Posts by Cassius

Well after further thought.... Social Media Can Be Anti-Epicurean - 101 Reasons Why (?)

It definitely has its uses when kept under control, and in the end this is probably another example of how a tool is neutral and its results for pleasure or pain depends on context / how it is used.

I suspect my comments seem self-contradictory but I think it's an essential point. The problems which we're pointing out result from how it is used. If used with great care, it can be very powerful for pleasure. We would not be here today in this forum were it no for the Facebook of the 2010 era.

I altered the thread title slightly to firm it up rather than say "considering," but I'm still not necessarily happy that "Social Media's Anti-Epicurean Aspects" is the ultimate title. Julia feel free to continue to adjust, especially with the goal of making it something that people are likely to find by searching. Given the content of the thread and the strong consensus I think most of us have that social media has major negative issues, I thought "considering" might not be strong enough.

Thank you Don! Looking forward to it.

Great post Julia! That really develops the detail of what I think most of us sense to be true but have not fully expressed. I'll look for a way to pin this one for greater exposure, and I also wonder if it doesn't point to the need for additional steps or conclusions of some kind.

Very nice -- is it ok for me to move this to the "Technology" public forum?

Quote from Pacatus

Wouldn't appeal to some common prolepsis (on the question of gods’ existence) be subject to the ad populum fallacy?

Yes, it would be such a fallacty if Cicero/Cotta's interpretation of what Epicurus is saying were correct, that Epicurus held that he believed in gods "because 50 million Frenchmen say that there are gods."

But that's not the correct interpretation of prolepsis. Cicero should have known (and probably did know) better than that.

If prolepsis is a "canon of truth" (which it is), then prolepsis is no more an opinion than any other perception or sensation is an opinion. We don't test opinions against other opinions - that would be circular reasoning. A test of an opinion cannot itself be an opinion, but must be evidence in the form of an irreducible given against which we compare and then process in our minds to determine what is true and consistent with that given. If so, a prolepsis is best thought of as an irreducible perception, just like a sensation of sight or sound or a feeling of pleasure and pain.

Quote from Lucretius 4:478 (Brown / Dunster)

[478] But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses, which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false.

A true opinion corresponds with what we conclude are the facts of reality after repeated observations produce the same results. A single glimpse of light or color by the eyes is not an opinion, a particular sound heard by the ear is not an opinion, and neither is a single "anticipation" an opinion. A true opinion (what we label to be a "fact") is an opinion concluded by the mind after the receipt and processing of streams of evidence. An "opinion" is held to be true if it is consistent with the evidence, and not contradicted by evidence. Therefore individual perceptions, whether received by the senses, or by prolepsis, or by feelings of pleasure and pain are not "opinions" or "facts." True opinions require consistent streams of perception over time, and individual perceptions (even those of prolepsis) can and often are interpreted incorrectly in ways that are not true to what we eventually conclude to be the ultimate facts after we receive additional data.

Quote from Diogenes Laertius

[34] Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view. The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth.

The opinion that gods are living beings blessed and imperishable is an "opinion" which is held by Epicurus to be true for reasons that are not stated in full in the letter to Menoeceus. As Joshua is saying, the letter is definitional: Epicurus tells us the true opinions, and that the opinions of many about the gods are false. He also tells us why the opinions of the many are false: the opinions of the many are false because they are logically inconsistent with a being that is truly blessed and imperishable.

But that does not mean that the many did not base their false opinions about the gods on anticipations they received about the gods, it only tells us that the many misinterpreted the anticipations that they received by not processing them correctly. They let their disposition to believe that the gods are like themselves prejudice their opinions, rather than sticking strictly to the first premises that gods are fully blessed and do not suffer from the weakness of needing to reward friends and punish enemies.

What is an anticipation then? I think the best definition as to what Epicurus was saying (which various people here on the forum have stated in the past) is that prolepsis is a form of "pattern recognition." Through prolepsis we perceive relationships between the data (perceptions) that we receive. These patterns can be found in any or all of the perceptions, not only through the perceptions of the five senses and the feelings of pleasure and pain, but also by the perceptions of the mind received through the "images." But perceiving patterns in these perceptions does not in itself give us a correct opinion about what the perceptions are reflecting. We may in fact be perceiving a centaur in the images, but we know that centaurs do not exist in reality.

In the context of gods, a pattern we perceive about one or more gods in dreams, images received by the mind, seeing paintings or statues of gods, hearing mystical music, feelings of holiness or fear of lightning, or perceptions in any other manner do not in themselves constitute true or false opinions. Just as with centaurs, people can receive all sorts of anticipations about the gods, some of which we will conclude to be true and some of which we will conclude to be false. Epicurus gives us the core opinions that we conclude to be true (living beings blessed and imperishable), and says in the letter to make sure that any other opinions you form about the gods are consistent with those basic truths. If any other opinion you consider is inconsistent with total blessedness and imperishability, that opinion is immediately ruled out of court and deemed to be false.

