Posts by Cassius

Once again this morning, for the second time in four weeks, we have had a couple of hours of offline time. This is purely attributable to the hosting provider, and if it keeps recurring we will switch hosts. Both times they have blamed their "Litespeed" service, which I read is an alternative to Apache. Not sure what is going on but we'll just have to move if this keeps happening. Sorry for any inconvenience.

I don't think anything was lost, because I presume when the error happened and the system crashed, everything went down, so there was no need for a restore. If anyone observes otherwise please let me know.

That graphic came at the end of my typing for today. Here's more of the context:

Again, since you allow that all bodies do not emit sound and smell, and not attribute sound and smell to every body; so, since we cannot discover every thing by our eyes, you may conclude there are some bodies as much void of color, as there are others without smell or sound; and a judicious mind can properly form a notion of such bodies void of color, as it can of others that are without smell or sound, or any other qualities whatsoever.

But lest you should conceive the first seeds are void only of color, you must know that they are without warmth, are altogether free from cold or heat, the emit no sound, are without moisture, nor do they send out any smell from their several bodies; so when you propose to compound a pleasant ointment of sweet marjoram, myrrh, and flowers of spikenard, that send out the richest odor up to the nose, the first thing you are to do is to choose, as far as it lies in your power, an oil that has no smell, that it may, as little as possible, infect and corrupt those few sweet ingredients, being mixed and digested with them, with its native rankness.

Lastly, the seeds do not bestow any smell upon the bodies they produce, nor any sound, for they can exhale nothing from themselves; and, for the same reason, they can communicate no taste, nor cold, nor any vapor hot or warm. You must separate all qualities from the seeds that render them liable to dissolution, such as viscous, brittle, hollow, which proceeded from qualities that are soft, putrid, and rare, the seeds must have nothing of these properties if you would fix them upon an eternal foundation, upon which alone depends the security of beings, lest all things should fall to nothing, and perish beyond recovery.

Now farther, those beings we see indued with sense, you must needs own are produced from insensible seeds; nor is there anything we perceive by common experience, which refutes or opposes this opinion. Everything rather leads us on, and compels us to believe that animals, I say, proceed from principles that are void of sense; for we observe living worms come into being from stinking dung, when the earth, moistened by unseasonable showers, grows putrid and rotten.

Besides, beings of all kinds undergo continual changes; the waters, the leaves, and the sweet grass turn themselves into beasts; the beasts convert their nature into human bodies; and the bodies of wild beasts and birds increase and grow strong by these bodies of ours. Nature therefore changes all sorts of food into living bodies; and hence she forms the senses of all creatures, much after the same manner as she quickens dry wood into fire, and sets everything in a blaze. You see now it is of the utmost importance in what order these first seeds are ranged, and, when mingled together, what motions they give, and receive among themselves.

But tell me, what is it that lays a force upon your mind? What moves you? What drives you into another opinion, that you should not believe a thing sensible can be formed from insensible seeds? Perhaps you observe that stones, and wood, and earth, when mingled together, can produce no creature indued with sense; but you will do well to remember, upon this occasion, that I did not say things sensible, or sense, could instantly proceed from all seeds in general, which go to the production of beings, but that it was of great consequence of what size the seeds are that created a being of sense, with what figures, motions, order, and position they are distinguished. Nothing of which we observe in wood, or clods of Earth. Yet these, when they are made rotten by moisture, produce worms, because the particles of matter, being changed from their former course by some new cause, are so united and disposed, that living creatures are formed, and creep into being.

Besides, those who contend that a sensible being may be raised from sensible seeds, (and this you are taught by some philosophers), must needs allow those seeds to be soft; for all sense is joined to bowels, nerves, and veins, all which, we know, are soft, and consequently liable to change and dissolution.

But grant their seeds to be eternal, yet if they are sensible, each seed must be endued with sense, either as a part or a whole, and be like a complete animal of itself; but no single part can perceive or exist of itself, for each part requires a union with the other parts, to make it capable of sense, nor can the hand feel any more, or any other part retain its sense, when separated from the body. These seeds therefore must be perfect animals, and so unite together in a vital sensibility; but how then can be seeds be said to be eternal, and secure from death, when they have the nature of animals, and are one and the same with them in all respects, and therefore are mortal, and must die?

