Posts by Cassius

I think we are because I would focus on that fragment where Epicurus is reliably (it appears) quoted as criticizing those who walk around harping uselessly on the meaning of the word good.

I think that's Plutarch and maybe that's a fragment that would be well worth our examining the Greek in detail.

You know the one I mean? I need a better way to lock down the source but it appears to be;

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Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

This is an area where I think it is understandable why Cicero framed Torquatus' argument in the way he did, but I question whether Epicurus would fully endorse that interpretation, especially since Torquatus himself seems to be saying that he disagreed with Epicurus.

Those are two sources I would compare and contrast as a way to getting to this issue of the "highest good" problem -- and of course I also think deWitt's points on this are worth incorporating as to multiple meanings of the word good and how "highest" might not be the best way to look at things (at least without lots of explanation ) and --- that need for explanation -- is exactly the problem of "concepts not mapping to feelings' that we are talking about.

Now that I've finally seen the Instagram post long enough to absorb the text - ABSOLUTELY that is what we are up against. This calls to mind that passage in Nietzsche's Antichrist where he points out that this is what Epicurus / Lucretius had campaigned against even before Christianity emerged. It's a war to the very end and there is absolutely no hope of prevailing against it without returning to the essence of Epicurus and building cooperation, communication, and even organization on that foundation. And I also think that's why constantly following the eclectic tendency to blend aspects of Epicurus with other philosophers, rather than distill the core and work from the base, is the worst possible option and what dooms those "accomodationist" efforts to failure.

I agree that the analysis you're using is the right track - and I think the destination of those tracks is the realization that all words are concepts and ultimately concepts do not map one to one with feelings, and that nature provides us feelings, not concepts, so that no single concept can ever serve every use case.

I think that's what Epicurus was pointing to and those who insist on pegging a single abstract concept as "the good" are going to forever be at war with Nature and with Epicurus.

And since every single significant religion and philosophy other than Epicurus has "the good" as its goal (whether they admit it or not) - we need to get prepared to continue a very long war.

And that's why being an Epicurean is not for slackers or pacifists / passivists. There is no escaping that "they" will bring the war to us, because Epicurean philosophy is a challenge and offense to their worldview.

I would say there the "alleged" subjectivity of happiness, and I think Epicurus would say there is in fact an objective answer, best summarized in what remains of his texts through Torquatus (very close to the meaning of PD2, but with the implication stated rather than implicit):

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"For since, if you take away sense from a man, there is nothing left to him, it follows of necessity that what is contrary to nature, or what agrees with it, must be left to nature herself to decide. Now what does she perceive, or what does she determine on as her guide to seek or to avoid anything, except pleasure and pain?

It appears to me from reading at least the early part of the doctors statement that he is pretty clearly in Aristotle's "good person" camp without entirely admitting it:

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Eudaimonia is a tricky term. It goes back to Aristotle. People debate it in lots of different ways. But to me, it just means trying to grow and connect to be a good person. And so that’s a very broad description that could apply to a lot of different things that we might do. And how do we tell if things are eudaimonic or not? Well, we’ve come to the strategy of it’s eudaimonic if it makes you happier. If it increases your subjective well-being. And the reason we say that is that [for] almost every eudaimonic-type activity that we measure when people do it, it increases their subjective well-being. But again, we don’t think that’s the main thing. It’s just a side effect. But it’s also a very important side effect because if you start doing something eudaimonic, like you’re going to express gratitude, or you’re going to try to be a kinder person, it’s awesome if that behavior can be reinforced by good feelings.

He's trying to avoid what Aristotle eventually admits - that being a good person makes beging "good" the goal, and there is no objective meaning of "good,". It is my understanding that Aristotle is more honest and says in Nichomachean ethics that "good" can be defined only as looking to see what good men do, and so he ends up with a circular definition that answers nothing - except providing a means for an "elite" to justify their rule over the rest.

Ok now the luddites like me who don't have an instagram account will be able to see it. I am surprised that it didn't provide an error message or something - it just appeared to me as a totally blank post.

Actually I never signed up for instagram because I couldn't figure out the use case. What does it provide that Twitter and Facebook don't?

Don is there a graphic in that first post in this thread that is referenced as "this is what we're up against"? Maybe it's just me who is not seeing it some reason but that would be strange if true. Could we try reposting it?

