Posts by Cassius

Quote from Nate

Cassius, Hiram actually created me a login with the Society page to publish the piece after he read it, so I'm just posting this for peer review.

Yes, that makes a lot of difference. I've always been sensitive about when I or someone else is speaking for themselves vs when they are speaking for some kind of group entity. Everyone has their own opinions and deserves total latitude (as far as I am concerned) in holding them. The issues arise when we speak or write and imply that what we are saying amounts to speaking for someone else, or for a group, for obvious reasons. It's a difficult balancing act. The part in the last sentence about Epicurus being one of many is consistent with the manner in which Hiram often writes, and is a style that makes sense when trying to appeal to wider audiences, and it's not something that I am generally comfortable with myself -- but it all depends on the context and all the surrounding circumstances. As a personal opinion stated by you or anyone else it can come across as a totally benign remark, but if affixed to a "group" statement made by a group devoted to Epicurean philosophy then it could come across with a much different implication.

Issues like this are an inevitable part of trying to "grow" something so I don't see them as bad - it's just necessary to work through them.

Yes I very much agree with Elayne's post. If we start off in studying Epicurus with the idea that Epicurus reached absolute conclusions about how to live, based on decisionmaking about pleasure leading to the same conclusions for all, then we are off on the wrong track at the beginning, and the sooner we get off that track the better.

Long before anyone can decide "how" to live they have to make fundamental decisions about the nature of the universe and the nature of humans, including decisions about the existence of a supernatural, about a life after death, and about how to relate abstractions and ideas (the workings of the human mind) to the senses and the other operations of the body.

If Epicurus had concluded that supernatural gods existed, and that those gods offered to opportunity for an eternal life of "happiness" after death, then he would have been the first to embrace the implications of that conclusion and pursued some form of religion as the key to proper living. It is only because his commitment to "the truth" was so strong that he rejected the anesthesia-like pleasure of fantasizing about gods and afterlifes and a single way of life for everyone.

We live in a world where it takes the strength of will of an Epicurus to be willing to stand against the 'universal truths" that are forced on us by peer pressure, and increasingly by force of law. Many people who can read this over the internet are already under the force of law to believe or not believe certain viewpoints. And that means that there is a strong temptation for us to incorporate and hold as a part of Epicurean philosophy points of view that Epicurus himself would never have imagined, and would likely feel disgust a being associated with.

Some of us are not going to be able to stand up to that temptation, and are going to look for common ground between Epicurus and modern attitudes at the expense of fidelity to what Epicurus and the Epicureans actually taught and stood for. And some of us are going to stand more strongly for the classical Epicurean approach and decide not to incorporate those accommodations.

As I see it that means at least two things are going to happen:

(1) We are going to see "interest groups" or simple divisions formed, with people of particular persuasions forming their own Epicurean groups. Although Robert Hanrott's pages are not "groups," he is an example of someone who writes as much or more about "politics" than about Epicurean philosophy, and as a result people who agree with him can work in common with his approach, or other approaches that are similar. I would expect other "interest groups" to form in the future as well, with other political approaches.

(2) I personally am committed to seeing this forum remain dedicated to core Epicurean philosophy, and that will mean (as Elayne says) making clear that it is open to anyone of any political persuasion who wants to learn about the core philosophy, and that it will be not be limited only those whose politics are left, center, or right. We've maintained a very cooperative spirit here in the past and I hope we will continue to do so, but it will also be necessary to be frank about issues that divide us.

As far as I am concerned there is *no* political issue so important that someone holding it cannot at the same time be included within the study of Epicurean philosophy so long as those issues are kept separate and not allowed to be harmful to the goal of Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus did not provide a list of political positions which are "approved" and a list that is "not approved" - and I strongly believe the reason he did not is because the philosophy does not support such absolute political judgments. Everyone is going to have their own personal opinions about such issues, but if they attempt to make a particular position a requirement, or a particular position an absolute bar, then that shows me that they are placing some "ism" or abstract idea above a proper understanding of what Epicurus really taught.