But allow these seeds to be sensible and Incorruptible too, yet, by their union and agreement, they can produce nothing but animals and things sensible; that is, mankind, and cattle, and wild beasts, can produce nothing but men, and cattle, and wild beasts. (How then could things insensible, such as trees, metals, have a being?)

If you say these seeds, in mingling together, lose their own proper sense, and assume another, what need you impute any sense at all to them, when they must lose it again? Besides, as we have proved before, since we perceive the eggs of birds are changing into living young, and that worms break out of the earth, when it is made rotten by unseasonable showers, we may conclude, that things sensible may arise from insensible seeds.

If anyone will assert here that sense indeed may proceed from insensible seeds, by sort of change made in the seeds, by virtue of the thing that generates, before the animal is formed, it will be sufficient plainly to show him, that no animal can be formed but by a union, first of the seeds, nor can anything be changed but by agreement of the seeds, so that there can be no such thing as sense in any body before the animal is completely formed. And for this reason: because the seeds lie scattered in the air, the water, the earth, the fire, nor have they yet united together, after a proper manner, into any vital motions by which the senses of any animal may be produced, in order to guide and preserve it.

Besides, a blow falling upon any animal, heavier than its nature can endure, immediately torments it, and confounds all its senses both of body and mind; for the connection of the seeds is dissolved, and the vital motions are wholly obstructed, till the force of the blow being agitated violently through the limbs dissolves the vital ties of the soul from the body, and compels her, scattered and broken to pieces, to fly out through every pore. For what can we conceive to be the effect of such a stroke but to separate and dissolve the seeds that were united before?

And then it happens, when the blow falls with less violence, that the remains of vital motion often get the better, they recover and calm the great disorders of the blow, and recall everything again into its proper channel. They rescue the body, as it were, from the jaws of death, and give new life to the senses that were almost destroyed; else why should creatures rather return to life from the very gates of death with new spirits, than when they were just entering in, proceed on, and utterly perish?

Further, since we feel pain when the seeds are shaken from their natural state and situation within, and are disordered through all the bowels and limbs by any outward force, and when they return again into their proper place, a quiet pleasure immediately succeeds, you may conclude that simple seeds cannot be tormented with pain, nor of themselves be affected with pleasure; because they do not consist of principles or other seeds by whose violent motions they may be disturbed, or be delighted with any pleasure they can give; and therefore they cannot possibly be endued with any sense at all.

Again, if in order to produce creatures with sense, sense must be imputed to the seeds from which they are formed, of what principles, I pray, is the human race properly composed? Of such, no doubt, as laugh, and shake their little sides, such as bedew their face and cheeks with flowing tears, such as can widely talk how things are mixed, and such as search of what first principles themselves are formed; For all things that enjoy the faculties of perfect animals must consist of other seeds like them, and these must arise from others, and thus the progression would be infinite. I urge further, whatever you observe to speak, to laugh, to be wise, must proceed from other seeds that can perform the same; but if this be ridiculous and downright madness, and things that can laugh can spring from seeds that never smile, and the wise, that learnedly dispute, are produced from foolish seeds and stupid, what hinders that sensible things may not as well be formed from seeds without any matter of sense at all?

Lastly, we all spring from ethereal seed; we have all one common parent, when the kind Earth, our mother, receives the quickening drops of moisture from above, she conceives us and brings forth shining fruits, and pleasant trees, the human race, and all the race of beasts, she yields them proper food on which they feed, and lead a pleasant life, and propagate their kind, and therefore has she justly gained the name of mother. The parts that first from Earth arose return to Earth again; what descended from the sky, those parts brought back again that heavens receive; nor does death so put an end to beings as to destroy the very seeds of them, but only disunites them, then makes new combinations, and is the cause that all things vary their forms, and change their colors, become sensible, and in a moment lose all their sense again. You may know from hence of what importance it is, with what the first seeds of things are united, and in what position they are contained, and what are the several motions they give and take among themselves. And from hence you may conclude that these first seed are not the less eternal, because you perceive them floating, as it were, upon the surface of bodies, and subject to be born, and die. It is of like concern with what the several letters are joined in these verses of mine, and in what order each of them is disposed; for the same letters make up the words to signify the heaven, the sea, the Earth, the rivers, the sun; the same express the fruits, the trees, the creatures; if they are not all, yet by much the greater part are alike, but they differ in their situation. So, likewise, in bodies, when the intervals of the seeds, their courses, connections, weights, strokes, union, motions, order, position, figure; when these things are changed, the things themselves must be changed likewise.

