If I am following you correctly then I definitely agree that "necessary" and "sufficient" are very relevant terms. However I think where this goes is that simply using those terms does not really advance the ball to the ultimate conclusion, which is understanding when we can confidently apply those terms, and why we are confident in applying them in a particular situation. Ultimately in every case we have a conceptual issue of what happens at the limit of our ability to observe directly. Is it proper to conclude that 'seeing is believing' is the appropriate standard of considering something to be true? At what point are we confident in going further to make a confident statement about something that we can and probably never will observe directly.

Here's something else that is relevant, a jibe from Cicero, in his "On the Nature of the Gods." This is a jibe, but it is easy to see how an Epicurean might appear to be overly confident to a skeptic. I think what we're looking for here is first an understanding of the ancient Epicurean position on when to be confident and when not to be, and then we have to decide for ourselves which we are "confident" to adopt:

Quote

Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus! “I am not going to expound to you doctrines that are mere baseless figments of the imagination, such as the artisan deity and world-builder of Plato's Timaeus, or that old hag of a fortuneteller the Pronoia (which, we may render ‘Providence’) of the Stoics; nor yet a world endowed with a mind and senses of its own, a spherical, rotatory god of burning fire; these are the marvels and monstrosities of philosophers who do not reason but dream.

We just finished recording Episode 33 and I think we had a very interesting discussion that will help us advance our thinking on these topics. I will work to edit and post this asap so we can keep the flow going.

At risk of cluttering up this thread I want to copy/paste here a set of clips from Delacy's commentary to On Methods of Inference that I posted here. I think what we are debating here involves the category of knowledge in the Epicurean scheme that Delacy refers to under his heading 2b, which DeLacy says "is important because it involves validity of the doctrine of atoms and void."

Below is the clip, and I think what we are wrestling with are our opinions of the validity of the terminology and how we should express our confidence in things we may conclude to be true using this standard:

________ (clipped from the other thread on Syllogistic and Canonical Reasoning____________

I think these three pages pretty well sum up what DeLacy sees as the three categories into which Epicureans divided things (I am using DeLacy's numbering so that is why it appears out of order):

1 - Things we can validate directly through the senses because they are nearby. (Position here should not be controversial, but contradicts Plato.)

2 a - Things which can never be known due to our own limitations, such as whether the number of stars is odd or even - there is no test of truth for these - they can never be known.

2 c - Things we may have to wait to validate through the senses, but ultimately we can get enough data to validate them through the senses. (Position here more aggressive but should not be controversial, still contradicts Plato.)

2 b - Things which by nature we can never get so close as to validate by the senses (the atoms, the far reaches of space). In this category things are considered true when there is some evidence from them and no evidence to the contrary. Multiple things can be considered true / possible. Choosing from among them, that only one is true, is improper absent sufficient evidence to do so, in which case you are in category 2c rather than 2b. (Position on this category is the most controversial; contradicts Plato)

The list of the categories:

The test of truth for category 2a of Delacy List - Opinions about things immediately before us are validated directly against the object itself:

The test of truth for category 2c of Delacy list - Opinions about things that can eventually be validated directly by the senses are validated when we get that information :

The test of truth for things in category 2 b, those things which the senses can never examine closely enough to validate. This is the most challenging category and constitutes the Epicurean canonical reasoning on ultimate issues rather than syllogistic reasoning which arguably does not rely on sensory evidence.

This episode is going to continue on the topic of colorless atoms, with many of the same underlying issues, so here is a link to a post by Don on the same subject in the Episode 32 thread. We can continue the discussion there or here in this thread for Episode 33.

Don as I recall from the episode there was discussion to the effect that "indivisible" ultimate particles might be sustainable by modern science and something that we can or should still maintain to be true, but not "immutable."

I think that's probably the issue you're addressing but I am not quite sure from what you wrote where you would come down on that.

Could you clarify what you're saying as it applies to that issue?

Over the last several episodes - and this is likely to continue - I think we're debating explicitly or implicitly our varying perspectives on whether Epicurus / Lucretius were going too far in their logical extrapolations about ultimate particles, or whether there is a perspective based on a combination of logic and observation in which their opinions were justified or even may still be justified in certain respects. Certainly as we drill down deeper into the atom then the levels that we once thought to be uncuttable are now cuttable, but how really does that translate into an expectation as to whether there is a limit on uncuttablility. I thought Elayne made a significant point about how we need to hold "both sides" (those who say there is a limit, and those who say there is not) to the same standard of proof, which certainly makes sense to me, but on the other hand it is not clear to me what that standard of proof really is.