No doubt other unexpected developments will occur, but the bottom line is that it will be for the best for us to sharpen our views on issues even when they reveal divisions and the need for separate "teams" or activities or whatever. It will be for the best if we all advocate our positions as clearly and as strongly as we can, and then we take steps to pursue those positions, together where possible, separately where necessary. And that's the point I made in the first paragraph - there is no single "political" destination called for in Epicurean philosophy, and that means no single "group" or "project" can ever be considered the last word in Epicurean philosophy.

Nate a lot of hard work went into that - thanks!

Has that been reviewed by Hiram or others as representative of a collective view of the Society of Epicurus? I note the opening reference to that and it seems to be written as such, but I wasn't clear. The last paragraph in general, and the final sentence in particular, sounds like it was intended as such, and wasn't part of your earlier comments on this subject if I recall correctly. And in that context I am interested in the thought process behind the last sentence, because I don't really agree with that formulation myself. I would probably not comment about except for the inference that this might be intended to be a statement of the Society of Epicurus (if that was intended) in which case I think the conclusion is something to discuss further.

I would particularly question "the distinguishing feature of Epicurus' wisdom is his insistence that pleasure is the supreme goal of life" and "

The wisdom of pleasure was NOT invented by any one prophet, nor divinely revealed to illuminate humanity; simply, Epicurus was one of many insightful friends who observed this reality, and shared in the wisdom of pleasure."

Godfrey, have a safe trip and we look forward to seeing you back soon.

Charles, that sounds like a useful transcription so I look forward to your posting it somewhere where it can be referenced in the future.

I will be looking forward to seeing that Hiram.

This may be a good place to begin to reflect on where we are as 2019 begins to come to a close. I think we've had a pretty active year and are probably ending strong in terms of our general level of activity. I would be interested in any and all assessments of where we are and where we ought to go in the next twelve months, not only in terms of EpicureanFriends.com but also our general activity as Epicurean activists.

Happy Twentieth to everyone here!. Lately I have been working on putting together some audio material on Lucretius, and this morning I was following a link to a blog entitled "The Wrong Monkey" which I know absolutely nothing about - except that I have now scanned three blog posts written about Lucretius and Greenblatt's book "The Swerve" about the transmission of the text. I think if you start with the link I will post below and follow back to check his previous two posts, you will find some valuable material about references to Lucretius during the period when it is commonly presumed today that his work had been "lost." The key work cited appears to be a book by David Butterfield: "The Early Textual History of Lucretius" which appears to be well worth checking out.

https://thewrongmonkey.blogspot.com/2019/12/david-…-tradition.html

Happy Twentieth of December, 2019, to everyone here! I've opened this subforum where we can post 20th threads each month from here on out. I hope everyone is well and getting ready for a happy holiday season!

Welcome @brentan ! And thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

12 Chance and Natural Law in Epicurean Philosophy - AA Long -

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In a video that was released just today but has already received close to four million views, Youtube Personality "Pewdiepie" attacks "virtue signaling" on Twitter by comparing it with "virtue" as described by Aristotle and other Greeks (notably NOT Epicurus). In following the lead of Aristotle, Pewdiepie gets the problem totally wrong - but it's hard to blame him when he appears totally unaware of Epicurus, and he simply follows the lead of the crowd, who proclaim the supposed wisdom of Aristotle and the standard Greek philosophical view of virtue, which is totally wrong in Epicurean terms.

Here's the full video, which starts out referencing Twitter, but quickly switches to Aristotle:

The video is worth watching to frame the issue, and I think Pewdiepie's instincts are correct to see that there is a problem here. Unfortunately Pewdiepie concludes that the way to solve the problem is Aristotelian word-gaming, rather than getting to the heart of the problem: that "virtue" is a meaningless term in and of itself, without reference to a well defined proper goal of life.

But even here Pewdiepie realizes that there is a problem, and that "virtue" must have a point of reference. Unfortunately he nails his colors to the Aristotelian ship and goes down with it into the abyss of further word-chopping about "extremes" and "golden means" and "wellbeing" that also lead nowhere but to further word games.

