Posts by Cassius

Couple more quotes from the Philodemus text:

From page 41 of the Armstrong book:

37.24–39: “the emotion itself, taken in isolation, is an evil, since it is painful or is analogous to something painful, but if taken in conjunction with one’s disposition, we think that it is something that may even be called a good. For it (anger) results from seeing what the nature of states of affairs is and from not having any false beliefs in our comparative calculations of our losses and in our punishments of those who harm us.”

From page 42:

Philodemus explicitly says in On Anger that anger is an evil that is “inescapable, and therefore called natural” (ἀνέκφευκτον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φυϲικὸν λεγόμενον, 39.29–31; cf. 40.18–26). It is something “most necessary and most unpleasant” (ἀναγκαιότατον, ἀηδέϲτατον δέ, 44.19–21), and it cannot be entirely rejected by anyone. Natural anger can suit the third and fourth categories also: it is advantageous, since it prods the Epicurean to self-defense, 111 and it is so-called because the name has the characteristic of “first utterances” or “primal appellations”: “direct, one-to-one correspondence with their objects.” 112

From page 43 (this is commentary but apparently a high-level summary:

The main thrust of On Anger’s argument is that anger for its own sake is never compulsory merely because one supposes oneself intentionally harmed. In a person of reflective disposition, suppositions of intentional harm are always contextualized and submitted to symmetrēsis, which requires knowledge and experience of the world and the possible consequences of anger. Only these can tell us whether our anger is natural and whether we can punish the offender (see 37.32–39). If the answer is no, we can simply profess ourselves “alienated,” hate and avoid the person who wronged us, and drop the relationship (see 42.1–4); hatred and avoidance are available to the sage who has suffered harm but cannot punish the wrongdoer and guarantee her continuing security. If the answer is yes to both questions, then the anger becomes necessary and inescapable in a completely different way: it would be absurd not to punish the wrongdoer.

As we gain wisdom, anger does not disappear from our lives any more than grief or love, but it is more and more framed in protective layers of cognition and reflection; we are more likely to feel natural anger. Of course, there are various ways in which this ideal progression can go astray: most people do not have the calm and awareness of circumstances and causes that the Epicurean sage does, and even sages can make mistakes. That said, a reflective and aware person, and the sage most of all, can reluctantly “accept” (ἀναδέχεϲθαι) anger, however strong one’s resistance to it, and can certainly retaliate under the right conditions with confidence.

And here's more citation to anger as a motivator:

Verification through a cite to the text - that the wise man will be "insane" not to "grit his teeth and come back at him (the offender) in one way or another."

In terms of commentary, the Preface helpfully suggests that those wanting an immediate overview should refer to sections 4 and 5 of the Introduction. I see that section 3 discusses the prior position of Plato and Aristotle, so that looks good too.

Here is a good baseline for comparison with the stoics: The Stoics held that there is no such thing as any kind of rational or natural anger, and this will be different from the Epicurean position, who are apparently going to focus on "vengeance" as a bad thing, but who don't consider all types of anger as bad:

And this is what I expected to find - the Epicurean will take action against the offender (of course this is commentary, so we need the backup to confirm):

I don't know that I agree with the following in its opinion that "punishment for harm done is itself not harm..." -- it may be simply that the harm done to the offender is justified -- I would expect this to be an issue of definitions of "harm"

I have long suspected that a number of people who come to Epicurus from other philosophies or religious backgrounds tend to presume that Epicurus was very passive and frowned on all forms of anger. This topic comes back to mind after our most recent A Few Days In Athens Discussion (on Chapter Eight ) in regard to the exchange between Metrodorus and Epicurus on the subject near the end of the Chapter.

Frances Wright does not develop this issue very far, but I think it's important for us to bring out that Epicurus did not rule out all forms of anger from his philosophy. There's a hint of that already in several aspects of Diogenes Laertius's biography (such as in the passage that the wise man will experience his emotions more deeply than others) and probably in other places at all. But maybe the most extensive material will be found in the surviving portions of Philodemus "On Anger."

