Posts by Cassius

At risk of deviating off track I want to call in this suggestion / illustration. I think the opening items of the Principal Doctrines are best viewed in the same way we are discussing here: they tied to particular contexts, in which they are "antidotes" to popular misconceptions which Epicurus expected his readers to confront.

He expected them to confront all sorts of misconceptions about the gods, so instead of dealing with all of them separately he gave them the key to unwinding all of them - by referring to the nature of what a "true god" would certainly be like, and not be like.

He expected them to confront all sorts of threats and promises about life after death, so instead of dealing with all of them separately, he gave them the key to unwinding all of them -- that death is the end of all sensation, and therefore NOTHING can happen after death.

And then -- and here is the current issue --

He expected them to confront all of the Platonic and other arguments about why pleasure cannot be the goal of life, most all of which are based on some version of the "pleasure is insatiable" and "it can't be the best because it has no limit, and so he gave them the key to unwinding all those "logic traps" - he pointed out that human life gives us a limit of how much we can experience, and that the very most pleasure we can experience in life is the amount that we experience when all pain has been eliminated. THAT's the context and the reason for the entire "absence of pain" discussion, and it makes perfect sense when viewed in that context, but seems absolutely inscrutable to us - because we haven't read Philebus, we don't know anything about Plato, and we've totally lost the common context that any educated person in ancient Athens would have learned from childhood!

Quote from JJElbert

To put the matter succinctly; not "eudaimonia", or "happiness", or "minimalism", or "freedom from pain", or "letting go", BUT

"Bold-stroke-capital-P-comically-oversized-cartoon-mallet-PLEASURE"

And not just because I am a radical, or I think Epicurus was devoted to radicalism for the sake of radicalism, but for the reason I just summarized to Todd: admit that ANYTHING is a required component of the ultimate good, and you are left drowning without a life-preserver until you admit that REASON/LOGIC/WISDOM is required to identify that good, and probably (if you are Aristotle) money and other accoutrements of being a noble Athenian. You will quickly be led to find that this "art of slicing and dicing" the components of the good is really the essential thing, and you will ultimately (if you are persuaded by "reason") be forced to admit that Venus is held in too high an esteem by Epicurus, as Plato urged on Philebus.

I wish I were more of an expert on Philebus myself, but I have read it several times and these arguments are indeed there.

And what we are reading in the letter to Menoecus is essentially a summary letter written to a student who would in all likelihood have been familiar with those Platonic arguments as the "gold standard" on discussing pleasure as a potential competitor for "the good."

Quote from Todd

How do you reconcile this with Epicurus' advocacy of clarity of language, and using words in the sense that immediately comes to mind?

I think that that answer is found in looking at the full context of the texts and seeing the many many references to "pleasure." I don't think that those foreclose the use of terms like "happiness" as well as long as the fundamental statements that "pleasure" is the only thing desirable in itself are kept in mind. I can easily imagine Epicurus believing that he had been so clear in laying down fundamentals that he could not be misunderstood by his own student (who presumably Menoeceus was, not an outsider or someone unfamiliar with the thrust of the philosophy.)

Your comments are not sidetrack at all

And as you referenced I think this is similar to the "gods" issue. It is useful to have a term for beings which constitute what we would truthfully consider divine, and Epicurus would also have known that he could not enforce his own terminology on everyone.

But i don't think this comes down to questioning his use of "happiness" a few times in relation to the many times "pleasure" is clearly designated. It is a matter of starting at the basics, building consistently on them, and keeping the big picture consistent as he surely would have done himself.

And there's no better example that we need to take things into account than the sentence which reads "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul." That sentence is as counterintuitive and potentially contradictory to so much else that was written that it demands to be taken contextually and explained by reference to the whole. In that case the issue must be traced to the underlying premises of only two feelings (so therefore absence of one is presence of another by definition) and even further, tracing down why Epicurus was concerned about "only two" in the first place (which I think ties to Plato's arguments against pleasure).

