of Hermarchus. Let them provide for Nicanor as I have done previously, so that none of those members of the school who have rendered service to me in private life and have shown me kindness in every way and have chosen to grow old with me in the School should, so far as my means go, lack the necessaries of life.

All my books to be given to Hermarchus.

And if anything should happen to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodorus grow up, Amynomachus and Timocrates shall give from the funds bequeathed by me, so far as possible, enough for their several needs, as long as they are well ordered. And let them provide for the rest according to my arrangements; that everything may be carried out, so far as it lies in their power. Of my slaves I manumit Mys, Nicias, Lycon, and I also give Phaedrium her liberty.

Bailey's Extant Remains:

For some reason this comes to my mind too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Quality_of_Mercy

"The quality of mercy is not strained, it droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.' Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, but applicable to any moment in time, to any group of soldiery, to any nation on the face of the Earth—or, as in this case, to the Twilight Zone."

Even today in a non-Epicurean society we praise law and justice, and yet we also have and praise (at times) the executive right to pardon. If we really think about how pardons can be "just" then I think the Epicurean perspective begins to come into focus. (And that's not to mention our legal concepts of the separation between "courts of law" and "courts of equity.")

I think Mousikos' comment is my first thought too, though there are probably several aspects to it, including situations where officers of the law go forward even when they know they are wrong out of a desire to retain "respect" for it.

Another common phrase that deals with some of the same issues is the American phrase that is desirable to have a "government of law and not of men." That makes it sound like "law" exists apart from the men with whom it deals, and I think it fails the Epicurean test for the same reason.

The doctrines to the effect that there is no absolute justice are some of the most challenging of all of them, but I think they show how committed Epicurus was to the logical consequences of his premises.

(1) So you have read A Few Days In Athens! Excellent!

(2) That is LOL funny in the line "then let God arrest him!"

(3) I do think your last comment re "convention" is the right direction to the answer

I think this from Diogenes of Oinoanda is relevant to Elli's point. It shows how in some things, like philosophy - and engaging in acts that are virtuous in the Epicurean model - the pleasure of engaging in the act coincides in time with the act of participating in it. One implication is that we never experience this type of pleasure unless we engage in the act that brings it about. If we refrain from that action - if we instead seek nothing more than "absence of pain" - then that type of pleasure is never available to us:

" I want now to get rid of the error, prevalent among you along with others, concerning the same emotion, and especially to speak against one doctrine of yours, Stoics. My argument is as follows: not all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others coincide with them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are solid and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, sexual acts: we do not eat food and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink wine and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, without awaiting the future.

As for causes that follow, an example is expecting to win praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with pleasure), go completely astray."

Originally posted by Elli -

E.Π XXVII.(27) Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις τελειωθεῖσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνὸν οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μάθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.

Baileys' translation : ES27. In all other occupations the fruit comes #painfully after completion, but in philosophy pleasure goes hand in hand with knowledge; for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous.

Warning: Bailey wears again his stoic glasses. Where in this ES 27 does Epicurus mention the word "painfully" ? And where he says that any occupation of one’s labors - the fruit - is bitter and painful? Where the creativity of any work and by any human being like us has pains? Here is, again and again, the devious trick for saying that Epicurus did not suggest to be active and creative, or to not enjoy any of your work and labor, because this is painful. Stay in "apathy", then, in your sofas, your beds, and your chairs to not doing anything at all.

According to this translation by Bailey, it is like Epicurus remarks: When I’ll do something is painful, so I chose the “absence of pain”.

The right translation from the ancient greek to english is : In the case of other occupations the fruit (of one's labors) comes upon completion of a task while (in the case) of philosophy pleasure is concurrent with knowledge because enjoyment does not come after learning but at the same time (with) learning.

And below is the analysis/explanation in the above saying to this link http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_27/

"A sublime, yet also readily credible assertion regarding the benefits of philosophy: all other occupations reward their practitioner after a task is completed; the baker has bread only after it comes out of the oven, the fisherman has a day's catch only after he pulls up his nets from the sea. Yet in the singular case of philosophy, the process and pleasure of acquiring knowledge are concurrent, simultaneous.

