Posts by Cassius

Here is a quick promo I made to call attention to a new project: a podcast dedicated to going step by step through Lucretius' "On the Nature of Things." Surprisingly few fans of Epicurus have taken the time to read Lucretius's poem in its entirety, and I think there's a good reason why commentator's rarely recommend him: because in his six books and thousands of lines, Lucretius has very few crumbs for those who want to portray Epicurus as motivated by "freedom from pain" rather than Pleasure.

From start to finish Lucretius focuses on a practical approach to following "Divine Pleasure, Guide of Life" by blasting the foundation out from under supernatural religion, threats of punishment after death, and dialectical trickery, all the while pointing out "the straight path" to follow pleasure to happy living. We very much need a podcast on this, and several of us will work to bring you this as soon as we can.

Thank you for letting me know Martin! I am investigating that now. I don't see an option that I can change but I have posted a request on the user forum and I will report back to you.

I need to check back in DeWitt to see how he documents the "Twentiers" comment, and whether that is more Cicero or from another source.

Horace's "herd" and the funeral inscription "choic" are both clearly by Epicureans, but could perhaps be "tongue in cheek."

I am not sure that I am aware of Lucretius or anyone who was clearly an Epicurean using the term "Garden" and I wonder if that is also a term applied by outsiders, perhaps just because it is somewhat parallel to place names like Stoa and Peripatetic and Academy.

So as part of this discussion it would be interesting to see if we could clearly document a name that the Epicureans called themselves. I need to check Lucian...

There is a lot of fun stuff in there - you won't regret it!

I am trying to come up with a list of names which were applied to the Epicureans either by themselves or others. So far I have:

1. The Garden
2. The Twentiers (or some variation referring to the 20th
3. Hogs In Epicurus' herd (from Horace)
4. ..."The joyous choir" (on the funeral inscription, noted below
5. Epicurus himself was referred to as "The Garghettian" by Cicero so maybe they also applied that to the group.

Are you aware of any others?

Cites:

20ers -

Joyous Choir

https://newepicurean.com/keeping-watch-…alive-with-joy/

Hog in the Epicurean Herd -- Horace letter to Tibulus

Todd I am forgetting - is this tied to an Epicurean context or chapter?

Quote from Todd

Second, an anecdote from Diogenes Laertius, where some philosopher has defined "man" as a featherless biped. Later, someone shows up with a plucked chicken and says, "Behold, a man!" (I'm paraphrasing, but that's the gist of it.)

DAILY LUCRETIAN FRIDAY OCTOBER 25, 2019 (Continuation of Book Three)

To say likewise, that the eyes can see nothing of themselves, but the mind looks through them as through doors laid open, this is ridiculous, when sense itself tells them the contrary, and sets it full in their view; especially when we are unable to look upon objects that dazzle the eyes, because our site is confounded by too great a lustre. This could not be, if they were mere doors, nor are open doors that we look through capable of pain. Besides, if our eyes were no more than doors, the mind would see clearer when the eyes were pulled out, and the whole frame taken away.

In this case it is vain to take shelter under the sacred opinion of Democritus, who says that as many parts as there are of the body, so many parts too of the soul are answerable, and are contained in them; for since the principles of the soul are not only much smaller than those of which the body and its parts consist, but are fewer in number, and are spread thinly in distant Spaces all over the limbs, you may a firm so far, that the principles of the Soul take up only so many different spaces and intervals, as may be sufficient for those little seeds that are in us to incite those motions that produce Sensation.

That this sense does not affect every minute part of the body is plain; for we seldom feel the dust that sticks upon us, nor the particles of chalk that drop upon our limbs; nor do we perceive the dew by night, or the fine threads of the spider meeting us, when we are entangled by the subtle net as we pass along; nor the decaying web lighting upon our heads, nor are we sensible of the soft feathers of birds, nor of the flying down of thistles, which from their natural levity are scarce able to descend upon us; nor do we feel the motion of every creeping insect, nor the little traces of the feet which gnats and such animals make upon us. So that the many seeds which are diffused over all the limbs, must be first put into motion before the principles of the soul are agitated and made capable to feel, and before its seeds, by striking upon each other through so many distance spaces, can meet, unite, and part again, and be so variously moved as to produce sense and perception in us.

