Posts by Cassius

I am glad you brought this up Todd because it is a subject I think is important. If I recall the story goes that Epicurus originally got interested in philosophy because of his rejection of common understanding about "chaos" in relation to the origin of the universe, and it is my view that most "regular" people have been thoroughly indoctrinated to the view that there are only two options: Either (1) "God" created the universe, or (2) that the universe arose "accidentally" from "chaos" and that therefore everything is essentially chaotic and totally unpredictable.

It is also my view that Epicurus saw the remedy to this false dilemma in the atomic theory: that the properties of he elements provide the "natural laws" by which all things occur according to those properties. These properties are perhaps boundless in number but not "infinite" or "unlimited" in number -- only a certain number of combinations (boundless though they may be) are possible. This is why centaurs and other impossibilities are impossible. In this context, the regularity that arises from the properties of the elements is actually a far more important matter in most contexts than the swerve. The swerve establishes how we can have free will, and perhaps how the atoms came together originally instead of falling downward, but in the end the regularity which the uniform properties of the atoms establishes is our main bulwark against false religion - this is how the universe operates with gods.

(Also i remember being impressed when I read for the first time in the Long article how it is obvious that the swerve, if Epicurus had held it to override the regularity of the properties of the atoms, would have totally destroyed the Epicurean / atomic theory. Why is there ANY regularity if all atoms are constantly swerving in dramatic ways? But we know that it is likely that Epicurus did not teach that the swerve "breaks through" except in limited circumstances because otherwise Cicero would have used to swerve to point out the obvious inconsistency -- which (as far as we know) is an argument that Cicero never made. if Cicero had thought that Epicurus had opened himself to that inconsistency it is almost certain that Cicero would have featured that argument prominently.

So that is why I think that in discussing the basic nature of the universe to nonprofessionals, which is exactly what Epicureans like Lucretius were doing, the issue is to emphasize that there is regularly without the action of a supernatural god, and the show how that regularity arises from the nature of the atoms themselves.

In that context, words that imply that "luck" "fortune" or "chaos" that imply that *anything* is possible are exactly incorrect.

Obviously we can define words anyway we want to, and there is in fact a technical definition of "accident" that is acceptable. But it the first or one of the primary meanings that word will evoke in regular people is going to call up a damaging message, it seems to me that that word should be avoided, which I sense (but cannot prove) is exactly what the 1743 translator thought as well.

Here is another which zeros in on my main concern -- lack of necessity. As stated in the letter to Herodotus, whatever we observe in the universe that happens with regularity happens,absent the effect of the swerve that is visible in the actions of higher life, as the result of "necessity:"

Let me find that cite: Here is the Bailey version, but he does not use the word necessity as I have seen it used elsewhere - he calls it "law of regular succession":

"Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about."

Epicurus.net: "invariably recurring" --

"Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariability of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed."

OK I was remembering the Yonge translation of the letter to Herodotus:

Now I am really getting off on a tangent, but I want to note fwiw that this issue of "chance" vs "necessity" vs "chaos" - and how most things happen by "necessity" without the effect of the swerve, is discussed at length in AA Long's "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism."

Yes Todd that is a good point, and it needs to be noted in this discussion. As usual I tend to analyze things in terms of how a non-expert / non-academic expert would hear it, and I think that this is something that they need to hear in very clear terms.

My reading of the Latin back when I last looked at this is that indeed the latin was "eventum" and while that surely is not a 100% correlation to "event" -- it's my general understanding of the main connotations of the words in general use that "event" would more equate to "transitory" -- which i think is exactly the issue here, while to many people "accident" conveys "fortuitous" which implies something more than transitory.

Maybe that is my legal mind and the definition of accident that I see discussed in cases as the word applies to "insurance policies." Also, here is one set of definitions presumably at least somewhat in order of general use




For the sake of my curiosity, however, can you explain why "accident" sounds more correct to you?

Don't forget tomorrow at 11:00 AM Eastern is our next installment of the DeWitt "Epicurus and His Philosophy" book review discussion. Tomorrow is Chapter 13 - "The New Piety." Topics for discussion are here, and this outline will be expanded before tomorrow: Discussion Plan For Chapter 13 "The True Piety" (Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus And His Philosophy")

We'll probably devote tomorrow to Chapter 13, then our next discussion will conclude the book with Chapter 14, and we'll then begin a new series discussing Lucretius.