Seeing the Stallings version pushes me back in the direction of the ultimate implication being, as per Browne, that the result of the victory is that we live "as gods." That's what would be sanctioned by Epicurus suggesting we live as gods among men, and Lucretius himself comparing Epicurus to a god. I suppose I need to think generically about what it means to go "to the skies" or "to the heavens" but I am not sure I see other allusions in the Epicurean texts to "to the stars" or "to the skies" as being a reference to superior living, or excellence in general. Oops - isn't there a reference to the Canon of Truth being something that is almost fallen from heaven - maybe that's the example to look for heaven / skies?

Also, what are you guys seeing about the "victory" -- is it clearly "HIS victory" or a more generic reference to "victory over religion." It's not like he was Jesus whose work allegedly did the job for us - although he does show us the way to do it ourselves..

Don that "in turn" reminds me of the statement made earlier in the poem about a double-edged victory. It looks like its Book 3 around 510. Here is Bailey but I think it's more clear in some others. Maybe it's just poetic reinforcement by repetition, but this earlier passage makes me think there might be something about "doubling-down" in Epicurean thought.

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[510] And since we perceive that the mind is cured, just like the sick body, and we see that it can be changed by medicine, this too forewarns us that the mind has a mortal life. For whosoever attempts and essays to alter the mind, or seeks to change any other nature, must indeed add parts to it or transfer them from their order, or take away some small whit at least from the whole. But what is immortal does not permit its parts to be transposed, nor that any whit should be added or depart from it. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. And so whether the mind is sick, it gives signs of its mortality, as I have proved, or whether it is changed by medicine. So surely is true fact seen to run counter to false reasoning, and to shut off retreat from him who flees, and with double-edged refutation to prove the falsehood.

Munro:

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[510] And since we perceive that the mind is healed like the sick body, and we see that it can be altered by medicine, this too gives warning that the mind has a mortal existence. For it is natural that whosoever essays and attempts to change the mind or seeks to alter any other nature you like, should add new parts or change the arrangement of the present, or withdraw in short some tittle from the sum. But that which is immortal wills not to have its parts transposed nor any addition to be made nor one tittle to ebb away; for whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, this change is at once the death of that which was before. Therefore the mind, whether it is sick or whether it is altered by medicine alike, as I have shown, gives forth mortal symptoms. So invariably is truth found to make head against false reason and to cut off all retreat from the assailant, and by a two-fold refutation to put falsehood to rout.

Interestingly Brown does not highlight the "doubling" or "two-fold"

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[510] And since we see the mind can be made sound, and be affected by the powers of medicine, as well as a disordered body, this is a strong evidence that the mind is mortal; for whoever attempts to make any alteration in the mind, or offers to change the nature of any other thing, must either add some new parts to it, or take off some of the old, or else transpose the former order and situation; but what is immortal can have nothing added to it, or taken from it, nor will admit of any change in the order of its parts: for whatever is so altered as to leave the limits of its first nature, is no more what it was, but instantly dies. The mind, therefore, whether it be distempered, or relieved by medicine, shows (as I observed) strong symptoms of its mortality. So evidently does the true matter of fact overthrow all false reasoning, that there is no possibility to escape its force; and the contrary opinion is either way fully refuted.

But Loeb does:

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....so completely is the truth seen to combat false reasoning, and to cut off its retreat as it flies, and to convict falsehood by a double refutation.

Latin from Perseus (not sure exactly where)

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Et quoniam mentem sanari corpus ut aegrum cernimus et flecti medicina posse videmus, id quoque praesagit mortalem vivere mentem. addere enim partis aut ordine traiecere aecumst aut aliquid prosum de summa detrahere hilum, 515commutare animum qui cumque adoritur et infit aut aliam quamvis naturam flectere quaerit. at neque transferri sibi partis nec tribui vult inmortale quod est quicquam neque defluere hilum; nam quod cumque suis mutatum finibus exit, 520continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante. ergo animus sive aegrescit, mortalia signa mittit, uti docui, seu flectitur a medicina. usque adeo falsae rationi vera videtur res occurrere et effugium praecludere eunti 525ancipitique refutatu convincere falsum. Denique saepe hominem paulatim cernimus ire et membratim vitalem deperdere sensum; in pedibus primum digitos livescere et unguis, inde pedes et crura mori, post inde per artus 530ire alios tractim gelidi vestigia leti.

Quote from JJElbert

That's a highly daring translation of the most dangerous line in a hugely subversive poem. It's no great wonder the translator remained anonymous!

