Posts by Cassius

Quote from Hiram

I still can't wrap my head around your categorization of "idealist" after six years of work in positing what Onfray calls "a counter-history of philosophy from the perspective of the friends of Epicurus and the enemies of Plato". Maybe you have considered my willingness at some point or another to consider other people's views as my agreeing with them? I just don't see what you're even talking about

I think one way of stating what I see as "idealism" is a pattern of leaping from what we as individuals find pleasurable to a wider position on social/political issues. This pattern is clear in the work of Catherine Wilson (and she admits it, I think) and certainly in the work of Robert Hanrott, but it is also inherent Hiram in many of the things I see you writing in the 20 tenets threads. For example you are taking the last ten doctrines on "justice" and extrapolating that a certain set of conclusions on social issues should be "the Epicurean position." Catherine Wilson does that repeatedly, and while I may agree with her (or you) on many of the positions you choose to take, it seems absolutely clear to me that you violate the spirit of what Epicurus was saying, in proclaiming "no absolute justice" and "no matter how depraved we think the person is...." if it ends in pleasure for that person then we have no reason to complain with that person's choices. This is very clear from you "mutual benefit" conclusion, in translating "not to harm or be harmed," which is a restraint of action rather than a command of action, and turning it into a categorical imperative that we seemingly have a duty to "benefit" each other -- and implicitly not only each other, but *everyone.*

I am no libertarian myself and I am not looking for libertarianism in Epicurus' work, nor am I looking for justification to argue that *any* particular set of policy conclusions should apply to everyone. But it is absolutely clear to me that if someone continuously asserts that one or a list of policy choices should be adopted by everyone, then they have failed to accept the basic underlying premise that the feeling of pleasure, which all of us experience *individually* is the guide, rather than an idealized version that they think applies to everyone.

That is the problem with "Humanism" and I do not see you even acknowledging the issue, much less taking the non-asbsolute position that Epicurus's doctrines would plainly call for.

Interim comment: There is a lot going on in these exchanges, which combine philosophical and personal points with many thing in one post. I am going to have to come back to this series to break it down, but I want to make a procedural comment:

We are writing these posts publicly and I do not think people should read too much into the "Likes" or "Failure to Likes" that get added to posts in a series like this. At least in my own case I am having to think about a series of points being made in each post before I decide how best to respond, and I don't want people to think that I am taking flat sides one way or the other by liking or failure to like individual posts. I feel sure that this observation applies to other people as well but I thought this was worth saying. The "like" system has its uses, but in complicated discussions like this one I think its usefulness breaks down.

The issues being discussed here are important on lots of levels so I hope people will free to comment on "parts" of these posts without fear of being misunderstood as endorsing or not endorsing someone's entire position.

I agree with Elayne's comments and there is probably a lot more here to be unpacked.

I would first start however with the point that the Philodemus material is by no means as well established as the other core material including Lucretius. I presume you are referring to Dirk Obbink (sp?) material and I would simply not be willing to take material like that as confidently established without looking at exact pages and reference material to see what he had to go by in reconstructing his version. How much of the word being translated as "effortless" really survives, and how much is reconstructed? And what does survive, has Dirk himself seen the original, or is this itself reconstruction from 200+ year old material that all we have is penciled versions with who knows what level of accuracy?

I suspect that reconciliation could be done to bring "effortless" into consistency with the rest of the philosophy, but I just don't think it is a very good idea to place so much emphasis on such slender material.

And I also think that summarizing the point being made really comes across in " The goal of religion is the experience of pure, effortless pleasure."

The words "religion" and "pure" and "effortless" would all require explanation to make sense, and I would not think much is being accomplished with a summary that is so unclear absent explanation.

Yes, this is the key point:

Quote from Elayne

Giving specific lists is just a way to provide examples of what would cause pain or not if unsatisfied for _most_ people, but the map is not the territory.

None of these things, even air, water, food, clothing, are necessary at every particular moment, and some of them can be postponed for quite a while in order to pursue greater pleasure or avoid greater pain.

Natural and necessary are always going to be contextual and I don't think there is anything in Epicurus that would contradict that -- nor could there be consistent with the overall philosophy.

So the closer someone gets to a specific list, without always raising the context requirement, the closer it appears that they are approaching stoicism and absolutes which don't fit at all in Epicurean philosophy.

Hiram my issue here is probably mostly related to coming up with a word like "Attestation." Where do you get that and what is the purpose of seeming to coin it as if it means something specific?

Again, is not the entire point that, as Elayne describes, we are trying to use words to describe reality, and that this use of words is an individual contextual thing that is going to vary with circumstances?

Why imply that there is ever some kind of flash-point that changes this contextual explanation into something that is not contextual?

So that when you say ....