Thus Epicurus intertwines inextricably his teachings on the general value of philosophy, with all its salubrious effects of ridding us of false beliefs, and his teachings on pleasure. Philosophy is not just good for us; it is also a pleasure, and therefore an "oikeion agathon", a "familiar good" that we ought to happily espouse.

This is one of the most optimistic tenets of Epicurean philosophy and stands in sharp contradistinction to the more common attitudes (of antiquity and the present age) that regard philosophy as a stern, grave, strenuous occupation".

This legal phrase came to my attention this afternoon: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_justitia_ruat_caelum

There was a time in my life when I would heartily endorse this statement. What do you think Epicurus would say about it?

Epicurean, or not?

Nice looking blog! Be sure to let me / us know when you have that article ready.

Can anyone imagine Diogenes of Oinoanda writing:

"I say both now and always, shouting loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that ABSENCE OF PAIN is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues....."

Instead of what he actually wrote:

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into "what is the means of happiness?" and they wanted to say "the virtues" (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not "what is the means of happiness?" but "what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?", I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

________________________

Perhaps it is imaginable, but if so only because our understanding of Epicurus is so corrupted.

I bet Eikadistes knew this was on its way!

My choice of fonts was not artistic and could be better. However I do like to think of "pleasure is the absence of pain" as seductive but fruity, while "the limit of quantity of pleasures is the removal of all that is painful" has the look and sound of the "golden words" of Epicurus that seem almost as if they were dropped down from heaven!

The crucial sentence in the analysis of the Humanist article quoted above is this one: "He [Epicurus] defined pleasure as the absence of pain."

"He defined pleasure as the absence of pain." This is the sleight of hand you see in some form or another in all of the "anesthesia" analysts. But is this true?

The implication of this statement is that Epicurus considered "pleasure" and "absence of pain" to be exact equivalents - interchangeable terms - the same in every respect. Such a statement, if that is what Epicurus meant, would in fact be shocking, and would be in fact the centerpiece of the philosophy, as this Humanist claims it to be. But what is the evidence for that?

Where can this definition be found to be explicitly stated in Lucretius, Epicurus' faithful poet and renderer of Epicurus' own "On Nature?"

Where can this definition be found in the list of "Authorized Doctrines" which was clearly represented to be the summation of the most important points of the philosopher? Or in the later iteration of that document in the form of the Vatican Sayings?

Nowhere do words appear to the effect that "absence of pain" and "pleasure" are interchangeable terms, and in fact Epicurus himself does not use those terms that way even in his own letters, even within the letter to Menoecues.

The key to unwinding this is to observe what is said within the Principal Doctrines, in the form of Doctrine Three, which reads (Bailey translation) "The limit of quantify of pleasures is the removal of all that is painful." This is joined with the explanation that "Wherever pleasure is present, so long as it is there, there is neither pain of body or of mind, nor of both at once."

Epicurus does not say that "pleasure" and "absence of pain" are the same except in ONE respect: *Quantity of Experience."

The explanation for the importance of the limit in "Quantity of experience of pleasure" is the Platonic argument in Philebus, repeated elsewhere, that any ultimate and final good, in order to be considered "highest," must have a limit - must not be improvable by the addition of something else, or of "more." And Epicurus' response to that argument is that the most pleasurable life that it is possible for any being to experience is one in which ALL of that being's experience was filled with pleasure -- "filled" meaning that it contains no mixture of pain.

In order to establish that point it was necessary for Epicurus to stress that ALL experience is one of either of two kinds - pleasure or pain. And when seen from that perspective, the quantity of one measures the same as the "absence of" the other, just as the quantity of gasoline in your car's tank can be described as that part of the tank which is "absent of air."

Turning back to the letter of Menoeceus, this overall perspective can be used to explain the passages that otherwise are apparently inconsistent to the point of being otherwise nonsensical.

In what follows I am referring to the Bailey translation.

