Now "empty" when applied to VIRTUE does make sense, because virtue is not its own reward; virtue must be performed for some other purpose, so "empty" makes good sense there.
As to "vain" that presumably is a synonym for "fruitlessly" rather than a reference to "vanity"(?)
Ok last of my related by somewhat random thoughts: I find discussion of "empty" to be fruitless without a LOT more explanation than is generally given to this issue. No doubt Epicurus had something in mind, but throwing around the word "empty" in our discussions means little, in my view, and appears to be superficial and unhelpful. Pleasure is pleasure, and pain is pain, and an experience of pleasure or pain is in itself never "empty." If what is being meant is that the pain outweighs the pleasure in the end, then that needs to be stated clearly, which "empty" does not convey. But I am not even sure that that is what is meant, as it appears more likely that Epicurus intended it as a synonym for "unnatural," which would require a lot more discussion as to what is meant.
Therefore so as far as i am concerned any modern reference to "empty desire" is more confusing than it is helpful (again, unless much deep explanation is provided). Otherwise, the result is some kind of Platonic idealism of a particular type of desire or action.
I just don't think the modern writers (and possibly Philodemus, depending on what he actually wrote, which is almost impossible to say) are going in the same direction as Epicurus intended. Since we aren't sure what Philodemus or these other writers were arguing about, I would not presume that any of them were wrong; I would say this is an example where we should "wait" to form a judgment about them unless and until we get more texts.
Edit: Referencing the quote below, I would say not only is there no "simple" answer, there is no "complex" answer either, if what is meant by "answer" is a bright line. My reading of the Epicurean viewpoint is that there ARE no bright lines (simple or complex) that apply across groups of people, only individuals in context.
Related to my last point is this from one of Annas footnotes:
I find all efforts to come up with discrete lists of "natural" and "necessary" to be artificial and unlikely to be something that Epicurus himself encouraged. That observation is behind my resistance to thinking that there is any kind of discrete / absolute / bright line "Epicurean measure of wealth" or Epicurean measure of anything else, other than in the most generic form of saying that it is the most pleasure and the least pain, but even that is clearly totally contextual to the individual involved.
So I think Julia Annas is right here that there is no reason to give this scholion authority, and every reason to question his judgment in adding this to the text.
Edit: I think where Epicurus was going with this is stated by Torquatus: the principle of the classification is that some pleasures are easier to get and some require more effort. That's the kind of thing you need to think about when you evaluate which path to choose in any course of conduct. He's giving practical advice on things to consider, not drawing bright lines.
I will be very interested in comments from other readers on this essay. There are several aspects of this article that reinforce my view that people should be cautious in trying to read too much into fragments from Philodemus or anyone else. It seems highly unlikely to me that Epicurus thought it wise to hyper-analyze any emotion any more than he would obsess on any one pleasure, because the issue is so contextual. In fact the very attempt to derive strict rules on anger or any other emotion, just like with any pleasure, would violate the core premises of the philosophy. There are several references in this article that make clear that the later followers of Epicurus were disputing among themselves about this, and we ought to first ask if they were on the wrong track by even following this path at all, rather than presume that they were in some desirable manner expanding or extending or improving on what Epicurus had taught.
Yes we need to think about these issues and that's the purpose of this thread, but attempting to come up with bright line rules for anger or any other emotion is probably exactly the wrong direction to take, because it is in the nature of the philosophy that such bright line rules do not exist in nature, but can only be generalized arising from the context of the totality of the individual's circumstances.
Ultimately, given how little Julia Annas seems to really derive out of the exercise, that may be one of the main take-aways from her work here.
Directly on Point! Thank you!
I don't know how many times we are asked something about "Epicurean techniques" for achieving happiness. Many of these questions come from people who have recently been toying with Stoicism, and I think in a significant number of cases they are really asking:
"How do I manage my emotions to keep them from getting the best of me?"
That's a large part of the reason that as soon as they find out that Stoicism is all about the "suppression" of emotion, and the treating of emotion as an enemy of the best life, that many people are quickly out the door of the Porch.
