Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

"just because something can be shown to have a mathematical probability of happening doesn't mean it has a corresponding possibility in reality."

Yes but I wonder if that is specific enough. Like in the monkey analogy people seem to default to a position that "anything is possible but the possibility may be infinitesimally small." Well, but that's the question, isn't it? is there really ANY possibility of certain things happening, and can't we be pretty confident in saying that some things can never happen, and shouldn't we try to be rigorous in separating the two? If we think about the monkeys that exist in reality, even given an infinite time I would not expect them by nature to be interested in hitting all the keys randomly and persistently enough to come up with a sonnet.

The "anything is possible" cliche is a dangerous one, I'm thinking.

Thanks for posting that Charles!

Don thanks for the link to the wikipedia article. I woke up thinking about the monkeys and the aspect that struck me is that Epicurus might say that reasoning by analogy would include the fact that we can observe monkeys here in earth playing with typewriters and we observe that they are not in fact apt to randomly press all keys. The wikipedia article observed something similar. Changing the paradigm to reference some kind of random letter generator .... changes the hypothetical. I am tempted to say that Epicurus would say that even in an eternity of time a monkey could never be expected to produce even a single work of Shakespeare, and that it is always essential to be very clear as to ones statements so as to avoid overbroad and incorrect implications of infinity and eternality. Even in an infinite and eternal universe there are limits on what we should expect to happen, and *all things* are not possible.

I find this interesting because I don't think it is a small point - I think it's an important one.

Are we inferring that the monkey will learn or reproduce and generate more intelligent offspring? Or is the hypothetical that the same monkey keeps typing on the same typewriter for an infinite time? Does randomness expanded to an ever greater power ever produce something highly complex without there being something in the nature of the process under consideration that creates a tendency toward "organization"?

At this point I am not advocating a position just trying to think it through.

At least in my own mind I relate these questions back to the presumption that the Epicureans thought the universe eternally old into the past as well. Regardless of whether we think that violates modern physics, toward what conclusions would that presumption have led them? That life in the universe has existed eternally too? I personally think that must have been a conclusion of theirs but anyone care to comment?

I would think the common thread in the questions is whether there must be some kind of "disposition" to lead to the formation of life, or to monkeys typing Shakespeare, in order for that to happen.

Must there be something in the nature of certain elements that tends to produce organization?

Tim if you do take any steps at all I hope you will be sure to post them here at the Forum. I think it's highly motivational for people to see others trying, and highly helpful to each other to see what techniques seem to have worked and which do not work so well. After some ten years of watching I've only seen one ongoing "success story" and that is the meetup group in Australia. I attribute that largely to the leadership of one individual, which is much to his credit, but I'm not sure whether other leaders within that community have emerged, or to what extent they have become stronger Epicureans vs just having a good time (which is of course worthwhile in itself).

Tim -- I presume you're talking about the nature of the gods -- check out the opening of chapter 13 - the true piety.

As to the monkeys and Shakespeare, I don't mean to dismiss that question. I am inclined to think that the answer is "no" as I indicated but it would be good to articulate more clearly why not (or why he would) agree that "random" events (which is pretty much the meaning of monkeys on a typewriter) could or could not produce Shakespeare.

It immediately comes to mind that of course we generally think that natural events that are to a point "random" produce life, and life eventually produced humans, and humans eventually produced Shakespeare, and he eventually produced his body of work.

But I don't think that's really the fair way of analyzing the question. The question starts with a typewriter, and a monkey, so that kind of sets some parameters. Would ANY amount of time be sufficient for a monkey sitting in front of a typewriter to produce the work of Shakespeare? No doubt we could talk about the analogy from many different angles but the heart of the question seems to me to be some defined force of randomness eventually producing a highly organized result which would seem couinterintuitive given the starting point.

Any care to argue that such a result is "inevitable" given enough time? There may well be better ways to articulate the question but the I think there are useful lessons to be drawn from analyzing it and considering both the limits of the hypothetical results and how we reach the idea that there are in fact limits (if we do).

Time I moved this into our "Epicureans in Europe" where it might be more easily found by others asking the same question. At the moment I don't have much specific advice but look at the other postings in this thread:

Regional Epicurean Groups and Activities

and THIS thread especially: Live / Local Epicurean Groups, Meetings, and Seminars

Great topics to discuss Tim! I bet Don would agree with me that this is similar to what we're currently discussing here: Stoic Objections to Epicurean Doctrine on Infinity of The Universe

Here is the way I would begin to unwind your statement:

Quote from timrobbe

I think it was Bernard Shaw who stated that given enough time, a monkey would type a copy of Shakespearean works. Eternity would certainly be enought time.