Epicurean ethics is built on the framework of rejecting Platonic/Arisotelian/Stoic virtue signaling in favor of grounding ethics, and thus all correct concepts of "virtue," in the human feeling of pleasure and pain. Probably the best summary is contained in the Torquatus narrative in Cicero's "On Ends, " a small part of which I include here:

Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.
...

XIV. If then we observe that ignorance and error reduce the whole of life to confusion, while Wisdom alone is able to protect us from the onslaughts of appetite and the menaces of fear, teaching us to bear even the affronts of fortune with moderation, and showing us all the paths that lead to calmness and to peace, why should we hesitate to avow that Wisdom is to be desired for the sake of the pleasures it brings and Folly to be avoided because of its injurious consequences?

The same principle will lead us to pronounce that Temperance also is not desirable for its own sake, but because it bestows peace of mind, and soothes the heart with a tranquilizing sense of harmony. For it is temperance that warns us to be guided by reason in what we desire and avoid. Nor is it enough to judge what it is right to do or to leave undone; we also need to abide by our judgment. Most men however lack tenacity of purpose; their resolution weakens and succumbs as soon as the fair form of pleasure meets their gaze, and they surrender themselves prisoners to their passions, failing to foresee the inevitable result. Thus for the sake of a pleasure at once small in amount and unnecessary, and one which they might have procured by other means or even denied themselves altogether without pain, they incur serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace, and not infrequently become liable to the penalties of the law and of the courts of justice.

Those on the other hand who are resolved so to enjoy their pleasures as to avoid all painful consequences therefrom, and who retain their faculty of judgment and avoid being seduced by pleasure into courses that they perceive to be wrong, reap the very highest pleasure by forgoing pleasure. Similarly also they often voluntarily endure pain, to avoid incurring greater pain by not doing so. This clearly proves that Intemperance is not undesirable for its own sake, while Temperance is desirable not because it renounces pleasures, but because it procures greater pleasures.

XV. The same account will be found to hold good of Courage. The performance of labors, the undergoing of pains, are not in themselves attractive, nor are endurance, industry, watchfulness, nor yet that much lauded virtue, perseverance, nor even courage; but we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body. The fear of death plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused many men to betray their parents or their friends, some their country, and very many utterly to ruin themselves. So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow.

It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theater, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure.

XVI. It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, License, and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awakening trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected. ...

Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?…s-from-on-ends/

This topic is never complete without including Elli's graphic containing the quote from the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Charles posted this:

What's the Epicurean position on the immediate removal of pain, rather than the absence of it. I was thinking about how after my migraines pass, I get an immediate sensation of pleasure and happiness, not just because the pain is gone, but primarily of having the agency to experience just about anything without an intense throbbing pain from my temples to the back of my head. But it got me thinking, in the Letter to M, Epicurus states: "For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good." (Bailey)

Is there perhaps some mis-translation somewhere about the absence and/or removal of pain? The Cyril Bailey translation constantly switches back and forth on this issue.

Cassius' replies:

First comment is that I almost look forward to getting a bad cold or flu like I have now, because the health sensation of feeling better when it passes seems much better than the state before the flu started!

Second, the line you have quoted about pleasure being the standard is every bit as clear, if not more so, than the line about absence of pain. Plus, the line about pleasure as the standard is consistent with the start of On the Nature of Things, and consistent with every surviving fragment of text from Epicurus that we have EXCEPT (on the face of it) the statements in the letter to Menoecues about absence of pain. I am not competent to say that there is a mistranslation, although I suspect that too. Absent a mistranslation, it is necessary to reconcile the apparent conflict, and in my case I believe that the reconciliation comes by looking to PD3 for its inclusion of QUANTITY as a key component, and then comparing the discussion of quantity of pleasure with the argument in Plato's Philebus (and elsewhere) alleging that pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit. So my preferred reconciliation is that there is no conflict, because the passages about absence of pain are limited to "quantity" (as in PD3) and not intended to conflict with the other clear statements about Pleasure as the good.

OR, you can follow the Cambridge/OKeefe position, and take the position that when Epicurus used the word "pleasure" he didn't mean what we ordinarily mean by "pleasure."