Now apply your mind closely to the documents of true reason, for a new scheme of philosophy presses earnestly for your attention, a new scene of things displays itself before you. Yet there is nothing so obvious but may at first view seem difficult to be believed, and there is nothing so prodigious and wonderful at first that men do not by degrees cease to admire. For see the bright and pure color of the sky, possessed on every side by wandering stars, and the Moon’s splendor, and the Sun's glorious light; these, if they now first shown to mortal eyes, and suddenly presented to our view, what could more wonderful appear than these? And what before could men less presume to expect?

Nothing surely, so surprising would be the sight have been. But now, quite tired and cloyed with the prospect, none of us vouchsafes so much as to cast our eyes up towards the bright temples of the sky. Therefore do not be frightened, and conceive an aversion to an opinion because of its novelty; but search it rather with a more piercing judgment. If it appears true to you, embrace it; if false, set yourself against it.

Now, I should be glad to know, since, without the walls of this world, the visible heavens, there lies an infinite space, what is contained there. This the Mind desires eagerly to search into, and, by its own vigor, to range over freely, and without obstruction.

And first, since there is no bound to space in any part of it, on no side of it, neither above or below it, as I have proved, and the thing itself proclaims it, and the very nature of space confirms it; we are not to suppose, (since this space is infinitely extended every way, and the seeds innumerable fly about this mighty void in various manners, urged on by an eternal motion) that this one globe of Earth, and the visible heavens only, were created, and that so many seeds of matter that lie beyond do nothing; especially since this world was made naturally, and without design, and the seeds of things of their own accord, jostling together by variety of motions, rashly sometimes, in vain often, and to no purpose, at length suddenly agreed and united, and became the beginning of mighty productions, of the Earth, the Sea, and the Heavens, and the whole animal creation. Wherefore, it needs must be allowed, there were in many other places agreements and unions of the seeds of the same nature with this world of ours, surrounded as it is with the fast embraces of the heavens above.

Besides, since there is a large stock of matter already, and a place suitable, nor is there anything or cause to hinder and delay, things must necessarily be produced, and come into being. Now, since there is so great a plenty of seeds, that all the ages of men would not be sufficient to number them, and the same power, the same nature remains, that can dispose the seeds of things in any other place, by the same rule as that united in this world of ours, we must needs confess, that there are other worlds in other parts of the universe, possessed by other kinds of inhabitants, both of men and beasts.

Add to this, that in the universe there is no species that has but one of a sort, that is produced alone, that remain single, and grows up by itself; but whatever species things are of, there are many more individuals of the same kind. This you may observe in the animal creation, this you will find to be the state of the wild beasts, of the human race, of the silent fish, and the whole brood of birds. By the same reason you must own, that the heavens, the Earth, the Sun, the moon, the Sea, and all other beings that are, do not exist singly, but are rather innumerable in their kind; for every one of these have a proper limit fixed to their beings, and are equally bound by the general laws of nature, with all those whose species include a numerous train of individuals under them.

Catherine Wilson is on a tour, it seems, promoting her latest book, and here is video of a speech that was just uploaded on October 1. We're trying to make each post here as substantive as possible by adding commentary, so before posting this I watched the video in full and made the following notes of the major topics she covered. In sum, I think this is a fine speech and she deserves a lot of credit. She covers most of the major aspects of Epicurus (I don't think I heard her mention the canon or epistemology) and most of us here would have some differences with some of the points she makes. But this speech does not go off into politics whatsoever, and in general this is an excellent mostly-sympathetic introduction to Epicurean philosophy. I will forewarn you, however, that Ms. Wilson is not presenting this as a "motivational" speech. She is making an academic presentation to a serious audience, so her tone and presentation are appropriate to that setting.

I do want to give her particular credit for her quote from Plutarch, showing how the Epicureans disagreed with and opposed the Stoics, even calling Stoicism the result of "another and greater bad thing, savagery or unadulterated lust for fame, and madness."

With her featuring a quote like that, how could this speech be anything *but* worthwhile!

