Excellent! Too late at night for me to absorb at the moment but I will read! This is probably a situation calling for a "collapsible" outline hierarchical format with headings and subheadingsat increasing levels of detail the further out it is opened. Otherwise we deal with the "wall of text" problem you mentioned earlier.
The Jowett intro is helpful bit it ends up being a wall of text too.
"But with everything from Gutenberg, it becomes a large wall a of text."Yep. We ultimately need an outline of the major arguments.
Oh geeze i forgot how the "mixture" issue is also mixed in to the package. Something about how if there are types of pleasure, of which some are better than others, or which are judgeable by outside standards, then that is proof that the knowledge/ wisdom of this outside standard is more important than pleasure itself, since you need it to recognize the best pleasure. If admitted, this once again dethrones pleasure from the top spot as the greatest good. And which therefore means that it is a fatal error to ever admit that there are types of pleasure which are judgeable by anything other than the feeling of pleasure itself. No doubt this is related to the "unity of pleasure" discussed by Dewitt.
i think the Jowett version is probably the standard english version, and i found his intro useful. I also made a copy for cut and paste purposes here : https://epicureanfriends.com/wiki/doku.php?id=plato_-_philebus
Thank you Charles! I am certainly no Plato expert myself, but i think Philebus is fairly manageable. If i recall correctly i got some good leads from the Gosling and Taylor book, but Philebus pretty much stands on its own and is written to supposedly be pretty focused.
I think the 2 big arguments about (1) to be the best, a thing must have a limit and (2) something that is "pure" is better than having more of something that is adulterated, are both profoundly relevant to the Principal Doctrines. I am pretty sure that I have a good handle on how the "limit" argument relates to PD3 and absence of pain, but the "purity" issue may have even deeper implications for the "fullness of pleasure" and "pure pleasure" arguments of other PDs
Godfrey, while this is on my mind, I recall also thinking that the parts of Philebus that I pulled out to the "limits" as relevant are pretty clear, but the version of the argument made by Seneca is even *more* clear. To me that's especially true with Seneca's formulation that "THE ABILITY TO INCREASE IS PROOF THAT A THING IS IMPERFECT.” I think Plato says the same thing in different words, but Seneca's version is extremely precise. A thing which has no limits cannot be "perfect" and therefore it cannot be the "highest" anything, and since we're talking about the "highest" good - that rules out pleasure!
Once someone gets a handle on the argument that is being made, PD3 and the otherwise troublesome passages of the Letter to Menoeceus as to "limits" make perfect sense.
And the continuation of the argument into the discussion of "purity" is also extremely important, and bears on some otherwise very obscure parts of the Principal Doctrines.
But this is going to take a long and dedicated campaign to bring this observation into wider view.
_Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. **Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits. **
Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”“THE ABILITY TO INCREASE IS PROOF THAT A THING IS IMPERFECT.”
Here Seneca explicitly links PD3 to the “limits” argument, but Seneca being the Stoic that he was, chose to focus on the “Tranquility” rather than viewing the result as the uninterrupted enjoyment of the pleasures that filled the cup in the first place:
Godfrey just FYI I split off your comments about Philebus into THIS new subforum / thread: Philebus - Plato's Arguments Against Pleasure and Epicurean Responses
Of course I have my notes and excerpts that I collected on my original"Full Cup of Pleasure" page at NewEpicurean.com but the subject demands a much more detailed analysis, starting with just a basic outline of Plato's arguments against pleasure, and a basic summary of how he tricks Philebus into making admissions that make it impossible to maintain pleasure as the goal.
I know that there are other Platonic dialogues that contain other relevant arguments, but Philebus seems to be the ultimate summary of Plato's anti-pleasure argument, and as such it would not be surprising if Epicurus organized his arguments against that document in particular.
Godfrey I would be extremely grateful if you could help me get discussion going about this, as i have generally not succeeded in getting much followup comment in the past. If you made any note of important sections or just general comments that would be great and we can split the discussion off into the Philebus thread. There is a TON of important stuff there - not just "quantity" but also "purity" argument and it would really help if we could get some readable commentary going on that.
I suggest THIS location for discussion of Philebus in detail: Philebus - Plato's Arguments Against Pleasure and Epicurean Responses
More of my ill will toward Cicero: Cicero was nothing if not intelligent, and he had the means at his disposal to get to the bottom of the issue, and, if necessary, consult the two opposing sides for their own explanation of the apparent conflict between Heironymous and Epicurus. Yet rather than present a sympathetic explanation from an Epicurean (or from a Heironymian) as to why their positions were in conflict, he simply stated the alleged inconsistency and left it unanswered, planting in the mind of his readers that Epicurus was a sloppy thinker and did not even know how to make a coherent argument about pleasure.