Check back here tomorrow just before 11:00 AM for a Skype Link to the discussion location.

In preparation for the upcoming series of Skype sessions to read and talk through Lucretius, I am putting together a "Reference Edition" PDF which contains three of the best Public Domain translations (1743 Daniel Brown, Hugh Munro, and Cyril Bailey). When put together and bookmarked in a single PDF, it is easy to compare alternative translations to get the best fix on the original meaning of the text.

I will post that new PDF here soon, and we can use that ensure that everyone participating in the podcast series has free access to the same version being discussed in the podcast. In the meantime the separate PDF editions are available here. I am envisioning that each podcast would be about an hour in length, with the first fifteen minutes or so of each podcast dedicated to a reading from the text, followed by discussion of that reading each week.

Of course there are many other and more modern translations, of which the Martin Ferguson Smith edition is in my view the best, but those are not in the public domain and would present copyright issues that would limit what we could do with those texts. There are also public domain "poetic" versions, notably the Emery Leonard version, but those versions take such a large degree of poetic license in translation that they are not the most suitable for rigorous study of the original meaning of the text.

Let me go ahead and say that I want to focus on the 1743 edition as the main text to organize the discussion. We can and will of course use the other editions for comparison in each discussion, but it makes sense to pick one translation to use at the start of each discussion/podcast, and that's where we should use the 1743 edition uniformly. Each of the three translations has strengths and weaknesses, and some passages in some texts seem more clear and accurate and well-worded than others. Here is a side-by-side example of one passage from the various texts compared to each other

I believe the 1743 Edition is the best for the purpose of reading at the beginning of each sesssion for the following reasons:

