Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

What this means to us laymen is that when we read a news story on the most current theory, we lack most of the building blocks leading up to it.

Which reminds me of this below, as I was flipping through and find this quote from Stephen Hawking.

The part in red I do not believe for a second. Just like for the last 2500 hundred years, I think it is a dead-correct bet that for the next 2500 years we'll be doing the same thing: observing, finding new evidence, constructing new theories, and then revising them over and over in a cycle. And in the meantime each generation lives only about 80 years at most, and has to decide how to live in the interim:

This quote is from this lecture by Hawking entitled "The Origin of the Universe": http://www.hawking.org.uk/the-origin-of-the-universe.html

So call me presumptuous and arrogant to suggest that I know better than Stephen Hawking, but I don't believe for a second that we are getting close to "ultimate" answers. On this I am comfortable with Frances Wright and 2500 year old reasoning. There will always be new discoveries and new horizons and unanswered questions for science to attack.

Quote from Elayne

That is why I think it's more helpful to tell people no matter what, there's no supernatural-- if they are on that simple of a thought process, maybe we can take Vic Stenger's stuff and simplify it. I don't know. I feel sure Epicurus could have done it but Idk if I can, lol.

I completely agree with that!

As to this:

Quote from Elayne

However, then the problem remains that we have data Epicurus didn't have-- and now his model no longer fits ALL the observed data. It's not just that we are missing data, in case you thought that was the problem -- it's also that we now have data that doesn't fit.

As to that I would say that we ought to be very rigorous in requiring confirmation and explanation of any data that allegedly does not fit. For example, if someone is alleging that all that has been observed is moving away from some center or in some other way expanding, then I would rigorously demand of him whether he is maintaining that he has now observed ALL matter, or exactly what he is claiming about that which he has not observed, for obvious reasons.

So I would apply to those who assert that the universe may not be eternal a requirement that they may fully accessible in complete detail the evidence that they say supports that conclusion, along with any reservations and limitations that they themselves admit exist (in the way that when Lawrence Krauss writes a book entitled "A Universe from Nothing" he admits that he really doesn't mean "nothing") And I would not give someone who was willing to do less than that the respect that I would give to Epicurus and the nothing from nothing / nothing to nothing argument unless and until the evidence and argument could be lined up in that kind of way.

Of course I am not suggesting any kind of bright line exists today or tomorrow on what to do or what not to do. I'm really just discussing in a general way the different approaches that make sense to talk about. Unless and until someone wants to suggest a "catechism" or some set of rules for a particular organization, it's not necessary for us to come up with that kind of rigor.

Of course the reason we are typing this, or course, is that coming up with that sort of list is exactly what the "Society of Epicurus" is doing, and so it's appropriate for the Society of Epicurus to deal with those issues (and to decide whether to take a position or not) since it is in the middle of that process. Hiram can do that, and then people can decide whether they want to be part of his organization or not based on the decisions he makes. As to us, we're just discussing!

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That is why I think it's more helpful to tell people no matter what, there's no supernatural-

.... Which is kind of like the approach we probably should be taking on anticipations, Epicurean gods, and maybe other subjects where there are ambiguities that are difficult or impossible to resolve due to lack of texts and other issues.

No way we can do it now or over the short term, but over time we need to explore these issues in detail, group-sourcing the effort, and try to help each other here: Nothing From Nothing / Nothing To Nothing / Eternality and Infinity of the Universe

Quote from Elayne

This is one of those places where either I'm different from Epicurus or he would have taken physics data he didn't have access to back then into account and said that we have at least gotten enough info to be very certain there's no supernatural and no absolute. Both of us would feel equally secure in that knowledge even if we arrived at our conclusions differently.