First remember that "all good and evil consists in sensation" - this being a reference to the feeling of either pleasure or pain evoked in any sensation of feeling.

The paragraph that begins "We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain...." occupies within the letter the approximate position - after discussion of gods, and of death, as does Principal Doctrine three in the Authorized List. This positioning in itself is evidence that the emphasis is on quantity, not full equivalence.

This paragraph contains a series of statements such as "when we do not feel pain, we have no need of pleasure" that would seem to call for Epicurus to conclude that "avoiding pain" is the most important thing in life. Indeed Epicurus says in this passage that "For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. " But does Epicurus close the passage by saying that "And for this we call 'absence of pain' or 'freedom from pain" the beginning and end of the blessed life"? No!

The true conclusion of the paragraph is "And for this we call PLEASURE the beginning and end of the blessed life. Why the switch back to "pleasure"? Because Epicurus never consider the two terms to be exact equivalents. Every bit of this paragraph can be read to mean: "The goal of life - the highest life - is one filled with pleasure and without any pain. Only when our experience is NOT filled with pleasures, only when some degree of pain is present, do we need MORE pleasure. Because when we reach the goal, the definition which we are concerned about, we have by definition filled our experience totally with pleasurable experiences, and succeeded in eliminating painful experiences. We have no MORE need of pleasurable experiences when we are full of pleasures, any more than we have need of MORE gasoline when our gas tanks remain completely full of gasoline for the life of the car.

The next two paragraphs ("And since pleasure is the first good...." and "And again independence of desire...." emphasize that we sometimes choose pain for a time when that choice leads to greater overall pleasure -- a greater TOTAL EXPERIENCE OF PLEASURE over the lifetime. Once again, there is NO INFERENCE that "pleasure" and "absence of pain" are expressions that are equivalent in every respect.

Now we turn to "When therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end...." we find "we do not mean the pleasure of profligates...." but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." Then the next sentence focuses on the means of production of produc[ing] the pleasant life.

There is absolutely nothing in that paragraph inconsistent with the interpretation that Epicurus is again referring to "the end" and "the pleasant life" as the life which is FULL OF PLEASURABLE EXPERIENCES as the term "pleasure" is ordinarily understood. He is simply saying that the most efficient way of producing a life which is as full of pleasurable experiences as possible is not by rushing headlong for immediate pleasures, but by prudently calculating the results of our actions before taking them so that we maximize the experience of pleasure and minimize the experience of pain.

And indeed Epicurus goes further to emphasis that he is describing the conceptual goal of a life full of pleasure - a life which can be described as reaching "the limit of pleasure" when he says "For example who, think you, is better than the man..... [who implements Epicurean philosophy]?
This indeed is so clearly defined as the goal of life that he equates it at the end of the letter with reaching the result of being "a god among men" -- which in Epicurean terminology is not something supernatural or non-natural, but implies a state which cannot be exceeded.

This same state which cannot be exceeded is shown to be full of pleasures as ordinarily defined in the more extensive passage delivered by Torquatus:

"The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement."

In sum, the above analysis is what is going on with the discussion of "Absence of pain" in the letter to Menoeceus. It is absolutely untrue of Epicurus to say, as does the Humanist writer, that "He defined pleasure as absence of pain."

But the Humanist writer, or those whose essential focus is Humanism, are unlikely to reach the conclusion demanded by the full context of Epicurean philosophy because they do not wish to do so. Their goal is "an ethical life" that "aspires to the greater good." That is Platonism - that is Aristotelianism - that is Stoicism - but it is certainly not Epicurean, and never the two will meet today, any more than they met during the lifetime of battles between these schools in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds.

Yes, that's the problem with reading PD5 out of context. If one had first started with the twelve fundamental principles of physics, one would know that eternal absolute rules are physically impossible due to the nature of the universe (no center, no creating god, constant motion, all things that come together eventually break apart).

If one had read more of the ethics, one would have read the argument (now mainly left to us in Torquatus / Cicero) that all virtue is subservient to the goal of pleasure, and thus has no absolute meaning outside of the context of the goal of pleasure.

