Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

Not directly relevant to the natalist question, but at least Epicurus was genuinely concerned with the continued well-being of Metrodorus' children, enough to specifically address their care in his will.

Yes and I would take that further and combine it with the observations that have been made by Dr Boeri and Aioz (in Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy) and by others in other contexts, that the Epicureans were far from being totally unconcerned about the welfare of society as they are caricatured by Plutarch and others.

I think it's likely that Rolfe has not been around long enough for our podcast or discussions about that book, but the book argues that Epicurus certainly understood that the happiness of himself and his friends is directly related to the welfare of society, and no society can perpetuate itself for very long without attention to who is going to replace it.

The idea that we are concerned for ourselves alone only until we are ready to exit the stage makes no sense given the emphasis on friendship and rational understanding of cause and effect, nor would it have made as much sense for the Epicureans to be concerned about future generations as Diogenes of Oinoanda explicitly stated himself to be and is implicit in the writing of Lucretius and others.

If the Epicureans had made a practice of criticizing the having and rearing of children as more trouble than it is worth, we would have had much more documentation of that in the arguments of their enemies than we do. If I recall Cicero hardly mentions this specific allegation at all, and much of the rest of the argument is an attack alleging that humans have no bonds of affection for each other, which is a misreading of Epicurus' position on how society arises through nature rather than through divine guidance.

We don't have to have had children ourselves to be very glad for and supportive of those who do.

Quote from Rolf

Thanks for the reply Cassius. I feel I may be a bit lost in the weeds... From the way you describe things, it doesn't seem like the observable and verifiable aspects of quantum physics and modern physics in general contradict Epicurean physics at all, beyond some changing terminology (eg. "atom" referring to the smallest indivisible substance). Quantum indeterminacy seems to align well with the idea that some things happen by chance rather than necessity or choice.

I think that's generally correct. As long as we are all devoted to finding the explanations for all phenomena in Nature, and we are not implying that there is something "non-natural" behind what we see, then all is well.

And I will be happy to agree that most scientists are approaching things in that way. But we're not able here to become specialists ourselves, and the real issue is not the legitimate debate between competing natural theories, it's the "uses" to which the scientific theories are put by non-specialists who do not admit the limitations of the existing science that causes most of the problems.

There are definitely differing interpretations of the Heisenberg "uncertainty" principles and the issues surrounding Schroediger's cat. But in the field we are in (practical philosophy for living life) those become slogans that can be used to intimidate nonspecialists into believing that "of course" nothing is really knowable or predictable, or "of course" we make our own realities through our observation of it. Again, no one is doing that here, but part of our job in understanding (and promoting) Epicurean philosophy is to talk about how it responds to challenges.

Really the "swerve" in Epicurean philosophy is open to exactly this same kind of misuse. We've discussed before that if you took "the swerve" to its possible logical extreme, then the swerve would consume the rest of the physics and make all the rest of the system fall apart. This is discussed in AA Long's article "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism." But neither Cicero nor the other enemies of Epicurus recorded an attack like that, obvious as it would have been to make it, because it seems the Epicureans were careful to limit the operation of the swerve to prevent that kind of application.

It's definitely a constant challenge to keep things in line, but I think it begins to come into focus when - for example - you realize that to Epicurus "atom" just meant "indivisible" and that it makes no difference at all where that level is found -- whether it is found what we call today at the molecular, atomic, subatomic, quantum, or whatever other level. The argument to swat down is the essentially mystical argument that the divisibility "never" stops, because that would compel the conclusion that there is ultimately nothing (except a supernatural force) that can be counted on as a basis for the predictable reality that we do see to exist.

Quote from Rolf

If somebody presents physical, observable, repeatable evidence for something that contradicts my worldview, I’d be a fool to not at least consider it. Blind acceptance and rejection is the domain of supernatural religion. This isn’t me blindly rejecting epicurean physics in favour of whatever I read in science articles, but asking honest questions about things I’m genuinely unsure about.

And I completely agree that that is the right attitude. Going further, however, there is absolutely no reason to expect, and therefor every reason to reject, contentions that "one day" science will prove the existence of a supernatural force, or absolute determinism, or radical skepticism, because those are logical impossibilities given what we know already. If you admit that "maybe they'll prove those things tomorrow" then you've essentially lost the game already, because you will have given in and accepted an argument for a "possibility" that has no evidence to support its possibility whatsoever. You've lost the game of logic if you give in to logic that has no basis in hard evidence.