I think this "standard of proof" issue is what we are really wrestling with, and we need to be as clear as possible about the "standard of proof" position we think is correct when we reach the limit of observation available to us at a particular moment.

I am definitely interested in hearing what you (Don) or anyone else may be thinking after hearing these recent discussions on this issue. This is going to be a recurring issue as we go through the rest of the book and it would be good if we could begin to come to terms with a general approach to this issue, which is I think directly related to some of the details discussed in Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference."

Episode 32 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, the panel discusses the Epicurean viewpoint that the atoms are colorless, and the implications of this doctrine. As always we appreciate your listening and we're happy to entertain comments or questions about the episode in the thread below or at the Epicureanfriends . com forum. Remember that you can subscribe to the podcast on your smartphone using any podcast application. Thanks for listening!

YES Martin thanks. Been a long week... I am editing last week and fixing this today.

Welcome to Episode Thirty-Three of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 788-864

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

788-794: We are tempted to give to atoms colour, not knowing how colour otherwise can come: but we have seen that white can come from what is not white; and surely white can arise more easily from no colour, than for instance from black : this reason then falls to the ground.

795-816: Again colours cannot exist without light, atoms never come into the light, therefore atoms have no colour: what colour can there be in darkness, when we see that the same thing continually changes its colour in different lights ? as therefore it is such and such stroke of light which produces such and such colour, without that stroke they cannot exist: as too one stroke produces white, another black, and as a stroke is a touch, and as it is shape, not colour, which affects touch, atoms need, not colour, but different shapes to give different touches.

817-825: Again if atoms have colour, it will not be said that this or that colour belongs only to this or that shape of atom : why then should not things formed out of coloured atoms vary their colours also? Why should not crows be sometimes white, swans black or green?

826-833: Again the smaller the shreds into which a thing is divided, the more its colour vanishes: be sure that all colour is gone before a thing comes to its first elements.

834-841 : you do not assign sound or smell to things which give forth no sound nor smell : why then attribute colour to all things? The mind can perceive things without colour as well as things without smell.

842-864: But atoms are likewise without heat or cold, without sound flavour or smell. As in preparing a perfume you seek out a quite scentless oil, that it may not infect the perfume with its own scent; thus first-beginnings must possess neither heat nor cold, smell sound nor flavour; these qualities are all frail and mortal, and must therefore be wanting to immortal elements unless things are to pass away to nothing.

Daniel Brown:

And since the eye receives within itself one sort of stroke with when it is said to perceive a white Color, and another contrary one, when it views an object of a black or any other color, and since it is of no moment by what color any thing you touch is distinguished, but rather of what peculiar shape and figure it is, you may conclude there is no manner of occasion that seeds should be stained with any colors, but that they should cause that variety of touch by the various figures with which they are imbued.

Besides, since there are no certain colors peculiar to certain figures, and since seeds of any figure may be of any color, whence is it that bodies that consist of such seeds are not in their several kinds imbued with all sorts of colors? It would be common to see crows, as they fly about, cast a white color from their white feathers, and black swans might be produced from black seeds, or be of any other one or more colors, as there seeds chance to be distinguished.

Further, the more any body is broken into small parts, the more you may perceive its color languishes by degrees, and dies away. This is the case of gold, when it is divided into thin shavings, its luster is extinguished, and the purple guy, by much the richest, when it is drawn out thread by thread, is quite lost. Hence you may infer that the particles of bodies discharge themselves of all color before they come to be as small as seeds.

Again, since you allow that all bodies do not emit sound and smell, and not attribute sound and smell to every body; so, since we cannot discover every thing by our eyes, you may conclude there are some bodies as much void of color, as there are others without smell or sound; and a judicious mind can properly form a notion of such bodies void of color, as it can of others that are without smell or sound, or any other qualities whatsoever.

But lest you should conceive the first seeds are void only of color, you must know that they are without warmth, are altogether free from cold or heat, the emit no sound, are without moisture, nor do they send out any smell from their several bodies; so when you propose to compound a pleasant ointment of sweet marjoram, myrrh, and flowers of spikenard, that send out the richest odor up to the nose, the first thing you are to do is to choose, as far as it lies in your power, an oil that has no smell, that it may, as little as possible, infect and corrupt those few sweet ingredients, being mixed and digested with them, with its native rankness.