This is almost exactly what Don and I are discussing, and my view is that Epicurus would NOT take this position. Yes over an eternity of time and an infinity of space and innumerable number of things are going to happen, but at the same time Epicurus was very focused on limits and bounds and that "everything" is not possible given simply time and space. That's a very important issue to discuss and I hope others will chime in but for the moment I just want to raise it.

Quote from timrobbe

I understand Epicurus deduced God(s) must exist because atoms and void are both eternal and limitless (leading to PD 1).

No, I do not think that Epicurus deduced that gods must exist because atoms and void are both eternal and limitless -- at least, that is only a relatively small part of the analysis. Important, yes, because it is important to everything, but as to the existence of "Gods" we have a couple of very specific lines of reasoning that are basically along the lines of (1) anticipations, as explained by Velleius in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" and (2) images of the gods, which is referenced in Lucretius. Again here I would refer you to the much longer discussion of this in DeWitt's book. Do you have a copy of that? If not, let me know. But I think the main point is that there is a lot more to the "god" story than the eternal/limitless nature of the universe. I don't think there is anything in Epicurean theory that requires that gods exist purely because the universe is infinite and eternal.

Quote from timrobbe

Given that atoms and the void (and the swerve) are eternal and limitless, it is an almost certainty that after death our atoms once again will eventually form out bodies and minds again.

This argument appears in Lucretius but not in the form of admitting that it is true, but by saying that EVEN IF it were true, it would make no difference to us, since we can't remember past lives. That's not the same as saying that it is an absolute certainty, but I can see how someone could argue that, especially from a Nietzschean "eternal recurrence" perspective.

OK back to Lucretius - this occurs near the end of book three -- here, the HUMPHRIES version:

Death Is nothing to us, has no relevance

To our condition, seeing that the mind

Is mortal. Just as, long ago, we felt

Not the least touch of trouble when the wars

Were raging all around the shaken earth

And from all sides the Carthaginian hordes

Poured forth to battle, and no man ever knew

Whose subject he would be in life or death,

Which doom, by land or sea, would strike him down,

So, when we cease to be, and body and soul,

Which joined to make us one, have gone their ways,

Their separate ways, nothing at all can shake

Our feelings, not if earth were mixed with sea

Or sea with sky. Perhaps the mind or spirit,

After its separation from our body,

Has some sensation; what is that to us?

Nothing at all, for what we knew of being,

Essence, identity, oneness, was derived

From body's union with spirit, so, if time,

After our death, should some day reunite

All of our present particles, bring them back

To where they now reside, give us once more

The light of life, this still would have no meaning

For us, with our self-recollection gone.

As we are now, we lack all memory

Of what we were before, suffer no wound

From those old days. Look back on all that space

Of time's immensity, consider well

What infinite combinations there have been

In matter's ways and groupings. How easy, then,

For human beings to believe we are

Compounded of the very selfsame motes,

Arranged exactly in the selfsame ways

As once we were, our long-ago, our now

Being identical. And yet we keep

No memory of that once-upon-a-time,

Nor can we call it back; somewhere between

A break occurred, and all our atoms went

Wandering here and there and far away

From our sensations. If there lies ahead

Tough luck for any man, he must be there,

Himself, to feel its evil, but since death

Removes this chance, and by injunction stops

All rioting of woes against our state,

We may be reassured that in our death

We have no cause for fear, we cannot be

Wretched in nonexistence. Death alone

Has immortality, and takes away

Our mortal life. It does not matter a bit

If we once lived before.