And if one had read more of the epistemology, one would know that Epicurus held the senses, feelings, anticipations (all human "relative" and not "absolute" faculties) to be the source of and test of all knowledge, and would therefore know that morality requires context, and that rationalist morality is false and a dead end.

But it is absolutely right to ask about PD5 - read it out of context and it is easy to conclude that Epicurus was talking in terms of OUR modern philosophical system (essentially a Stoic /Platonic / Aristotelian mashup), instead of talking in terms of his own system. And if you do presume he's talking in our context, you draw exactly the opposite conclusion rather than the conclusion that is inherent in Epicurus' own system.

In the same way, it is easy to read one passage in the letter to Menoeceus and conclude that "absence of pain" is the full and complete definition of pleasure - despite everything else Epicurus said about joy and dance and food and sex and almost every other kind of normal pleasure that no one in his right mind would think to call "absence of pain."

"Gee honey, you really gave me a lot of "absence of pain" in bed tonight!!!" Such a person deserves to be slapped, not given a philosophy degree.

The basic issue is that Epicurean philosophy requires an attitude of understanding and applying the concept of "context."

My goal in the discussion of "Humanism" has been to generate "light" rather than "heat," but since the goal of life is "light" (pleasure), and not the avoidance of "heat" (pain), I have more to add. The accompanying graphic is not a "proof" of anything. It is simply a summary of my observation, over many years, of a common thread that binds what I find to be the majority view of "Humanism" to what I find to be a popular but flawed view of Epicurus.

The text on the left is from an article that just came to my attention. It is what is often considered to be a "good" article about Epicurus. However the version of Epicurus that it promotes, I submit, is not a version that Epicurus would recognize or endorse, and not only because he would not appreciate being called a liar.

I certainly understand that many people will disagree with my commentary on the right. Everyone has to evaluate for themselves whether this pattern and connection really exists, and their own view of it.

Life goes by so quickly and time is so short. I want to read that article as soon as I can but haven't yet..... What i AM convinced of, without reading the article, is that that's probably an Epicurus vs Plato debate going through the heart of the music issue.

Very nice!

Eikadistes - You kind of got the ball rolling on the subject of music with your music theory post, in response to my question about major and minor key. But aside from Post 11 above Music Theory And Epicurean Philosophy I am not sure I recall your weighing at a "high level" on this Philodemus discussion. I know I am distracted and probably making mistakes because I am not focused on this enough, but I would be interested in your (or any others' comments) organized like this:

(1) What philosophical positions on music were taken by pre-Epicurean / non-Epicurean Greek philosophers?

(2) What position did Epicurus take in response to those previous philosophers' positions? (I am presuming that Philodemus is following Epicurus, which I think we should presume unless there is some clear evidence otherwise, else this whole discussion is pretty hopeless.)

Other that questions which would arise from Epicurean rejection of Platonic idealism, such as "Can music embody a particular idea?" I don't even have a clear picture of what the issues are.

(I edited this to reference post eleven, and combine three questions into two.)

Ell I what do you understand the point of this material to be?

When I read a sentence like "The Epicureans do not underestimate music for lack of culture; to them, only philosophy counts", that means nothing to me at all, and I tend think the lack of meaning arises from the mangling of the text rather than from Philodemus.

I need to spend more time rereading the old academic article that Ed Lee posted because I am not comfortable with any of this yet. I will accept that the fault is mine but I can't yet with confidence state even the most basic position that is supposedly being made by Philodemus on music.

Unless I see exact quotes, with notes as to which words we're perfectly clear and which words were guessed at or even made up, very little of this has much credibility with me.

And one point keeps coming back to me: that these commentators Sen to agree that it was Philodemus' method to quote his enemies followed by his own views and go back and forth. Unless the surviving text is very clear it's possible that what it appears Philodemus is says may be him quoting something he does not believe.

But my main point is that unless we have a clear statement of what words were clear and what were "reconstructed" the final product is little more than speculation.