2:07 - Epicureanism is one of her favorite philosophies

• 2:27 - Epicurus had a "cult-like" school of philosophy.
• 5:55 - She says "infinity of shapes" but that is not correct. Lucretius said that the number of different shapes are limited, but the total number of atoms is unlimited/infinite. (this is a very minor point)
• 7:18 - Lots of other worlds with plants and animals too
• 11:09 - Reality depends on the observer. (Uses good example that the atoms do not have color; flock of sheep on a hillside)
• 12:29 - Attrition - (Uses good example of ring and, plow)
• 13:20 - Limits discussion. How much wealth etc is "ethically acceptable."
• 14:10 - Theology. She says that here there is a real difference between Epicurus and Lucretius(?) She cites the reference in the Letter to Menoeceus and how to think about the gods. She says Lucretius was much more fierce about religion than Epicurus and implies that this was different from Epicurus himself.
• 18:20 - "Natural selection before Darwin" - "system of perishing." Says Epicurus was not very good on his science of how things came about and are regular - as to all sorts of natural phenomena.
• 21:44 Implies that Epicurean natural selection theory , as opposed to Darwin, was not based on observation and argument.
• 23:38 - Says that Lucretius said that the primitive period was the happiest period in the human race(?) And that what changed was technology which allowed tools of war and slavery (?) With civilization came war and slavery.
• 25:45 - Says aspiration to honor, fame, and power is root of evil.
• 26:35 - Book 6 doesn't seem to fit with the rest; ends up very darkly.
• 27:44 "Pleasure which I will get to in a minute."
• 29:02 - Maybe illness of humanity as a metaphor for sick state of society(?)
• 29:45 - "Epicurus said that physical well-being / absence of pain is the most important value in human life" Cites the "contend with Zeus for happiness" quote.
• 31:35 - Discovery of fire gradually produced misery of civilization and oppression
• 32:10 - Talks about how other philosophers are opponents of pleasure. Epicurus was out on a limb here and suffered a lot of criticism for it
• 32:58 - Death is nothing to us. This strikes people as a sophism, she says, because the main concern is that we are going to be "missing out." She explains there is neither heaven nor hell. They stress the idea of a natural limit and not bad to lose life when you are at the natural limit. (good)
• 35:00 Lucretius is consoling on death as are the Stoics.
• 36:48 - Epicureans v Stoics - She says Stoicism is about forbearance and you should resign yourself to your losses and your mind can choose not to be affected by external circumstances. Epicureans did not think that at all, as mind and body are one to epicureans. Epicureans did not suggest that all emotions should be suppressed. She gives an EXCELLENT quote from Plutarch with Epicurean criticism of Stoicism.
• 39:00 - Epicureanism is not (1) dedication to fine dining, (2) consumerism, (3) dialectical materialism."
• 40:45 - What Epicurus thought was most pleasurable in life was learning new things. For Lucretius what gave him pleasure was writing his poem.
• 42:00 - Recommends Greenblatt's book the Swerve. She thinks this is mis-titled as the swerve is not all that central to Epicurean philosophy. She does, however, stumble and say that Epicurus mentions the swerve once and Lucretius not at all; she has that reversed, but I am sure she knows that.

Yes Lucretius can seem like a wall of text, especially when deep in the weeds of the atoms. I think it helps a lot to keep the full context in mind as digesting small pieces.

I need to finish the transcription of the 1743 Edition, so I am going to try to discipline myself to work on it daily to get through it. At present I am nearing the end of Book 2, so I think I will post the progress I make daily, and that may serve as a sort of daily "reading."

October 8: Book 2, Approx Line 770 - Lucretius is discussing the relationship between the properties of atoms and the qualities / events of the bodies which they compose, and he is pointing out how color is such an example:

That seeds may be void of color I have shown; I shall now prove that they actually are so. Now every color may be changed one into another; but the principles of things will by no means in admit of change, there necessarily must be something that remains immutable, lest all things should be utterly reduced to nothing; for whatsoever is changed, and breaks the bounds of its first nature, instantly dies, and is no more what first it was. Be cautious therefore, how you stain the seeds of things with color, lest all things should recur to nothing, and be utterly destroyed.

Besides, though Nature bestows no color upon seeds, yet they are endued with different figures, from which they form and vary the colors of every kind which show upon them. (For it is of great concern what seeds unite with others, and what positions they are preserved, and what motions they give and receive among themselves;) and thus you may readily account why things that just before appeared black, should suddenly look white. As the sea, when the rough winds enrage the waters, grows white with foaming waves. So you may say of what commonly appears black to us, when the seeds of which it is formed are mingled, and their order changed, when some new seeds are added, and some old ones are removed, the direct consequence is that its color is changed, and appears white. But if the water of the sea consisted essentially of blue particles, it could by no means change into a white color. Disturb the order of the seeds how you would, the principles that are blue would never pass into a white.