Lastly, the seeds do not bestow any smell upon the bodies they produce, nor any sound, for they can exhale nothing from themselves; and, for the same reason, they can communicate no taste, nor cold, nor any vapor hot or warm. You must separate all qualities from the seeds that render them liable to dissolution, such as viscous, brittle, hollow, which proceeded from qualities that are soft, putrid, and rare, the seeds must have nothing of these properties if you would fix them upon an eternal foundation, upon which alone depends the security of beings, lest all things should fall to nothing, and perish beyond recovery.

Munro

And since the pupil receives into it a kind of blow, when it is said to perceive a white color, and then another, when it perceives black or any, and since it is of no moment with what color the things which you touch are provided, but rather with what sort of shape they are furnished, you are to know that first-beginnings have no need of colors, but give forth sensations of touch varying according to their various shapes.

Moreover since no particular kind of color is assigned to particular shapes and every configuration of first-beginnings can exist in any color, why on a ‘like principle are not the things which are formed out of them in every kind overlaid with colors of every kind? For then it were natural that crows too in flying should often display a white color from white wings and that swans should come to be black from a black seed, or of any other different color you please.

Again the more minute the parts are into which anything is rent, the more you may perceive the color fade away by little and little and become extinct; as for instance if a piece of purple is torn into small shreds: when it has been plucked into separate threads, the purple, and the scarlet far the most brilliant of colors, are quite effaced; from which you may infer that the shreds part with all their color before they come back to the seeds of things.

Lastly, since you admit that all bodies do not utter a voice nor emit a smell, for this reason you do not assign sounds and smells to all.

So also since we cannot perceive all things with the eyes, you are to know that some things are as much denuded of color as others are without smell and devoid of sound, and that the keen discerning mind can just as well apprehend these things as it can take note of things which are destitute of other qualities. But lest haply you suppose that first bodies remain stripped of color alone, they are also wholly devoid of warmth and cold and violent heat, and are judged to be barren of sound and drained of moisture, and emit from their body no scent of their own.

Just as when you set about preparing the balmy liquid of sweet marjoram and myrrh and the flower of spikenard which gives forth to the nostrils a scent like nectar, before all you should seek, so far as you may and can find it, the substance of scentless oil, such as gives out no perfume to the nostrils, that it may as little as possible meddle with and destroy by its own pungency the odors mixed in its body and boiled up with it; for the same reason the first-beginnings of things must not bring to the begetting of things a smell or sound of their own, since they cannot discharge anything from themselves, and for the same reason no taste either nor cold nor any heat moderate or violent, and the like. For as these things, be they what they may, are still such as to be liable to death, whether pliant with a soft, brittle with a crumbling, or hollow with a porous body, they must all be withdrawn from the first beginnings, if we wish to assign to things imperishable foundations for the whole sum of existence to rest upon: that you may not have things returning altogether to nothing.

Bailey

And since the pupil of the eye receives in itself a certain kind of blow, when it is said to perceive white colour, and another again, when it perceives black and the rest, nor does it matter with what colour things you touch may choose to be endowed, but rather with what sort of shape they are fitted, you may know that the first-beginnings have no need of colours, but by their diverse forms produce diverse kinds of touch.

Moreover, since no fixed nature of colour belongs to fixed shapes, and all conformations of first-beginnings may exist in any hue you will, why on like grounds are not those things which are made out of them steeped with every kind of colour in every kind? For it were natural that often flying crows too should throw off white colour from white wings, and that black swans should be made of black seeds or of any other colour you will, simple or diverse.

Nay again, the more each thing is pulled asunder into tiny parts, the more can you perceive colour little by little fading away and being quenched: as comes to pass when purple is plucked apart into small pieces: when it has been unravelled thread by thread, the dark purple or the scarlet, by far the brightest of colours, is utterly destroyed; so that you can know from this that the tiny shreds dissipate all their colour before they are sundered into the seeds of things.

Lastly, since you do not allow that all bodies send out sound or smell, it comes to pass, therefore, that you do not assign sound and smell to them.