I feel sure that some of our other readers (particularly Scott ) will find this material interesting too, especially passages that bear on anger as a motivating force, such as : " (natural anger) is a feeling that is more than enough to motivate a forceful and decisive response (41.2–8)." (from page 40 of the Armstrong / McOsker book).

It looks like the best collection of surviving texts is here: https://www.amazon.com/Philodemus-Ang…d/dp/1628372699

Here is the table of contents:

This is not material I am familiar with, and I need at least a passing understanding of the main topics. I will post here as I go through it and of course I invite others interested in the topic to do the same.

Quote from Don

Did I hear my name?

Just about every episode!

Episode 115 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week, we continue discussing the Letter to Herodotus, and we begin our examination of atoms, void, and basic epistemology issues.

Quote from SimonC

(The list of troops from the sun and moon also implies that they are large, and not the size of a basketball)

I haven't read the True Story in a while so I don't remember that, but it sounds like a good observation to keep in mind!

Would it be correct to say that the implication of a "world" is that it constitutes certain areas out of the totality of things (the universe) which in revolving (?) came together into one unit. If so, would there also be an implication that while the "universe" has no center, a "world" does have a center? Key to that question would be the "revolving" part. I don't see that here in Herodotus, and I can't recall if it is in Lucretius.

Letter to Herodotus:

Quote

And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

[74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

Thank you! I have been confused all week! Plato was so elitist that he was even more elitist than himself! (Fixed now - thanks!)

Rather than add too many more posts to this thread prior to posting the episode, I want to make several points that I will update in this single post:

1 - I think that most all of what we say in this episode is accurate, yet I have a sense that the big picture is still lacking in clarify, especially if someone listens to the first half alone and doesn't go all the way to the end. We're working over some very difficult territory here and this comes across as more of a preliminary discussion rather than a fully-formulated presentation of conclusions.

2 - We make the point that Plato's perspective is much more elitist than Epicurus's. That's a fair and good point, and yet if we were answering the question "List in order of priority the ways that Plato's approach to knowledge differs from that of Epicurus?" I doubt this would be at or even near the top. It gives us some comparative information but doesn't really strike at the heart of the actual process differences.

3 - What I find most at fault at this episode is that I tended to follow a more "Socratic" approach and asked questions in tones that may have been difficult to follow, and that weren't appropriate for this difficult material. I probably created more confusion by using irony when I should have been totally direct. I will work to avoid that problem in the future, but the best way to solve the problem will be to start with some direct and important quotations from each source (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus). We can then have those quotes fresh in our minds and use them to be sure we are on the same page as to each philosopher, rather than look for differences before we have identified at least the broad outlines of each.

4 - One of several quotes that should definitely have been used early in this podcast, but was not, was this from Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Quote

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

5 - I am beginning to assemble some of the key epistemology quotes here, and these need to be part of the discussion as we get into the details: http://epicuruscollege.com/coursematerial/Canonics/

6 - Although we probably don't have the time it deserves to include it as part of the Letter to Herodotus, it would be very valuable to find and review some kind of text material on basic Epicurean Epistemology. We need to look for a single article to see if we can find a starting point. Lacking a better one at this moment, my best suggestion remains the Appendix to DeLacy's translation of Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (I go back and forth on whether to refer to this with Delacy's title, or with Sedley's "On Signs." Sedley's title is probably more direct, but sounds in English like an Astrological Matchmaking Book. "On Methods of Inference" is probably a more accurate description of what is actually being discussed:

Appendix Chapters:

• The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism
• Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology
• The Logical Controversies of The Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics

Those titles of chapters are right on point with what we need to explore further and get a command over. Unless we can come up with a better set of material to use for review, I think I am going to have to propose that we find a way to focus on this material as soon as possible. possibly with a special series of panel discussions.

The first step is to identify where there is any better "course material" that these three Appendix Chapters from DeLacy. These chapters have the great advantage as well that they are public domain and easily accessible to everyone, but if someone knows of something better (focusing on Epicurus) then please comment below.

