Posts by Cassius

No problem! In fact I can easily move this entire thread to that location after a time. My current thought is that leaving threads in "General DIscussion" will make them a little more visible, but if people pay attention to how the forum software works they quickly see that new comments bubble to the top of the "Recent Activities" thread regardless of what forum they re in.

Thank you Nate and Elli!

I see that this discussion has turned into a full-time bashing of "free will." As Ilkka has commented, I hate being on the same page as the Randians on anything, but on "free will" that's the way it is.

I don't judge that I have time to personally participate over at PEL, but I see a couple of comments that would be valuable to us here:

First, I completely agree with this guy: (1) first paragraph: Objectivism is essentially a confused form of Stoicism, and (2) he confirms the crucial role of "free will" (the idea that we do have at least *some* control over our actions and lives) which is no doubt why Epicurus staked out his "free will" position.

And this guy sees correctly (in my view) that "stoicism is defined by a rejection of pleasure or temptation in order to pursue a higher good." << This "rejection of pleasure position" is a point that a lot of people don't want to face as they try to combine Epicurus with other philosophies.

Godfrey I just remembered there is an entire section of the forum devoted to the architectural sites, so anyone who follows that topic and has info to share, please be sure to post it: Places of Interest to Epicurean History

Thank you Godfrey! Posts like this including anything related to Herculaneum are always very welcome.

I see we haven't updated this thread or moved on to complete Chapter 12 for a couple of months now. When someone is ready for another one of these sessions please post and we will get started again!

Revealingly at Partially Examined Life what they want to argue against in the article is "free will." They could care less about the points made against Stoicism. That perspective is why "free will" is an issue for us on which we can't backtrack from Epicurus. Everyone has to judge for themselves how much time to spend in arguing against those who are so committed to the "fate" view of the universe but Kudos to Hiram for shooting back in their own forum! (And here I am talking about the PEL forum, which is so friendly to stoicism -- rather than the randian page, which at least has that issue largely correct.)

So I guess we are placed in the league with "Tony Robbins" --- Yes HAHAHAHAHA indeed.....

Thanks Hiram! Great find, and the article is generally on target I think. Too bad they push Ayn Rand instead of Epicurus.

E: I think putting all the PDs together, both agreement and mutual advantage apply, and "advantage" I don't know how to read as other than net pleasure. So consented surgery, etc, could fall under the category of a just contract.

But not all agreements would be under the umbrella of justice-- if they do not provide mutual advantage/ net pleasure. It appears to be a very specific term as Epicurus uses it. That doesn't mean a situation is wrong if it falls outside the umbrella-- it can be "not applicable", I think. I would save the term unjust to use as he did, for when contracts are broken or --the way I'm reading it-- if laws are imposed AS IF they were agreements but are not mutually advantageous (coercion can often fall in this category). These are the occasions when our intuition of injustice rises up, so that we desire to obtain our freedom, or, as he says, when we know we've broken a contract and live in fear.

K, or anyone, do you disagree with what E just wrote? I agree that *both* concepts apply: these PD's specifically reference "agreement," and "harm" has to be consisted in context with what we know from many other Epicurean references:

(1) "harm" of "evil" or "what is bad" must ultimately be tied to "net pain for the person involved."

(2) "advantage" or "benefit" or "what is good" must ultimately be tied to "net pleasure for the person involved."

And the reason I think "for the person involved" is important is that even though the person involved might not realize the full effects at the moment, the ultimate calculation is HIS/HER personal calculation.

It isn't an "absolute" or "objective" calculation by some outsider who wants to substitute their definition of "harm" for that person for that person's own experience.

?????

M: I've read somewhere that it (justice) was partly defined as what people would agree to if they were not under coercion. Assuming that isn't right, where do you think this misconception came from?

H: If you google the Principal Doctrines you will find justice explained as mutual advantage in the last ten Doctrines, with more detail furnished there.

E: I don't think you've got that wrong. Coercion wouldn't be part of a mutual contract. A person might choose an agreement that appears asymmetric in some ways, if they find it to their advantage. But if they aren't choosing it, that's not really a contract. By contract, I'm including informal, unspoken understandings between people who have at least met each other.

The thing people do, though, is make a leap and say ok, then if an interaction isn't proceeding according to mutual free agreement then it's "wrong." But there's no absolute standard. If there's no contract to begin with, it might even be hard to say "unjust"-- because that assumes mutually beneficial contracts should be the rule for every interaction, no matter who is involved, and poof, there you are, back to social utilitarianism.

The way I think of it is that I strongly prefer to interact with people who do not try and coerce me. And I avoid coercing others partly because it's just not my personality but also because I prefer to establish relationships where that doesn't happen, for the sake of my happiness.

V: The prohibition on coercion is a consequence, not a definition. The definition of justice is: One person must not harm another. You are acting justly when you don't cause harm to others. Coercion is a form of harm, and therefore against justice.

In terms of what is and isn't just, agreement has very little to do with it. People can willingly agree to all manner of silly things that are harmful to them... and anyone who takes advantage of such agreement is behaving unjustly.

Cassius Amicus to Mike -- What I remember questioning the accuracy of your statement was this point about "if everyone were in the same position" --- which is not at all the same as your point about "not being under coercion" - "not being under coercion" is simply a part of the definition of an "agreement."

Like the others are saying, if you are under coercion then you are not "agreeing." Check the exchange below and you'll see that my point was that Epicurus never said the world was fair that justice applies only "when everyone is in the same position."

Cassius Amicus Of the answers above I think we ought to discuss V's: "The definition of justice is: One person must not harm another. You are acting justly when you don't cause harm to others. Coercion is a form of harm, and therefore against justice."