Yes I agree. At first I thought daring in a negative way, but on quick second thought I think your point is that it doubles down on the as religious aspect, and I agree. I think I will have to add this to my mental list of examples where I think the Brown translator is more in tune with Epicurus and Lucretius than the later translators. I tend to think this is an example (especially compared to Smith) where we have moved further away from the meaning of Lucretius over the last 200 years rather than closer.

This is why when I come across a difficult passage my money is on Brown giving the version that is most in tune with the intended inflections.

Quote from Don

Sorry. I love digging in the weeds of language!

No reason for apology at all. As we have AMPLY seen, the translators - even in narrative form - cannot be trusted not to do their own editorializing by omitting or adding words/concepts. The only way to be confident in the final result is to check them.

I do think that we can form a generalized impression of a particular writer -- such as my own views which I constantly revise but that I will list here:

Munro tends to be highly literal but can be awkward to read; Bailey is a more polished version of Munro but is much less to be trusted in his interpretations because he is not ultimately a fan of Epicurus' views; Brown editorializes but frequently seems most trustworthy in interpreting Epicurusso; Smith has access to the latest and best scholarship but regularly editorializes and may be less trustworthy that Brown; Stallings has a good feel for the poetry but is probably not a reliable indicator on deep philosophy; Humphries has a good feel for the poetry but probably goes too far in some of his poetic flights ("the way things are").

Might actually be a good idea to set up a table of our impressions of the various translators. There will never be a way to judge them "objectively" but might be helpful to compare subjective opinions.

Does anyone have an opinion as to how the Latin Library textstacks up against Perseus or other online sources of the Latin Lucretius?

I don't think I have the resources to retype the whole thing so I will probably use the Latin Library text in my materials unless someone has a much better source?

Back to the issue of paragraph numbering, I've always wanted to be able to swap back and forth from section to section (almost like Joshua's interlinear) so that means that I may take the Loeb paragraph numbers and eventually find a way to get them into my text of the Latin Library edition so at least we can crossreference passages.

Any comment on that idea?

Note: I see that the Latin Library has line numbers every five lines.

1. Is there a way to consider that authoritative?
2. I presume that goes with one particular exemplar of the poem but that the others don't follow that?
3. So the Loeb is just making judgment calls on paragraphs and dividing the numbering that way?
4. I think for readability purposes it IS necessary to divide up by "paragraphs" but that surely leads to problems with line numbers. That's why I am currently with the Loeb system and will probably stay there, but any comments on alternatives would be appreciated.

142-foundations-005-by-his-victory-religion-is-trampled-underfoot/

Quote from Don

And since Lucretius puts nos first, maybe the emphasis should be on us, accusative or not. My understanding is that the first word is used to denote emphasis.

That is an example of the kind of homespun rules of construction that I think MUST be correct, and have to be important to follow.

My reasoning for that is that the Romans were not any better mind-readers than we are. They HAD to be able to make sense of a spoken sentence AS THEY WERE HEARING IT, and they could not wait until the end of some monumentally long line to find the "verb" and then reorient everything and understand it only after they had heard the last word, like we are taught to do today.

So i agree -- it may be helpful in some cases to move the words around so that we are more comfortable, but I think there is a good argument that we should leave them where they are and insert mentally whatever pronouns or gender or tense or filler concepts or whatever is necessary to make sense as written / as read.

If the Romans thought it was perfectly adequate in the order they used then we can make sense of it too.

Quote from JJElbert

Cassius , are you certain you have the translation right?

Thank you for catching that Joshua -- I am not sure where that came from! I will correct. As I write this I can't remember if I had a source for that particular version or just mashed them together in a way that seemed logical at the time.

That's part of the reason for my exercise in doing this because I'd like to check each one of the "slides" in this presentation and then use it for a systematic presentation of the philosophy.

So thank you!

I guess the vicissim opteritur is what I haven't drilled into far enough

Don what do you think about the "terror" / "fear" versions? Is there anything in the Latin to justify that or is that just more translator editorializing ?

Yes I agree that some form of "to the skies" is a good non-religious metaphor that makes the most sense.

As for the line numbers i will probably go to my grave never being happy with a numbering system. I've taken lately to using the Loeb numbers and I kept all this designated at under line 62 because Loeb doesn't give another line number until 80. I presume that these are just discretionary paragraph divisions so I think as a compromise from here on out I am going to make all my digital versions conform to Loeb paragraph numbering for the sake of some kind of ability to cross-reference.

Thanks for the commentary!

By his victory, the terror of religion is trampled underfoot, and we, in turn, are lifted to the stars.

Quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim opteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo.