Even so, since we cannot with the eyes descry all things, you may know that some things are made bereft of colour, just as some are without any smell and far parted from sound, yet that the keen mind can come to know them no less than it can mark those devoid of other things. But lest by chance you think that the first-bodies abide bereft only of colour, they are also sundered altogether from warmth and cold, and fiery heat, and are carried along barren of sound and devoid of taste, nor do they give off any scent of their own from their body.

Even as when you set about to make the delicious liquid of marjoram or myrrh, or scent of nard, which breathes nectar to the nostrils, first of all it is right to seek, in so far as you may and can find it, the nature of scentless oil, which may send off no breath of perfume to the nostrils, so that it may as little as possible taint and ruin with its own strong smell the scents mingled in its body and boiled along with it. Therefore after all the first-beginnings of things are bound not to bring to the begetting of things their own scent or sound, since they cannot give anything off from themselves, nor in the same way acquire any taste at all, nor cold, nor once more warm and fiery heat . . . and the rest: yet since they are such as to be created mortal, the pliant of soft body, the brittle of crumbling body, the hollow of rare, they must needs all be kept apart from the first-beginnings, if we wish to place immortal foundations beneath things, on which the sum of life may rest; lest you see all things pass away utterly into nothing.

Very good work again Joshua!

I think these three pages pretty well sum up what DeLacy sees as the three categories into which Epicureans divided things (I am using DeLacy's numbering so that is why it appears out of order):

1 - Things we can validate directly through the senses because they are nearby. (Position here should not be controversial, but contradicts Plato.)

2 a - Things which can never be known due to our own limitations, such as whether the number of stars is odd or even - there is no test of truth for these - they can never be known.

2 c - Things we may have to wait to validate through the senses, but ultimately we can get enough data to validate them through the senses. (Position here more aggressive but should not be controversial, still contradicts Plato.)

2 b - Things which by nature we can never get so close as to validate by the senses (the atoms, the far reaches of space). In this category things are considered true when there is some evidence from them and no evidence to the contrary. Multiple things can be considered true / possible. Choosing from among them, that only one is true, is improper absent sufficient evidence to do so, in which case you are in category 2c rather than 2b. (Position on this category is the most controversial; contradicts Plato)

The list of the categories:

The test of truth for category 2a of Delacy List - Opinions about things immediately before us are validated directly against the object itself:

The test of truth for category 2c of Delacy list - Opinions about things that can eventually be validated directly by the senses are validated when we get that information :

The test of truth for things in category 2 b, those things which the senses can never examine closely enough to validate. This is the most challenging category and constitutes the Epicurean canonical reasoning on ultimate issues rather than syllogistic reasoning which arguably does not rely on sensory evidence.

I know what you mean about lack of time!

Here's one more section I will point out to you from Delacy;

https://archive.org/stream/philode…ge/148/mode/2up

starts with this section:

I will paste here a few paragraphs that appear to me to be highlights so someone skimming can decide if they want to read the whole thing:

Important observation from the Epicurean Polystratus, that values are just as real as objects, although neither are reflections of Platonic forms, because they are real TO US:

Joshua I paste this here not really for the point, which we have covered pretty well, but for the citation to the point, what looks like a lengthy article by someone named Cronert. Just thought at some point it might be something you or someone else would want to track down.

That is exactly what I was remembering Elayne -- thank you!

This is a thread to discuss the interelationships between "syllogistic reasoning" and "canonical reasoning."

At this point the main suggestion I have for textual material is:

1. - DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy
   
   1. Chapter 7 - The Canon, Reason, and Nature
   2. Chapter 8 - Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings
2. DeWitt's "Epicurus on Immediate Presentations"
3. 2 - DeLacy's Appendix to Philodemus' On Methods of Inference:
   
   1. Sources of Epicurean Empiricism
   2. Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology
   3. Logical Controversies of Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics
      

This page from the DeLacy material has always stuck in my memory as setting forth the issues most clearly:

More:

Remember that this is Delacy's opinion about Epicurus, but here is a significant part of it!

Philos as to the neo-epicurean issue, I think we are almost there on that and almost all other issues.

I do not mean to be condescending by saying this, but I gather that you have not yet had time to spend much time reading the past posts on this site. It's not necessary for you to do that, but I do think that many of these issues will become more clear to you as you read more. I especially recommend Elayne 's essays on pleasure which are linked to on the first page. You and her have quite a bit in common, but as you will see Elayne is at least as firm as I am on the "absence of pain" issue, even though she is closer to you on the physics issues.