Probably the first part of the education process is to show these people that Epicurus held feeling - the feeling of pleasure, which includes pleasurable emotions - as the goal of life, and that emotion is not the enemy. As Diogenes Laertius recorded about the Epicurean, in contrast to the non-Epicurean:
He [the Epicurean wise man] will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom.
But after that, can we assemble some thoughts from other aspects of Epicurean philosophy that will help in describing the Epicurean attitude toward emotions? I hesitate to use the term "management" of emotion, but maybe that is not far from accurate. Ultimately, this issue is probably a subset of the analysis voiced by Torquatus in On Ends, when he laid out the basic theory to Cicero.
Can we substitute "pleasurable emotion" for "pleasure" in this text?
No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure?
On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided.
But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.
It might be a start to say that "pleasurable emotion" is the goal, and the guide, while "pursuing pleasure rationally" with maximized pleasure remaining always the goal, is the technique.
But there's a lot more that can be said, and I'm starting this thread to see what we can develop.
Ah very good, and that is why I have always been familiar with use of that word to mean "everything," and find it frustrating that some segment of modern physics wants to segment that term and consider "multiverse" or something else as larger than the universe itself. Why don't these guys just learn their Latin (and Greek!)?? 
Very interesting! Have you thought about the equivalent Latin? What would that be?
Welcome to Episode Ten of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar and wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
Today's episode is the first of our episodes to be significantly impacted by the coronavirus episode, so we will be more brief than normal, in that Martin and I will be carrying the full show while we await several of our normal panelists to return hopefully next week.
For that reason Martin and I will begin the discussion of the void mainly by introducing the topic and its implications, and then in the next episode we'll dive more deeply into the details of the text.
So with that, Martin, please read the next section from Book One for us:
This is the text that will be covered in Episode Ten. The Latin version of Book One has this as beginning at approximately line 330 of the
1743 Daniel Browne Edition (click link for English and Latin):
And yet all beings are not formed of close and solid parts; in things there is a void, which in your searches into nature will be of use to know. This will preserve your wandering mind from doubt, prevent your constant toil by judging right of nature's laws, and make my words believed.
Wherefore there is a place we call a void, an empty space intangible, or else no bodies could be moved, or stir; the quality all bodies have to stop and to oppose does never fail, so that to move would be in vain to try, no body first by yielding would give way. But now we see before our eyes that things move various ways in seas, in Earth, and in the heaven above; but were there no void, they would not be deprived of that activity of motion only, but would not be at all; for matter wedged and crowded close on every side had ever been at rest.
Besides, though things appear of solid parts composed, yet you will find them, in some measure, formed of bodies that are rare; the liquid moisture of the water sweats through rocks and stones, and all things weep with drops abundant; the food that every creature eats disperses through the body; the trees increase and grow and in due season shew their fruit; because the juice is from the lowe roots spread through the trunk, and over all the boughs. Sounds pass through strong partitions, and fly quick through walls of houses, and the piercing cold strikes through the very bones; but were no void, no empty space, that bodies ever should pass, you'd find a thing impossible to prove.
Again, why do we see some things exceed others in weight, though of equal size? For if as much of body went to form a ball of wool as made a ball of lead, their weight would be the same; for the quality of body is to press downward: but a perfect void by nature has no weight; so that a body of equal size, but lighter in its weight, proves it has more of empty space. So again, the heavier body has more of solid parts 'tis plain, and has within it less of void. And this is doubtless what with reason's searching eye we look for, mixed with things; we call it space.
But I am forced to step before, and answer what some pretend, lest you should be seduced from truth: They say the waters yield to fish making their way, and open their liquid paths; for when the fish have left a space, that instant thither the yielding waters circling flow. By the same rule, all beings may be moved among themselves, and change their former place, though all things should be full: but this, 'tis plain, is false throughout; for how could fish advance at all, unless the waters gave them way? And whither should the waves retire, if the fish did not move, and leave a space behind? So that all bodies must be deprived of motion, or you must say a void is mixed with every thing from whence each being first derives a power to move.