Our position of no supernatural forces, hard determinsm is false, and radical skepticism is false, is already proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Those are big philosophic issues, but I personally place "the universe as a whole is eternal" and the universe as a whole is infinite in size" in the same category as already proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

"Nothing can come from nothing or go to nothing" is very close to the same category, but that is one where everything turns on your definition of a "thing" (energy? waves? some other term?) and since quantum mechanics is what we're talking about, it's perfectly acceptable to me to talk in those terms rather than atoms, as long as the ultimate limit is remembered and the mysticism doesn't thereby creep in.

Rolf speaking for myself (and I suspect Bryan would agree but he will say it better), I am not denying the existence of subatomic particles in any way whatsoever. And what is currently held to be the lowest level may ultumately prove to be only another intermediate step.

But the point Epicurus is making is that the particles are not "infinitely" indivisible, as asserted by some, with the corollary being that Epicurus holds that regularity comes from the consistency of the ultimate particles, not from (as others assert) a mystical overlay at any or every step along the way.

We're always dealing with the logical games of Parminides in that sense -- the assertion that there is NO bottom limit whatsoever, which leads to conclusions such as motion is impossible and other assertions that are contrary to what we sense to be the case.

It's the unstated implications of the assertions of INFINITE divisibility and FINITE size and age of the universe as a whole that creates the logical problems and inserts the possibility of supernatural forces that is objectionable.

Dave:

The primary example I have cited in the past is Lawrence Krauss and his book "A Universe from Nothing" which we've discussed in the context of the Heraclitian Flux thread. We've also discussed Sabine Hossenfelder and her strongly determinist viewpoint.

But I know you're asking a much more general question, and it comes down to asking for specific cites to particular scientists to whom I object, in the absence of which it is your view that the concerns I have about these issues is unwarranted.

I would very much like to oblige you and go through specific citations, and in fact we could use AI questioning (as I believe I recall us doing in that other thread) to try to make the effort more manageable. Or as an alternative, we could look these issues up in Wikipedia and get a sense of the general drift of the majority viewpoints from their point of view. Over time I will do my best to satisfy you and those who ask these questions (as you are definitely not alone) with all the resources I can bring to bear on it. In fact this is one example why I have not agreed to ban all use of AI resources on the forum. Doing raw research on who takes what position is likely to be an excellent use of AI as a starting point for answering these questions.

But at the most basic level, we'll simply have to disagree as to what we individually observe from our own experiences. My observation is that not only are my general concerns not overstated, but they are in fact understated. In fact I think these issues are much more of a concern than is generally appreciated precisely for the reason that the observation is correct. It is my view that much of "science" has become so dominated by political and corporate considerations that it is not even acceptable to discuss the possibility that there is any suppression of dissent.

At the moment I have to budget my time and pick my battles, and I think it is much more important for me to focus on the "absence of pain" and "nature of pleasure" ethical issues, along with the epistemology questions that come into play, than it is to catalog the scientists who I believe to be on the wrong side of these issues.

I'll get back to this as I can find the time, because I do agree that the issue is important. But it is my strong perception that the battle over deference to experts in physics is closely related to issues of dogmatism and determinism that some people consider to be outside physics. if our physics issues were limited to "X scientists are right about subatomic particles and Y scientists are wrong," then there would be seem to be no reason for urgency or concern over which set of scientists is correct.

But it is precisely because the positions taken on physics do impact the other issues and have such clear implications for them that Lawrence Krauss and Richard Dawkins found it appropriate to argue. Again I do not defer to Richard Dawkins as a modern-day Epicurus, but if there is anyone sensitive to Epicurus's viewpoint as they conflict with modern attitudes, I would put Dawkins near the top of the list. It is my perception that Krauss sees the importance of the same conflict as does Dawkins, but from the opposite viewpoint. And I do not see Dawkins and Krauss as outliers, but as the tip of the iceberg.