I don't know how much background time you have spent discussing these issues with Hiram, but I think you will see as you read more here how it is we evolved in different directions, and how we are basically going our separate ways. I still wish Hiram well personally and will always consider him to be a friend (at least as much as you can be entirely over the internet having met someone) but you will want to come to understand more about how he diverged from what we are doing here.

As the work week starts I am going to have less concentrated time to respond, but i again repeat that all your topics and questions are of great interest and I think both I and others here will be happy to address them all. These types of discussions are what a forum is designed to facilitate.

As to the specific question about being a "Neo-Epicurean" I don't think we've tried to "trademark" that term in any way, so you do you and use whatever words you like. As you are currently using it I do not see your issues as being the targets of our major concerns, so from that point of view it does not cause a problem. If you are looking for label to describe yourself, however, eventually I think you will be able to do much better than that.

By the way, I started my website using the name New Epicurean from the point of view that I was someone "new" to Epicurean philosophy, and the blog was my running record of my studies into the topic. To me, "neo-Epicurean indicates more of a divergence than someone who is consistent on the core aspects would probably want to convey, because (as I think Martin and Elayne would agree) we don't think that Epicurus ever intended that the scientific discovery part of his philosophy was ever to be frozen in time. That means that if the "neo" is used to indicate mainly the physics updates, I bet an ancient Epicurean would say that that wasn't a necessary prefix..

The term I really have the most issue with is "hedonist." The ancient Epicureans did not seem to use that to refer to themselves, and I think the word obscures critical aspects of the philosophy. And also it's probably true that the Epicureans really did consider their grouping to be related to Epicurus as a particular example, without crossing a line over into cult-like behavior. I tend to equate this in my mind with being a fan of the "Miami Dolphins" or some such. That's a trite example, but I do think that there is a significant aspect in which the real history of Epicurus as a person serves as an example worth emulating from the point of view I'll pararphrase as "reverence for the wise man does the most for the person doing the reverencing."

At this point we are branching off in this discussion to a different aspect of this topic: How Supporters of Epicurean Philosophy Should Approach The Effect of Modern Scientific Discoveries

That thread is going to be primarily devoted to "organizational" aspects of how Epicureans should relate to each other and/or incorporate new scientific discoveries in their organized activities.

This thread should continue on the original topic, primarily addressed to individuals in their own studies and thoughts:

To What Extent, If Any, Does Modern Physics Invalidate Epicurean Philosophy?

Yes I am looking for a place to move this thread now, but before i forget I need to comment on this:

Quote from Philos Armonikos

By my division here, I satisfy both and would therefore classify myself as a neo-Epicurean, in the particular sense that I am for seeking a revival of the Epicurean tradition and also a revision of some of the conclusions of the physics.

Philos, you are the first in a while (perhaps ever) to come into our circle so intensely focused on physics. The origin of the labels and the materials on this website on the "Neo-Epicureans" is primarily that there are large numbers of people in academia who reject almost every significant conclusion of Epicurus, but adopt his name in their efforts, because they want to redefine "pleasure" as the equivalent of "absence of pain." That is a HUGE problem and is the core of most every dispute or division that we have ever had in our "circle."

The word "circle" is relevant to your sentence that I quoted. Given that there is no formal "Epicurean School" anymore (Don's point) it is not really logically possible to "revise some of the conclusions of the physics." The Epicurean physics are what they are, and no one is really qualified to say "we are revising position X and it is now position Y."

This is closely related to the issue that you will read about if you refer to the thread entitled Discussion of the Society of Epicurus' 20 Tenets of 12/21/19

Since we don't have a formal organization with a formal set of mandatory beliefs, it's not really up to us to say what is or is not Epicurean on a very detailed basis.

We've never had a real problem in the past, and I hope and expect in your case it will be the same, accommodating each other on issues like the size of the sun, infinity, indivisibility,etc., because we are not in the business of writing a physics textbook or the like.

None of us (including me) see any real problem with believing that the universe is infinite or atoms are indivisible or not, except as the reasoning process for those conclusions might indicate some form of skepticism or other process that would lead to problems later - and even then we haven't even begun to approach such a point of concern.

You will see some of these issues discussed when we release the latest podcast (32) that we recorded this morning.