Without some pretty strong qualification I don't think I agree with that. For example, I would never admit that it is "unjust" to harm a burglar, or someone trying to kill me or my family. We could define "harm" as "unjust harm" and reach that result, but that would be circular, stretching words out of their ordinary use, and clarify nothing.

Now the point about "can we agree to give or receive harm" is I think the more important issue.. We can and often do agree to receive pain from someone else, such as when we sign up for gym training and we follow the instructions of the trainer, or we willingly accept a "shot" from a doctor.

So I think we have to discuss what "harm" is and whether Epicurus would have used that word as having an "absolute" or "subjective" definition.

Here is an example from "On Ends" of Torquatus saying that some men must be "restrained": "Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation."

I don't see a necessary distinction between "restraining" them or "harming them to stop them." They are not agreeing to be restrained, but we are not acting "unjustly" in restraining them. In any situation where there is not agreement on both sides, nothing is "unjust" - and in fact "justice" does not apply at all in Epicurean terms.

Here for easy reference are the main doctrines in issue:

31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.

32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm.

33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.

34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.

35. It is impossible for a man who secretly violates the terms of the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure that he will not be detected.

36. In general justice is the same for all, for it is something found mutually beneficial in men's dealings, but in its application to particular places or other circumstances the same thing is not necessarily just for everyone.

37. Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

38. Where without any change in circumstances the things held to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the concept of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for that time just when they were advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they were no longer advantageous.

Cassius Amicus I do think that PD32 does place the focus on "agreement" in defining justice, and that absent agreement, the concept of justice does not apply to what happens between the people involved. All sorts of other concepts and issues do apply, but in a world without absolute justice, "justice" is not one of them -- unless you want to talk purely in terms of "civil justice" or "conventional justice." Seems to me that Epicurus is pretty clearly focusing his point on emphasizing that there is no NATURAL or ABSOLUTE justice ---->

"Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm."

So to repeat I would like to know what people think about this:

Now the point about "can we agree to give or receive harm" is I think the more important issue. We can and often do agree to receive pain from someone else, such as when we sign up for gym training and we follow the instructions of the trainer, or we willingly accept a "shot" from a doctor, or even when we agree (like Socrates (?)) to accept certain criminal penalties.

So I think we have to discuss what "harm" is and whether Epicurus would have used that word as having an "absolute" or "subjective" definition.

If "harm" has an 'absolute' definition, then what is that definition, and what happens when the person involved doesn't agree with that definition?

Joshua your last comment is a subject on which I am intensely interested as well.

I largely agree with what I perceive Gibbon says that it was the influence of Judeo/Christian/Eastern religions that was one of the most important destructive forces, but if we use the civil war as a dividing line that's presumably a little too early --- however the problems in the empire with various Jewish rebellions may have been spreading the eastern influence well before Christ --- as I recall one of Cicero's speechs talks about Jewish movement of goal to Jerusalem from other places, and governors trying to clamp down on that, as well as references to Jewish monied influence in Rome. And those factors don't even address philosophical changes.

I hope you will post any thoughts that you think are relevant in any thread or subforum that seems appropriate, or we can set up another one something like "How The Ancient World Came to An End" or whatever you wish.

Very very interesting and thank you Joshua! And I think you are right to suspect that some people might have seen it as a golden boy inside joke!

But how in the world does a Stoic philosopher wind up with that name UNLESS it is an explicit reference to Plato????? This is weird and I hope we can track down something that shows more light on this.

The coinage is an excellent path!

If this from Brittanica is correct, then our humble virtuous philosopher Marcus DID start to adopt the name "Golden" during his reign.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Marc…s-Roman-emperor

If I were more familiar with MEDITATIONS I would look for a quote on modesty and paste it into one of Nate's graphics with something like "Preached Modesty" << >> "Called himself 'Golden'"

This describes the system but doesn't address our guy -- http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman…GRA*/Nomen.html

(I think Martin and I crossposted.) If someone has good info on the family name and origin of "Aurelius" please post. I kind of think given his temperament he might not have accepted people calling him "the golden" in his lifetime. Maybe so, maybe not.

IT would be a very interesting aspect of his character if Marcus DID ask for, or accept as part of his official title, the word "Aurelius" if that was not already associated with his family.

Actually I wonder who gave the name "golden" to the son of Marcus Annius Verus, That sounds like it could be a much later development. Anyone know?

Wikipedia says "Marcus was born to Marcus Annius Verus, a praetor and the great-great-nephew of Emperor Trajan, and Domitia Lucilla, a wealthy noblewoman and heiress."

So sounds like the family name was Verus? And that Aurelius might not ever have been used while he was alive? Would be interesting to track down but Wikipedia doesn't seem to say. Seems possible that it was a later addition by philosophers specifically remarking on his philosophy.

Yes I agree it is more fitting to Plato, but is not "Aurelius" a given name that means "golden", so that he was EXPLICITLY called golden and specifically because he was such a philosopher?

The main reason I fudged the name is because the statement in the balloon is not a quote, and I didn't want to be accused of misquoting.

I'm no fan of Marcus Aurelius, but the only reason I picked him for the graphic rather than someone else is that Nate gave the perfect blank form. On the other hand he is an icon of the Stoics so makes a perfect foil for Epicurus that many modern readers will recognizing. Actually this graphic looks to me more like a typical 60's college professor than he does Marcus Aurelius anything. Anyway thanks for the feedback I have changed it around several times already and may again.

One more comment -- I am a HUGE fan of ancient Rome so I don't lightly make fun of the Romans. I agree too that Aurelius is more eclectic than stoic, but the modern stoics have adopted him as their patron saint so for effectiveness of graphics his image is hard to beat as a stand-in for Stoicism. Zeno or Chryssipus would be better, but no one would recognize them.

Thanks to Nate for helping me express in one graphic what I have spilled weeks of time writing in much less effective form.