1. The Cyril Bailey Edition, even though the most recent of the three, appears to me to make editorial choices in word selection which at time deviate from the literal meaning in significant ways. Of the three translators, Baily also expresses in his commentaries the most criticism of Epicurean ethics and epistemology, and so in passages that are somewhat obscure I do not believe his editorial decisions are to be trusted as the most friendly and accurate to Epicurus / Lucretius' intent. He clearly did not consider his own ethics to be Epicurean, so I question how well he understood the material, or a least how sympathetically he was willing to view it. I do not believe it makes good sense to trust an enemy of a position to convey it accurately and sympathetically.
2. The Hugh Munro Edition appears to be significantly more literal and faithful to the original intent than the Cyril Bailey version, and for those reasons alone are to be preferred over Bailey. It also appears to me in reading his commentaries that Munro was much more of an admirer of Epicurus than Bailey, and therefore more likely to convey his meaning sympathetically. However it is also my observation that Munro tends to be so literal that his syntax and choice of words is frequently significantly more complex for a modern reader to follow. It appears to me that in most cases the improvements we see in the Bailey version over Munro are mostly that Bailey modernized Hugh Munro's language so that it flows better to the modern ear. But in many ways it appears to me that when someone wants the most literal translation they should always compare what they are reading against Munro's version. If I had to choose one of the two for studying an obscure passage, I would always choose Munro.
3. The 1743 Edition was published by a translator who appears unknown (Daniel Browne was the publisher, not the translator). Counterintutively, due to its age, in many cases it is actually written more clearly to the modern ear than either Munro or Bailey. It is almost as if the 1743 translator more intuitively understands the original intent of the text and shapes it into simpler and more direct form than Munro or Bailey. And here is the most important reason of all for choosing the 1743 edition: regularly throughout the text in critical sections where shades of meaning are important, the 1743 translator makes word choice selections that are different, but to my observation likely more sensible, than either Munro or Bailey or other modern translators. Is it possible that in remaining anonymous the 1743 translator felt more free to convey Lucretius accurately, and not hold back on Lucretius' anti-religious and anti-Academic message? Over time I will come back and add to this list, but here is an example:
   1. At around line 450 of Book 1 there is an important discussion of the "properties" of the elements and the "qualities" of combined bodies. In this connection Lucretius makes the point that the properties are eternal and unchanging, but that the qualities vary with time, place, and circumstance. Most modern translators use the word "accidents" to translate this varying quality, but the original text is "eventum" and the 1743 translator logically calls them "events." I know not everyone will agree with this, but to me the two words "accident" and "event" have very different connotations. "Accident" can be read to imply that the circumstance is totally "random" and "unpredictable" - similar to "chaotic." It is my view that this is a very unfortunate choice of words, because the qualities of combined bodies are not "chaotic" but rather strictly determined by the local circumstances under which they occur. It is my view that this is an example of modern translators missing the point of Lucretius, subconsciously thinking along the lines that the universe is "accidental" when in fact Epicurus taught (for example in the letter to Herodotus) that the action of the universe is strictly "determined" by the nature of the elements and the limited ways they can combine (limited by their properties). Perhaps "accidents" is also a nod to the religious perspective, in which the only alternatives are God vs Chaos, rather than the "natural law" universe based on the properties of the atoms? At any rate, combined with other examples I will list later, I believe this word choice shows that the 1743 translator was more "in tune" with Lucretius / Epicurus on this very important point.
   2. In the opening of Book 2, I consider Bailey's phrase "all such power belongs to reason alone" to be an absolutely awful phrase that Epicurus / Lucretius would never have endorsed, given the Canonical focus on the senses over logic / reason. But that is the phrase Bailey uses: "But if we see that these thoughts are mere mirth and mockery, and in very truth the fears of men and the cares that dog them fear not the clash of arms nor the weapons of war, but pass boldly among kings and lords of the world, nor dread the glitter that comes from gold nor the bright sheen of the purple robe, can you doubt that all such power belongs to reason alone, above all when the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness?" Munro has this as "But if we see that these things are food for laughter and mere mockeries, and in good truth the fears of men and dogging cares dread not the clash of arms and cruel weapons, if unabashed they mix among kings and caesars and stand not in awe of the glitter from gold nor the brilliant sheen of the purple robe, how can you doubt that this is wholly the prerogative of reason, when the whole of life withal is a struggle in the dark?" However the 1743 Edition has this much more neutrally as "But if these things are vain and all grimace, and the truth is that nor the fears of men, nor following cares fly from the sound of alarms or cruel darts, but boldly force their way among the kings and mighty of the earth; nor do they homage pay to shining gold, nor the gay splendor of a purple robe. Do you doubt but all this stuff is want of sense, and all our life is groping in the dark?" I presume that Munro has probably made an attempt to be literal, and his version can be justified if we consider "reason" to refer to "true reason" in the Epicurean sense. We could give the same license to Bailey as well, but his "reason ALONE" seems to me to be the worst possible choice if it is read, as many will, following Plato, to mean "reason without reference to and superior to the senses." In my view the 1743 Edition is a significantly better choice and actually uses the word "sense," which evokes the senses over reason, in the way the term "common sense" is generally used. At the very least the 1743 edition will not plant in the mind of a new reader (the target audience of Lucretius!) the idea that reason/logic is superior to the senses and has no use for them.

One unfortunate fact is that while I have a transcription of Book 1 complete, and that will let us get started for probably five sessions, in the interim I am going to have to work hard to get the remaining five books fully transcribed. Each has been started at the Epicureanfriends wiki, but considerably more work will be done to finish them. If anyone has any time to help I would greatly appreciate the assistance. Both the original PDF text and the work that has been done already is available here. If you have time to contribute, just type up the text in pure ascii (no bold, underlines, or italics) and send me a private message and/or post it here in this thread and I will add it into the wiki for use in the final version we use with the podcast. As I work on this myself I am adding the transcription to the wiki immediately, so if you don't see the transcribed text in the appropriate page for the 1743 edition you can be sure that that part has not been transcribed and you will not be wasting your effort.

As of this writing Book One is fully complete, and portions of the following books are also ready. Next in line to be finished is Book 2, which is only about halfway complete. If you are able to help, this is the place to start. (UPDATED LINK TO GOOGLE DOC.) You will note that I am adding line numbers in brackets to the beginning of each paragraph, but it is not necessary to worry about those at this point, especially since they are necessarily approximations and not easy to dig out of the text.

