Posts by Cassius

AZ -- Yes the Stoic universe presumes a providence and without one their system would fall apart, and they would have no goal - which I guess is why they insist on Providence.

As to "long term pleasure as the sole good" that probably needs thought. As I mentioned in another recent thread some of us have been debating precisely that issue. I have used the term "long term pleasure" regularly myself, but I am getting more careful about it. Epicurus clearly says in the letter to Menoeceus that

"

And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

So I think we need to be careful assuming that we can describe the goal as "long term pleasure." It is probably more accurate to say simply "Pleasure" for that reason, or to try to find modifiers such as "net pleasure" or "maximum pleasure" that do not indicate that time is the key factor. In fact we probably need to consider that it is hard to pin down what the key factor is, if not time. Is it "intensity?" Is it "percentage of experience?" Or what?

Pleasure being a feeling it is hard (impossible?) to reduce it to a measurement in terms of time, or space, or some other outside measurement.

Presumably that is why Epicurus generally talks about "pleasure" as the goal and does not combine it with some other form of limiting or modifying adjective.

This is interesting to think and talk about.

I am working on updating this for use this Sunday. If you have any comments or suggestions or text you'd like me to include please post.

Your observations point out GD why the "hedonic calculus" is so flexible and individual and that point itself is something that we need to stress and remember. Every time we put a modifier in front of "pleasure" we risk implying something that is too restrictive , so clarity is always important.

It is an observation that the senses are all we have to work with, and that our choice is either to use them intelligently or essentially despair and go live in a cave and die. You are stating a huge epistemology issue that we ought to develop and be very clear about. Because there are certain things that are outside our power to observe, do we then sit down and cry and say that "anything goes"? Or do we with confidence embrace the tools that we have and use them to the best of our ability?

Much time is spent on this issue in Book 4 of Lucretius as it is basically the same issues as the "illusion" question. We know that we are imperfect and that the senses can provide perceptions that are at times distorted. Do we then throw up our hands to imaginary gods to save us from our weakness? No!

That's what is being discussed in this passage from Lucretius Book 4:

"The sun, to Mariners, seems to rise out of the sea, and there again to set and hide his light; for they see nothing but the water and the sky; but therefore you are not to conclude rashly that the senses are at all deceived.

To those who know nothing of the sea, a ship in the port seems disabled, and to strive against the waves with broken oars; for that part of the oar and of the rudder that is above the water appears straight, but all below, being refracted, seems to be turned upwards, and to be bent towards the top of the water, and to float almost upon the surface of it.

So when the winds drive the light clouds along the sky in the night, t he moon and stars seem to fly against the clouds, and to be driven above them in a course quite opposite to that in which they naturally move.

And if you chance to press with your fingers under one of your eyes, the effect will be that every thing you look upon will appear double, every bright candle will burn with two flames, and all the furniture of the house will multiply and show double; every face about you, and every body, will look like two.

Lastly, when sleep has bound our limbs in sweet repose, and all the body lies dissolved in rest, we think ourselves awake; our members move, and in the gloomy darkness of the night we think we see the sun in broad day-light, and, though confined in bed, we wander over the heavens, the sea, the rivers, and the hills, and fancy we are walking through the plains. And sounds we seem to hear; and, though the tongue be still, we seem to speak, when the deep silence of night reigns all about us.

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses."

Poster:

Isn't that an argument from ignorance which is usually employed by various religious systems? My question is related to his method - since he employed that argument against both sceptics and the religious of his days. If we presuppose various models without any confirmation in the observable we can also presuppose that any of these presupposed models rest upon the giant turtle - or a god of any variety.

Welcome @john.smith123 ! When you get a chance, please introduce yourself and tell us about your background in Epicurus. It would also be very interesting to know how you found the forum.

I will be interested in what others have to say about this, especially Martin Huehne, but I think the key aspect of your question is contained in "is not something we can observe even with the aid of the most sophisticated technology."

The point to remember here is that Epicurus was not a "radical" empiricist who insisted on direct observation of every aspect of his philosophy. This is a point developed at length by DeWitt, but not often by others, that it is obvious that Epicurus embraced deductive reasoning, with the starting point being sensation, but by no means limited to what can be perceived directly.