Lastly, if two broad bodies meet, and instantly are separated again, the air must needs fill up the void that is between; but this air, though it should hurry with its swiftest powers, it cannot all at once fill up the space these bodies will disclose at parting; first the nearest part will be filled up, and then the more remote, until the whole be full.
If one should say when these flat bodies meet the air is condensed, but when they part the air is rarefied, 'tis a mistake; for then here must be void where there was none before, and that void that was before must now be full; in such a case, the air can't be condensed; and if it could, it can't without a void contract itself, and so reduce its parts into a closer space. Wherefore, perplex the matter as you please, you must confess in things there is a void.
[330] And yet all things are not on all sides jammed together and kept in by body: there is also void in things. To have learned this will be good for you on many accounts; it will not suffer you to wander in doubt and be to seek in the sum of things and, distrustful of our words.
[335] If there were not void, things could not move at all; for that which is the property of body, to let and hinder, would be present to all things at all times; nothing therefore could go on, since no other thing would be the first to give way. But in fact throughout seas and lands and the heights of heaven we see before our eyes many things move in many ways for various reasons, which things, if there were no void, I need not say would lack and want restless motion: they never would have been begotten at all, since matter jammed on all sides would have been at rest.
[347] Again however solid things are thought to be, you may yet learn from this that they are of rare body: in rocks and caverns the moisture of water oozes through and all things weep with abundant drops; food distributes itself through the whole body of living things; trees grow and yield fruit in season, because food is diffused through the whole from the very roots over the stem and all the boughs. Voices pass through walls and fly through houses shut, stiffening frost pierces to the bones. Now if there are no void parts, by what way can the bodies severally pass? You would see it to be quite impossible.
[359] Once more, why do we see one thing surpass another in weight though not larger in size? For if there is just as much body in a ball of wool as there is in a lump of lead, it is natural it should weigh the same, since the property of body is to weigh all things downwards, while on the contrary the nature of void is ever without weight. Therefore when a thing is just as large, yet is found to be void in it; while on the other hand that which is lighter, it proves sure enough that it has more of ‘heavier shows that there is in it more of body and that it contains within it much less of void. Therefore that which we are seeking with keen reason exists sure enough, mixed up in things; and we call it void.
[371] And herein I am obliged to forestall this point which some raise, lest it draw you away from the truth. The waters they say make way for the scaly creatures as they press on, and open liquid paths, because the fish leave room behind them, into which the yielding waters may stream; thus other things too may move and change place among themselves, although the whole sum be full. This you are to know has been taken up on grounds wholly false. For on what side I ask can the scaly creatures move forwards, unless the waters have first made room? Again on what side can the waters give place, so long as the fish are unable to go on? Therefore you must either strip all bodies of motion or admit that in things void is mixed up from which every thing gets its first start in moving.
[385] Lastly if two broad bodies after contact quickly spring asunder, the air must surely fill all the void which is formed between the bodies. Well however rapidly it stream together with swift-circling currents, yet the whole space will not be able to be filled up in one moment for it must occupy first one spot and then another, until the whole is taken up.
[391] But if haply any one supposes that, when the bodies have started asunder, that result follows because the air condenses, he is mistaken; for a void is then formed which was not before, and a void also is filled which existed before; nor can the air condense in such a way, nor supposing it could, could it methinks without void draw into itself and bring its parts together. Wherefore however long you hold out by urging many objections, you must needs in the end admit that there is a void in things.
[330] And yet all things are not held close pressed on every side by the nature of body; for there is void in things. To have learnt this will be of profit to you in dealing with many things; it will save you from wandering in doubt and always questioning about the sum of things, and distrusting my words.
[335] There is then a void, mere space untouchable and empty. For if there were not, by no means could things move; for that which is the office of body, to offend and hinder, would at every moment be present to all things; nothing, therefore, could advance, since nothing could give the example of yielding place. But as it is, through seas and lands and the high tracts of heaven, we descry many things by many means moving in diverse ways before our eyes, which, if there were not void, would not so much be robbed and baulked of restless motion, but rather could in no way have been born at all, since matter would on every side be in close-packed stillness.