I know these topics are covered in Chapters 7 and 8 of DeWitt, such as in the excerpt below from page 122. This is good general material and needs to be referenced as well, but DeLacy's material is probably more directly on point with what we need at this point in our discussions. DeWitt doesn't give us citations to Aristotle and Plato and the other key figures, and we need those to confirm our positions.

So the Epicurus wiki puts preconceptions there but the others do not? Possible to tell why?

That must be where once long ago I thought I read that.

To elaborate more on what we need, we have layers and layers of commentary like this one from the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:

Quote

The latter point holds especially for the objects of philosophical knowledge that Plato later on in the dialogue (103e) refers to as “Forms.” Here Forms are mentioned for what is perhaps the first time in Plato’s dialogues: the Just itself, the Beautiful, and the Good; Bigness, Health, and Strength; and “in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is” (65d). They are best approached not by sense perception but by pure thought alone. These entities are granted again without argument by Simmias and Cebes, and are discussed in more detail later. .

All told, then, the body is a constant impediment to philosophers in their search for truth: “It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes to us from the body” (66c). To have pure knowledge, therefore, philosophers must escape from the influence of the body as much as is possible in this life. Philosophy itself is, in fact, a kind of “training for dying” (67e), a purification of the philosopher’s soul from its bodily attachment.

But unless we can marshal and command reliable and convincing quotes in our discussions, our arguments will seem less than convincing.

We need a series of quotes that are so clear as to the differences between Epicurus and Plato (and to pin down the others too is desirable) that the issue is beyond dispute and absolutely clear even to the newer student.

Thank you for posting that Joshua. We ran into a number of complicated issues in this podcast that I think we could greatly improve on, so I will try to get this one edited in time for posting and review by others a little more quickly than usual.

We particularly ran into difficulty in describing in summary terms the differences between Plato and Epicurus in terms of their attitude toward the senses. I think all of us are pretty familiar with the emphasis that Epicurus placed on it, but I wasn't prepared to cite chapter and verse on Plato or Aristotle, and without a firm point of reference it is not easy to illustrate the point.

I will trot out my usual cite to the appendix by DeLacy on Philodemus' On Methods of Inference, but we need specific quotes to make the issue more clear.

Much more needs to be done on this issue so when we produce the final edited product I will find a way to make clear that we are not the last word especially on these other philosophers, so we need to marshal our cites in better form.

The audio recording of Session Eight of our Book Review of A Few Days In Athens (this week on Chapter Seven) is now available:

The audio version of this episode is coming up soon. As I edit it I want to draw attention to a point made by Kevin after the twenty minute mark that the Stoics were arguing that "pursuit of pleasure can be dangerous for an Epicurean, but for a Stoic, pursuit of virtue can never be dangerous - so ovbiously pursuit of pleasure can never be part of pursuit of virtue."

It's an interesting point that bears further discussion as to its implications.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Fifteen of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world, and to Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean School.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Bailey:

Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.

[40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

[41] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

[42] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

[43] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

[44] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

[45] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

HICKS

Further this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature", the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."

[43] The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

YONGE

"Further [this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature"], the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things. "Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. "Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them - out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved - vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."]

[43] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

Episode 114 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus with first principles of Physics.

Episode 114 will be out soon (later today). In final editing, I am finding that I think we have significantly more work to do on the topic discussed near the end of the podcast, which is the line:

Quote

Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

We (correctly I think) discussed this as an example of Epicurus reasoning at a "logical" rather than "empirical" level, but I am not sure by the end of the podcast we had put this in perspective of how much of Epicurean physics follows exactly this course (reasoning from what is observable to draw things that are not observable). We're pretty comfortable that atoms are an example of things we can't see and yet we draw firm conclusions about, but in dealing with this conclusion (that there is nothing outside the universe which can come into it) we probably need to spend more time discussing what level of confidence Epicurus placed in this conclusion. Our discussion may not have been clear enough in bringing out that issue of level of confidence.

I'm not sure that what I am noting here deserves specific backtracking to cover more in the next episode, but I wanted this note here in case someone listening to the podcast also makes the same observation that this issue probably needs further treatment as part of our development of discussion of Epicurean logic.