This is obvious even from the beginning of the discussion of atoms and void - Epicurus certainly did not have the technology to observe atoms directly, and void is by its nature empty of details to sense, and atoms and void they are at the core of his philosophy due to his deductive reasoning that they must exist based on what he *was* able to observe. This observation applies both to the existence of the atoms as well as to the conclusion that the universe is eternal, which is based on the observation and reasoning that matter is not created or destroyed spontaneously (or, as specified in Lucretius, at the will of gods).

Here are a couple of quotes where we can observe this deductive reasoning most clearly:

From the letter to Herodotus, note the sentence I have placed in ALL CAPS:

"First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change. Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: FOR THAT BODIES EXIST, SENSE ITSELF WITNESSES IN THE EXPERIENCE OF ALL MEN, AND IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE OF SENSE WE MUST OF NECESSITY JUDGE OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE BY REASONING, as I have already said. And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences.

Lucretius Book 1 Bailey:

[420] But now, to weave again at the web, which is the task of my discourse, all nature then, as it is of itself, is built of these two things: for there are bodies and the void, in which they are placed and where they move hither and thither. For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; AND UNLESS FAITH IN THIS FEELING BE FIRMLY GROUNDED AND ONCE AND PREVAIL, THERE WILL BE NAUGHT TO WHICH WE CAN MAKE AN APPEAL ABOUT THINGS HIDDEN, SO AS TO PROVE AUGHT BY THE REASONING OF THE MIND. And next, were there not room and empty space, which we call void, nowhere could bodies be placed, nor could they wander at all hither and thither in any direction; and this I have above shown to you but a little while before.

Poster:

What is the Epicurean position on 2. law of thermodynamics in relation to their presupposition of eternal universe? These two things appear to be mutually exclusive to my mind. The 2. law is observable by senses and was probably even obvious from the direct observation to a cave man. The eternal universe however is not something we can observe even with the aid of most sophisticated technology.

Also Garden Dweller do you mind saying how you found the forum? It helps foe future planning to know if people come through facebook, reddit, google, or whatever.

Wow that is excellent! That took some effort!

There was only one place that raised a question in my mind - the heading *Ignore Negative Inputs* i wonder whether some word other than ignore would be better.

But that is very minor.

I do have a more substantive thought that some here will recognize that we have been raising recently, and that is the issue of focusing on pleasure " over the long run" vs. "short term." It is interesting to consider the role of time in the analysis and whether it is what Epicurus intended to favor the longer time as always better. There is in fact the specific reference in Menoeceus to choose not the longest, but the happiest life (if i recall the wording). It is interesting to consider the limits of long vs short term analysis in that light. Some of us have been discussing - if not "length of time" then in what other ways is pleasure measured. "Intensity"? And how should those relative measurements be compared? Because it appears that Epicurus clearly did not advise to always choose the "longest" pleasure (this may relate to the "purity" of the experience as well, in terms of whether it is "pure pleasure" or "mixed" with pain (which is itself something that must be approached carefully).

But I want to repeat - great work and thanks for posting!

Great to have you and i look forward to reading it!

One more thing, AZ, how did you first come across the Epicureanfriends forum? I know you heard about the Discord group that was set up. How did you hear about that? Just asking for the sake of fine-tuning our outreach program.

Great points Godfrey. It's obvious that we would all be better off if we were life-long students of the classics with lots of degrees, and if we were we would have lots of context to bring to the discussion. Be we would also likely be "immobilized" as most academics seem to be

After reading Philebus a couple of times I agree that it's really not as complicated as these dialogues have the reputation for being. These students of Greek philosophy weren't any smarter then than we are now, and it seems to me that these were written for an intelligent audience, but not necessarily specialists. I think we can take the main threads of the arguments pretty much on face value and make a lot of headway in dealing with them even though we are not tenured professors.

Quote from Godfrey

For example, dialectic is something Epicurus opposed. My intuitive reaction to it has always been that, while it may have some value, it's also possible to prove, using dialectic and/or logic, that a banana is a didgeridoo or an elephant is a building.

I think this is exactly correct. Epicurus was not against "reason" or even "logic" properly employed - he was against the idea that conceptual reasoning could be divorced from the senses and used to generate conclusions that cannot eventually be validated by the senses. Epicurus / Lucretius goes on and on in "De Rerum Natura" about images and illusions, and they certainly understood that people can make mistakes in interpreting the information gleaned from the senses. But in the end "mistakes" are proven to be such because of newer, more accurate and repeated sense observations, not by a chain of conceptual reasoning that never reconnects with reality through the senses.

This is a long and detailed project but what it requires is more "time" than "training" and we can make a lot of progress even without being specialists.