But if you say that the seeds which make the sea look of one uniform white are stained with different colors, as a perfect square that is one figure, is made up of several bodies that are of several figures, then it would follow that, as we perfectly see that dissimilar figures which the square contains within it, so we might discover in the water of the sea, or in any other body of one simple color, the mixed and different colors from which that simple color proceeds.

Besides, the dissimilar figures that go to make up a square do by no means hinder that the surface of the body should appear square, but a mixed variety of colors will forever prevent that the surface of any body should appear of one fixed and uniform color.

And then the very reason that would incline us sometimes to impute colors to seeds is by this means destroyed, or, in this case, white Bodies are not produced from white, or black from black, but from seeds of various colors. Now a white would much sooner proceed from seeds of no color at all, then from such as are black, or any other opposite color whatsoever.

Besides, since colors cannot appear without light, and since the seeds of things cannot appear in the light, you may thence conclude that they are covered with no colors at all. For how can any color show itself in the dark, which surround in the light itself, as it is differently struck either with a direct or oblique ray of light? After this manner, the plumes of doves, which grow about their neck, and are an ornament to it, show themselves in the sun. In one position they appear red like a fiery carbuncle, in another light, the greenness of the emerald is mixed with a sky blue. So, likewise, the tail of the peacock, all filled with light, changes its colors, as the rays strike directly or obliquely upon it. Since therefore colors are produced only by the strokes of light, we cannot suppose that they can possibly exist without it.

And since the eye receives within itself one sort of stroke with when it is said to perceive a white Color, and another contrary one, when it views an object of a black or any other color, and since it is of no moment by what color any thing you touch is distinguished, but rather of what peculiar shape and figure it is, you may conclude there is no manner of occasion that seeds should be stained with any colors, but that they should cause that variety of touch by the various figures with which they are imbued.

Besides, since there are no certain colors peculiar to certain figures, and since seeds of any figure may be of any color, whence is it that bodies that consist of such seeds are not in there several kinds imbued with all sorts of colors? It would be common to see crows, as they fly about, cast a white color from their white feathers, and black swans might be produced from black seeds, or be of any other one or more colors, as there seeds chance to be distinguished.

Further, the more any body is broken into small parts, the more you may perceive its color languishes by degrees, and dies away. This is the case of gold, when it is divided into thin shavings, its luster is extinguished, and the purple guy, by much the richest, when it is drawn out thread by thread, is quite lost. Hence you may infer that the particles of bodies discharge themselves of all color before they come to be as small as seeds.

Joshua have you studied the word "accidens"'s Latin history? I would be curious how you would contrast that to eventum, since that appears to be what Lucretius used.

I proudly proclaim geek status (computer-geek, mostly) and I am unwashed of any but two undergraduate courses in philosophy, in college, many years ago!

Yes Todd your reasoning was exactly why I said that it was "probably correct as written." The issue as to how to classify emotions into the pleasure / pain model is not necessarily easy, and surely "indifference" is a concept that we recognize as useful. But I suppose that maybe part of Epicurus' reasoning is that by nature words like "indifference" are concepts / abstractions, and that ultimately all feelings, to the extent a feeling is perceived, can be traced back to some direct perception of feeling approval/pleasure or disapproval/displeasure.

i just noticed this: "Our intellect provides us with a response to what we sense in the natural world, which is pleasure, pain, or indifference."

I think that is probably correct as written but it is extremely important to remember that there are only two feelings ultimately, pleasure and pain.

Garden Dweller I also want to cover this by apologizing in advance if you read any sense of disapproval ("You should have read the DeWitt book already!!!) in my comment

By no means is DeWitt the only writer worth reading, and I am acutely aware that most people who come across Epicurus today by means of recent / modern commentaries are not going to have heard of DeWitt, because it is the current fashion to omit him, treat him as if he never existed, and mention him only in a demeaning manner if at all. For example if your primary exposure to Epicurus is to read the Okeefe / Cambridge / Warren / Catherine Wilson / Voula Tsouna material you are probably never even going to know DeWitt's book exists.

