Posts by Cassius

Wow it is interesting that they may have been added as late as that. I had presumed that the date was much earlier. Great research!

Well they are mainly addressed to the aspect of fear of nonexistence from the aspect of the feeling of pain from "missing out" on something after we are dead. The fear of any aspect of the experience of being dead in itself is dealt with fully as being impossible based in PD02.

Anonymous comment from a Facebook reader on Episode 95:

"About the latest podcast. As a beginning student of Epicureanism, I found Elaine's summary of pleasure and pain very useful in order not to end up in rabbit holes. I reread it regularly to keep seeing the main lines. You could also put a kind of warning on the texts on the website how reliable they are (Philodemus) by whom they were written and for what purpose (Cicero) and how they can best be interpreted. New people are warned then about the rabbit holes."

I am afraid my roach analogy betrays how much time I spend living in an old farmhouse.

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How are the gods described as spending their time? I was digging around but couldn't find what I was looking for. Is that in Cicero's writings?

That's a good question. I am personally applying that description of the best life from Torquatus in "On Ends" to the gods themselves, because I think that when he starts out that this is the best life we could imagine, that would apply to our imaginings of the gods as well. But your' right he doesn't explicitly say so -- as far as I am aware (unless there are some fragments in Philodemus "On Piety") the only description of the life of the gods occurs in Cicero's Velleius narrative in "On the Nature of the Gods"

Quote from Don

It seems people get hung up on the a- "not" prefix

Yes I am not primarily talking to you on this point, but to the external commentators who don't make your distinction of experiencing a positive feeling. It is my view that they are in fact either implicitly or explicitly trying to equate this particular statement "absence of pain" to "nothingness" and in so doing transmute Epicurean philosophy into Stoicism, Buddhism, or worse. What I plainly read in their material is that they are equating the particular experience of "calmness" or "tranquility to be the apex of human life and the goal of every human being. And to that I say "hogwash."

That is not the way the gods are described as spending their time, and it is not the way I want to spend mine. This is the way I understand to be the most accurate description of the best way of life, and therefore the goal to seek to be in line with at every point down that bowling alley:

Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?

I interpret the "with no pain to thwart or threaten them" as the ataraxia / aponia component of the description - as descriptors of various aspects of the goal, not as the goal itself. The advocates of ataraxia and/or aponia as of primary importance leave out everything else in that description, and it's my view that they do so intentionally to misrepresent the philosophy.

Not you or people here, of course, but the "commentators" I reference so often

Yes primarily PD19 and PD20 on unlimited time.

Kalosyni could you start a thread on those?

I am probably more with Kalosynis formulation rather than to say that ataraxia is equal to pleasure.

We're into the definition game when we say something "is equal to" something else, but this is something we have to be clear about. I would say that ataraxia is a way of experiencing some (any) other mental or bodily pleasure (without disturbance). I am still firmly maintaining that "absence of something" is not something that is a positive feeling or experience. It is something we can define as desirable, like absence of roaches in your house, but when you are experiencing absence of roaches as a good thing you are really experiencing your house in a way you like to experience it - without roaches.

Further, the real hazard of defining ataraxia as equal to pleasure plays into the hands of those who equate it with "peace of mind" and say that it is the true goal of life rather than pleasure itself.

This recalls Joshua saying in episode 95 that he does not enjoy spending too much time defining pleasure. I think that is a very good observation and it represents a goal we should have not to worry about these issues. But like Joshua also said after his first podcast, he felt like Cicero had us dancing like puppets on his arguments.

I don't think any of us here are negatively caught up in that, but a lot of people I see on the internet ARE. They desperately want to validate Buddhist or Stoic viewpoints by saying that the real goal of life is some sort of nothingness.

Everybody is entitled to their own opinion about things, but I think it's our responsibility (if we want more Epicurean friends) to make sure that argument doesn't get in the way of people escaping Buddhism and Stoicism to "the true philosophy."

I think so Kalosyni. The issue of length of life and worries about whether someone is missing something is probably more dealt with in other doctrines (fascinating in itself) such as those that talk about there being no need for unlimited time.

Humphries Book 1 of Lucretius:

1.07 You may,

Yourself, some time or other, feel like turning

Away from my instruction, terrified

By priestly rant. How many fantasies

They can invent to overturn your sense

Of logic, muddle your estates by fear!

And rightly so, for if we ever saw

A limit to our troubles, we'd be strong,

Resisters of religion, rant and cant,

But as things are, we have no chance at all

With all their everlasting punishments

Waiting us after death.

1743 Edition:

In either case, he doesn't appear to me the type of dynamic figure that I would be interested in taking lessons from!

Thanks for all that work Martin, and AMEN to THIS :

Quote from Martin

Once a friendship has been established, the bonding is actually much stronger and important than the equivalent of profitable trades between indifferent business partners.

well said!