I should add that the work that is going to be necessary to finish the 1743 transcription is a measure of my confidence that it is the best for our use. I already have the Bailey and Munro editions fully transcribed, and if I thought they were suitable I would use one of those already finished. However I started this project trying to use first Bailey, then Munro, and I found the result so unsatisfactory, and the 1743 edition so superior, that I think it is worthwhile to finish the transcription so that our final work is the most useful that is possible. And that is even despite the fact that the 1743 edition uses the old style "f" for "s" in some words! (As we transcribe we need to substitute the modern typeface, and I should also note that in most cases I am not preserving Capital letters that do not appear at the start of a sentence, except of course for proper names or other words we would expect to be capitalized.)

ALSO as part of planning for a Skype / online series of discussions to be turned into a podcast, I want to break down each book into manageable sections of fifteen minutes or so which can be read aloud and played at the opening of each session. I am in the process of preparing logical divisions now, and I will turn each division into a text-to-speech version which we can use if necessary or appropriate.

HOWEVER it would be optimum, and a long term goal, to get these sections read aloud by volunteer readers from among our Epicureanfriends participants. If you can volunteer to read a section in good-quality audio, please volunteer, because those will no doubt be better than the computer voice. I hope multiple people will be willing to do this for each selection, because even though we will use only one per podcast, I would like to circulate any that are submitted on Epicureanradio.com and use them on other similar opportunities. I think there is hardly any better way to get used to the Epicurean texts than to listen to them being read aloud by a human speaker, because voice inflection conveys meaning that is hard to pick up in the written word. I will be recording versions myself, and I hope you will consider trying it yourself and letting us know so we can make available your versions to other students of Epicurus.

Once we are well underway with the project we should plan to turn to the human-read versions of Lucretius into a freely-available audiobook of the full text of Lucretius, which we can make available freely to the world in addition to the podcast discussion versions.

Quote from Martin

From the context of the surrounding text, I guess you mean unnecessary desires which are not worth the prior or subsequent pain when fulfilled.

Excellent catch, Martin. I think that's always a very important point - otherwise the "natural and necessary" categorization becomes a very un-Epicurean absolute rule, which would violate the more fundamental Epicurean observation that pleasure is pleasure is pleasure, all pleasure is desirable in itself, and the first question is always to ask what would happen practically if the particular desire/pleasure is pursued.

Given what I think is Epicurus' clear rigorously-consistent thought processes, I cannot imagine that he intended an intellectual classification which varies with circumstance to override the general rule that Pleasure is the guide of life. But that is just what happens when people (not referring to Garden Dweller) elevate the useful categorization tool to an end in itself, just like that happens whenever any tool is so elevated to an end in itself, just like "virtue."

That observation applies the the very development and use of a set of observations like this "Continuous Life Improvement" list. As GD is finding, priorities shift with circumstance and written rules, no matter how generally and insightfully written, require adjustment to those circumstances.

Thanks Todd. Because it is new it will continue to show up for a while in the "New Threads" views, but I will move it to the section on "Herculaneum Text Research" where it will be easier to find in the future.

Nate I remember reading the Once and Future King a long time ago - it was great! I need to revisit it.

The quote you listed on the face of it could read the wrong way - some kind of Platonic idea that "wisdom" is the goal of life, but I don't think the quote can be read without realizing the FEELING behind it, so it is kind of ironic but that in stating that somehow "learning" is the goal, he is saying that learning brings "the remedy for being sad" which is pleasure!

And yes Godfrey I agree too that reading the physics helps bridge the time gap and reminds us than no matter what the year on the calender we are all pretty much the same in basic nature and questioning.

THIS is my position too:

Quote from JJElbert

In a hundred years our conception of physics might be as unrecognizable to us now as our models now would be to those living a century ago. For the practical student of philosophy, the ends remain unchanged. There continues to be no good evidence for the miraculous. The explanatory power of a hypothetical 'god' continues to be, as Neil DeGrasse Tyson put it, "an ever-receding pocket of scientific ignorance". And the stage is still too big for the drama.