But the mind it is that keeps up the defences of life, and has a more sovereign power to preserve our beings, then all the faculties of the soul; for, without the mind, the least part of the soul cannot secure its residence in the body for a moment, but follows it readily as a close companion, and vanishes into air along with it, and leaves the cold limbs in the frozen arms of death. But the man whose mind is whole and entire, remains alive, though he be mangled and all his limbs lopped-off; yet his trunk, though his soul be so far gone, and his members separated from him, still lives and breathes the vital air; the trunk, if not spoiled of the whole, yet of a great part of the soul, still continues alive and holds fast its being. So, if you tear the eye all round, if the pupil remains safe, the power of sight continues entire, so long as you do no injury to the Apple, but cut the white all around, and leave that hole, this may be done without any danger or lost to the sight; but if ever so little of the middle of the eye be pricked through, though the ball otherwise looks bright and sound, the light instantly dies away, and darkness follows. This is the case of the mind and soul, and by such bonds are they always held together.

Maybe the "first mental image" is our own in each case, and the reference is not to everyone having the same or even a similar image, or to communication with others at all, but a reference to we ourselves having confidence in our own image being clear and firm. And so maybe the entire passage by Epicurus is not referring to language or communication but is referring to having confidence in our own thought processes?

Elli found this for Philebus, in the website of philologers/teachers in hellenic education at schools of Greece. She translated this passage:

The work was written in Plato's old age, probably between 362-360 BC and the main person is Socrates who discusses with the Protarchus and Philebus. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates introduces Philebus to claim that pleasure is the supreme good for all beings. Because Philebus appears to be a devotee of Aphrodite and surrendered to pleasures, he could not adopt his personal dialectical views and therefore shows confidence in his defense of his friend the Protarchus who had trained near Gorgias. Philebus may not have been an actual but imaginary person because this name did not exist in Attica, and Plato probably chose it as the sign of "friend of puberty”. In contrast, Protarchus was a real person. He was the son of Callias and a student of Gorgias and he already is mentioned some of his quotes by Aristotle in his book "The physics".

https://www.filologikos-istotopos.gr/2017/04/30/to-platoniko-ergo-filivos

The writer here is Suzana Karakosta, who has a degree in theology and history of philosophy.

Here is an excellent article shared today by the Epicurus page - I am pasting a clip of the conclusion. Claims of truth without evidence are something that Epicurus dealt with regularly. When people make claims for which they have no evidence, can they not at least pay us the respect of saying so, even if they do so in the name of "science?"

(I see the piece comes from Britain, where they do not have American freedom of speech. Because I like free speech, nor do I see any evidence that Epicurus attempted to restrict the speech of his adversaries, I editorialized by striking the "within reason" comment.)

https://aeon.co/essays/post-em…it-is-dangerous?

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct…obox=1571920959

Also contains this reference as to the date of the Eruption --

Epicurus said it for himself, and it applies to you and me as well - **We Would Not Know What the Good Would Be If We Eliminate Pleasure** - and that is exactly the way that Aristotle and Plato and the Stoics would have you be - **blind and dumb** as to what we should do with our lives.

Because then, blind and dumb, where could we turn but to THEM to tell us all about "virtue" and "appropriate excellence" and how to spend our lives! So if you are hesitant to embrace "pleasure" as the goal - and I too was, in the past - think about who it is who really profits from your hesitancy to name the name of "pleasure."

"For I at least do not even know what I should conceive the good to be, if I eliminate the pleasures of taste, and eliminate the pleasures of sex, and eliminate the pleasures of listening, and eliminate the pleasant motions caused in our vision by a visible form"

Another variation some say is "I don't need pleasure, all I want is to be happy," Or "happiness doesn't mean pleasure." -- Well exactly what do they think happiness is? Ask and you will find out that they have another agenda - THEIR definition of "virtue."