If your experience has been different, and you see no scientists arguing these positions I am concerned about, then I'll take that as an encouraging data point and consider it in my future attention on this issue. But my own personal experience in attempting to keep current on educated but non-specialist literature over my adult life has led me to a strongly opposite conclusion.

But by all means let's continue this discussion now and over time and as long as anyone reading this thread is willing to continue it, because it's certainly a goal of mine to have more material developed on this extremely important issue.

Quote from Rolf

I was a big fan of Benatar and antinatalism as a teenager. How things can change…

For the better!!!

Good catch Don and I completely agree that it is about as much contrary to Epicurus as one can get.

Epicurus touches on this in the letter to Menoeceus, and I would think it would be clear how un-Epicurean this point of view is, but I am afraid that some people see this as acceptable to Epicurus just like they see "Absence of Pain" as meaning that Epicurus wanted nothing in life other than to escape pain, as Plutarch argued.

This subject came up in 2018 in a thread that remains accessible in the Epicurean Philosophy Facebook group, and it's worth glancing at some of those posts. One in particular I made note of to illustrate the problem mentions Michel Onfray, who some hold in high regard:

One of my comments in response has some other references:

This list from wikipedia of groups who support antinatalism is a rogue's gallery in my view:

The teaching of the Buddha (c. 400 BCE) is interpreted by Hari Singh Gour (1870-1949) as follows:

Buddha states his propositions in the pedantic style of his age. He throws them into a form of sorites; but, as such, it is logically faulty and all he wishes to convey is this: Oblivious of the suffering to which life is subject, man begets children, and is thus the cause of old age and death. If he would only realize what suffering he would add to by his act, he would desist from the procreation of children; and so stop the operation of old age and death.[4]

The Marcionites believed that the visible world is an evil creation of a crude, cruel, jealous, angry demiurge, Yahweh. According to this teaching, people should oppose him, abandon his world, not create people, and trust in the good God of mercy, foreign and distant.[5][6][7]

The Encratites observed that birth leads to death. In order to conquer death, people should desist from procreation: "not produce fresh fodder for death".[8][9][10]

The Manichaeans,[11][12][13] the Bogomils[14][15][16] and the Cathars[17][18][19] believed that procreation sentences the soul to imprisonment in evil matter. They saw procreation as an instrument of an evil god, demiurge, or of Satan that imprisons the divine element in matter and thus causes the divine element to suffer.

Further, this:

I am surprised that wikipedia does not list THIS group, which is the place I've heard a variation of that view before:

For two-and-a-half years, the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel debated. These said, "It is better for man not to have been created than to have been created"; and these said, "It is better for man to have been created than not to have been created."

Talmud, Eruvin 13b

........

And yet, the sages of Shammai are of the opinion that man would be better off not to have been created—an opinion which the Talmud cites as a legitimate Torah viewpoint. Indeed, it is regarding the debates between the schools of Shammai and Hillel that the Talmud declares: "These and these are both the words of the living G‑d"!

http://www.chabad.org/.../2578/jewish/To-Be-or-to-Be-Not.htm

For this announcement thread I added the tag line "Make Sure It's Not Yours" to the tagline, because Don joins us this week on a short excursion into the land of Plutarch as we examine a criticism against Epicurus that far to many people accept as valid. Thanks Don for standing in for Joshua this week!

Post

RE: Episode 295 - Plutarch's Absurd Interpretation of Epicurean Absence of Pain

Episode 295 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Plutarch's Absurd Interpretation of Epicurean Absence of Pain." Thanks to Don for stepping in during Joshua's absence and contributing to this important episode!

[media]https://www.spreaker.com/episode/67447827/media

Cassius

August 19, 2025 at 6:33 PM

Episode 295 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Plutarch's Absurd Interpretation of Epicurean Absence of Pain." Thanks to Don for stepping in during Joshua's absence and contributing to this important episode!

This podcast will be out either later today or tomorrow at the latest. One note I want to make before finishing the edit is that there is a particular segment that I think can be highly useful to us in future Zoom meetings, probably also on the twentieth.

Here is a segment from Non Posse 7, with the speaker sarcastically attacking the Epicureans:

Quote

Have they not reason, think you, to value themselves for such things as these, and to talk as they are wont when they style themselves immortals and equals to Gods?—and when, through the excessiveness and transcendency of the blessed things they enjoy, they rave even to the degree of whooping and hollowing for very satisfaction that, to the shame of all mortals, they have been the only men that could find out this celestial and divine good that lies in an exemption from all evil.