Another reference, this one from Lucretius Book 2 (Bailey). This is one of the most specific that I remember:

And yet we must not think that all particles can be linked together in all ways, for you would see monsters created everywhere, forms coming to being half man, half beast, and sometimes tall branches growing out from a living body, and many limbs of land-beasts linked with beasts of the sea, and nature too throughout the lands, that are the parents of all things, feeding Chimaeras breathing flame from their noisome mouths. But it is clear to see that none of these things comes to be, since we see that all things are born of fixed seeds and a fixed parent, and can, as they grow, preserve their kind. You may be sure that that must needs come to pass by a fixed law. For its own proper particles separate from every kind of food and pass within into the limbs of everything, and are there linked on and bring about the suitable movements. But, on the other hand, we see nature cast out alien matter on to the ground, and many things with bodies unseen flee from the body, driven by blows, which could not be linked to any part nor within feel the lively motions in harmony with the body and imitate them. But lest by chance you should think that living things alone are bound by these laws, the same condition sets a limit to all things. For even as all things begotten are in their whole nature unlike one to the other, so it must needs be that each is made of first-beginnings of a different shape; not that but a few are endowed with a like form, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. Moreover, since the seeds are different, there must needs be a difference in their spaces, passages, fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, which not only sunder living things, but part earth and the whole sea, and hold all the sky away from the earth.

This is the kind of exploration of this argument that I think is most useful. I agree with you Don that from my quick reading he seems to be alleging that Epicurus held that "all possible options possible, they actually exist in all possible infinite cosmos." This may be the first time we have discussed this here on this forum, but I think I have seen this before and in fact I think it is probably the argument that we'll run into frequently as soon as we seek out and discuss more often the general approach. So I think it will be very good for us to pick this apart and line up the responses, including not just that quote but a series of others that are even more specific that all things cannot combine in all "possible" ways. If I recall correctly too there is a "conceivability" aspect to this as well.

But at any rate, we have to very carefully articulate these issues about how to treat "possibilities." Otherwise this will always be a hurdle that will be thrown in front of us, and I think the best (or at least one of first) responses is simply to hunt out and marshal the sources which say that this is not so.

so it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole; whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone. And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven.

OK yes something like that is what I too gather the thesis to be, but I definitely reject that as what Epicurus was saying, and I really don't think its even close as a reasonable construction.

I think it is clear that Epicurus is telling us how to approach issues where evidence is lacking (hold reasonable possibilities as "possible"rather than picking among them when there is insufficient evidence to do so). He is certainly not saying that all things are possible as that is specifically ruled out by the limitations in the way that atoms can combine, and this is stated in several ways in Lucretius and I think other places as well.

So when you say you can't rule out his thesis, what do you see his thesis being?

Because yes this seems valid to be a valid approach to me: "Epicurus does say all the alternatives are possible or permissible or allowed" ... when you qualify that these possibilities have some evidence to support them, even evidence by analogy, and you qualify that the particular alternative does not have evidence against it to disqualify it.

i haven't had time to read the paper yet and probably won't in the near future, so with that caveat I have two preliminary comments:

I suspect you are correct Don and he is distorting the doctrine. Sounds like an extreme variation the "all sensations are true" argument which Dewitt deals with, applied to attack the idea that we should not eliminate possibilities until there is evidence on which to do so.

Also, I think this article and the background probably helps show how the infinite universe argument was not so much a "knowledge for the sake of knowledge" debate as it was an example of logical fencing, originating with the Platonists et al, who were using their logic to persuade others toward a theocentric universe model. Given that playing field the Epicurean position was probably always intended more as an antidote to theism than anything else.

I think we are seeing a thread here that the real crux of many matters is this "methods of inference" question, turning on the question of what is the proper perspective to take when the evidence of our senses seems to us to be insufficient to establish the level of certainty we would prefer.

In such cases do we allow ourselves to follow "logic contrary to some evidence and to the experience here we can refer to by analogy" or do we "wait" and in the meantime accept that multiple possibilities may be true.

If in fact the Epicureans said "are true" rather than "may be true" (and I question that) then this must have been another example of a nonstandard definition of the word "true" just like they used "god" in a way that to us seems nonstandard.

We should not judge the Epicureans according to our own technology or according to our own definitions.

Yes he's using a Stoic argument here:

In contrast to the issues about infinity of the universe based on modern physics, the original issues involved in infinity theory involved important logical and ethical issues. This thread is not to address the physics arguments, but to address the arguments of the Stoics and others who thought that the Epicurean argument on infinity of the universe was insufficient. I don't have time to go through this right now but the attached article came across my email, and I see it is written by someone whose thesis is that the Stoic argument was superior. Over time I'd like to develop in this thread some discussion on potential responses to these Stoic-based arguments.