Quote from Hiram

An attestation is not "an abstract truth that is the same for everyone", it's a particular instance of direct perception of something.

... what is the authority and the reason for assigning a word "attestation" to a particular instance of combinations of perceptions?

I think Elayne has the correct point here.

Quote from Hiram

Mutual benefit is not "hopelessly vague". In fact, it made it to the last ten Principal Doctrines

I do not see "mutual benefit" as written into the last ten principal doctrines. The last ten essentially state that there is no such thing as absolute justice, which is Elayne's point. Now if the parties involved in a relationship agree to certain terms (not to harm or be harmed) then that is what we call "justice," but if the two parties end their agreement, for whatever reason, then there is no more justice. That's really all the last ten are saying, they are NOT saying that a particular set of facts constituting justice "is always good" or "injustice is always bad" any more than any other set of facts are laid out to be good or bad in the context of any other virtue.

The entire point of the virtue analysis is that there IS NO absolute virtue.

But Hiram you take from that starting point that you should endorse particular policy prescriptions that apply to everyone as something that would be endorsed in the name of Epicurus???

I do not follow that analysis at all!

Quote from Oscar

one of Zeno's paradoxes. This suggests that there are, supposedly, an infinite amount of steps to complete any distance, that it's hopelessly impossible because it can neither begin nor end. From this, the argument concludes that motion is an illusion.

Yes exactly thank you Oscar! Do you also have a short explanation of the problem with Zeno's argument ( other than walking across the room, which I gather is the standard and good! response?

I bet you are correct Elayne at least in large part. There is also probably something going on here too that illustrates the limits of logic when not connected to observation. That might be the same thing, or might not.

It's apparently possible to construct a logic argument that motion is impossible. In contrast, we see and feel motion all the time. In such cases "logic" must give way to the senses.

Very good point as to the need for an evolution subforum. Will set up now.

Edit: Done, and I moved this thread to that location.

JLR -- you have not committed a faux pas by posting on my timeline, but the timeline feature of the forum is not particularly well integrated into the main forum part, and may not show up using the search function.

It is generally best to post in the "General Discussion" forum, unless you are aware of a specific subforum that is directly on point. But posting in the General Discussion forum is always safe because I can easily move threads to a more appropriate place if needed.

The "timeline" feature is generally best used for posting things about yourself that don't really fit into another subject.

I should have said more about this, but I think I missed the point because my first reaction to Oscar's comment was that it was funny. More that being funny, observing that application may be "disorganized" is EXACTLY what I think. I think it's the nature of the universe that living things experience pleasure in ways that are both (1) broadly similar among species and (2) widely variable within those limits for individuals of the same species. And that means that there are going to be very many individual "takes" on how to apply Epicurean philosophy. I would like to think that we can bring a certain degree of organization to it, and that it definitely not be "chaotic" (at least under some definitions of that word) but there is no way everyone is going to see things the same way on everything.

And I see this as one of the major differences in perspective that is behind these discussions. I find myself regularly making the point that we should not expect everyone to come to the same conclusions about how pursue pleasure. I think part of the reason I find myself doing that because I get the impression from posts at Society of Epicurus seem to imply that everyone should pursue things in at least broadly similar ways (such as the "golden rule" comments).

I doubt I need to elaborate much further again because I have make the same point earlier in this thread, but that's why I don't want people to get too disconcerted over the disagreements they are reading in this thread. By trying to enforce rules against "politics" we can try to keep focused on higher-level issues that allow the widest possible big tent. But at the same time, real people have real feelings and specific interests that they want to talk about. The rub is that the more specific they get about controversial issues (as does Catherine Wilson or other "humanist" writing) then the more we're going to have disputes need to form separate initiatives.

That's natural and to be expected, just as Oscar implies, and need not be a source of personal animosity.

Oscar I may eventually move this thread to Physics or epistemology, but I bet it would be helpful for someone coming across this to have a quick and dirty explanation for what "magical thinking" means. Is the context of this discussion whether a "supernatural" exists, or is this more of a mathematical / logical theory discussion?

Quote from Oscar

to be as disorganized and chaotic as the universe it describes

We have certainly been successful in achieving that so far!

Yes agreed that is part of the issue. If the word "atom" essentially means indivisible then you have an immediate definitional issue as to whether such a concept can exist. I am not well versed at all on these "ontological" issues -- such as does the fact that we can imagine a god (or an atom) itself mean that it '"exists."

I have to admit that I personally detest what I see as "word games" like I consider this to be. On the other hand, there is little doubt but that this kind of game-playing was rampant in ancient Greece (as it is today) and that Epicurus thought (and I think properly) that it is necessary to deal with it. If you are going to inoculate your school against infection by logic gamesmanship then you need a plan for response.