As Joshua indicates, the reasons given by Epicurus for belief that the gods about which we have anticipations are blessed and imperishable are not in the letter, but and the best indication we have of those reasons are as given by Velleius. The foundations seem to include the "supremely potent principle of infinity," wherein we conclude that in an infinite universe, those things which are possible will occur an infinite number of times. Living beings which are happy and continue to live over time are known to use through our experience here on earth, and logical extensions of those things (including Joshua's example of the existence of oceans even if we have only seen small bodies of water in the past) are believable and expectable to be true.

Those things which are not possible (supernatural gods or supernatural anything) will never occur because they are not possible. I do not think the concern that this amounts to an ontological argument is valid because these ontological arguments for the existence of supernatural gods rely on imagination which postulates supernatural things which cannot exist by definition (based on experience). The principal of infinity may be very powerful, but it cannot break the laws of nature, and the supernatural is impossible - full stop.

I think most of us have come to the conclusion that a prolepsis is not an opinion, but that's clearly the first step in this chain of thought which has to be confronted. If you think that a prolepsis is an opinion, and that the opinion in this case is that there are gods, and you should believe in gods because lots of people say that there are gods, then you've reached the conclusion that Epicurus believed in gods because 50 million Frenchmen say that there are gods, and if you believe that then Epicurus was such a fool that nothing else Epicurus held should be believed either, and if you're a fan of Epicurus at all it's because you're a Stoic or Buddhist looking for justification for your devotion to tranquility in the phrase "absence of pain." Obviously in my case I reject that entire line of thought as absurd.

The second key issue is the implication of infinity, which Epicurus clearly tells us to study as a central matter, and Velleius tells us why. Were it not for Cicero preserving this in "On The Nature of the Gods" we'd have almost nothing to go on about why Epicurus stressed that it is important. In the case of infinity, we're facing another set of headwinds similar to the Stoic/Buddhist problem. A certain set of modern scientists allege that the universe is not infinite, and that Epicurus has been refuted on that point. As with the Buddhists and Stoics, Epicurus rejected the logic of that conclusion and considered it to be absurd to argue that the universe has an "end" on the other side of which there is something "outside" of reality.

There are all sorts of ways to respond to those who say the universe is not infinite today, but the one I would point to primarily is that they are misinterpreting the data in a way that they should have rejected out of hand because it never made and can never make any sense. The "universe as a whole" is all that there is, and it can never have a "limit" or an "end" outside of which is "something else" or "nothing." Infinity has always been and always will be the most compelling opinion as to the nature of the universe, regardless of the religions who say that "god" created the universe, or anyone else on any other theory, has to say.

Quote from Joshua

Also of note is the passage from Cicero wherein he suggests that an Epicurean would deny the existence of the sea if he had never seen it with his own eyes. On this point I would echo Christopher Hitchens; extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. There's nothing extraordinary about water in quantity, so the existence of the sea can be provisionally accepted pending confirmation. The existence of ghosts would be extraordinary, and so merits skepticism.

And just to be clear, you are disagreeing with Cicero (in this case Cotta). An Epicurean who lives inland would not deny the existence of the sea, because he knows that water can accumulate into bodies, and there is no physical reason why under the right circumstances into very large bodies.

1 - I wonder why it suspended it!?

2 - I think we ought to have a forum for posts like this on use of technology for Epicurean creation, even if we don't have one already.

We sort of do for the thread here - Using New Technology To Produce More Effective Memes

If it's ok with you Joshua I would suggest moving this thread to here:

Technology and Epicurean Educational Content

Quote from Plantpierogi

Don’t fear god,

Just out of curiosity, how would you interpret that one for yourself, or to someone to whom you want to be as clear as possible?

In case anyone is now thinking that Cassius thinks Epicurean god / aliens might look like Starfish, that's old hat from 1956!