I think what's going on here in our different perspectives probably explains why Epicurus ended up on the "incorrect" side of the size of the sun issue. I suspect that Epicurus was well aware of what the calculations indicated, and that he did not reject the calculations out of hand, but he had to make what he saw as a practical decision to deal with the supernatural claims of the mathematicians who were using their calculations to bolster the argument that the sun and the stars were gods due to their huge size. My suspicion is that he defaulted to his general rule -- a theory must explain ALL the observed facts in order to be held to be correct, and he decided that his observations as to (1) things far away aren't sharp, and (2) bright things don't lose their size so quickly, and (3) maybe other "sensory" arguments, and that those could not be discounted. Since those appeared to be true, and he did not know that the huge distances and/or issues of viewing through the atmosphere would cause distortions, he refused to credit the CONCLUSION that the sun was huge. And he probably calculated that any embarrassment caused by later discovery that he was factually wrong would pale in comparison with the happiness of those who used his argument to discount the supernatural arguments of the Platonists.

And if that was his reasoning (I know I am doing a lot of speculating) I would say that he was right to take the position he did, and I would do the same thing in his place. That's pretty much what I am doing, I admit, even though I have a good degree of confidence that in this situation, there really can''t be a limit to the size of the universe, and that there is an explanation for why everything observed so far may seem to imply a big bang (if in fact it does).

But the real contextual issue is probably not the question of relative amounts of information -- I personally think the most important consideration is that you (and maybe even a majority of our self-selected group) really are different from the run-of-the-mill person who does not have nearly the scientific disposition or background that we have. And I think that this is where DeWitt is right that Epicurus was pursuing a "Philosophy for the Millions." He calculated that his philosophy was needed by everyone, and ESPECIALLY for the non-scientists, who he could not expect to handle the mental challenge of all the uncertainty that constantly engaging in speculation and uncertainty causes. I do think that he was willing to say that as to these people, it was good for them to trust "authority" that they could tell had their best interests for happy living in mind, and that for these type of people "trust" in their "teachers" was the best course for them to follow -- because they could in no way duplicate or follow the speculative sciences themselves.

I think many of us are comfortable with all the uncertainty of the speculations, and we consider that it's just fun and or even cause for wonder and amazement, as you say. But I think it is true (and was true then) the the "majority" of the people in the world are just not capable or disposed or willing to engage in that kind of constant mental challenge. They want something understandable, effective, and accessible to them that will help them live happily, which after all I think we all agree is established to be the ultimate goal.

For many of us the mental challenge of keeping everything open and juggling in our minds is enjoyable, but for people like that it is terrifying. So while we would never affirmatively lie to them, if we really care about giving them a helpful philosophy of life then we present them with one that is manageable for them, just as we simplify things when we explain difficult issues to children.

Now you may think I am taking it all back but I will say this too: I do think that this approach of requiring a theory to fit ALL observable data before it is entertained as something to give credence to is the correct approach. And that is from each person's perspective, not from an absolute standard of what one or two of the greatest minds might say. If indeed we put that kind of trust in them for good reason, then maybe so, but we are not talking about Epicurus when we talk about Lawrence Krauss or any number of nameless (to the outside world) string physicists. It's just not logical to allow any individual or group of scientists, no matter how brilliant they may be, to say "you need to believe C because my theory says A and B and that adds up to C without any ability of the rest to follow the evidence and the argument. To place that kind of blind faith in a "scientist" seems to me to be no different than a tribesman placing it in a witch doctor.

So this is where I think it comes down, and where you are exactly right speaking for yourself:

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Both of us would feel equally secure in that knowledge even if we arrived at our conclusions differently.

I am thinking that that applies to you, and to many of us here, but it doesn't apply to the "millions." Given the numerous texts about Epicurus' sincere desire to show the way to happiness, I don't think that anyone should see Epicurus' scepticism to the claims of theoretical science, or his reasoning on the size of the sun, to undermine their confidence in him.