This thread really isn't off the ground yet and we're basically still brainstorming. We ought to identify and isolate the major threads of the argument and address them separately - once we have a handle on what they are.

Presumably the "plenum" argument is related to this as well, but I don't believe that the two issues are exactly the same, so that's an example of what needs to be split into pieces for analysis.

Godfrey: That is GREAT if you have time to tackle God and the Atom. I recall Alex saying many good things about Stenger and that book in particular. I think I scanned a few pages but that is as far as I got. It would be tremendously helpful if you are able to expand this or related threads with commentary from Stenger.

As far as the clips above those are from the Cambridge books so I don't think there is a full free copy on line.

I know I have read about this in various sources but unfortunately I don't seem to have kept good notes. That was one of the reasons for setting up this forum

Here's a clip from page 12 of DeWitt's book:

The whole issue of "infinity" is charged with implication, both down (infinite divisibility) and "up" (is it right to say that the universe is "infinite" in size, or is "boundless" perhaps a better word?) Because ultimately there must be no mystery to whether something exists or not.....

And of course those issues lead to the closing of the letter to Pythocles:

All these things, Pythocles, you must bear in mind; for thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand what is akin to them. And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details. But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.

Here is where the issue of "movement" comes in, from the same source. We need more development of Epicurus' response to this. I am not going to have time to pursue this right now, but there had to have been important reasons for this dispute and we can't analyse the issue without uncovering them:

From the Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Epicurus was responding to Aristitotle's attacks on Atomism:

Quote from elli

That is why the poet thinks it may be better that he cannot find the windows – which are the causes that has to search and deepening in them – because, as he says, he may then be confronted with issues that he would rather not to know or has not to realize. Perhaps, the poet says : to find windows, to be finally a new state of the feeling of pain, and the truth that he wants so much to find, to be the cause of a crucial battle with himself, and this may, instead of rescuing him, it will bring him a greater agitation.

I think this gets very close to an ultimate issue that divides people who interpret Epicurus differently. I can certainly understand that there are times and circumstances where the pain of life is just so overwhelming that it seems like nothing is worth doing other than escaping agitation. But as bad as I feel for such people, I don't think that such a worldview is necessary for everyone in every circumstance, and I think Epicurus was part of the segment of humanity who sees life in Jefferson's phrase - "the greater part of life is sunshine." We can't measure the sunshine part in terms of length, or in any specific terms at all, other than that we FEEL that part to be why we are alive and how we want to spend our lives.

Those of us who see the world that way bear no ill will against anyone else who wants to focus on the dark side and the escape to what they want to call "tranqulity." But that doesn't seem to be a two way street, because many people who are focused on escaping from pain see those who are not so focused as an affront to themselves, and so they work very hard to invent all sorts of ways to "prove" that pleasure is an impractical guide to life, and that there are things in their minds that are so much more "worthy" than the pleasure of themselves and their friends.

To me it is no coincidence that both Nietzsche and Liantinis saw something important in Epicurus. I don't think either of them developed the connection deeply enough, but both of them express the depth of feeling that is (to me) the end result that is compelled by the Epicurean worldview.

This is a placeholder to start the discussion of indivisibility, by first going back to why it was an issue for Epicurus in the first place. What questions or positions was he addressing?

Here are some starting points, first from David Sedley's "Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom":

OK as to the points raised in the other posts by Elayne and Elli in the last 24 hours: there is a lot of background context to this discussion which may not be appropriate to explain further for this thread. On the other hand it "may" be appropriate, too, depending on whether one of the participants or someone reading it wants to discuss and learn from the details for more than just an unproductive desire to air unpleasantness. I can address any details as appropriate.

For now I think the basic point I want to make is that my reading of the history is consistent with Elli's and Elayne's interpretation of it. Elli goes almost as far back with Hiram as do I, so she has watched the situation over the years and knows it clearly. Elayne brings a fresh and quickly insightful perspective to evaluating where we are. It is clear to me that she expresses a justifiable frustration with the situation because as we have advanced in clarity over the years of study, the contradictions that might not have been quite so apparent years ago are now much more visible and easy to see. Elayne sees the contradictions and is working vigorously to deal with them, as we all should, regardless of pre-existing relationships.

Those of us who are committed to promoting Epicurus as he was understood "classically," as a mortal enemy of Stoic emotionlessness and Platonic idealism, are in a distinct minority. It is necessary for us to stick together cooperatively wherever and whenever possible. And that means that watering down the philosophy for the sake of appealing to its enemies, which we do when we compromise with the many variants of humanism, is a very negative thing that needs to be called out as such.

What rumbles beneath the surface here is a continuing struggle against humanism / idealism / stoicism that isn't going to go away, and isn't going to be fixed by finding some kind of middle ground or papering over the canyon between the opposing perspectives.