There's more before and after this quote that makes it clear that Plutarch is trying to caricature the Epicureans for praising absence of pain so highly, and I think the proper response is to caricature him right back.

Plutarch thinks it is a persuasive argument to say that Epicurus held that the goal and best thing to do in life is sip a little water and nibble a bit of cheese.

That's hogwash, and Plutarch knows it.

The absurdity of saying that Epicurus taught this is obvious, but the even greater absurdity is that so many modern Epicureans have accepted this characterization as accurate.

Sarcasm can be used by all sides to this debate, and I am going to make it a standard part of my discussion of Epicurean philosophy to play act examples of this absurdity. Neither my life nor Epicurus' nor any other Epicureans' life is summed up in the act of nibbling cheese or sipping water, but to act as if it is will serve to illustrate the absurdity of it. For those who are willing to see the absurdity, caricaturing it by taking Plutarch's argument to its literal extreme --- whooping and hollering about the ecstatic experience of a sip of water or a bite of cheese -- will help break down one of the worst misrepresentations of Epicurean teaching.

Quote from DaveT

I don't think scientific endeavor used by mainstream scientists exploring and testing the boundaries of physics, have an agenda to prove there are mystical realms or that knowledge is impossible.

I see that as raising the same issue Bryan raised. Who has the authority to say what is "mainstream" and what is not? And if "mainstream" is defined as the majority position, then we are to follow science by majority vote? I suspect it was in a context like this that Philodemus made the aside that democracy is or can be the worst form of government.

Quote from DaveT

And even those scientists (thinkers and experimenters) who are exploring the degree to which human behavior is entirely mechanistic, I.e. biologically and environmentally determined,will admit that theirs is a minority opinion so far.

And in regard to this, that's a very important "so far" there at the end, and I it is my observation that tolerance of opinions which dissent from that which is proclaimed to be "mainstream" by the majority is declining fast. And that's an inherent bug (or feature) of the deference to experts in matters of philosophy vs. science. You're quite right that many scientists are not willing to state their personal beliefs as to where their opinions lead, so there's an inherent bias toward more and more accumulation of power by those who proclaim that they alone have the expertise to even ask the questions, much less answer them.

i wish I were overstating this problem and I want to keep a bright line against discussing modern politics, but we can find ample illustrations of this problem throughout history, even if we exclude the events of the last 200 years. I don't expect the devoted skeptics or determinists or mysticists to seriously entertain my opinions any more than I seriously entertain theirs, but history has shown that the Epicurean viewpoint is the minority, and the majority are always all-too-ready to enforce their opinions on "science" just as much as on religion or any other subject.

I'm glad there are (were) people like Daniel Dennet promoting compatibilist views, but it's a constant effort to keep the free flow of information and opinions going.

And that what takes us back to the central issue -- do we simply defer to "experts" and get out of their way when they proclaim that modern science makes Epicurean philosophy (except for the ice cream and friendship and tranquility part) totally obsolete? I'd say of course not.

Quote from Adrastus

Science isn't supposed to take into account the health of the soul when off discovering or theorizing in the same way Ancient Philosophical systems needed to more or less wrap everything up nice and tidy as to be a system of psychological health or attainment.

I think you're right that this is the general modern position, but whether that is an advancement or a regression is also a matter for debate.

Quote from Kalosyni

For Epicurus, contemplate/meditate would have meant to think about, study, and apply philosophy.

And that sense is absolutely appropriate, so long as it is understood that thinking and studying are not the only activities that must be pursued, and which are also desirable to pursue, and which are also of vital importance in human life. Nor would it be appropriate to say that *thinking alone* can get you anywhere in life, absent the evidence of the senses as a starting point and on which to base that thinking and apply its results.

Quote from Rolf

even when they have a higher degree of expertise than you?

I think the key is in this part of the question. I certainly admit that there are many people with more expertise in many subjects than I have. Doctors know more medicine, computer scientists know more programming, and so on down the line.

But despite their expertise in specific subject areas, claims of mysticism, radical skepticism, and total determinism are already adequately proved to be false. And there is no good reason to hold open a possibility in one's mind that they will ever prove to be true.