From that same page:

Elayne posted:

Once a person has gotten a firm grip on this understanding, "how to live" tends to fall into place. Yes, there is some learning on the hedonic calculus-- how to make decisions for actions bringing more pleasure than pain. But I find that fairly intuitive for a person who has truly decided to enjoy life!

Watch out for anyone who gives you a list of activities, political positions, economic choices, etc, and says you should do them to have pleasure. People like that want to convince you to do things their way, for their own pleasure, and your may vary. Instead, pay attention to what brings you more enjoyment than pain and do those things. Day by day, you will gain skill!

Attached is a "doc" version of the collection of quotes in this graphic:

One thing that may be relevant to this that I pick up as I retype the Lucretius passages from the old PDFs is how much use is made of consecutive alternate descriptions, such as:

I am going to walk through the door, the portal, the gate, the wooden sheet on hinges, the white barrier to the entrance, the divider of rooms..... Etc.

Now that is indeed a way to make sure one's point is understood, and maybe it is also a way to drill home a mental image.

just to pick on doors, it seems to me that I have a series of mental images that cone to mind on hearing door - or most other words - so what is it about "first"?

Thank you Joshua you are doing a better job of focusing on the question than I am. You are right to highlight this from the letter to Herodotus:

Quote from Cassius

For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

Is this "first mental image associated with each word purely internal to each person? And where does this first mental image come from? Is this a reference to a picture we store in our mind (such as 'leaf') after many observations? Is the picture an "abstraction"? If so, does this have anything to do with "anticipations"?

And what is referenced by "there should be no need of explanation"? Is that a reference to somehow the thing is in our mind without experience of it previously, or that, once it is there, the thing is so clear to us that it needs no further analysis or examples in order to be clear?

I tend to interpret all this as meaning "let's be as clear as possible in our use of words as we discuss things with other people" which seems basic common sense. An easy example in when in Rome, speak Italian. And there are all sorts of other ways to be precise. But is that all it is saying, or does this have anything to do with "anticipations"?

Godfrey in my own analysis, I presume it is pretty clear that conceptual reasoning is what occurs when we identify concepts such as "economics" and "socialism" and "capitalism" and talk about socialism and capitalism as involving different perspectives on economics. The key point being that we are clearly manipulating "ideas" that don't really have independent physical existence, but are terms that we have defined. Actually "conceptual reasoning" is probably much broader than that, and probably should be considered to include all kinds of reasoning and logic about anything, even concrete things, because what does reasoning and logic ever work with besides concepts? At any rate, "conceptual reasoning" using "concepts" or "abstractions" is certainly a highly useful tool of human affairs and I would think it is clear that everyone, including Epicurus, agrees that properly used, conceptual reasoning is a wonderful tool for human pleasure and happiness.

As for this discussion of language, someone / anyone points at a flying feathered animal and calls it a "bird" and then afterward in that territory among people who speak the same language flying feathered animals are called birds. Maybe the very disposition to point and make a sound at the same time is anticipated in our nature. But would anyone say that the precise sound made, and word chosen, was anticipated in our nature, or is every word / precise sound totally arbitrary based on local circumstances? Even considering words of emotion, does the word "joy" sound pleasing in some way and the word "hurt" sound painful?

Because ultimate the question is as Nietzsche raises in the excerpt. Is any part of conceptual reasoning, or the assignment and manipulation of words, a result of there being an "essence-like quality of a leaf" or an essence of "honesty" that our nature puts us into contact with. Or is the entire naming and conceptual reasoning process totally a function of our own "arbitrary" choices as to how to name things and manipulate those names? Stated that way it seems pretty clear that the only way that could be correct would be some kind of Platonic theory of ideal forms existing somewhere else, or Aristotelian theory of "essences" residing within the thing being observed, neither of which I gather Epicurus believed to exist. And so is the process described by Lucretius essentially consistent with Nietzsche's excerpt?

Joshua do you have comment on whether there is any relation between the excerpt from Nietzsche, especially in relation to the Lucretius Book FOUR material as to the relation of knowledge and the senses?