The "happiness" question is much easier than that one. There are only two feelings, only pleasure is desirable in and of itself, and no one thinking in Epicurean terms is ever going to suggest that "happiness" is ultimately tied to any necessary requirement other than "pleasure."

All the other tools and alleged requirements of happiness with Aristotle and others alleged to be necessary would, if true, blow the theory of "pleasure as the ultimate good" out of the water. Because if something besides pleasure is required, how do we know what that is? Admit that the goal requires something other than pleasure and Plato will lead you down the primrose path that he led Philebus, and you will end up admitting that knowlege/wisdom that enables you to identify and obtain this non-pleasure element is an essential part of the goal itself, and you will end up admitting Plato's ultimate aim - that "wisdom" is the most important thing in life.

Quote from JJElbert

Do I take your meaning, Cassius, to be that Eudaimonia becomes a problem only when removed from the Greek and set into English?

Joshua I think there are a couple of levels of problem here. Epicurus used the word eudaimonia himself, but had his own definition and context, just as he had for "gods." So there was potential dispute even when used in Greek among Greek-speakers, and we see that issue going on even today among the supporters of Epicurus in Greece. It is my understanding that even today there are factions within the Epicureans in Greece who engage on this very same issue, with some being much more comfortable with "eudaimonia" and "happiness" to the extent that they rarely if ever even mention pleasure, and spend little if any time examining what "happiness" really means, or how it is connected to pleasure, just as Hiram's article glides over that point.

I think that debating the meaning of the word even between and among the Greeks is implicit in Diogenes of Oinoanda's inscription, and also in the statement by Torquatus (which is of course Latin), in the examples given above.

I think the same issue arises when we discuss it in English in translating from the Greek. Pleasure is a feeling for which we need no explanation, as Epicurus held:

(Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?)

... but "happiness" is a much broader concept which cries out for a precise definition. We generally use Aristotle's "flourishing" as an example of a compound concept that is not at all the same as the "life of pleasure" advocated by Epicurus. As the Wikipedia definition above indicates, it appears that Stoics and others pre and post Epicurus used the term eudaimonia to mean very different things, although I am not proficient in quoting Stoics so I am not able to provide any examples at the moment.

The ultimate issue in this discussion, as I see it, is the polemical issue of how to explain the ultimate goal of life as clearly as possible. Epicurus clearly held PLEASURE as the single term which fits that single word to describe the ultimate goal, but he also used eudaimonia within his own context, likely to indicate that a "happy" man will also experience some pains at time, and also that the happy man experiences many different types of pleasures -- in the Lampe's words above, "happiness is a collection of pleasures" which I think is correct - a combination of every kind of physical, mental, and emotional pleasure which we can possibly experience. If an experience is deemed by us to be desirable, it is solely because it is, or leads to, pleasure.

So the real issue is that those who disagree with Epicurus, and who want to appeal to real normal people (we can exclude the Stoics from this) realize that normal people feel instinctively the pull of Nature and therefore want to "be happy." The manipulation and deception game of other philosophers is to pull in an ambiguous concept like "happiness" and redefine it to suit their own tastes in virtue, in nobility, in worthiness, or in whatever other high-sounding word is calculated at the moment to persuade the unwary. That way they deprecate pleasure as the feeling which is the ultimate guide given us by Nature, which is exactly what Hiram's article leads toward in deprecating the role of "pleasure" even though he denies that that is his intent.

This is an issue that has been discussed at length in public and in private in the past, and that is what I read into the message of the article. Some people believe that "pleasure" is such a disreputable word that they cannot tolerate riding under its banner, and that is in my humble opinion a very huge mistake

I see that Hiram has written an article ("In Defense of Eudaimonia") with which I strongly disagree, but which will provide a great platform for discussing the details of Epicurean philosophy.