Warning from Space - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I don't have any cites but I would expectthat the ancient Epicureans could well have been familiar with this example of bodily regeneration, which would be relevant to the possibility of continuous regeneration and therefore imperishability:

Starfish, or sea stars, are radially symmetrical, star-shaped organisms of the phylum Echinodermata and the class Asteroidea.^[1] Aside from their distinguishing shape, starfish are most recognized for their remarkable ability to regenerate, or regrow, arms and, in some cases, entire bodies. While most species require the central body to be intact in order to regenerate arms, a few tropical species can grow an entirely new starfish from just a portion of a severed limb.^[2] Starfish regeneration across species follows a common three-phase model and can take up to a year or longer to complete.^[2] Though regeneration is used to recover limbs eaten or removed by predators, starfish are also capable of autotomizing and regenerating limbs to evade predators and reproduce.^[2]

Quote

Due to their wide range of regenerative capabilities, starfish have become model organisms for studying how the regenerative process has evolved and diversified over time. While the overall morphological processes have been well documented in many starfish, little is known regarding the underlying molecular mechanisms that mediate their regeneration. Moreover, some researchers hope starfish may one day serve as inspiration for therapeutics aiming to expand the extent to which humans can repair and replace damaged cells or tissues.^[3]

Starfish regeneration - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Pliny discussing Starfish (but apparently not the regeneration quality):

CHAP. 86. (60.)—SEA-STARS.

In addition to what I have already stated, I find that authors, distinguished for their wisdom, express surprise at finding a star in the sea—for such, in fact, is the form of the animal, which has but very little flesh2845 within, and nothing but a hard skin without. It is said that in this fish there is such a fiery heat, that it scorches everything it meets with in the sea, and instantaneously digests its food. By what experiments2846 all this came to be known, I cannot so easily say; but I am about to make mention of one fact which is more remarkable still, and which we have the opportunity of testing by every day’s experience.

Yes, and gosh only knows that I too live in a glass house when it comes to typos and other errors! Almost any major mainstream article bringing Epicurus to people's attention is going to be a net positive, and this one surely is too.

As to paragraph 40, the first part is essentially the "action" vs "idleness" argument which with I think we are pretty well equipped to deal. It also argues that since Epicurus values bodily pleasure, and Cotta does not admit that the gods of Epicurus have real bodies, or even quasi-bodies, then the gods cannot experience the kind of pleasure that Epicurus praises. This latter argument is often met by the argument that what Epicurus really valued is "katastematic" pleasure rather than bodily pleasure, which I think is an argument that is totally off the mark.

First:

Epicurean pleasure is *not* "inaction," no matter how much some people (who essentially agree with Cicero and the Platonic argument that virtue and the mind are higher or more "noble" than the the ignoble pleasures of the body) might want to try to infer that based on the word "katastematic" or other arguments. Even mental thinking is a form of action, and the atoms of all living bodies are constantly moving. Only the living can experience pleasure of any kind, no matter how we slice up the numberless subtypes of "pleasure."

We've dealt with that a lot in the past so we should be able to present that clearly, but if anyone has ideas for illustrations or backup arguments please post.

Second:

Cotta refuses to admit that the contention that gods have quasi-bodies makes any sense, but that is the contention: the bodies of the gods are also made of atoms, but the atoms are continuously replenished indefinitely. Since the Epicurean gods do have bodies of a sort, there is no reason that the Epicurean gods cannot experience both "bodily" and "mental" types of pleasures, just as humans do.

Quote from Cicero's Cotta speaking to Velleius

To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say;

This would appear to refer to isonomia, and there is little reason to doubt that Cotta/Cicero is applying it in a way that Velleius/Epicurus would not approve. I suspect the intentional distortion is that of failing to distinguish the possible from the impossible.

It seems likely to me that this is referring to an aspect of infinity. In an infinite universe things that are possible are going to recur an infinite number of times. The "infinite number of times" would account for the "equal" or "equitable" number. Given that presumption, you can deduce that things that *can* happen *will* happen an infinite numbers of times. Infinite = infinite so the number of occurrences is the same.

So I would presume that it's the "things that are possible" that Cotta/Cicero is evading. I'd say that's especially true when he says "by the same rule" and goes on to list scenarios that we see on earth do not occur at all. His references, in fact, (living beings springing from the air or sea) are similar to what Lucretius talks about do *not* happen due to the regular process of nature as governed by the atoms.

So I think we can dismiss earthlings being born in the earth and water as ruled out by uniform observation of earth-bound physics. But what might we infer about what Epicurus could have thought about equitable distribution of living things from mortal to deathless?

My first thought would be that humans (intelligent living things) have the ability to control their environments so as to extend their lives. The Greeks were certainly aware of medical treatments, and it was imaginable then, and readily predictable today, that medical technology will allow more and more transplants and replacements of body parts. It is easily conceivable that even brain transplants or rejuvenations, which are as yet impossible under current technology, will be attainable in the future.