Any of us could put down what we are doing, devote every waking moment to studying and pursuing the latest in physics, but I think we can say with confidence that at the end of that time we would still find questions to pursue which cannot be answered. We'd know a lot more, but have an entirely different set of questions.

And we can with certainty state that we'll still face the argument "How can I know FOR SURE? I wasn't there to see it myself!"

So we will always face a question of "evidence' as to what we choose to accept as "final" for us, and what we choose to reject or hold open. And if that is the case, it makes sense right at the start to recognize the limits of how much knowledge we will ever accumulate, and instead of pouring every waking moment into physics books, think about the big picture of what we DO know, what we can practically do with our limited knowledge, and what kind and amount of evidence we are going to accept, given that we will never obtain "god-like certainty" or even "I was there" certainty about the answer.

Podcast of May 30, 2016: https://philosophybites.com/2016/05/cather…icureanism.html

I don't have this book yet, but it appears to be a variation with changes of "The Pleasure Principle" released in Britain for the UK audience. We can use this thread to discuss "How To Be An Epicurean" as people begin to get and read this one.

I know that Ms. Wilson is making the podcast rounds as well, so it will probably make sense to set up a thread for each of her major interviews, which I will do now with the Philosophy Bites podcast as suggested by SamJ

Thanks Charles!

Excellent points Charles and Todd.

Todd, I was referring to a discussion we had on a Skype call, the one Charles is referring to, in which JAWS referred to "the area under the curve." We have not yet done a graphic but have that on the to do list.

Basically we were discussing the feasibility of illustrating the issue of how long we should want to live by a standard x-y graph, with "pleasure" on the vertical Y axis, and time on the X axis.

That would make "the area under the curve" representative of the sum of pleasures over a lifetime.

But for the reasons we have repeated here, it does not seem correct that Epicurus was suggesting that the "area under the curve" as a result of time should be our ONLY concern. And we have to consider "what exactly are we measuring on the Y axis?" Is it "intensity" of pleasure, or how do we measure pleasure?

Epicurus also says in the letter to Menoeceus that "life is desirable" so it would seem that it is true that it is in fact desirable to live as long as possible, so long as pleasure dominates over pain, while at the same time it is not "necessary" to live forever in order to be satisfied with life.

I think both of these considerations are true, and as we explore and think about Epicurean philosophy it would be great to work on articulating this with more precision, because most of us are trapped in sort of a religious perspective that if we are not immortal singing songs in heaven we are somehow miserable.

AZ -- Yes the Stoic universe presumes a providence and without one their system would fall apart, and they would have no goal - which I guess is why they insist on Providence.

As to "long term pleasure as the sole good" that probably needs thought. As I mentioned in another recent thread some of us have been debating precisely that issue. I have used the term "long term pleasure" regularly myself, but I am getting more careful about it. Epicurus clearly says in the letter to Menoeceus that

"

And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

So I think we need to be careful assuming that we can describe the goal as "long term pleasure." It is probably more accurate to say simply "Pleasure" for that reason, or to try to find modifiers such as "net pleasure" or "maximum pleasure" that do not indicate that time is the key factor. In fact we probably need to consider that it is hard to pin down what the key factor is, if not time. Is it "intensity?" Is it "percentage of experience?" Or what?

Pleasure being a feeling it is hard (impossible?) to reduce it to a measurement in terms of time, or space, or some other outside measurement.

Presumably that is why Epicurus generally talks about "pleasure" as the goal and does not combine it with some other form of limiting or modifying adjective.

This is interesting to think and talk about.

I am working on updating this for use this Sunday. If you have any comments or suggestions or text you'd like me to include please post.

Your observations point out GD why the "hedonic calculus" is so flexible and individual and that point itself is something that we need to stress and remember. Every time we put a modifier in front of "pleasure" we risk implying something that is too restrictive , so clarity is always important.

It is an observation that the senses are all we have to work with, and that our choice is either to use them intelligently or essentially despair and go live in a cave and die. You are stating a huge epistemology issue that we ought to develop and be very clear about. Because there are certain things that are outside our power to observe, do we then sit down and cry and say that "anything goes"? Or do we with confidence embrace the tools that we have and use them to the best of our ability?