And that relates back to the complaint from Cicero about the Epicureans in his view being uneducated:

This article says that "atheists" tend to prefer cats. We should take a poll of Epicureans to see how we stack up.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7…KZGahsaC1QtS4Uk

So that this allegation by Cicero from "On the Nature of the Gods" is not a "bug" in Epicurean philosophy - it's a "feature." It's because of what Epicurus would call an incorrect philosophical position that Cicero thinks he needs to attack in this way. Cicero was ultimately in bed with the skeptics such as Plato (which as Dewitt says Epicurus considered Plato to be) and denying the possibility of confidence in knowledge based on the senses:

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Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! “I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortuneteller the Pronoia (which, we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream.

EDIT: Stated another way, Cicero and Hitchens are implying that you can never "know" anything beyond your own lifetime based on the information provided by the senses. He is saying that you MUST either (1) intellectually disarm yourself to become a jellyfish and waffle through life, or (2) look to some other source of authority beyond the senses. So the real battlefield here is over the meaning of "to know."

And we all know (or should know) that there are LOTS of people who are happy to make these arguments against confidence in knowledge based on the senses -- because they will usher you directly into the waiting arms of religion, idealism, etc. Some people make these arguments innocently, but I don't think the people who are out there promoting them are innocent or mistaken. Someone who was innocently a skeptical jellyfish would be content to waffle around in its own corner of the ocean being a jellyfish rather than being a crusader against people who think that it is rational to have confidence in conclusions that are strongly consistent with the available evidence.

Militant jellyfishism is what we see everywhere, and it's like Diogenes of Oinoanda lamented that he saw people around him being captured by error is if like sheep.

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Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep)

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And I am content to think that some contradictions will remain contradictory, some problems will never be resolved by the mammalian equipment of the human cerebral cortex, and some things are indefinitely unknowable. If the universe was found to be finite or infinite, either discovery would be equally stupefying and impenetrable to me

That is an interesting quote from Hitchens and I do think it illustrates a way in which though he admired Epicurus, he was not fully Epicurean.

I think that Epicurus would go further and differently than this, because Epicurus would process the information and attempt to come to a conclusion in which he could be confident that the discovery (especially that the universe is "finite") assisted him in concluding whether to entertain the possibility of supernatural control.

Because if we DO have to entertain supernatural creation and control, then all bets are off on everything. And I do mean "bets" because it is not a matter of considering all this to be "stupefying" or "impenetrable." We have finite lives and we have no choice but to take practical positions on what to do with our time - whether to go to church and worship Allah or Yahweh or whoever, or base our decisions on Epicurean or some other philosophy.

So OF COURSE this next point is true......

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And I am content to think that some contradictions will remain contradictory, some problems will never be resolved by the mammalian equipment of the human cerebral cortex, and some things are indefinitely unknowable.

The question is really what is meant by "knowable." If Hitchens is suggesting that anything less than "I am eternal myself and I have observed everything myself and therefore I KNOW the universe is infinite or finite" is required in order to say that you "know" something, then that is a false standard and never going to be satisfying to someone who thinks about ultimate issues like Epicurus did.

It's a FACT that in our lifetimes we have and will have limited evidence, just as Hitchens did in his lifetime. We have to make our decision on how to live based on what we think of the evidence before us. Everyone has to do that. Epicurus is saying that it is foolish to walk around being stupefied and thinking everything that is really important to you is impenetrable. he is saying look around, observe all the facts you can, and then live by a method that incorporates all of the observed facts and doesn't contradict any of them.

Quote from Elayne

I advise caution in saying that there would be any scientific discovery we would reject on the grounds that someone would use it to insert their god of the gaps. We are wisest to base knowledge on evidence, not worry about trying to get evidence to exclude religionists.

Yes I agree but as I see it I am making a somewhat different point.

I would never suggest that we reject a "discovery" or "evidence" -- I am talking "theory."

In other words, if there is indeed evidence that everything observed so far is expanding in one or more directions, then we definitely "accept" that evidence -- but not necessarily every conclusion that someone suggests should be drawn from it.