As for survival past the destruction of Earth or any particular "world" due to the natural deterioration of all bodies over time that cannot fix themselves, there's no reason to think that Epicurus was dogmatic that it would be "impossible" for living beings to live in and travel through "outer space." For example, Lucian directly wrote about travel to the moon in "The True Story," and there's no reason to think that this obvious proposition was imaginable to many others. So as we are even about to do now in regard to travel to Mars, and then further on later outside the solar system, humanity will soon become "multi-planetary" to be followed by "interstellar" and then one day beyond our galaxy. Humanity will one day (if we stay on the current path) be able to survive any local supernovas or whatevers, and as a whole will achieve a sort of "species immortality" or "species deathless." One would expect that any technological civilization that can travel interstellar will also be able to master the deterioration of the human body.

I don't think any of that would have been beyond the ancient Epicureans to imagine, and therefore since they would deem such a thing to be "possible" within the laws of physics, they would have been able to imagine living beings which can continuously replace the atomic structure of their bodies, which is essentially what we have Velleius relaying and Cicero/Cotta ridiculing. That would allow for a "distribution" of life (at each stage, in infinite numbers) all the way from quickly-expiring primitive organisms to intelligent beings who are in fact essentially "deathless." The only requirement of deathlessness is totally natural - such a being has to be able to develop the technology to replace or rejuvenate their bodies so as to make death a matter of choice rather than necessity.

So something along these lines is what I would speculate the Epicureans were theorizing:

The impossible (such as anything supernatural) will not and can never occur. On the other hand, because the universe as a whole is infinite in space and eternal in time, all things that are possible will occur an equal (infinite) number of times. Intelligent living beings which develop the ability to control their experience have the possibility of extending their lives indefinitely. Species or individuals which do so are ultimately deathless, and there are the same number of them as there are being that are mortal.

Everything in this set of possibilities would be purely natural and involve nothing supernatural whatsoever.

Welcome to Episode 251 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 39 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.

XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus, in which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve up the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do not see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he could use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a happy life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where is to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the Academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the Epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly remembered and used to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very words in which they were written. He likewise used to quote many, which were more gross, from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who blamed his brother Timocrates because he would not allow that everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. You grant what I say, I perceive; for you know it to be true. I can produce the books, if you should deny it; but I am not now reproving you for referring all things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. What I am now showing is, that your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not happy.

Thanks for that quote. I had a mental lapse on the podcàst last time I tried to use that and couldn't remember if it was Neptune or Ceres that was referenced. Now I see why - it's *both*

Thanks for posting that KochieKoch! Joshua pointed that out to me a short while ago but I neglected to get around to posting the link. One reason I neglected to do so was that it is kind of casually edited, as with the part I highlighted in red below. But's it's generally a good article probably oriented toward readers we need to cultivate, so glad to see it.

Don’t fear the gods is an homage, in principle, to the adage, “He is a god fearing man.” Instead, if you believe in god, choose to believe in a benevolent one. And what’s interesting is that Epicurus was actually atheist, but empathetically accounts for believers, encouraging a more optimistic view. In Epictetus’s eyes, there is no use in having religion if it becomes a detriment to your life.

Quote from Don

Putting ourselves in Epicurus' headspace and social context in this topic is nigh impossible given our current understanding of the universe.

Not to be argumentative and just for the record, in case lurkers see this and wonder if no one responds, I'll state that I respectfully very much disagree with this statement. The regulars here know that we've gone through this question many times before, and there is respectful disagreement among our regulars on this point, but the lurkers won't so that's why I note it.

Quote from TauPhi

It's morally acceptable to kill a mosquito but killing a cat is morally unacceptable. It was morally acceptable for Epicurus to own slaves but it's morally unacceptable for us. I'm giving these examples to show that human morality is liquid, ever changing set of societal rules arbitrary agreed upon by majority of people at any given time.

I think these are good points. In an Epicurean context where virtue (morality) is keyed to the production of pleasure rather than anything absolute, I suspect you're right to think that "morally incorruptible" wouldn't do anything more than point the finger back to the ultimate questions such as:

Can they sustain their lives of pleasure indefinitely, and is there any "natural law" reason that would prevent them from doing so?

We observe here on earth that all things that come together ultimately are broken apart, but I see no reason why that must translate into a law of nature that cannot be - through natural means - indefinitely postponed in time. Certainly I don't know how to do that myself, and I doubt it will be discovered in my lifetime, but I see no reason to postulate that it will always remain technologically out of reach.

The earth and sun and moon etc don't have the intelligence to alter the facts of nature that were started when they first came into being, but can we say for sure that intelligent beings can't develop to the point of doing so? I would say that the odds of that happening over infinite space and infinite time are actually pretty good, and I'm intentionally understating what the odds probably are in reality.

Quote from Cyrano

My entire page was too large.

This is actually a very common problem and it often traps me. The software does a good job of adapting to different screen sizes, but I think the designers generally work from good-sized screens, and if you don't know what to look for, you might never realize that there is something lurking just off the visible edge of the screen.