Welcome to Episode Thirty-Five of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 944-1047

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

944-962: a living creature receives a blow which its nature cannot endure: the senses of body and soul are stunned; the connection of the two is broken, and the soul escapes through the apertures of the body: a blow can do no more than break up and scatter the several elements. Again the remaining vital motions can often get the better of a less severe blow, bring each thing back to its proper channel, and rekindle the senses: in this way only is the thing recalled to life.

963-972: there is pain when the elements are disordered in their seats, pleasure when they return to their place; therefore first-beginnings themselves can feel neither pleasure nor pain, since they are not formed of other first-beginnings, whose motions can be disturbed so as to give them pain, or rearranged so as to give them pleasure.

973-990: if sense must be given to the elements of living things in order that these things may have sense, then must their elements have the same feelings and reasoning powers which men have; they will thus have to consist of other elements, and these again of others on to infinity: if all this is absurd, and you cannot conceive laughing or thinking atoms, why not allow generally things that have sense to come from elements without sense?

991-1022: nay we men, as well as beasts and the fruits of the earth, may be said to have our birth from heaven as father, and earth who as mother gives us food and therefore life: death too is but the going back of our elements to heaven and earth respectively: then in a moment all forms and colors and senses perish, which depend on the motions arrangements etc. of first-beginnings ; even as in this our poem a few letters produce by different arrangements, etc. quite different verses.— The first part of this passage is a literal translation of a fragment from the Chrysippus of Anaxagoras' scholar Euripides.

1023-1047: listen now to a question of vast moment. But nothing is so easy that it may not at first seem difficult; nothing so wondrous but people cease in the end to admire it. Look at the sky with sun moon and stars: what more marvelously beautiful? yet the world weary of the sight cares not now to give it a glance. Fear not therefore the novelty of the thing, but hear what I have to say; and if it be true, surrender; if false, gird yourself to the combat : the mind would fain comprehend that immensity into which it looks and in which it freely expatiates.

Browne:

Besides, a blow falling upon any animal, heavier than its nature can endure, immediately torments it, and confounds all its senses both of body and mind; for the connection of the seeds is dissolved, and the vital motions are wholly obstructed, till the force of the blow being agitated violently through the limbs dissolves the vital ties of the soul from the body, and compels her, scattered and broken to pieces, to fly out through every pore. For what can we conceive to be the effect of such a stroke but to separate and dissolve the seeds that were united before? And then it happens, when the blow falls with less violence, that the remains of vital motion often get the better, they recover and calm the great disorders of the blow, and recall everything again into its proper channel. They rescue the body, as it were, from the jaws of death, and give new life to the senses that were almost destroyed; else why should creatures rather return to life from the very gates of death with new spirits, than when they were just entering in, proceed on, and utterly perish?

Further, since we feel pain when the seeds are shaken from their natural state and situation within, and are disordered through all the bowels and limbs by any outward force, and when they return again into their proper place, a quiet pleasure immediately succeeds, you may conclude that simple seeds cannot be tormented with pain, nor of themselves be affected with pleasure; because they do not consist of principles or other seeds by whose violent motions they may be disturbed, or be delighted with any pleasure they can give; and therefore they cannot possibly be endued with any sense at all.

Again, if in order to produce creatures with sense, sense must be imputed to the seeds from which they are formed, of what principles, I pray, is the human race properly composed? Of such, no doubt, as laugh, and shake their little sides, such as bedew their face and cheeks with flowing tears, such as can widely talk how things are mixed, and such as search of what first principles themselves are formed; For all things that enjoy the faculties of perfect animals must consist of other seeds like them, and these must arise from others, and thus the progression would be infinite. I urge further, whatever you observe to speak, to laugh, to be wise, must proceed from other seeds that can perform the same; but if this be ridiculous and downright madness, and things that can laugh can spring from seeds that never smile, and the wise, that learnedly dispute, are produced from foolish seeds and stupid, what hinders that sensible things may not as well be formed from seeds without any matter of sense at all?