DeWitt is by no means the most brilliant writer who over lived, but if and when you do find the time to read him i think you will understand the enthusiasm that some of us have for him. DeWitt was a very competent scholar but what he brings to the table is a sweeping approach that first and foremost grounds you in what Epicurus was trying to teach without a lot of condescending commentary, or over-focus on how some particular doctrine ('absence of pain' I am looking at you) may seem "to be a lot like Stoicism" or that "Epicurus was an anti-commercialist ascetic just like we should be," and "really and truly if the Stoics and Epicureans had just listened to each other they would have been best pals," etc etc etc.

DeWitt takes the material in a logical manner and organizes it pretty much (in my view) as you would expect an ancient Epicurean would have organized it. And on issues which we find difficult today, such as "all sensations are true," or the meaning of the "greatest good" argument, DeWitt gives explanations that are sympathetic to Epicurus and come together into a consistent whole.

Many of us here got our start in Epicurus through DeWitt, and I don't think that is an accident. If you read DeWitt you see the power and logic of the entire system. If you read most of the others, you get a piecemeal approach that ends up making Epicurus look like a footnote to Stoicism or to Plato and you're generally left wondering why anyone would worry about studying Epicurus.

DeWitt may not be the sage of the ages, but in my view, and in many cases, DeWitt is the key to awakening a real interest in what Epicurus was all about and untangling the controversies. And I know no better way to get people off on the right track, and to "inoculate" them from and against the modern pseudo-Stoic and pseudo-Epicurean "heresies" than to recommend that, if possible, they start off reading DeWitt first. And if they have already started elsewhere, but still have an interest and have not been totally turned off, the best antidote is to go back and finds copy of EAHP.

Quote from Garden Dweller

Should the student of Epicurus carefully guard against anything that would disturb, modify or distort one's senses and sensory observation of the natural world?

Let's not skip over this last question, either, as I think this is an EMPHATIC yes! Now I am all in favor of painkilling drugs when needed, but the senses are vital to us, and efforts to dull them in general (which is essentially what the Stoics advocate) are exactly the wrong direction. Not to mention to problems that alcohol and other mind-altering drugs can lead to. We certainly aren't talking being Puritans, but I think it is pretty clear that overindulgence in mind-altering substances can be very harmful to our overall ability to lead a life of pleasure.

The key part of the DeWitt discussion of this occurs in Chapter 8. Here is an introductory paragraph on the issue Todd and I are citing:

Todd and I were typing over each other but each citing DeWitt and the same answer -- EXCELLENT!

Quote from Garden Dweller

Can our senses be wrong? Could they be disturbed, modified or distorted in some way?

Oh absolutely!

Garden Dweller this question tells me that first and foremost I would urge you to read the DeWitt book, as this is covered in great detail.

I am sure others could improve on what I am about to say but the thumbnail is that (as DeWitt points out) the senses are never strictly speaking giving us an opinion at all. The senses are giving us a direct and unfiltered percerption of what they are receiving, and it is up to us to intrepret that, to learn how to use it, and to judge if the perceptual data they are reporting has been distorted by conditions that intervene between us and the subject of our attention.

We can and should go into this in great detail, but i am about to be called away. The one thing in addition to DeWitt that I would mention is that it is important to review Book 4 of Lucretius in this regard.

The meat of Book 4 is discussing exactly this issue - the matter of "images" and "illusions" and how we should deal with them without letting the distortions undermine our confidence in the senses.

Here is a part I have at hand to paste starting at about line 421. Reading this it is impossible for anyone of good faith to buy the argument that Epicurus held "all senses to be true" in any way other than as explained by Dewitt: The senses are "true" in the sense of "honest witnesses" -- the report exactly what they receive, but it is in the MIND that judgment about what is perceived is made, and THAT is where the possibility of error must be addressed:

[421] Observe, when your mettled horse stands still with you in the middle of a river, and you look down upon the rapid stream of the water, the force of the current seems to drive your horse violently upwards, and hurry you swiftly against the tide; and on which side soever you cast your eyes, all things seem to be borne along, and carried against the current in the same manner.

A long portico, though it be of equal breadth from one end to the other, and reaches far, supported by pillars of equal height, yet when you stand at one end to take a view of its whole extent, it contracts itself by degrees to a narrow point at the further end; the roof touches the floor, and both sides seem to meet, til it terminates at last in the sharp figure of a dark cone.

