Episode 287 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "The Fear of Pain Is Overrated, But Cicero and Epicurus Disagree As To Why."
Sure, the motivation for the effort of learning a new skill or achieving a goal one wants is potentially pleasurable, but the effort experienced is painful in the form of repetitive exercises or practice. Frustration sets in that must be overcome. Feelings of inadequacy.
This comes very close, or is at least analogous, to the question of whether all "desire" should be seen to be painful.
My personal view is that not all desire is painful, and neither is all effort. And in the case of either desire or effort, even in those times where the desire or effort is painful, the ultimate question remains whether the resulting total pleasure is worth the total cost in pain.
I suppose in a sense the answer is “as much effort as possible” - what else could be more important?
Bingo Rolf! Exactly what I hoped you were thinking. 
Why art thou confused, Sir Rolf ? 
I would like to think I can predict your concern but I am not sure.
Cassius created a new event:
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What Don says is true and also a lot turns on what definition you give to "effort." Building a stone wall with an inscription about Epicurus takes a lot of a certain type of effort. So does composing six long books of a poem. So does writing 37 books on Nature and all the rest that Epicurus wrote. So does building a philosophical school that opposes and takes on the majority philosophical and religious orthodoxy.
If effort means intensity of focus and action, then those are examples of people putting tremendous effort into their pursuit of a correct philosophy, on which happiness depends, and I would say you put everything you've got into that effort to find pleasure and be happy.
The pleasures Don lists which can be achieved by "getting out of the way" of them is a valid approach if you are able to maintain those and have confidence in their continuance and your satisfaction with them, but there are also other pleasures that you will never experience if you do not pursue them vigorously. There is no god to tell you whether to pursue them or not, and no "ideal" pattern to follow. You yourself have to decide which to pursue. I would argue that there is no good Epicurean authority for the proposition that everyone should always choose those pleasures which take the least "effort." Epicurus says we will sometime choose pain in order to avoid a worse pain or achieve greater pleasure.
It is also arguable based on the sources that DeWitt cites that even the Epicurean gods have to take action to maintain their own blessedness, and certainly every Epicurean we know anything about went to lots of effort to promote their philosophy. There are no Epicurean examples I know of who were held up by the Epicureans as pursuing happiness through engaging in minimal effort in all aspects of life.
The reference to the gods needing to act to maintain their deathlessness is in Section 13 part 3 of DeWitt's book, including: "If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved. However astonishing this doctrine may seem, it is well authenticated. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile, wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern." This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation. The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's good-bye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings.")
That is a good idea but I don't think we have addressed that specifically before, at least in those terms, so we probably out to create a separate thread in the ethics forum so we can discuss it before distilling a FAQ answer. Can you do that please? Or point to a thread where we've already discussed this?
We're still in the early editing phase of this week's edition, but I think I will go ahead and post this link to a topic that Joshua introduces fairly early in this episode. Joshua's topic is the story of John Brown, and especially statements made by Henry David Thoreau in reaction which indicate that Thoreau's perspective had parallels with the perspective of Cicero.
Many people here are probably not aware of the story of John Brown, and while Joshua was certainly aware of the story he wasn't aware of this 1940 movie, in which John Brown is portrayed very effectively by the actor Raymond Massey. It's not a deep philosophical movie so don't bother about it if you don't find it to your liking, but the character and story of John Brown do provide an effective dramatization of what's at stake in choosing the source of one's moral decisionmaking.
As always, ifanyone has any issues, comments, or questions about any changes please let us know.
During the course of the Trojan War, Ares, who had sided with the Trojans, was wounded by the Greek hero Diomedes who drove a spear into his side, sending him flying back to Olympos bellowing in pain. <<More>>
I don't think I was aware that Mars sided with the Trojans. I presume that would be a major point in his favor in the eyes of the Romans (and therefore Lucretius and Memmius).
That web site has a ton of interesting material. I don't get the idea that Mars was viewed as demonic in any way, as Abrahamists might view "Satan." He certainly appears to be as subject to doing weird things as are the other Greek gods, but I also don't get the idea that he was any more "irrational" than they were either.
I think I'm mainly looking at this in perspective of the recent material we've discussed in the podcast as to whether pain is "evil," and/or whether a "god of war" would be viewed as "evil" vs Venus being viewed as "good." I gather from these anecdotes that Venus was far from being Ms. Goody-Two-Shoes herself.
You can't have Venus without Mars. Old things must be destroyed, must die, for new things to be created. Otherwise, nothing would change; everything would be static.
Yes I am thinking in that direction. The depictions I am seeing in Greek and Roman art show Mars as a warrior but not necessarily an "ogre" or "ugly" or "horrible" as we might do today in portraying some kind of monster. Along the lines of death not being something to fear, then we might also see Mars as what you are saying - a necessary part of nature whose presence we need to understand more subtly, rather than something that is acting "maliciously" toward us.
This whole line of thought is fairly specialized and not of immediate significance to me, but over in the Facebook group a user wrote:
"But as an Epicurean, I see it plainly: war is the collapse of reason and the triumph of unnecessary desire."
While I would think in many cases that statement is probably true, I am thinking it is probably overbroad, as it would be overbroad (I think) to characterize Mars as a wholly negative figure. To some extent Mars might be analogizable to a "gun" -- something very dangerous and to be handled carefully but sometimes having beneficial uses. No doubt the circumstances are going to override everything else, but in the it is only pain that is in itself always undesirable (even though we sometimes choose it) and a "god of war" might be also in the same category.