We first and also have the firmly established observation that nothing comes from or goes to nothing. We don't throw that out the door just because we have evidence of expansion. We now have two separate sets of evidence, and the "truth" must incorporate BOTH to be valid, since we cannot throw out either.

So the point I think is valid is that we can never throw out any evidence, but we can and must throw out theories that are not consistent with ALL the observed facts. In those cases where we can't pin down a likely answer we accept all possible alternatives that ARE consistent with the facts, even when incomplete or ambiguous, and/or we follow the "wait" method.

Aside : we should try to stake a public domain claim in the name of Epicureans everywhere for graphics designed with this combination of letters:

NFN

NTN

Or

NFN/NTN

Or

NFN>NTN>EU>IU>

Nothing from nothing> nothing to nothing>eternal universe >infinite universe> pleasure as the guide of life.

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knowledge of how things began is probably beyond our grasp

That phrasing from such an article would be an example of the problem. The implication that everything in the universe "began" at a single point in time conflicts with the observed nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing, and therefore should not even be entertained as a valid theory since it does not incorporate all reliable evidence. And the implication that there was some mysterious "we'll never know" inflection point in time (which again conflicts with nfn/ntn) plays right into the hands of the " gnostics" who claim to possess some special revelation of the "truth").

At most, an expanding area within a total universe would appear to imply that that locality, and not the whole, had an explosive event that might then be followed by a collapse of that section - but never of the whole universe.

I believe an Epicurean plan of early education would start with premises such as "eternal universe" based on nfn / ntn to the point where the "normal" person would consider phrases such as "universe began" with the same disdain as we hear someone speaking of human sacrifices to appease the gods.

As things are, the default position is "in the beginning, god created the heaven and the earth" and that has brought a cascade of disastrous thinking.

And I don't think there is any coincidence, accident, or mistake in the rise of such terminology in religion, or in its incorporation and embrace by large parts of humanist-friendly modern society. It plays right into the hands of monotheism / absolutist thinking. See, the universe DOES have a central point from which one perspective is correct! We may be separate atoms today, but one day the universe will all come back together into one uniform homogeneous whole where we all get along with no conflicts at all.

Obviously I am saying this just for myself and not as a red line of "you're not an Epicurean if you don't believe it," but that is why I think the chain reasoning of nfn/ntn >> eternal universe >> boundless universe >> life throughout the universe was so important to Epicurus and should be so important to us.

It's acceptable as Epicurus said to maintain multiple theories that are consistent with the evidence, but anything less (a flat "we dont know") reduces our response to religion and platonism to "maybe you're right, we can't prove it because we weren't there and we'll never know because the origin of things is 'beyond our grasp.'" And this leads directly to "Your Yahweh is entitled to as much respectful consideration as my eternal universe, because we ourselves personally weren't there and therefore we can never know for sure."

It seems to me that Epicurus stands for the proposition that we can and should do better than that.

Excellent points Elayne and JJ. So long as the model does not create the inference of "everything" starting at a single moment from nothing / supernaturally," I suppose that would be an example of alternate acceptable theories of the type Epicurus said was AOK. Now of course it's beyond the scope of my ability to deal with, but I think if we were talking about a well-developed Epicurean community there would be effort directed toward making sure that there was an understandable theory available to "everyone" which didn't imply "spookiness" / implicit supernatural factors, which I gather is the aura that certain people like to create exactly for the purpose of spreading religious views, or simply for the fun of keeping simpler people disconcerted.

Such a theory would probably need to address the point about whether "everything that we observe so far seems to be expanding" applies to our expectation for everything not yet observed, and if so why or why not.

Quote from Elayne

Experienced drivers can get distracted and drive home, avoiding obstacles, without having paid any attention.

Great example. Some of my most helpful sessions listening and thinking about Epicurus have been driving while listening to podcasts, and when I get where I am going I hardly remember the drive.