The sun, to Mariners, seems to rise out of the sea, and there again to set and hide his light; for they see nothing but the water and the sky; but therefore you are not to conclude rashly that the senses are at all deceived.

To those who know nothing of the sea, a ship in the port seems disabled, and to strive against the waves with broken oars; for that part of the oar and of the rudder that is above the water appears straight, but all below, being refracted, seems to be turned upwards, and to be bent towards the top of the water, and to float almost upon the surface of it.

So when the winds drive the light clouds along the sky in the night, the moon and stars seem to fly against the clouds, and to be driven above them in a course quite opposite to that in which they naturally move.

And if you chance to press with your fingers under one of your eyes, the effect will be that every thing you look upon will appear double, every bright candle will burn with two flames, and all the furniture of the house will multiply and show double; every face about you, and every body, will look like two.

Lastly, when sleep has bound our limbs in sweet repose, and all the body lies dissolved in rest, we think ourselves awake; our members move, and in the gloomy darkness of the night we think we see the sun in broad day-light, and, though confined in bed, we wander over the heavens, the sea, the rivers, and the hills, and fancy we are walking through the plains. And sounds we seem to hear; and, though the tongue be still, we seem to speak, when the deep silence of night reigns all about us.

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest?

This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

Cassius started a new event:

Event

Featured Online Book Discussion - DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 14- The New Virtues - Skype

Sun, Oct 13th 2019, 11:00 am – 12:00 pm

Cassius

October 6, 2019 at 12:04 PM

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Here is this link for this morning's discussion call: https://join.skype.com/NSVK30V2BKhb

LOL is right. That IS funny. I know they generally do the best they can but this is like some Vanna White "Wheel of fortune" game. Before long they will be reporting that he was enslaved by the charms of his Platonic lover of something!

"Fleischer also says that the text calls into doubt certain historical details about Plato — for example, it suggests that he was enslaved at an earlier date than previously believed"

Thank you Todd! Yes I went back and checked to be sure that Lucretius had both accidens and eventum from which to choose, and it appears he did. As to whether the shades of meaning today match those in ancient Rome, it's very hard (for me) to say:

     

I am not familiar with what Greek words we have to work with, presumably that would be in the letter to Herodotus if anywhere.

Well probably this is just one of those myriad of examples of why, if everything were clear and everyone agreed on anything, there would be no need for this website or for us to be discussing Epicurean philosophy!

Anyway thanks for the opportunity to discuss this.

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for which "essentials" and "accidents" are typical philosophical descriptions, however problematic for the modern reader.

Yes, that is exactly the issue. In my work I am going for understandability for the modern reader, not for the modern commentator/philosopher class, who in my view have generally made a mess of things

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"non-essential" or "non-essential properties" for "accidental" or"accidents", respectively.

Then all of a sudden, we're talking about events???

Yes I agree that essential or non-essential is exactly the issue, but what separates the two except that we observe that at some times they are together as one, but at some times the things observed are separated? To me that distinction qualifies most strictly as an issue of transiency, or change in place over time, which is relatively close to "event." On the other hand "accident" invokes issues of "how did this happen" which is not really the issue -- the issue is simply whether the thing did in fact separate at any point, not "why."

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The problem arises because Lucretius gives examples that sound more like events than qualities to us. I would translate that loosely as "the condition of bondage or liberty, the state of being rich or poor, at war or at peace". These are accidents because they can change without changing the nature of the subject experiencing them (i.e, a probably a person in this case).

See Todd I am thinking that Lucretius was exactly right in giving these examples, which is the reason he gave them, to eliminate this confusion. There is no single thing that "intrinsic" about bondage or liberty, rich or poor, other than the passage of time - an event. Those changes could come about by intent, or by "luck," or by "gambling" or by any other word that can be assigned to human conduct. With the issue not being HOW the change came about, but simply that it did come about, thus showing that the quality being observed is not an essential part of the atomic structure.

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The overall point, of course, is that these qualities have no existence independent of matter.

Yes there we are in total agreement. The issue is that these qualities have no independent exist, and arise purely from the combinations of the matter and the void. BUT there is also the essential point that the qualities themselves are not "random" or "chaotic" or matters of luck - the qualities themselves are determined by the arrangement of the matter and void and the particular circumstances of that moment -- of that "event."