Proof of mysticism would require not simply proof of a force stronger than ourselves. In fact it's part of the philosophy that there are many living beings in the universe other than ourselves on earth, and that we expect some of them to be more technologically advanced than we are. There may in fact be intelligent forces in operation in our world now or in the past which we do not currently recognize. We will likely soon visit Mars and then eventually leave our solar system and visit other parts of the universe, and it is possible that others from other parts of the universe have already visited ours. But there are thousands of years of human experience (observation plus deductive reasoning) to establish that the forces of nature operate on regular principles which are consistent with having a fixed nature. There is no evidence or logical reasoning based on that evidence to postulate an intelligent force behind the universe *as a whole.*

Proof of radical skepticism would require evidence that *nothing* in the universe has a regular consistency that can be predicted. There is no real reason to argue this one further other than to observe that many things are in fact known and deserve to be considered facts of reality.

Proof of total determinism would be on the same order as proof of radical skepticism. Epicurean philosophy firmly holds that many things are in fact determined by purely physical factors, but the issue is that not *all* things are so determined. In our (and my), own experience we have held the ability to affect how our future lives will be lived, and that is sufficient proof of the point.

All of these are issues on which Epicurus had every reason to be confident in his day, and we today have 2000 years more evidence that confirms that he was right to be confident then.

But there is one more thing I would add to this analysis, and that is that experience also shows that there are people who are strongly motivated to push this issue for reasons that also have to be acknowledged to exist. There are no supernatural forces, and knowledge is possible, but because humans have free will they are free to postulate the opposite, and there is a lot of power to be gained and money to be made in doing just that.

The arguments made by Lucretius at the beginning of his poem about the priests spinning tales, and the arguments by Lucian in Alexander the Oracle Monger and the other citations go in exactly that direction. It is for that reason that the Epicurean approach is so important. Certain people will always find it in their self-interest to throw around fear, uncertainty, and doubt as a means of manipulating people who are not steeled against this by the Epicurean approach. It is not true that there are mystical forces, it is not true that all things are predetermined, and it is not true that knowledge is impossible, but it certainly is true that there are people who will make such claims, and it is therefore necessary to have a proper understanding of why they are wrong.

I know that there are questions as to how Epicurean we should consider Lucian to have been, but here are two citations from two of his works that have seemed to me to be relevant to this question. To me, they ring of the Epicurean attitude, not one of radical skepticism, in refusing to defer to "weird" claims whether based on mathematics or other claims of advanced knowledge.

The point here is not that there won't always be new discoveries of new facts, but that on the largest issues that concern us we already have plenty of facts to reach firm conclusions. And these areas where we have more than enough evidence include that there is nothing supernatural over us, that we can have confidence in some conclusions, and that we are not so tightly controlled by determinism that we have no freedom of will whatsoever.

These following selections aren't from Epicurus, but I would argue that Lucian was reflecting Epicurus' attitude towards claims of authority that contradict what we can gain from the sensations, anticipations, and feelings:

Quote

Lucian's Hermotimus

Perhaps an illustration will make my meaning clearer: when one of those audacious poets affirms that there was once a three-headed and six-handed man, if you accept that quietly without questioning its possibility, he will proceed to fill in the picture consistently—six eyes and ears, three voices talking at once, three mouths eating, and thirty fingers instead of our poor ten all told; if he has to fight, three of his hands will have a buckler, wicker targe, or shield apiece, while of the other three one swings an axe, another hurls a spear, and the third wields a sword. It is too late to carp at these details, when they come; they are consistent with the beginning; it was about that that the question ought to have been raised whether it was to be accepted and passed as true. Once grant that, and the rest comes flooding in, irresistible, hardly now susceptible of doubt, because it is consistent and accordant with your initial admissions. That is just your case; your love-yearning would not allow you to look into the facts at each entrance, and so you are dragged on by consistency; it never occurs to you that a thing may be self- consistent and yet false; if a man says twice five is seven, and you take his word for it without checking the sum, he will naturally deduce that four times five is fourteen, and so on ad libitum.