... Which I maintain is an absurd position, and reduces Epicurean philosophy to the realm of nonsense -- which is exactly where the neo-Stoics of the world want it to stay.

Charles here is another observation on your point. Pasted here is a side-by-side greek and english version of one of the key passages.

You will note that the phrase "by pleasure we mean" is added in as a presumably valid English translation, but in fact that is presuming the result of the entire question, because "be pleasure we mean" implies identity in every respect, and that would be a ridiculous contention. In PD3 the word "quantity" (sometimes translated "magnitude" appears, and this word provides a qualifier that indicates that the issue being discussed is one of measurement, and not identity in every respect. Your shoe or a loaf of bread could both equal a foot in length, but saying that they are both a foot tells you nothing about what you are measuring except their length. Why would Epicurus be concerned about pleasure and pain in terms of measurement? Because Plato in Philebus had explicitly argued that due to "measurement" issues pleasure cannot be the ultimate goal of life.

Richard Dawkins connects with the spirit of Epicurus! New members of the group, please pay special attention, and see the clips on Epicurus v Plato in the thread below Most of the modern commentators are too busy trying to convince you that Epicurus redefined "pleasure" in a nonsensical way and so they never get around to telling you that Epicurean philosophy is largely a total rejection of Platonism. It's good that Richard Dawkins sees the same problems!

Here's Norman DeWitt on the issue:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/772/

Welcome @semvandhuynslager and thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

12 Chance and Natural Law in Epicurean Philosophy - AA Long -

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Also that reminds me of this from Thomas Jefferson, which uses "ploughman" rather than "child" for the same point, from a letter to Peter Carr:

Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules. In this branch, therefore, read good books, because they will encourage, as well as direct your feelings.

Yes I agree that it rings that way, although I think probably the deeper implications are buried under the words "know" and "knowledge" which are probably not the exact Epicurean framework.

Possibly would be more accurate to say that children "feel" what is fair and unfair, or at the view stems from an "anticipation" that is there from the beginning rather than being something that is affirmatively "known" as if assembled from conscious thought or consideration.

And then there would need to be a discussion of whether what is being dealt with here really constitutes "human rights" or something else....

OK the Adelaide version is incomplete - the original appears to start with Leontion making a point somewhat similar to "Ternissa" but the omitted part does make it easier to understand how the conversation has developed. The opening footnote to Cicero and friendship also hints that "friendship" is somehow going to be the theme of the exchange.

HMMM - Elli finds what appears to be a different version:

Elli posted:

The painting is beautiful. However, this morning and as I started to read this book by that British Walter Savage Landor entitled: "Imaginary conversations of Epicurus, Leontion and Ternissa"... frankly, it left me with a feeling of boredom.Here is this book:

To this I (Cassius) responded:

I only scanned the beginning and end passages, Elli, but that is also my immediate reaction. This is not at all like "A Few Days In Athens" where the dialog is clear and the points made spring clearly from the Epicurean texts. Maybe I will see differently when I read more but the paintings may be much better than the text that may be behind it.
But this is definitely of interest so thanks Charles for finding it and posting!

I just skipped to the end looking for a conclusion and am similarly confused. This seems to me to compare pretty unfavorably to "A Few Days In Athens," where Frances Wright's points always seem very clear and precise, but I need to read the full thing before reaching a final judgment.

If anyone reads to the end of the "Imaginary conversation" let us know what you think. I find the beginning rather unimpressive.

Is the beginning directed in some broad manner that "hate" should not exist? If so the only point I can imagine about it is some kind stoic-like aversion to emotion, because I see no justification for arguing based on Epicurus that we should take please in everything equally, or that we should ignore an unpleasant feeling. Is that the message put in Epicurus' mouth at the beginning?

Presumably the focus changes as the dialog goes on but I did not get to read very far.

i suppose I am not as much of a libertarian as you are Hiram. I am interested in people who see the same things that I do and form friendships on that basis. I recognize that everyone will not agree, and the problem is not lack of communication, nor will it be resolvable by communication.