Mars, less complex, represents:
Whole world systems hurtling into ruin
Death, pain, strife, war, disease (like the plague with which Lucretius ends his poem), and so on
As to Mars, that's the type of conclusion I am questioning. The tendency now is to see Mars as wholly negative, whereas it does not appear that he was viewed in such a wholly negative way in Greco-Roman mythology. Are these conclusions about Mars what we are reading into Lucretius because of our current views, or did Lucretius view Mars exactly the same way we do? Is Mars something always to be feared and hated, or something to be accepted and viewed as natural, and channeled into productive ways when possible, as Venus apparently sometimes worked with Mars in mythology?
Links to various Aphrodite myths, including "The Trojan War in which she supported her favourites Paris and Aeneas and was wounded in the fighting. <<More>> (which stikes me as particularly relevant to Lucretius given that the poem starts out referring to Venus as "mother of the Roman line":
https://www.theoi.com/Olympios/Aphrodite.html
"I. THE ILIAD : PERSUADES ARES TO SUPPORT THE TROJANS
At the outset of the Trojan War the gods took sides. Ares promised his mother Hera and Athena that he would side with them and support the Greeks, but Aphrodite persuaded him otherwise and he joined the Trojan faction."
In regard to the opening of Lucretius referring to interaction between Mars and Venus, I know personally that I've always associated the allusion to mean something like "Venus - good / Mars - bad." However I now see that the original Greek mythology behind their relationship appears to be more subtle, with Venus being at one point in love with Mars, and that they were sometimes cooperative in ancient artwork.
I've collected several references, and I'm starting this thread to discuss whether there are subtleties in this relationship which would give us a deeper understanding of Lucretius' depiction of their relationship. I would especially appreciate comment by Elli or others who are more well-read on Greek mythology.
Ares & Aphrodite - Ancient Greek Vase Painting
https://www.theoi.com/image/K9.1Ares.jpg
This wikipedia article in particular is helpful:
"Aphrodite The Warlike"
Aphrodite Areia (Ancient Greek: Ἀφροδίτη Ἀρεία) or "Aphrodite the Warlike" was a cult epithet of the Greek goddess Aphrodite, in which she was depicted in full armor like the war god Ares.[1] This representation was found in Sparta and Taras (modern Taranto). There were other, similarly martial interpretations of the goddess, such as at her Sanctuary at Kythira, where she was worshiped under the epithet Aphrodite Urania, who was also represented as being armed. The epithet "Areia", meaning "warlike", was applied to other gods in addition to Aphrodite, such as Athena, Zeus, and possibly Hermes.[1]
Rolf I am pretty sure this is the one where Don appeared with us:
there's also the full series of episodes on Cicero's "On The Nature of The Gods" that begins with episode 226:
Bryan's word list:
Welcome to Episode 287 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in human life (Death, Pain, Grief/Fear, Joy/Desire, and Virtue) with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:
Today we close in on the ending of Part 2 - "Is Pain An Evil?." Last week we focused on Cicero's argument that all we should face pain "like a man," focusing most of his attention on soldiers and military analogies. This week, Cicero turns his attention to examples of wise men facing pain, and he begins to summarize his argument. We'll pick up with Section XXV.
Prolepsis Discussion Outline
FWIW at the moment my plan is to organize tomorrow's session to maximize getting all participants up to speed on what the sources say about the background of the dispute. We can then after that, and in this thread, take up any relevant modern theories that people want to discuss.
- Review of the pre-Epicurean background to which Epicurus was reactling, including Plato's Meno Paradox, based on our prior discussions on that here.
- Review of the Epicurean sources, which we'll take up using DeWitt's organization in Chapter 8 (Section 3) of Epicurus and His Philosophy. These sources will include:
- Diogenes Laertius Section 33
- 33. The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’
- 34. Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view. The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth. Now we must proceed to the letter.
- Cicero's "On The Nature of The Gods" Book I Beginning Section XVI
- ... Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men is there but possesses untaught some preconception of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement.
- XVII You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a 'preconception,' as I called it above, or 'prior notion,' of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that "that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favor, since all such things belong only to the weak."
- If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshiping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favor alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence.
- Epicurus' References in the Letter to Menoeceus and Principal Doctrines
- Diogenes Laertius Section 33
I think that Cassius doesn't necessarily like endorsing one scientific view too much or trying to shoehorn Epicurean philosophy into a modern theory, and I agree somewhat. For me, modern science - investigations into nature - is a way to update Epicurus' spirit if not the letter of his physics.
I am all for discussing modern validations of Epicurean theory too, but the reason for my different emphasis is to get people on board with the philosophical issues that Epicurus was dealing with so we can see why he thought this issue was important.
Much like atomism is an explanation of the way the world works that is graspable and gives confidence that the universe is natural rather than divine, I we need to understand that Epicurus was assembling a theory to provide confidence that a reasonable explanation of knowledge can be grasped without requiring us to believe in ideal forms, recollection of past lives, etc.
When you grasp at a conceptual level what Epicurus was doing, you're not as likely to fall to the problem of toying with the theory as a purely historical predecessor to modern science. Just like there's a lot more to Lucretius than atomism, you see that a big-picture analysis of the problem of knowledge is still very relevant today.
As DofO said in identifying the ultimate question:
Fr. 5
[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?
Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.
It has been suggested that this week we do a general review of Prolepsis / Anticipations. This is a deep topic with lots of uncertainty but several of us have discussed this numbers of times and i think we can have an articulate discussion about the general outlines of the topic that would be of help to newer people. And so this will be our June 22nd topic for our Sunday Zoom discussion.
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