Much time is spent on this issue in Book 4 of Lucretius as it is basically the same issues as the "illusion" question. We know that we are imperfect and that the senses can provide perceptions that are at times distorted. Do we then throw up our hands to imaginary gods to save us from our weakness? No!

That's what is being discussed in this passage from Lucretius Book 4:

"The sun, to Mariners, seems to rise out of the sea, and there again to set and hide his light; for they see nothing but the water and the sky; but therefore you are not to conclude rashly that the senses are at all deceived.

To those who know nothing of the sea, a ship in the port seems disabled, and to strive against the waves with broken oars; for that part of the oar and of the rudder that is above the water appears straight, but all below, being refracted, seems to be turned upwards, and to be bent towards the top of the water, and to float almost upon the surface of it.

So when the winds drive the light clouds along the sky in the night, t he moon and stars seem to fly against the clouds, and to be driven above them in a course quite opposite to that in which they naturally move.

And if you chance to press with your fingers under one of your eyes, the effect will be that every thing you look upon will appear double, every bright candle will burn with two flames, and all the furniture of the house will multiply and show double; every face about you, and every body, will look like two.

Lastly, when sleep has bound our limbs in sweet repose, and all the body lies dissolved in rest, we think ourselves awake; our members move, and in the gloomy darkness of the night we think we see the sun in broad day-light, and, though confined in bed, we wander over the heavens, the sea, the rivers, and the hills, and fancy we are walking through the plains. And sounds we seem to hear; and, though the tongue be still, we seem to speak, when the deep silence of night reigns all about us.

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses."

Poster:

Isn't that an argument from ignorance which is usually employed by various religious systems? My question is related to his method - since he employed that argument against both sceptics and the religious of his days. If we presuppose various models without any confirmation in the observable we can also presuppose that any of these presupposed models rest upon the giant turtle - or a god of any variety.

Welcome @john.smith123 ! When you get a chance, please introduce yourself and tell us about your background in Epicurus. It would also be very interesting to know how you found the forum.

I will be interested in what others have to say about this, especially Martin Huehne, but I think the key aspect of your question is contained in "is not something we can observe even with the aid of the most sophisticated technology."

The point to remember here is that Epicurus was not a "radical" empiricist who insisted on direct observation of every aspect of his philosophy. This is a point developed at length by DeWitt, but not often by others, that it is obvious that Epicurus embraced deductive reasoning, with the starting point being sensation, but by no means limited to what can be perceived directly.

This is obvious even from the beginning of the discussion of atoms and void - Epicurus certainly did not have the technology to observe atoms directly, and void is by its nature empty of details to sense, and atoms and void they are at the core of his philosophy due to his deductive reasoning that they must exist based on what he *was* able to observe. This observation applies both to the existence of the atoms as well as to the conclusion that the universe is eternal, which is based on the observation and reasoning that matter is not created or destroyed spontaneously (or, as specified in Lucretius, at the will of gods).

Here are a couple of quotes where we can observe this deductive reasoning most clearly:

From the letter to Herodotus, note the sentence I have placed in ALL CAPS:

"First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change. Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: FOR THAT BODIES EXIST, SENSE ITSELF WITNESSES IN THE EXPERIENCE OF ALL MEN, AND IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE OF SENSE WE MUST OF NECESSITY JUDGE OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE BY REASONING, as I have already said. And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences.

Lucretius Book 1 Bailey:

[420] But now, to weave again at the web, which is the task of my discourse, all nature then, as it is of itself, is built of these two things: for there are bodies and the void, in which they are placed and where they move hither and thither. For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; AND UNLESS FAITH IN THIS FEELING BE FIRMLY GROUNDED AND ONCE AND PREVAIL, THERE WILL BE NAUGHT TO WHICH WE CAN MAKE AN APPEAL ABOUT THINGS HIDDEN, SO AS TO PROVE AUGHT BY THE REASONING OF THE MIND. And next, were there not room and empty space, which we call void, nowhere could bodies be placed, nor could they wander at all hither and thither in any direction; and this I have above shown to you but a little while before.