First, I would point to a couple of sources that picked up on this precise point in meeting the arguments of Stoics and others in the years after Epicurus:

What is Happiness? Let's let Diogenes of Oinoanda explain:

What is the true end? Let's let Torquatus make the point very clear in "On Ends":

Given those statements, we need to be very careful in loose use of words that have become associated with anti-Epicurean philosophies, especially when we are talking with people who do not understand the ramifications of the issue:

Ok - here is a link to Hiram's post:

I am attaching a full pdf of the article, but there is one clip I want to be sure to emphasize, because I think the writer cited is absolutely correct:

We can of course cite the many instances in Epicurus' own texts, and in Lucretrius, which precisely point to "pleasure" as the goal and guide of life, but I will add those here later.

You will also want to reread the arguments on this topic in Elayne's - On Pain, Pleasure, and Happiness Second Draft

This Epicureanfriends forum is no doubt the "some Epicurean circles" being referenced, so here is a thread to discuss it.

Quote from Elayne

taking the Heisenberg principle that the act of measuring phenomena at the subatomic scale influences the experimental results, so that we can measure position of the particle OR the velocity but not both at the same time, to thinking that means we can basically bend spoons with our minds

Or taking it to mean that everything is so chaotic that NOTHING can be predicted or counted on, so hey,what the heck, let's just give up trying and get drugged out!

This thread is devoted to the American Friends of Herculaneum:

http://cal.byu.edu/macfarlane/herculaneumfriends/index.htm

Quote from Elayne

It's not that older adults are leaving the churches so much as they are dying and being replaced, right?

Or in my observation in the traditional "mainline" churches, they are dying and NOT being replaced (maybe that was a typo, but maybe its a reference to how the churches are trying to reinvent themselves).

But in many cases it worries me that what is following behind to fill the vacuum in social structure is not much better, and in some cases worse, than before. If it is "social media" or Hollywood / New York glitter media culture (not sure what the best word is for it) that is taking the place of the old community churches, then something already rotten is being replaced by something in many cases more rotten still. Maybe one symptom is the rise of meth and other drugs, and the apparent rise (or so I read) in suicide.

Great find, Joshua, I have never heard of him but will be watching for him from now on.

Great Ideas!!!!

As I write this, this video presentation from the Getty Museum is less than 24 hours old. It's long, but holds out the promise of the very latest information:

Joshua I personally see those initiatives as kind of like the continuing anti-abortion emphasis in some legislatures -- they are on the losing side of history and there are enough of them around yet to cause trouble, but they are mostly older people (of course there are exceptions) and their numbers are declining. And even on the "right" where they identify themselves, they are losing their grip on their own constituents. I think that a significant result of Epicurean "activism" would add to their further and faster decline, but I do think there's a uniquely Epicurean perspective about WHY they are wrong that avoids muddying the Epicurean message.

Also keep in mind this: DeWitt's "Organization And Procedure In Epicurean Groups"

I intend to raise this issue in later threads, but the calendar crept up and here we are at another Twentieth, so I'd like to raise the issue: What would a modern local Epicurean "club" look like? We have frequently talked about Meetup groups, and some people (Sydney Australia) have even had some success with that method.

But as a general discussion that might help us in the future, if you could wish into being your idealized "Local Epicurean Group" in your home-town, in which you could participate, what kinds of things would you expect or like to see it doing?

How often would it meet? What kind of activities would it pursue? Would you think it would be logical for an Epicurean group to form the kind of "church-like" organization that we see some people, like the "Unitarians" attempt to do? Would you see an Epicurean group as more of a social gathering club that does mainly lunches and dinners along the "Meetup" style of things? Would you see a local Epicurean group giving lectures at local library meeting rooms?

Those of us reading these posts are nowhere near being able to accomplish any of these goals, but we'll never get there if we don't at least talk about what we'd like to see.

So what would you like to see in a local "Epicurean Group?"

Oh no, no problem with that post at all. I am seeing more and more attacks on standard Christianity from both left and right. The increasing polarization of the country, no matter what side one takes on it, is just exposing the impotence of traditional religion to deal with those divisive issues.