Once again the DeWitt statement about Cicero rings in my ears:
The bottom line is that Cicero took out of context the building-block discussion of "limit of pleasure" - which has a perfectly legitimate place in the *foundation* of the logical structure that Epicurus was erecting - and placed that building-block at the *apex* of the structure instead of in its proper place as a supporting explanation of why Pleasure is the ultimate goal. That's why it ("absence of pain") standing at the apex of the philosophy looks silly or ridiculous or even offensive to neutral normal people, but still is absolutely correct as written when viewed in its proper subordinate context.
According to Wikipedia, Hieronymous of Rhodes lived from c. 290 – c. 230 BC, while Epicurus lived from 341–270 BC. That means that Hieronymous lived after Epicurus, and had Epicurus' works to reference, but Epicurus was no longer around to respond to Hieronymous. If indeed Epicurus had taken the position that "absence of pain" is a correct and full statement of the goal of life, why would Hieronymous have had to deviate from Epicurus, and why would Cicero have had to set them up as opposites? the tragedy is that we don't have the works of contemporaneous Epicurus who would certainly have written to clear up this conflict. All we can go on now is that Cicero and those who knew at the time, knew that Hieronymous advocated "absence of pain" and deprecated pleasure, and that that was *not* what Epicurus had taught.
We will eventually straighten out the posting here, but in the meantime, here is the point: it is absolutely true that all these references to "absence of pain" do exist. The issue is "What do they mean?" and "What do they tell us about the goal of life?" For each reference to "absence of pain" we can find MORE references to "Pleasure," and so it is necessary to determine the relationship between the two. Cicero and Hieronymous and the Greeks knew that the two are absolutely not the same thing. Epicurus had a reason for saying what he said, and it is up to us to figure out what the Epicureans meant from the fragmentary texts that are still available.
Quoting over and over the same passages does nothing to explain to an honest inquirer how to reconcile these things, and the bitter truth for the Hiernonymous crowd is that "absence of anything" tells us NOTHING about "what is present" unless we define the terms of the discussion first. Epicurus had already done that - many times it appears - by making the point that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain. When there are only two of anything, the "absence of one" means that the space formerly occupied (if any) by that thing is now occupied by its opposite.
If you re like Hieronymous and think that "absence of pain" tells you anything specific and practical about how to spend your life, then more power to you, but have the grace to identify yourself as Hieronymian, and allow the Epicureans to pursue the pleasure which Epicurus, and more importantly Nature, calls us to pursue.
Once we have that ground rules of the debate established, we can then discuss with intelligence what the "absence of pain" references do mean, by referring to Plato and the other anti-pleasure philosophers who suggested that "gods" or "virtue" or "ideal forms" give us the standard by which to live our lives.
Poster A:
Even Cicero continues:
Fourth, we do not agree with those who allege that when pleasure is withdrawn, anxiety follows at once.
That result is true only in those situations where the pleasure happens to be replaced directly by a pain.
The truth is, in general, we are glad whenever we lose a pain, even though no active sensation of pleasure comes immediately in its place.
This fact serves to show us how life itself, WHEN LIVED IN THE ABSENCE OF PAIN, IS itself so GREAT a PLEASURE.
Poster GW:
Yes indeed that is a principal doctrine, and that has a meaning within the full context of Epicurean philosophy which does not contradict the bottom line that PLEASURE is the goal. That is what this thread is about, Garrett, that it is not possible to take things out of context and still understand the full picture.
And nothing that Poster A just wrote contradicts the point either, Poster G. As A writes, Epicurus endorsed both pleasures that some term as "at rest" and some term as "active" -- but both types are PLEASURE. the key observation is that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain - and that therefore as a matter of quantity, the "absence of one" is the same as "the presence of the other." This has everything to do with quantity and nothing to do about what type of feeling is actually happening at the time.
Poster G, (and anyone else reading along) - just read Cicero's words closely and you'll see the issue. Cicero was a master of the details of all of these philosophers, and he knew very well that Epicurus' view of the goal of life was pleasure, and that Heironymous' view of the goal was "absence of pain" and that these are two totally different things and are not reconcilable. That means that PD3 does NOT mean that "absence of pain" is the ultimate goal, or even "the ultimate pleasure." The key words are "maximum limit" or as others translate "the limit of quantity." This is not a discussion of the goal of life explicitly, but a discussion of a specific objection to pleasure that had been raised previously by Plato / other philosophers. The objection was that "pleasure has no limit" (we always want more) and Plato thought that was an effective argument because the logicians had decided that nothing could be an ultimate goal if it can always be made better (meaning that it has no limit). This is set forth in Philebus and elsewhere.