[347] Again, however solid things may be thought to be, yet from this you can discern that they are of rare body. In rocky caverns the liquid moisture of water trickles through, and all weeps with copious dripping: food spreads itself this way and that into the body of every living thing: trees grow and thrust forth their fruit in due season, because the food is dispersed into every part of them from the lowest roots through the stems and all the branches. Noises creep through walls and fly through the shut places in the house, stiffening cold works its way to the bones: but were there no empty spaces, along which each of these bodies might pass, you would not see this come to pass by any means.
[359] Again, why do we see one thing surpass another in weight, when its size is no whit bigger? For if there is as much body in a bale of wool as in lead, it is natural it should weigh as much, since ’tis the office of body to press all things downwards, but on the other hand the nature of void remains without weight. So because it is just as big, yet seems lighter, it tells us, we may be sure, that it has more void; but on the other hand the heavier thing avows that there is more body in it and that it contains far less empty space within. Therefore, we may be sure, that which we are seeking with keen reasoning, does exist mingled in things—that which we call void.
[371] Herein lest that which some vainly imagine should avail to lead you astray from the truth, I am constrained to forestall it. They say that the waters give place to the scaly creatures as they press forward and open up a liquid path, because the fishes leave places behind, to which the waters may flow together as they yield: and that even so other things too can move among themselves and change place, albeit the whole is solid. In very truth this is all believed on false reasoning. For whither, I ask, will the scaly creatures be able to move forward, unless the waters have left an empty space? again, whither will the waters be able to give place, when the fishes cannot go forward? either then we must deny motion to every body, or we must say that void is mixed with things, from which each thing can receive the first start of movement.
[385] Lastly, if two broad bodies leap asunder quickly from a meeting, surely it must needs be that air seizes upon all the void, which comes to be between the bodies. Still, however rapid the rush with which it streams together as its currents hasten round, yet in one instant the whole empty space cannot be filled: for it must needs be that it fills each place as it comes, and then at last all the room is taken up.
[391] But if by chance any one thinks that when bodies have leapt apart, then this comes to be because the air condenses, he goes astray; for in that case that becomes empty which was not so before, and again that is filled which was empty before, nor can air condense in such a way, nor, if indeed it could, could it, I trow, without void draw into itself and gather into one all its parts.
[401] Wherefore, however long you hang back with much objection, you must needs confess at last that there is void in things
That last part reminds me of this from Torquatus / On Ends: "But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful."
Every time I think about that one I question whether he is right to say "NO ONE rejects...." but I do think that his point covers probably the majority of people who are not trained in philosophy or religion.
Yes I think that's exactly right. And in case I haven't said so recently, I see no reason to discount Cassius Longinus' understanding of Epicurean philosophy, as he was willing to debate it even with Cicero, and he (and others he cites in his letters) were both devoted Epicureans and also leaders in Roman public affairs.
If we have to choose between what the commentators today, and the enemies of Epicurus, tell us, vs what we can observe for ourselves as to what leading Epicureans actually did, i will take "what the leading Epicureans actually did" every time!
I would be very careful there. Fame is one thing, but "public life" is a broad term, and to the extent that times require public action - an appropriate day to comment on this, given coronavirus panic - then public life may be required, as i think there are hints if not explicit record of Epicurus saying. "Fame" on the other hand, might be something that is a byproduct and never really a sound goal in the first place, nor would it seem likely to be required in the same way that public action might be required.
Right. Plus apparently Julian was properly concerned about getting "good" Greco-Romans to participate in public life so as to offset the nefarious influence of the Christians. I can't help but think that in those circumstances, Epicurus would have urged exactly the same thing as Julian, since the very survival of the Greco-Roman-Epicurean way of life that they valued was at stake and was about to be overwhelmed. .