This is the way that weird geometry proceeds: it sets before beginners certain strange assumptions, and insists on their granting the existence of inconceivable things, such as points having no parts, lines without breadth, and so on, builds on these rotten foundations a superstructure equally rotten, and pretends to go on to a demonstration which is true, though it starts from premises which are false.

Just so you, when you have granted the principles of any school, believe in the deductions from them, and take their consistency, false as it is, for a guarantee of truth. Then with some of you, hope travels through, and you die before you have seen the truth and detected your deceivers, while the rest, disillusioned too late, will not turn back for shame: what, confess at their years that they have been abused with toys all this time? So they hold on desperately, putting the best face upon it and making all the converts they can, to have the consolation of good company in their deception; they are well aware that to speak out is to sacrifice the respect and superiority and honor they are accustomed to; so they will not do it if it may be helped, knowing the height from which they will fall to the common level. Just a few are found with the courage to say they were deluded, and warn other aspirants. Meeting such a one, call him a good man, a true and an honest; nay, call him philosopher, if you will; to my mind, the name is his or no one’s; the rest either have no knowledge of the truth, though they think they have, or else have knowledge and hide it, shamefaced cowards clinging to reputation.

Quote

Lucian’s Dialog “Icaromenippus, An Aerial Expedition:”

“Menippus. Ah, but keep your laughter till you have heard something of their pretentious mystifications. To begin with, their feet are on the ground; they are no taller than the rest of us ‘men that walk the earth’; they are no sharper-sighted than their neighbors, some of them purblind, indeed, with age or indolence. And yet they say they can distinguish the limits of the sky, they measure the sun’s circumference, take their walks in the supra-lunar regions, and specify the sizes and shapes of the stars as though they had fallen from them. Often one of them could not tell you correctly the number of miles from Megara to Athens, but has no hesitation about the distance in feet from the sun to the moon. How high the atmosphere is, how deep the sea, how far it is round the earth— they have the figures for all that. Moreover, they have only to draw some circles, arrange a few triangles and squares, add certain complicated spheres, and lo, they have the cubic contents of Heaven.

Then, how reasonable and modest of them, dealing with subjects so debatable, to issue their views without a hint of uncertainty; thus it must be and it shall be; contra gentes they will have it so. They will tell you on oath the sun is a molten mass, the moon inhabited, and the stars water-drinkers, moisture being drawn up by the sun’s rope and bucket and equitably distributed among them.”

Quote

Lucian's Alexander the Oracle Monger

And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

Unfortunately I am afraid that the general interpretation of "the contemplative life" you quoted above is very entrenched, so it's important to be careful in praising "contemplation" in contrast with words like "study" or "applying."

Quote from DaveT

suggest that none of us, (except perhaps Martin ) have any capacity to judge the credibility of those giants of modern physics you refer to above.

I think that Epicurus would reject that attitude even if he were here today. and especially if he were here today to see the effects of some scientists - by no means all - making similar claims.

It wouldn't matter to me if Martin or 100 people with more experience than Martin were to tell me that "modern physics establishes that there is a mystical realm, or modern physics establishes that knowledge is impossible, or modern physics establishes that human life is entirely mechanistic."

Despite my regard for Martin, I would nicely but firmly 100% reject each of those conclusions, and never lose a moments sleep concerned that any new discovery has already or would arise to prove the opposite. I think what we are discussing is very much the situation Epicurus found himself in 2000 years ago, and it will very likely remain the situation 2000 years from now.

Lots of interesting history in that wikipedia link. Just like I wouldn't take medical advise from a professed Christian Scientist, I might well entertain adopting the rule that before I admit any credibility in anyone claiming to be an expert in "quantum weirdness" I would first want to know the writer's personal position on mysticism, determinism, and skepticism. And if he or she wasn't willing to lay their cards on the table on these issues, that would be a major red flag.