Lastly, we all spring from ethereal seed; we have all one common parent, when the kind Earth, our mother, receives the quickening drops of moisture from above, she conceives us and brings forth shining fruits, and pleasant trees, the human race, and all the race of beasts, she yields them proper food on which they feed, and lead a pleasant life, and propagate their kind, and therefore has she justly gained the name of mother. The parts that first from Earth arose return to Earth again; what descended from the sky, those parts brought back again that heavens receive; nor does death so put an end to beings as to destroy the very seeds of them, but only disunites them, then makes new combinations, and is the cause that all things vary their forms, and change their colors, become sensible, and in a moment lose all their sense again. You may know from hence of what importance it is, with what the first seeds of things are united, and in what position they are contained, and what are the several motions they give and take among themselves. And from hence you may conclude that these first seed are not the less eternal, because you perceive them floating, as it were, upon the surface of bodies, and subject to be born, and die. It is of like concern with what the several letters are joined in these verses of mine, and in what order each of them is disposed; for the same letters make up the words to signify the heaven, the sea, the Earth, the rivers, the sun; the same express the fruits, the trees, the creatures; if they are not all, yet by much the greater part are alike, but they differ in their situation. So, likewise, in bodies, when the intervals of the seeds, their courses, connections, weights, strokes, union, motions, order, position, figure; when these things are changed, the things themselves must be changed likewise.

Now apply your mind closely to the documents of true reason, for a new scheme of philosophy presses earnestly for your attention, a new scene of things displays itself before you. Yet there is nothing so obvious but may at first view seem difficult to be believed, and there is nothing so prodigious and wonderful at first that men do not by degrees cease to admire. For see the bright and pure color of the sky, possessed on every side by wandering stars, and the Moon’s splendor, and the Sun's glorious light; these, if they now first shown to mortal eyes, and suddenly presented to our view, what could more wonderful appear than these? And what before could men less presume to expect? Nothing surely, so surprising would be the sight have been. But now, quite tired and cloyed with the prospect, none of us vouchsafes so much as to cast our eyes up towards the bright temples of the sky. Therefore do not be frightened, and conceive an aversion to an opinion because of its novelty; but search it rather with a more piercing judgment. If it appears true to you, embrace it; if false, set yourself against it.

Munro:

Again a blow more severe than its nature can endure, prostrates at once any living thing and goes on to stun all the senses of body and mind. For the positions of the first-beginnings are broken up and the vital motions entirely stopped, until the matter, disordered by the shock through the whole frame, unties from the body the vital fastenings of the soul and scatters it abroad and forces it out through all the pores. For what more can we suppose the infliction of a blow can do, than shake from their place and break up the union of the several elements? Often too when the blow is inflicted with less violence, the remaining vital motions are wont to prevail, ay, prevail and still the huge disorders caused by the blow and recall each part into its proper channels and shake off the motion of death now reigning as it were paramount in the body and kindle afresh the almost lost senses. For in what other way should the thing be able to gather together its powers of mind and come back to life from the very threshold of death, rather than pass on to the goal to which it had almost run and so pass away?

Again since there is pain when the bodies of matter are disordered by any force throughout the living flesh and frame and quake in their seats within, and as when they travel back into their place, a soothing pleasure ensues, you am to know that first-beginnings can be assailed by no pain and can derive no pleasure from themselves; since they are not formed of any bodies of first-beginnings, so as to be distressed by any novelty in their motion or derive from it any fruit of fostering delight; and therefore they must not be possessed of any sense.

Again if in order that living creatures may severally have sense, sense is to be assigned to their first-beginnings as well, what are we to say of those of which mankind is specifically made? Sure enough they burst into fits of shaking laughter and sprinkle with dewy tears face and cheeks and have the cunning to say much about the composition of things and to inquire next what their own first-beginnings are; since like in their natures to the entire mortals they must in their turn be formed out of other elements, then those others out of others, so that you can venture nowhere to come to a stop: yes, whatever you shall say speaks and laughs and thinks, I will press you with the argument that it is formed of other things performing these same acts. But if we see these notions to be sheer folly and madness, and a man may laugh though not made of laughing things, and think and reason in learned language though not formed of thoughtful and eloquent seeds, why cannot the things which we see to have sense, just as well be made up of a mixture of things altogether devoid of sense?

Again we are all sprung from a heavenly seed, all have that same father, by whom mother earth the giver of increase, when she has taken in from him liquid drops of moisture, conceives and bears goodly crops and joyous trees and the race of man, bears all kinds of brute beasts, in that she supplies food with which all feed their bodies and lead a pleasant life and continue their race; wherefore with good cause she has gotten the name of mother. That also which before was from the earth, passes back into the earth, and that which was sent from the borders of ether, is carried back and taken in again by the quarters of heaven. Death does not extinguish things in such way as to destroy the bodies of matter, but only breaks up the union amongst them, and then joins anew the different elements with others; and thus it comes to pass that all things change their shapes and alter their colors and receive sensations and in a moment yield them up; so that from all this you may know it matters much with what others and in what position the same first-beginnings of things are held in union and what motions they do mutually impart and receive, and you must not suppose that that which we see floating about on the surface of things and now born, then at once perishing, can be a property inherent in everlasting first bodies. Nay in our verses themselves it matters much with what other elements and in what kind of order the several elements are placed. If not all, yet by far the greatest number are alike; but the totals composed of them are made to differ by the position of these elements. Thus in actual things, as well, when the clashings potions, arrangement, position and shapes of matter change about, the things must also change.