As much as I've always wanted to like Julian, isn't he the one who said that he was happy to see that Epicurus' texts were hard to find? So again an enemy of Epicurus even to mention it, but you're right he does not seem as bad here since he seems to be limiting the impact and stating a way it can be applied correctly, which is what I think we agree Epicurus would have said:
And this indeed may happen, but you will not be sure of it until that final day." Do you think that such a man after being told all this would choose even to live in a sea-port town? Would he not bid adieu to money-making and all the advantages of commerce, and caring little for troops of friends and acquaintances abroad, and all that he might learn about nations and cities, would he not approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles[10] who bids us "Live in obscurity"? Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration.
I had also forgotten before writing this that the source for this fragment is Plutarch's diatribe against this very Fragment itself. So, already in that respect, we're at a disadvantage! The very source of the (let's say) "infamous" saying of Epicurus is a polemic against that very "infamous" saying of Epicurus taken out of context to attack him! That's a vicious circle if I ever saw one.
Thank you for looking that up Eugenios, when I wrote I failed to take the time to do that - but you are exactly right from my perspective.
but was NOT disengaged from society, his friends, and those that sought him out.
Yes that's the key from my perspective. Unfortunately the "live unknown" is used primarily (in my experience) to imply the opposite, and that Epicurus was essentially a hermit. Used properly the phrase gives us lots of good warning about things to avoid, but improperly it reinforces one of the worst and most untrue stereotypes by Epicurus' enemies.
I largely agree with your conclusions here but in regard to this fragment I always caution against reading too much into it (beyond what you are doing here) because it comes to us with absolutely zero context. To my understanding we have zero knowledge about when or where or how or in what situation this was stated, or even for sure that it was Epicurus himself. And given as a premise that ALL rules of conduct are contextual, we would need to know much more than we do to conclude how much emphasis Epicurus and the key Epicureans placed on such views, since as you say they did not exactly "live unknown" themselves.
As I see it the phrase can be helpful for discussion, just like the "tetrapharmakon" but overemphasis on it creates many of the same problems that overemphasis of the tetrapharmakon does.
We simply dont have enough surrounding context to know the use cases that were referenced, or who said these things and why.
People who don't understand the full depth of Epicurus can easily misinterpret both, so its important to provide the background first (as you've done here) so these phrases don't get misused, as they probably often are in the hands of those who want to keep Epicurus safely confined in the hermit-like box they have created for him.
Thanks Godfrey I thought so too!
Over time I think these recordings will turn out to be very useful.
Yep!
And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away.
Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come.
Yes it is an interesting subject of how much time to devote to the anti-Epicurean literature, especially in discussing it with people who really don't have much fair grounding in Epicurus in the first place.
On balance I have found it very helpful to me personally, in that once I read DeWitt and began to see what the issues really were, then these attacks on Epicurus, especially the older ones, began to make more clear to me what was really at issue in the argument, which is pretty obscured today since everyone things approximately along the same Platonic/Stoic lines.
In discussing pleasure while attacking Epicurus, the issues involved in pleasure in particular and feeling in general become easier to pick out.
I can understand how people going through trials in life, which is a time when people tend to pick up philosophy books, will see "absence of pain" as an attractive phrase, and they'll think it is directly related to Stoic "mind over emotion" material, and they'll just essentially stop, like a person with a headache taking an aspirin and thinking nothing further about the aspirin.
But that totally misses the point, and if it WERE the point, then 98% of these articles attacking Epicurus would never have been written. Cicero and the stoics and other key attackers were "right" to see how big a thread Epicurus was to them, because the issue isn't a better form of anesthetic, the issue is essentially *everything* about how we see the world and decide to live our lives, especially when we are young and healthy and vibrant and looking to decide how to spend our lives.
Yes is it very hostile. I only got through the first part.
I can sympathize and agree with him if he is attacking "tranquilism" if he interprets it as running from pain, but I gather that his deeper disagreement is his preference for "reason" over feeling:
To discover substance, then, is a great step in the life of reason, even if substance be conceived quite negatively as a term that serves merely to mark, by contrast, the unsubstantiality, the vanity, of all particular moments and things.