Epicurus pointed out the error in this reasoning by showing that pleasure DOES have a limit - and that limit is reached when our total experience is filled with pleasures of any time such that there is no more room for the experience of any pain -- all pain has been "crowded out."
And thus in another context Cicero described the Epicureans as holding that "nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures." In Defense of Publius Sestius 10.23
Poster GW: "But is it not a Principal Doctrine that, "Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together."?
Poster A:
"...the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure.
Even Cicero forwarded Torquatus' writing:
The happiness we pursue does not consist solely of the delightful feelings of physical pleasures.
On the contrary, according to Epicurus, the greatest pleasure is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of all pain.
When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation, and relief from distress, is itself a source of great gratification.
But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure, just as everything that causes distress is a pain.
Therefore, the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure.
For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of those distresses brings pleasure as a result.
So as a rule, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place.
Welcome Garden Dweller ! When you get a chance please introduce yourself and tell us a little about your background in Epicurus.
Welcome azbcethananderson ! When you get a chance please let us know your background in Epicurus!
Exactly Charles. This information is out there, but I think very few people have taken the time to digest it and think about its implications. And the last couple of decades the problem is accelerating -- all people are reading nowadays is popular wikipedia-like summaries, and the most recent commentaries, and the misinformation is accelerating like a snowball on a hill.
According to Doctrine 3, Epicurus held that the limit of quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain. This is a function of the truism / premise that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain - which means that in quantity, the measurement that describes the "absence" of the one is the same measurement as the "presence" of the other. But this observation is limited to quantity - it has nothing to do with the quality or the detail of the type of pleasure (or pain) that is being experienced at a particular moment.
Nevertheless, there is at loose in philosophical communities today the idea that Epicurus taught that pleasure is exactly equal - is defined as - "absence of pain," and so many are motivated to try to reconcile the inconsistencies in the texts by holding that Epicurus meant "tranquility" and that "tranquility itself" is the goal of life. What they would really say, if they followed their conclusion to the end, is that "tranquility is the highest pleasure" -- but you rarely see that formulation, as it is so obviously and counter intuitively incorrect.
The record of how all this discussion got started is out there if people would look. Much of the story begins with Plato and Philebus, but Epicurus was not the only one to grapple with the issue. One philosopher -Heronymous of Rhodes - explicitly adopted the modern "absence of pain" position - and everyone at the time knew the difference. Heronymous of Rhodes is forgotten today, but Epicurus is tagged with his incorrect viewpoint. Beware!
Cicero - Academic Questions:
Cicero - On Ends:
I will give Hieronymous credit for one thing: he is consistent in seeing that holding up "absence of pain" as the goal means to depreciate "pleasure" as the goal of life. Whether they admit it or not, this is the natural road which proponents of "absence of pain" will follow - they end up being opponents of "pleasure" as ordinarily understood.
Next - again from Cicero, On Ends:
Cicero the lying litigator at work again! Cicero KNOWS that Epicurus did not make the mistake of calling "absence of pain" the goal of life, as Hieronymus did, but because some are so obtuse as to think "absence of pain" makes sense (Hieronymous was such a one!) Cicero is able to use the argument to great effect - or so he thinks! But once we see that the goal is PLEASURE, rather than absence of pain, Cicero's argument falls to the ground:
[Admin note 1/11/21 - Something has happened the image from the autarkist blog referenced below. I'll try to rconstruct what the image was, but in the meantime the article referred to is probably this one.]
Some time ago Hiram pointed to a book by Lampe entitled "The Birth of Hedonism" and made this statement on his Autarkist blog:
I have been wanting to track that down and finally today I found the page which is being referenced here:
This is another situation where words can be used in different ways, and it is necessary to be precise. Lampe's reference here does a good job of clarifying the issue being discussed. He is talking about the Cyreniacs, but if we just step back and think about the topic in general, then this passage makes clear a distinction between the words "happiness" and "pleasure," and probably explains why Epicurus used both words in different contexts.
In general and most frequently, it seems to me that when people use the word "happiness" in philosophical discussion it is very difficult to be sure what they mean, and how to unpack the definition. On the other hand, again generally, "pleasure" or "pleasing" generally refers to a "feeling" for which this statement from Torquatus applies:
We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.
What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?
_____________
All of which is not to be negative about "happiness" being an abstraction, because abstractions are incredibly useful. But in order to be clear as to what we mean we have to be very precise, and there are huge variations in opinion as to what makes a person "happy."