Quote from Martin

Equating ataraxia with apatheia seems to be an oversimplification. Hossenfelder refers to his much bigger book on Hellenistic philosophy for details. For a proper understanding and possibly a refutation, that other book would have to be studied

And yes, it sounds like he is in the "Stoics and Epicureans are much the same" camp - despite the violent disagreement of ancient Stoics and Epicureans on the subject.

Quote from Martin

This resembles Hegelian style false logic and appears to be a misleading oversimplification. Epicurus' philosophy is better characterized by the statement that peace of mind is required to experience maximum pleasure but is not equal to pleasure.

I very much agree here too!

I don't have time to comment on the rest but I agree with your direction on each of them.

Quote from JJElbert

I suspect that it was precisely this realization that so disturbed Dante

I've never read the full work, but the realization of how "freeing" this insight is should in fact strike fear in the heart of every proponent of religion who seeks to keep people oppressed in fear of punishment after death.

I suppose some people may shy away from this one because there is implicitly the premise that if things get bad enough for you, you can "exit the stage when the play ceases to please you."

Probably that's not one of the things we like to dwell on the most, but serious problems are an inevitable part of life for most of us, and I do think it is "liberating" if you take the saying to heart in exactly the way that the statement says (by truly comprehending the implications).

It's always important to make sure not to talk too casually about this, given that some people can be apt to apply it too readily and to forget the other clear statements to the effect that the wise man is going to find very few situations where it is appropriate to consider "exiting the stage."

But taken seriously, and thoroughly, and all together, I think that the implications here are some of the most practical and important for many of us to consider.

Maybe we'll be "lucky" enough to drop dead of an unexpected heart attack when we are 95, but if we aren't so "lucky" then most of us are going to face decisions relevant to this saying.

And the whole point of it, I think, is that if we truly comprehend what it means, it's an example of "knowledge is power" and it's by no means something to stick in a drawer and forget about.

Sometimes I wonder why this is not the most famous saying of Epicurus of all, and it's right from his own pen, in his letter to Menoeceus:

"For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live." (Hicks)

"For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living." (Bailey)

"For there is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live." (Yonge)

"For there is nothing to be feared while living by the man who genuinely grasped the idea that there is nothing to be feared when not living." (DeWitt)

Here is the selection from Seneca I mentioned at the end of the episode. Since the important part of it is a direct attack on the dialecticians, it sounds purely Epicurean to me, rather than Stoic, so I consider this to be part of what Seneca "borrowed" from Epicurus:

(Seneca’s Letters – Book II Letter XLVIII)

In answer to the letter which you wrote me while traveling, – a letter as long as the journey itself, – I shall reply later. I ought to go into retirement, and consider what sort of advice I should give you. For you yourself, who consult me, also reflected for a long time whether to do so; how much more, then, should I myself reflect, since more deliberation is necessary in settling than in propounding a problem! And this is particularly true when one thing is advantageous to you and another to me. Am I speaking again in the guise of an Epicurean? But the fact is, the same thing is advantageous to me which is advantageous to you; for I am not your friend unless whatever is at issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between us a partnership in all our interests. There is no such thing as good or bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbor, if you would live for yourself. This fellowship, maintained with scrupulous care, which makes us mingle as men with our fellow-men and holds that the human race have certain rights in common, is also of great help in cherishing the more intimate fellowship which is based on friendship, concerning which I began to speak above. For he that has much in common with a fellow-man will have all things in common with a friend.

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.

I should deem your games of logic to be of some avail in relieving men’s burdens, if you could first show me what part of these burdens they will relieve. What among these games of yours banishes lust? Or controls it? Would that I could say that they were merely of no profit! They are positively harmful. I can make it perfectly clear to you whenever you wish, that a noble spirit when involved in such subtleties is impaired and weakened. I am ashamed to say what weapons they supply to men who are destined to go to war with fortune, and how poorly they equip them! Is this the path to the greatest good? Is philosophy to proceed by such claptrap and by quibbles which would be a disgrace and a reproach even for expounders of the law? For what else is it that you men are doing, when you deliberately ensnare the person to whom you are putting questions, than making it appear that the man has lost his case on a technical error? But just as the judge can reinstate those who have lost a suit in this way, so philosophy has reinstated these victims of quibbling to their former condition. Why do you men abandon your mighty promises, and, after having assured me in high-sounding language that you will permit the glitter of gold to dazzle my eyesight no more than the gleam of the sword, and that I shall, with mighty steadfastness, spurn both that which all men crave and that which all men fear, why do you descend to the ABC’s of scholastic pedants? What is your answer? Is this the path to heaven? For that is exactly what philosophy promises to me, that I shall be made equal to God. For this I have been summoned, for this purpose have I come.