Apply now, we entreat, your mind to true reason. For a new question struggles earnestly to gain your ears, a new aspect of things to display itself. But there is nothing so easy as not to be at first more difficult to believe than afterwards; and nothing, too so great, so marvelous, that all do not gradually abate their admiration of it. Look up at the bright and unsullied hue of heaven and the stars which it holds within it, wandering all about, and the moon and the sun’s light of dazzling brilliancy: if all these things were now for the first time, if I say they were now suddenly presented to mortals beyond all expectation, what could have been named that would be more marvelous than these things, or that nations beforehand would less venture to believe could be? Nothing, methinks: so wondrous strange had been this sight. Yet how little, you know, wearied as all are to satiety with seeing, any one now cares to look up into heaven’s glittering quarters! Cease therefore to be dismayed by the mere novelty and so to reject reason from your mind with loathing: weigh the questions rather with keen judgment and if they seem to you to be true, surrender, or if they are a falsehood, gird yourself to the encounter.

Bailey:

Moreover, a heavier blow than its nature can endure, of a sudden fells any living creature, and hastens to stun all the sensations of its body and mind. For the positions of the first-beginnings are broken up and the vital motions are checked deep within, until the substance, after the shock throughout all the limbs, loosens the vital clusters of the soul from the body, scatters it abroad and drives it out through every pore. For what else are we to think that a blow can do when it meets each thing, but shake it to pieces and break it up? It comes to pass too, that when a blow meets us with less force, the vital motions that remain are often wont to win, yea, to win and to allay the vast disturbances of the blow and summon each part back again into its proper path, and to shake to pieces the movement of death that now, as it were, holds sway in the body, and to kindle the sensations almost lost. For by what other means could living things gather their wits and turn back to life even from the very threshold of death rather than pass on, whither their race is already almost run, and pass away?

Moreover, since there is pain when the bodies of matter, disturbed by some force throughout the living flesh and limbs, tremble each in their abode within, and when they settle back into their place, comforting pleasure comes to pass, you may know that the first-beginnings cannot be assailed by any pain, and can find no pleasure in themselves: inasmuch as they are not made of any bodies of first-beginnings, through whose newness of movement they may be in pain or find any enjoyment of life-giving delight. They are bound then not to be endowed with any sensation.

Again, if, in order that all living things may be able to feel, we must after all assign sensation to their first-beginnings, what of those whereof the race of men has its peculiar increment? You must think that they are shaken with quivering mirth and laugh aloud and sprinkle face and cheeks with the dew of their tears. And they have the wit to say much about the mingling of things, and they go on to ask what are their first-beginnings; inasmuch as, being made like to whole mortal men, they too must needs be built of other particles in their turn, and those again of others, so that you may never dare to make a stop: nay, I will press hard on you, so that, whatsoever you say speaks and laughs and thinks, shall be composed of other particles which do these same things. But if we perceive this to be but raving madness, and a man can laugh, though he has not the increment of laughing atoms, and can think and give reasons with learned lore, though he be not made of seeds thoughtful and eloquent, why should those things, which, as we see, have feeling, any the less be able to exist, mingled of seeds which lack sense in every way?