In fact I think the observations we're already making about how Epicurean arguments connect to Plato / Philebus are already MUCH more practical and important than most of what you read in most modern commentaries (other than Dewitt) about what Epicurus was really talking about.

AZ I saw that you posted a video recently in which you explained your latest thinking. Is that video still a good reflection of where you are? Would you mind posting it in this thread for others to see. I saw it and thought it was very good.

Yes exactly Charles - great quote from Onfray. I think that hits the nail on the head to explain much of what we encounter.

As to Onfray generally, I have not read his material directly, but from what I've observed other people quote he's written a lot of good stuff. I gather that he also chose to differentiate himself from Epicurus and that he's not exactly an Epicurean in his philosophy, but that doesn't mean that a lot of what he said isn't exactly on point, like (for example) some of Nietzsche.

Just for fun I'll post here a graphic I did previously:

I believe I started on this before but I cannot find my draft. No doubt this deserves many different approaches and many different articles. As for me, what I thought would be most useful in unwinding this was a relatively simple hierarchical outline like this, reducing the major arguments to a manageable handful in summary. It needs to have references to the text ( the Jowett text is here) (preferably line numbers, but some means of finding the section; here is the Adelaide version; the Jowett commentary is here).

One way of looking at it is that the arguments divide down along three key words/concepts: (1) "limits" (2) "purity" and (3) "continuity" but each one requires significant explanation to begin to understand the issue. Also there are probably other high-level divisions, and not all of them may be fully expressed in Philebus. But reducing them to series of headings would go a long way toward helping us get a grasp of them.

Plato's Arguments In Philebus Against Pleasure As The Good / The Ultimate Goal

1. Plato's argument from "limits" - that the good / the ultimate goal must be something which has a limit, and Pleasure has no limit, so pleasure is disqualified.
   
   1. Plato's Argument in Detail:
      
      1. A thing which has a limit cannot be improved
      2. If a thing can be improved, then it cannot be considered perfect
      3. SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul. — What think you, Protarchus? … SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less? PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree. SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point. PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question. … SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things? PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? PROTARCHUS: Most justly.
      4. The same argument in Seneca
         1. Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. **Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits. **
            
         2. Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”“THE ABILITY TO INCREASE IS PROOF THAT A THING IS IMPERFECT.”
            
         3. (Need to add the text in the GRAPHIC which follows these two here)
   2. Philebus' Improper Response
      1. One
      2. Two
   3. Epicurean Proper Response
      1. PD3 et al
      2. Two
2. Plato's argument from "purity" - The pure is more to be preferred than a larger quantity of the impure, and as a result we must have wisdom in order to separate the pure from the impure (which means that something other than Pleasure itself is of the ultimate importance)
   
   1. Plato's argument in detail:
      1. SOCRATES:* True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? PROTARCHUS: Right. To me you get almost a direct reflect of the first part of PD3 when you do that; “PD3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain.” Here is more context to give you the background: SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. PROTARCHUS: What is it? SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth? PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us. PROTARCHUS: Most true. SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance. PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. PROTARCHUS: Very good. SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? PROTARCHUS: Right. We can do the same substitution exercise with this example from Socrates: “How can there be purity in [pleasure/whiteness], and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of [pain/ other colours]? Answer: “clearly, that which is most unadulterated.”
      2. Two
   2. Philebus' improper response:
      1. One
      2. Two
   3. Epicurean Proper Response:
      1. One
      2. Two
3. Plato's argument from "continuity" - Pleasure cannot be the goal or guide because it is not continuously present. (Need to check whether this in Philebus, or in another Platonic work, or Plutarch?)
   