Oscar:

Quote from Godfrey

In terms of the feelings of pleasure or pain, I experienced pleasure from the sun's heat, but only the sensation of the sore throat.

Intuitively that makes sense to me, that you experience both. I am not sure that there is a workable distinction between sensations and feelings (or "experiences) but maybe that needs to be considered.

Aside: Just so I personally don't get lost in our current discussion, I am reminding myself that this is where we started, with Mike's post on FB:

Quote from Cassius

"Mental pleasure exists only when you have peace of mind. Peace of mind exists only when you have no more fears and worries. Fears and worries exist only if you are still wanting. You are still wanting only when you have no limit in what you want."

I am still not sure that the "physical" question of whether we can experience pain and pleasure in different parts of our body at once is really the issue, although that will be interesting to continue discussing and possibly answer.

The original question was more like: "whether the uses of "only" in this set of propositions are an accurate restatement of Epicurean views" which I don't think is necessarily the same issue.

And I continue to think to myself that we need to keep in mind that (in my opinion) this entire issue came up first in context of a LOGICAL argument (the refutation of Plato's arguments in Philebus) rather than a "medical" or a "clinical" context. I suspect that is highly relevant to this discussion because I think the main focus is really on the logical point that nature gives us no faculty of choice other than pleasure or pain, very broadly considered as "feeling." And that would mean that the primary issue Epicurus was addressing was probably "feeling vs reason" or "feeing vs religion" and not "whether pleasure in toes can simultaneously exist with pain in fingers." Because if a third guide exists that would tell us how to regulate choices between pleasure and pain, then that guide would be more important than pleasure and would deserve the title "guide of life." In Epicurean terms reason and logic and wisdom and virtue and the rest cannot meet that test, because they are still simply tools for the attainment of the feeling of pleasure, so pleasure always remains in primary seat.

So I doubt Epicurus was concerned with the question of whether he was multi-threaded or single threaded in experiencing intense physical pain alongside intense mental pleasure on the last day of his life. He might say to us that whether he was experiencing them simultaneously, or flipping back and forth between them as his attention refocused, would not be important to the discussion. He might say that the only thing important to the discussion was that FEELING (not "reason" or religion or the rest) remained his guide to the last moment.

Not arguing Mike, but why does that example seem to be a clear indication to you? Maybe we have a different definition of single-threaded?

Quote from Godfrey

If I get engrossed in a good book I feel pleasure even though the pain of sickness is still there, I'm just not perceiving it.

Quote from Godfrey

Which brings also to mind the much more extreme example of Epicurus on his deathbed, where he was enjoying pleasurable memories even while dying a painful death.

These are both examples that I think I would use to suggest that different perceptions (one of pleasure and another of pain) can exist simultaneously and us be aware of both at the same time?

When you are sick Godfrey are you actually completely oblivious to how bad you feel when you read?

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

Our sensation such as our eyes must not be discriminated from our consciousness.

I guess this is ultimately the same question, but I am not sure that PD24 answers the question. In fact does not PD24 indicate that "you" are conscious of separately evaluating multiple perceptions at the same time?

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

Human consciousness on the other hand is single-threaded.

I am not necessarily disagreeing at this moment, but it is not self-evidently clear to me that this is correct. I would like to know what Elli and Elayne (and of course others too) think about this.

Mike if someone were to dispute you on that point what would you point to as authority or evidence?

And would saying that consciousness is single threaded mean that we cannot be aware of more than a single feeling of pleasure and pain at one time? Maybe discussing "single or multi-threaded" becomes a rabbit hole not to pursue, but i think the general issue probably ought to be made clear.

Ok you are talking about separate parts of the body and presumably then separate perceptions (1. pleasurable perception from the tongue / taste and 2. perception of pain from the stomach ulcer.

I too would think that both of those can be experienced simultaneously, but I suppose someone could say that the attention could focus on only one at a time.