And so, we are all sprung from heavenly seed; there is the one father of us all, from whom when live-giving earth, the mother, has taken within her the watery drops of moisture, teeming she brings forth the goodly crops and the glad trees and the race of men; she brings forth too all the tribes of the wild beasts, when she furnishes the food, on which all feed their bodies and pass a pleasant life and propagate their offspring; wherefore rightly has she won the name of mother. Even so, what once sprung from earth, sinks back into the earth, and what was sent down from the coasts of the sky, returns again, and the regions of heaven receive it. Nor does death so destroy things as to put an end to the bodies of matter, but only scatters their union. Then she joins anew one with others, and brings it to pass that all things thus alter their forms, and change their colours, and receive sensations, and in an instant of time yield them up again, so that you may know that it matters with what others the first-beginnings of things are bound up and in what position and what motions they mutually give and receive, and may not think that what we see floating on the surface of things or at times coming to birth, and on a sudden passing away, can abide in the possession of eternal first-bodies. Nay, indeed, even in my verses it is of moment with what others and in what order each letter is placed. For the same letters signify sky, sea, earth, rivers, sun, the same too crops, trees, living creatures; if not all, yet by far the greater part, are alike, but it is by position that things sound different. So in things themselves likewise when meetings, motions, order, position, shapes are changed, things too are bound to be changed.

Now turn your mind, I pray, to a true reasoning. For a truth wondrously new is struggling to fall upon your ears, and a new face of things to reveal itself. Yet neither is anything so easy, but that at first it is more difficult to believe, and likewise nothing is so great or so marvelous but that little by little all decrease their wonder at it. First of all the bright clear colour of the sky, and all it holds within it, the stars that wander here and there, and the moon and the sheen of the sun with its brilliant light; all these, if now they had come to being for the first time for mortals, if all unforeseen they were in a moment placed before their eyes, what story could be told more marvelous than these things, or what that the nations would less dare to believe beforehand? Nothing, I trow: so worthy of wonder would this sight have been. Yet think how no one now, wearied with satiety of seeing, deigns to gaze up at the shining quarters of the sky! Wherefore cease to spew out reason from your mind, struck with terror at mere newness, but rather with eager judgement weigh things, and, if you see them true, lift your hands and yield, or, if it is false, gird yourself to battle

Episode 34 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, which begins around line 865 of Book Two of the Latin text, we discuss the Epicurean view that the elemental particles cannot possess a faculty of sensation within themselves. As always, leave your comments or questions below or at the ongoing thread here.

Potentially analogous thoughts from other Epicurean sources on animate beings arising from inanimate seeds:

Frances Wright, A Few Days in Athens, Chapter 15- Discussion between Theon, Metrodorus, and Leontium:

Theon: “How so? Does not even man possess a species of creating power? And do you not suppose, in your inert matter, that very property which others attribute, with more reason it appears to me, to some superior and unknown existence?'”

Leontium: “By no means. No existence, that we know of, possesses creating power, in the sense you suppose. Neither the existence we call a man, nor any other of the existences comprised under the generic names of matter, physical world, nature, &c., possesses the power of calling into being its own constituent elements, nor the constituent elements of any other substance. It can change one substance into another substance, by altering the position of its particles, or intermingling them with others: but it cannot call into being, any more than it can annihilate, those particles themselves. The hand of man causes to approach particles of earth and of water, and, by their approximation produces clay; to which clay it gives a regular form, and, by the application of fire, produces the vessel we call a vase. You may say that the hand of man creates the vase, but it does not create the earth, or the water, or the fire; neither has the admixture of these substances added to, or subtracted from, the sum of their elementary atoms. Observe, therefore, there is no analogy between the power inherent in matter, of changing its appearance and qualities, by a simple change in the position of its particles, and that which you attribute to some unseen existence, who by a simple volition, should have called into being matter itself, with all its wonderful properties. An existence possessing such a power I have never seen; and though this says nothing against the possibility of such an existence, it says every thing against my belief in it. And farther, the power which you attribute to this existence — that of willing every thing out of nothing, — being, not only what I have never seen, but that of which I cannot with any distinctness conceive — it must appear to me the greatest of all improbabilities.”

“Our young friend,” observed Metrodorus, “lately made use of an expression, the error involved in which, seems to be at the root of his difficulty. In speaking of matter,” he continued, turning to Theon, “you employed the epithet inert. What is your meaning? And what matter do you here designate?”

Theon: “All matter surely is, in itself, inert.”

“All matter surely is, in itself, as it is,” said Metrodorus with a smile; “and that, I should say, is living and active. Again, what is matter?”

“All that is evident to our senses,” replied Theon, “and which stands opposed to mind.”

Leontium: “All matter then is inert which is devoid of mind. “What then do you understand by mind?”

“I conceive some error in my definition,” said Theon, smiling. “Should I say — thought — you would ask if every existence devoid of thought was inert, or if every existence, possessing life, possessed thought.”