Philosophy, keep your promise! Therefore, my dear Lucilius, withdraw yourself as far as possible from these exceptions and objections of so-called philosophers. Frankness, and simplicity beseem true goodness. Even if there were many years left to you, you would have had to spend them frugally in order to have enough for the necessary thing; but as it is, when your time is so scant, what madness it is to learn superfluous things! Farewell

Welcome to Episode Ninety-Six of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar, and who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have temporarily turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Today we continue with that material starting with section twelve.

Now let's join our panel for today's discussion, with Joshua and Don reading today's text:

[40] XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance.

[41] When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better? Imagine on the other hand a man worn by the greatest mental and bodily pains which can befall a human being, with no hope before him that his lot will ever be lighter, and moreover destitute of pleasure either actual or probable; what more pitiable object can be mentioned or imagined? But if a life replete with pains is above all things to be shunned, then assuredly the supreme evil is life accompanied by pain; and from this view it is a consistent inference that the climax of things good is life accompanied by pleasure. Nor indeed can our mind find any other ground whereon to take its stand as though already at the goal; and all its fears and sorrows are comprised under the term pain, nor is there any other thing besides which is able merely by its own character to cause us vexation or pangs. In addition to this the germs of desire and aversion and generally of action originate either in pleasure or in pain.

[42] This being so, it is plain that all right and praiseworthy action has the life of pleasure for its aim. Now inasmuch as the climax or goal or limit of things good (which the Greeks term telos) is that object which is not a means to the attainment of any thing else, while all other things are a means to its attainment, we must allow that the climax of things good is to live agreeably.

XIII. Those who find this good in virtue and virtue only, and dazzled by the glory of her name, fail to perceive what it is that nature craves, will be emancipated from heresy of the deepest dye, if they will deign to lend ear to Epicurus. For unless your grand and beautiful virtues were productive of pleasure, who would suppose them to be either meritorious or desirable? Yes, just as we regard with favour the physician’s skill not for his art's sake merely but because we prize sound health, and just as the pilot's art is praised on utilitarian and not on artistic grounds, because it supplies the principles of good navigation, so wisdom, which we must hold to be the art of living, would be no object of desire, if it were productive of no advantage; but it is in fact desired, because it is to us as an architect that plans and accomplishes pleasure.

[43] (You are now aware what kind of pleasure I mean, so the odium of the term must not shake the foundation of my argument.) For seeing that the life of men is most of all troubled by ignorance about the goodness and badness of things, and on account of this blindness men are often robbed of the intensest pleasures and also are racked by the severest mental pains, we must summon to our aid wisdom, that she may remove from us all alarms and passions, and stripping us of our heedless confidence in all false imaginations, may offer herself as our surest guide to pleasure. Wisdom indeed is alone able to drive sadness from our minds, and to prevent us from quaking with fear, and if we sit at her feet we may live in perfect calm, when once the heat of every passion has been cooled. Verily the passions are unconscionable, and overthrow not merely individual men, but whole families, and often shake the foundations of the entire commonwealth.

[44] From passions spring enmities, divisions, strifes, rebellions and wars. Nor do the passions only air their pride abroad; they do not merely attack others than ourselves in their blind onset; but even when imprisoned within our own breasts they are at variance and strife one with another; and the inevitable result of this is life of the bitterest kind, so that the wise man alone, who has cut back and pruned away all vanity and delusion, can live contentedly within the bounds prescribed by nature, emancipated from all sorrow and from all fear.

[45] I ask what classification is either more protable or more suited to the life of happiness than that adopted by Epicurus? He affirmed that there is one class of passions which are both natural and needful; another class which are natural without being needful ; a third class which are neither natural nor needful; and such are the conditions of these passions that the needful class are satisfied without much trouble or expenditure ; nor is it much that the natural passions crave, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount; and it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit to false passions.

[46] XIV. But if we see that all human life is agitated by confusion and ignorance, and that wisdom alone can redeem us from the violence of our lusts and from the menace of our fears, and alone can teach us to endure humbly even the outrages of fortune, and alone can guide us into every path which leads to peace and calm, why should we hesitate to say that wisdom is desirable in view of pleasures, and unwisdom to be shunned on account of annoyances?

Episode 95 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. Today we continue our examination of Epicurean Ethics by reading further into the Torquatus narrative contained in Cicero's "On Ends." Our topic today is understanding the concept of "Absence of Pain."

Wow Cleveland you inspired quite a history lesson from JJ there!

You will get lots of takers on the Buddhism question so I will leave that to others.

On the DeWitt book, as you read more of the "conventional" commentary you will see why Dewii is both held in disrepute in the "establishment" and why some of us like him!

As for Caesar, there were probably Epicureans on both sides of that.

Ok who is going to explain the "tantra" reference??