Dealing with religion is such a fundamental part of Epicurean history and Epicurean philosophy that I think it stands in very different status from the standard "political" issues that are the real flashpoints and that get us distracted from the core ideas. "Religion" and the problems that arise from it are about as core Epicurean issue as anything can be.

Probably good for us to reread Torquatus too:

XVI. It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, License, and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awakening trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected.

The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumor, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity, and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved.

On the other hand, for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially as there really is no motive for transgressing since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings.

Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

One more thought for the night:

If justice is a virtue just like any other virtue, let's compare it to prudence or courage.

Is there really such a thing as "absolute courage" or "absolute prudence" apart from particular contextual situations that change moment by moment? And is not some action that might appear courageous or prudent at one moment considered to be foolhardy the next if the circumstances change? And are not all these evaluated contextually at every moment as to what results in terms of pain or pleasure?

Is justice any different?

Todd you don't know me as well as Elayne does. Elayne knows I often think out loud and say things in mid-thought without necessarily being committed to the result. I like to think that I am clear when I am doing that but I know I am not always. In this discussion, as in most discussions of anticipations, I always try to restate that all this is pretty speculative.

So you are right in your last point - I am not sure that anything we are discussing is fully formed. I think what we are doing is trying to unwind the train of thought without committing to any conclusion of it.

And I think what I am really doing is trying to view all this from the lens of justice being a "virtue" and given how flexible Epicurus seems to be about the nature of ANY virtue, considering that he is probably very flexible here too -- and tying the result as you are doing to pain and pleasure (when means feeling) with the logic of "rule-based" part of it strictly instrumental.

As to Elayne's comments which add up to:

"If justice were rational it would not be in the prolepses which are part of the Canon. None of the Canon is reason-based. It's how we know reality, not what we decide to do."

.... I think I am viewing that slightly differently. I am viewing "justice" as "virtue" and I view any "virtue" as a "concept," with concepts being rational constructions which may, or may not have the feelings as a component.

So if an anticipation is essentially some kind of "perception" in the sense that the eyes perceive light, then we probably do need to consider that an "anticipation of justice" might be an input to a "conception of justice" or a "definition of justice in a particular situation."

I think I need to go to sleep for the night.

Yes, absolutely, but everything we do to accomplish that when we work with other people by agreement doesn't necessarily fall under "justice" does it? Actually that is pretty much the original question I posted.

And this relates to much of the rest discussed above -- I try to read Epicurus strictly according to his words, and so when he refers to justice as involving agreements not to harm or be harm, I take him as meaning exactly that, no more, no less.

Quote from Todd

Wait...didn't Epicurus say exactly that in PD 31-33??? I'm not sure how to even respond to this statement.

I guess this is Bailey: 31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

Epicurus.net: 31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.

So I am reading that all together that it is not just any pledge of mutual advantage, but a specific pledge, to avoid harm, so that Justice has two components that are not independent, but inseparable in order to constitute justice.

Now that may be too strict a reading; that's why discussion is good!

Otherwise every breach of every agreement is "unjust:" even though Epicurus explicitly states that when conditions change, so does whether a thing is just or unjust.

And in going back to Elayne's most recent post:

Quote from Elayne

A lot of the confusion is arising in the world re justice is from trying to treat the sense of injustice like a rational function.

I am not sure whether "Rational" is the right word, or "absolute" ! Epicurus was being "rational" in telling us (seemingly) that" justice" has no absolute meaning and exists only in the context of agreements not to be harmed. So in other words he is telling us the true basis of "justice" to the extent we even want to use the word at all is that it cannot be analyzed apart from the feelings of pain of and pleasure of the people actually involved.

I think Todd may be attempting to do what all of us moderns would first attempt to do - to rescue some vestigte of absolute justice by tying it to "agreement" as if agreement alone is all that is necessary to establish "justice." Maybe it is enough to establish "civil justice" or "justice under the law of the United States" but I think we all agree that is not what we are talking about.

So the question that prompted the thread's title is still something like "How radical was Epicurus being?" "Was he essentially telling us that our "justice" is just as nonsensical as our "gods"?