But to repeat and re-emphasize the same point, our "Not Neoepicurean" position papers are almost entirely directed toward the "absence of pain" "be a minimalist" "run from all politics" "go live in a cave" approach which is either explicit or implicit in the academic version of Epicurean philosophy prevalent today.

I think I can already firmly predict from the intensity of your views and the things you have said so far that the "neo-epicurean" issues are not a problem for you personally.

And I am surrounding myself by so many scientists that I am beginning to feel outnumbered and questioning my own assessment of the world situation.

But at least at the moment I am still confident that what i wrote earlier about not letting the physicists war with the philosophers is still the best way to go. I remain convinced that outside the "halls of science" the vast majority of the world is taken in by these issues that are primarily "philosophical" rather than physics-oriented.

As we go forward we need a way to articulate this approach that does not involve constantly repeating "On physics point A Epicurus was wrong, on physics point B Epicurus was wrong, on physics point Epicurus was wrong ad infinitum. If we do that, we really undercut the way our presentation will effect the majority of people. Yes those points are valid and should be made at the proper time and place, but the global issues of supernatural gods, reward/punishment after death, the assertion that all human action is controlled by a hard deterministic fate, the true nature of "virtue" and its role in making decisions, the role of "abstract logic" and how to weigh it against the sensations, anticipations, and feelings -- all of those are HUGE issues and for better or worse the primary effort and attention of the forums needs to be primarily devoted to those.

Not exclusively, by any means, but just like with "politics" it would be a great pity if we allow ourselves to be too divided on details of physics unless they truly impact these bigger issues.

Here is one example that I see of the kind of attitude that is appropriate for an Epicurean to take even when we don't have the amount of evidence we would like to have, as illustrated by what Lucian thought was the proper Epicurean attitude toward a religious imposter, from "Aristotle the Oracle Monger"

And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled
against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

We will address some of these issues in the podcast that was recorded today in a way that most should find satisfactory.

To the extent that "some" in Philos' comment refers to me, the point I am making is that physics does not exist alone in its own world. Epicurus confronted in his day, and we confront today, arguments that are based on "words" - "logic" - and that those arguments are of concern to many people. We are always going to be faced with questions that are essentially "You don't know because you haven't personally been there / done that / seen that / etc." It is important to understand how we respond to those questions, what is involved in "waiting," what kind of standards of "certainty" we should expect to hold ourselves to, and what is an appropriate level of skepticism to hold toward various things.

Those who are primarily immersed in scientific pursuits are not generally going to be as concerned with those contentions as those who are not. However in Epicurus' day it was considered a serious philosophic argument to contend that it was impossible to walk across a room, and even today there are all sorts of logical and ontological arguments for the existence of god and similar questions waiting to trap the unwary.

Not everyone needs help in those areas, but there are a lot of people who get concerned with arguments like those who need help in responding. For them, no amount of "physics" is going to be enough.

So when Philos says:

Quote

The Epicurean physics needs to have a modern adjustment, while at the same time not losing any of the most important consequences for the ethics.

I would say that Epicurean philosophy is ultimately not about any particular and precise physics position (and in that I think we are agreed). The issue is more that Epicurean physics were derived using a particular approach to knowledge (the canonical faculties vs "rationalism") and if we don't learn the details of that method then we'll never understand the appropriate consequences for the ethics.

It is very important to observe the resistance that Epicurus displayed toward accepting contentions based on mathematics, geometry, or other aspects of logical modeling. Such conclusions can actually or apparently contradict what we observe through the senses, and that is why we are talking about these issues and need to continue to do so.

Studying the reasoning behind "the swerve," for example, will always be more useful for understanding Epicurus' thought process than it will ever be for explaining the movement of atoms.

The same goes for the infinite universe, life on other words, immutability, indivisibility, and the rest. That is why these issues cannot be dropped as if they were unimportant to talk about.

I'll close this comment by observing that in my ten years of internet involvement in Epicurus, I do see this as a recurring issue. People who approach Epicurus purely from the scientific perspective don't tend to appreciate the "logical" issues. People who approach Epicurus from a "history of philosophy" perspective or an "ethics" perspective don't tend to appreciate the physics of Epicurus and Lucretius, and they hardly spend any time at all on the letters to Herodotus or Pythocles, or on Lucretius' poem.

Both perspectives are important to understanding Epicurus, and we should not let the varying perspectives become at war with one another.