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Many early quantum physicists held some interest in traditionally Eastern metaphysics. Physicists Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger, two of the main pioneers of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, were interested in Eastern mysticism, but are not known to have directly associated one with the other. In fact, both endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Olav Hammer said that "Schrödinger’s studies of Hindu mysticism never compelled him to pursue the same course as quantum metaphysicists such as David Bohm or Fritjof Capra." Schrödinger biographer Walter J. Moore said that Schrödinger's two interests of quantum physics and Hindu mysticism were "strangely dissociated".^[11]

In his 1961 paper "Remarks on the mind–body question", Eugene Wigner suggested that a conscious observer played a fundamental role in quantum mechanics,^{[12][13]: 93}a concept which is part of the consciousness causes collapse interpretation. While his paper served as inspiration for later mystical works by others,^[12] Wigner's ideas were primarily philosophical and were not considered overtly pseudoscientific like the mysticism that followed.^[14] By the late 1970s, Wigner had shifted his position and rejected the role of consciousness in quantum mechanics.^[15] Harvard historian Juan Miguel Marin suggests that "consciousness [was] introduced hypothetically at the birth of quantum physics, [and] the term 'mystical' was also used by its founders, to argue in favor of and against such an introduction."^[16]

Mysticism was argued against by Albert Einstein. Einstein's theories have often been falsely believed to support mystical interpretations of quantum theory. Einstein said, with regard to quantum mysticism, "No physicist believes that. Otherwise he wouldn't be a physicist."^[16] He debates several arguments about the approval of mysticism, even suggesting Bohr and Pauli to be in support of and to hold a positive belief in mysticism which he believes to be false.

Quote from Rolf

While this is likely true in a literal sense, I wouldn’t underestimate the trend of “quantum woo” or “quantum mysticism”. I’ve encountered many people online who use their interpretations of quantum theory to argue absurd claims, such as the idea that there is some kind of higher level of existence we must escape to.

Yes I agree with that. Every time I hear the "weirdness" words i suspect also that that is what is meant, but I also know that many of them also insist that they are not mysticists themselves, so to keep the discussion civil and constructive I'll take them at their word until something otherwise becomes clear. All these issues of determinism and skepticism and mysticism are right beneath the surface, even though it might not be stated explicitly by the advocates. So the best way at the moment I can think of to handle the issue is to go right along that no doubt they have some interesting experiments, but to require them to spell out what implications do they take from those experiments. So long as those implications aren't skepticism or determinism or mysticism, I'm all ears.

Quote from Bryan

Any "science" that uses math to try to explain away the observable is doing something fundamentally different -- and this path can lead to any conclusion. Even such things as the universe just popping into existence, or that matter is not fundamentally physical.

That is a better way of getting at what I tried to approach in my last question before we ran out of time. There are now, have been for 2000+ years, and will always be people who advocate for a new kind of knowledge that is difficult of impossible for people who are not initiated in the specialty to understand. The rub comes when people use string theory or any other system of thought to argue against the basic ability of humans to have adequate confidence in the fundamental conclusions of their senses and the logical implications of what the senses have established. In our day, most of the advocates of quantum and other experimentation seem to be atheists, so they do not jump to arguing that their experiments prove that there is a "god," as the mathematics of the size of the sun issue was used in the past.

Today the advocates of these theories seem to be content to argue that their experiments prove that there is nothing that we should have confidence in. To my observation, they don't often state an explicit agenda of their own, and they seem satisfied to undermine the confidence of confidence of anyone else (anyone who does not participate in their theories) in anything else. They do this in the name of "science," without stating any more specific agenda for "science" other than that it is they (the scientists) who alone are objective.

Regardless of what quantum mechanics or what any other subatomic experimentation will eventually establish, there is every reason to be confident that what it will establish will be completely in line with a totally natural universe which has not prime mover, no master plan, and no intentional teleology for the way humanity should live other than that which we are given through pleasure and pain.

I am firmly convinced that most subatomic scientists are totally benevolent in their motivations, and if Epicurus were alive today he would be every bit as interested in their research as he was in atomism 2000 years ago. But I am also firmly convinced that there is and always will be a class of people who will attempt to manipulate the discussion, just as they did in Epicurus' time, to take advantage of the disparity in knowledge between "experts" and ordinary people. And I am convinced that the record shows that Epicurus was completely alert to this tendency and instilled deeply into his philosophy an antidote to it.

And that antidote is the understanding that all human sensations are to humans true, and there is no otherworldly or metaphysical standard of truth, no matter whether the person making the claim has a doctorate in theology from the Vatican or a doctorate in particle physics from M.I.T.

For those who understand the importance of the issue, the sun is, has always been, and will always be the size that it appears to be.