Leontium: “I should so have asked. Mind or thought I consider a quality of that matter constituting the existence we call a man, which quality we find in a varying degree in other existences; many, perhaps all animals, possessing it. Life is another quality, or combination of qualities, of matter, inherent in — we know not how many existences. We find it in vegetables; we might perceive it even in stones, could we watch their formation, growth, and decay. We may call that active principle, pervading the elements of all things, which approaches and separates the component particles of the ever-changing, and yet ever-enduring world — life. Until you discover some substance, which undergoes no change, you cannot speak of inert matter: it can only be so, at least, relatively, — that is, as compared with other substances.”

Theon: “The classing of thought and life among the qualities of matter is new to me.”

Leontium: “What is in a substance cannot be separate from it. And is not all matter a compound of qualities? Hardness, extension, form, color, motion, rest — take away all these, and where is matter? To conceive of mind independent of matter, is as if we should conceive of color independent of a substance colored: What is form, if not a body of a particular shape? What is thought, if not something which thinks? Destroy the substance, and you destroy its properties; and so equally — destroy the properties, and you destroy the substance. To suppose the possibility of retaining the one, without the other, is an evident absurdity.”

Theon: “The error of conceiving a quality in the abstract often offended me in the Lyceum,” returned the youth, “but I never considered the error as extending to mind and life, any more than to vice and virtue.”

“You stopped short with many others,” said Leontium. “It is indeed surprising how many acute minds will apply a logical train of reasoning in one case, and invert the process in another exactly similar.”

Jefferson to John Adams, August 15, 1820:   (Full version at Founders.gov)

…. But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need.

I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by Locke, Tracy, and Stewart.

At what age of the Christian church this heresy of immaterialism, this masked atheism, crept in, I do not know. But a heresy it certainly is. Jesus taught nothing of it. He told us indeed that `God is a spirit,’ but he has not defined what a spirit is, nor said that it is not matter. And the ancient fathers generally, if not universally, held it to be matter: light and thin indeed, an etherial gas; but still matter. Origen says `Deus reapse corporalis est; sed graviorum tantum corporum ratione, incorporeus.’ Tertullian `quid enim deus nisi corpus?’ and again `quis negabit deumesse corpus? Etsi deus spiritus, spiritus etiam corpus est, sui generis, in sua effigie.’ St. Justin Martyr `{to Theion phamen einai asomaton oyk oti asomaton—epeide de to me krateisthai ypo tinos, toy krateisthai timioteron esti, dia toyto kaloymen ayton asomaton.}’ And St. Macarius, speaking of angels says `quamvis enim subtilia sint, tamen in substantia, forma et figura, secundum tenuitatem naturae eorum, corpora sunt tenuia.’ And St. Austin, St. Basil, Lactantius, Tatian, Athenagoras and others, with whose writings I pretend not a familiarity, are said by those who are, to deliver the same doctrine. Turn to your Ocellus d’Argens 97. 105. and to his Timaeus 17. for these quotations. In England these Immaterialists might have been burnt until the 29. Car. 2. when the writ de haeretico comburendo was abolished: and here until the revolution, that statute not having extended to us. All heresies being now done away with us, these schismatists are merely atheists, differing from the material Atheist only in their belief that `nothing made something,’ and from the material deist who believes that matter alone can operate on matter.

Rejecting all organs of information therefore but my senses, I rid myself of the Pyrrhonisms with which an indulgence in speculations hyperphysical and antiphysical so uselessly occupy and disquiet the mind. A single sense may indeed be sometimes deceived, but rarely: and never all our senses together, with their faculty of reasoning. They evidence realities; and there are enough of these for all the purposes of life, without plunging into the fathomless abyss of dreams and phantasms. I am satisfied, and sufficiently occupied with the things which are, without tormenting or troubling myself about those which may indeed be, but of which I have no evidence. I am sure that I really know many, many, things, and none more surely than that I love you with all my heart, and pray for the continuance of your life until you shall be tired of it yourself.

I know currently, for me, nothing keeps me thinking about new issues (or old ones) more that the weekly Lucretius podcast. It can seem tedious to read the book alone but thinking through and talking about the implications of "why" each passage is there really helps you keep the details in perspective.

Quote from timrobbe

have a picture of Epicurus hanging on my wall and try to meditate on the philosophy on a daily basis

That's true for me too - in my case I have little statuettes of the bust of Epicurus, plus wall pictures, in various places around my home and office.