Maybe the issue is whether for purposes of discussing pain and pleasure (applying computer analogies) human consciousness is single-threaded or multi-threaded (?)

Right I am definitely with you there but would clarify, when you say this:

"My pleasure in my mouth can be pain in my stomach, but the pain in my stomach can't have any pleasure at the same time."

Do you mean that the pleasure in your mouth can *lead to* pain in your stomach? Otherwise I may not understand your point.

Great discussion Mike thank you. We are not very far apart at all.

Where I am thinking that greater precision could be gained is an issue I have discussed with Elayne. Are pain and pleasure "cumulative" summaries of all feelings being perceived at a particular moment? What happens when (for example) your eye relays a scene that you find pleasurable, while at the same time your toe is hurting from an ingrown nail? The eye (or some other part of the body perceiving a sensation that is pleasurable) is relaying information simultaneously with the toe perceiving pain. Definitely both perceptions are different and we are talking about either pleasure OR pain, we fully agree that there can be only one or the other.

But i don't think that Epicurus' theory requires (or even allows) that we sum up our total perceptions into one sum that is either pleasurable or painful, and I think that would be required for the "only" parts of your statements to be valid.

Now, it might be arguable that you can only pay attention to one thing at one time, and that you will register that feeling at the instant that you direct your attention to the toe as painful, and then change your assessment in another instant as you direct your attention to your eye. Is that the position that you wish to argue, or that you think Epicurus was contemplating?

I am open to the idea that the mind can only be aware of one thing at a time, but that doesn't seem intuitively true to me, so I am not yet convinced that that is what Epicurus would have been thinking about. Summation of all feelings/perceptions into a sum, and saying that your consciousness can only feel pain or pleasure at a single instant, seems to me to cause problems (such as creating the kind of "mixed states" which he pretty clearly wanted to avoid). It may seem like i myself am the one advocating mixed states, but I am saying that i think Epicurus was talking at the perceptual level, and saying that a particular perception can only be painful OR pleasurable, rather than saying that we can't be aware of more than one thing at a single time. In fact that's exactly what I think is involved in viewing life as a "vessel" which contains discrete experiences of pain and pleasure, with the goal of eliminating from the vessel all experiences of pain and having the vessel be full of experiences of pleasure.

Quote from Hiram

dismissed by Alex because, in an expanding universe paradigm, we are getting further away from the intercosmia and therefore the particles would eventually no longer reach us. This is just another problem with the realist position. Are we content to state something knowing that we will remain forever without evidence for it?

The "expanding universe" paradigm, to the extent it refers to "everything," is not Epicurean and I personally reject it on the same grounds Epicurus would -- it is inconceivable that the universe has a limit. This is not a problem with the realist position, but a problem with someone accepting "scientific" speculation based on incomplete evidence that contradicts something that is logically compelled. To the extent "expanding universe" is valid it refers (presumably) to what has been observed so far, and presumes that these observations are correct and can be taken to overrule something that is logically compelled by other compelling evidence (nothing comes from nothing or goes to nothing and the chain of reasoning that leads to infinite universe). There is no way that both can be true, and the likelihood is therefore that we either have not observed far enough out, or we are misinterpreting or misapplying the results of the evidence so far.

Note: Referring to Alex here does bring back memories too, and this I think is an area where i disagreed with Alex. I think Alex (in following the expanding universe model to the detriment of the bigger picture being the universe as unlimited in size) is committing the "error" that I think we are discussing here. Alx is very very much into "science" which is very admirable, but I frequently detected that this issue we are discussing is something where he and I disagreed. When "science" appears to contradict something as fundamental as infinite / eternal universe, then I am not going to easily accept that "science' is right without a tremendously more powerful expression of proof than I am away that the theoreticians can bring to bear.

Just the same with the religionists -- truly raise someone from the dead in circumstances that are beyond dispute and then we'll talk about supernatural gods and an afterlife.