This highly memorable line is a good one to review the Latin and alternate translations. Here are several renditions in English, and all of them make much the same point.

It appears to me that Munro might be the most strictly literal, with Brown and Humphries emphasizing the terror / fear of religion, while Bailey inserts "in revenge." Humphries' and Munro's "trampled" would seem to be a good rendition of "subjected to the feet."

However Loeb and Smith are particularly disappointing in choosing to deflect the blow against "religion" by inserting "superstition" in its place. While I think that is probably a defensible choice if one takes the position that the Epicureans considered their view of the gods to be "true religion" and the standard views of the majority as "superstition" - that editorial choice really does not seem warranted given that the Latin is "religio" and in our modern context the clear indictment by Lucretius and Epicurus was against what we today regard as "religion."

At any rate, anyone who seeks to soft-pedal Epicurus' views on the harm caused by standard supernatural religious viewpoints will be hard-pressed to deal with this passage.

Brown: And so Religion, which we feared before, by him subdued, we tread upon in turn. His conquest makes us equal to the Gods.

Munro: Therefore religion is put underfoot and trampled upon in turn; us his victory brings level with heaven.

Bailey: And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven.

Loeb: Therefore superstition is now in her turn cast down and trampled underfoot, whilst we by the victory are exalted high as heaven.

Smith: So now the situation is reversed: superstition is flung down and trampled underfoot; we are raised to heaven by victory.

Humphries: Religion, so, is trampled underfoot, And by his victory we reach the stars.

I think you are illustrating the main point with your practical examples - the point being that while the word humanist carries a genetic implication that is benevolent enough, it also carries in philosophy some very specific connotations that can be very different, and the devil is in the details.

As you say it's not normally an issue to be concerned about except in dealing with people for whom the word holds a special meaning, and I think it is fair to say that the more a person cares about the word , the more they are likely to be caught up in the special meanings which frequently contradict Epicurean philosophy.

In that sense even to be small-s stoic can sometimes be the proper course, but the more one drills down to what is meant by Stoicism the more one sees that there are serious implications to erecting a philosophy around it.

Also in this thread I think it would be good to point out that Cicero's "On Duties" would be an important point of reference that will help compare and contrast the view I am suggesting is in common between Stoicism and Humanism against that of Epicurus. Don I cannot remember if you and I have discussed whether you read that. Years before I converted over to Epicurus, "On Duties" was one of my favorite classical works, and now in retrospect I think my affection for it made it a lot easier for me to come to terms with the dramatic difference between the "mainstream Greek" approach vs. Epicurus.

Although i don't recall that very much of it explicitly names Epicurus, views such as those of Epicurus are clearly the target. if I recall correctly you could pretty much characterize the whole think as "The Anti-Epicurean" almost as much as you could consider Nietzsche's "AntiChrist" to be anti-Christian.

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Now, among the many important and useful subjects in philosophy that have been discussed by philosophers with precision and fulness of statement, their traditions and precepts concerning the duties of life seem to have the widest scope. [4]Indeed, no part of life, whether in public or in private affairs, abroad or at home, in your personal conduct or your social relations, can be free from the claims of duty; and it is in the observance of duty that lies all the honor of life, in its neglect, all the shame. This, too, is a theme common to all philosophers. For who would dare to call himself a philosopher, if he took no cognizance of duty? Yet there are some schools of philosophy that utterly pervert duty by the view which they propose as to the supreme good, and as to the opposite extreme of evil. For he who so interprets the supreme good as to disjoin it from virtue, and measures it by his own convenience, and not by the standard of right, — he, I say, if he be consistent with himself, and be not sometimes overcome by natural goodness, can cultivate neither friendship, nor justice, nor generosity; nor can he possibly be brave while he esteems pain as the greatest of evils, or temperate while he regards pleasure as the supreme good. These things, though too obvious to need discussion, I yet have discussed elsewhere.1 Those schools, therefore, can, if self-consistent, say nothing about duty; nor can any precepts of duty, decisive, immutable, in accordance with nature, be promulgated, except by those who maintain that the right is to be sought solely,2 or chiefly,3 for its own sake. This [5]prerogative belongs to the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics; for the opinions of Ariston, Pyrrho, and Herillus1 were long since exploded, though they might fittingly have discussed subjects pertaining to duty, if they had left any ground for the preference of one thing over another, so that there might be a way open for the ascertainment of duty. In this treatise I shall follow the Stoics, not as a translator, but drawing from their fountains at my own discretion and judgment, as much, and in such way, as may seem good.