   1. Plato's argument in detail
      1. DeWitt: "Neither was he in debt to his teachers for his hedonism. None of them was a hedonist. He was in debt to Plato for suggestions concerning the classification of desires and the calculus of advantage in pleasure,47 but differed from both Plato and Aristippus in his definition of pleasure. To neither of these was continuous pleasure conceivable, because they recognized only peaks of pleasure separated either by intervals void of pleasure or by neutral states. In order to escape from these logical dead ends Epicurus worked his way to a novel division of pleasures into those that were basic and those that were decorative.48 The pleasure of being sane and in health is basic and can be enjoyed continually. All other pleasures are superfluous and decorative. For this doctrine, once more, he was in debt to no teacher.
      2. DeWitt; Still need to track down cite in Plato: "The apex of the new structure of ethics erected by Epicurus consists in the teaching that pleasure can be continuous. The discovery of a logical basis for this proposition was essential for the promulgation of hedonism as a practical code of conduct for mankind. No philosophy that offered merely intermittent intervals of pleasure would have possessed any broad or cogent appeal for those in quest of the happy life. The predecessors of Epicurus had spent considerable thought upon the analysis of pleasure, but their attitude was in the main merely analytical and academic, lacking relevance to action. Their zeal was not for promoting the happiness of mankind. They were rather in the position of men who give themselves to the study of anatomy without contemplating the practice of medicine. The attitude of Epicurus, on the contrary, was pragmatic from the beginning. The declaration that "Vain is the word of that philosopher by which no malady of mankind is healed" has already been quoted.51 The desired logical basis for the continuity of pleasure was afforded by the discovery of natural ceilings of pleasures. From this is derived the division into basic and ornamental or superfluous pleasures, corresponding respectively to natural and necessary desires and those that are neither natural nor necessary.
      3. Example in Cicero: "Since, then, the whole sum of philosophy is directed to ensure living happily, and since men, from a desire of this one thing, have devoted themselves to this study; but different people make happiness of life to consist in different circumstances; you, for instance, place it in pleasure; and, in the same manner you, on the other hand, make all unhappiness to consist in pain: let us consider, in the first place, what sort of thing this happy life of yours is. But you will grant this, I think, that if there is really any such thing as happiness, it ought to be wholly in the power of a wise man to secure it; for, if a happy life can be lost, it cannot be happy. For who can feel confident that a thing will always remain firm and enduring in his case, which is in reality fleeting and perishable? But the man who distrusts the permanence of his good things, must necessarily fear that some day or other, when he has lost them, he will become miserable; and no man can be happy who is in fear about most important matters.” [need to re-find this cite]
   2. Philebus' improper response
      1. One
      2. Two
   3. Epicurean proper response:
      1. One
      2. Two

Jumping ahead when we peel this back far enough we are going to see that this all comes down to feeling vs logic. Life is about feeling / sensation and logic alone is worthless, but Plato through wordplay is attempting to reverse that natural priority and convince us that logic has primacy. This is why Epicurus' canonical analysis is so important.

But we have come so far down the wrong path for so long that today we have to walk back step by step through the argument in order to see how the Platonic / Stoic / Virtue / Dialectical Logic crowd led us astray.

I believe it is also useful to analogize this question to Epicurus' analysis of the boundlessness of space. We can throw the javelin endlessly and never hit the end of space, and yet the universe has a logical limit in being composed of only matter and void, outside of which nothing exists or can be conceived to exist as possibly entering the universe from outside to change it.

Pleasure and pain stand in the role of matter and void - it is useful to consider them from the perspective of quantity for some purposes, but no one should be so foolish as to forget that the matter and space composing my body and my mind are much different to me, and of much more concern, than the matter and space composing a rock on the far side of the moon.

The rock and my mind may be equivalent in quantity (weight) but they are dramatically different in most other,and most important respects, about which"quantity" tells us nothing.

Why are we talking about these absurdities? Only because Plato and the logicians seek to avert us from pleasure by arguing that the greatest good in life must have a "limit."

Poster GFL: "If you maintain that there is pleasure beyond the absence of pain, then you are not an Epicurean, but a Cyrenaic."

Cassius:

In the Epicurean system where all feelings are either pleasure or pain, there would be no possibility of adding another type of feeling once pleasures expand to occupy all feeling. However I am not aware of a Cyreniac statement which would assert such a thing, are you? The word "beyond" in that statement would need explanation, because if we are talking quantity in the way Epicurus stated it, there is no quantity of pleasure other than "absence of pain." Unless we are more clear about what we are talking about the entire conversation becomes a word game --- which is exactly what it was in its original Platonic context.

What does "quantity of pleasure" mean anyway except in context as an answer to a logic puzzle? That is why it appears to me that this entire discussion must be kept in mind as linked to Plato / Philebus for us to even understand what we are talking about. The original issue, as queried by Plato in Philebus, started with the question "Does pleasure have a limit?" Are we measuring the pleasure from ice cream in inches or pounds? What is a "limit?"

Unless you in know the reasoning behind the question, the discussion is meaningless -- and worse: deceptive. Of course that is just how Plato intended it, as wordplay to deflate those who see pleasure as the goal of life.