Posts by Cassius

Plus there is great pleasure in defeating your enemy - not something we would immediately look kindly on in polite company, but there nevertheless.

I think we once again have to separate pleasure as an ultimate goal, which we wouldn't generally pursue through a life of war, with the pleasures that can come through most any activity that is not always and every moment painful. And as much as we might want to call it that, many people do get great pleasure in war - at least when they are winning - just like boxers and others who fight for a living (all competitive sports?) Find it very exhilarating - again at least in some moments.

Just posted this on facebook as a reminder:

Last week we had eight people at our first Wednesday Open Invitation Zoom, and we invite both those from last week and new visitors this week to attend. The link is the same as last week (if you saved it) - otherwise follow the Eventbrite link below:

Several of us who are a part of either this Epicurean Philosophy Facebook group or of the EpicureanFriends.com forum are working on a new friendship-building project: a weekly hour-long Zoom meeting of those who are interested in casual "live" conversation about Epicurean philosophy. We intend to promote this beyond Facebook, so we are setting up an Eventbrite page to coordinate the Zoom link across other social media sites. Our second session will be this coming Wednesday May 18 at 8:30 PM Eastern USA time, and you can find a link and further description at the Eventbrite page below. The page references "tickets" but of course admission is free. No doubt we'll go through a shakedown period as we get off the ground, but we hope to develop something that will be a positive addition to the existing Epicurean internet communities. Let us know in the thread below if you have any questions. https://www.eventbrite.com/e/epicurean-op…ts-335486799047

Yes a very poor mental image :-). We need one better for lancing the boil, and a better term than "hedonist". At the very least a modifier for it, but since hedone isn't even an original English world we need to do better.

This far we are at "Epicurean" but that doesn't advance the goal toward being self-explanatory.

Call it a definitional issue or philosophical issue or just call it a word game it you must, but this has got to be one of our key challenges. How do we make this so clear that the terminology becomes second nature?

There is NEVER any goal that is a goal in itself other than pleasure, and there is no contradiction in at the same time saying that we sometimes choose pain in order to achieve pleasure.

This confusion is at the root of so much confusion.

As weve just seen in going through AFDIA, people get attracted to "pleasure" but they often never shake the premise that they came in with - they think there is something higher than pleasure which has to steer the ship toward some other goal to save us from ourselves and from overindulgence.

The philosophical boil has to be popped:. We sometimes choose pain in our daily activities due to circumstances, but our goal in making every choice and avoidance decision is always pleasure.

Maybe it helps to reduce pleasure and pain to "feeling" and simply say that it is feeling that makes life worthwhile. Yes we sometimes make choices that cause temporary annoyances to our feelings, but we can't ever lose sight that it is for the sake of our best "feeling" that we do everything.

What we don't feel is, like death, nothing to us.

Quote from Godfrey

I ask this because my reaction to this specific quote is that it’s even more necessary to seek pleasure and avoid pain in an unsafe environment.

Yes I think you've pointed out the issue in Kalosyni's original wording.

From the highest-level point of view, our orientation is that we are ALWAYS seek to obtain pleasure and avoid pain.

The issue is that from the moment-to-moment point of view we can and often do choose pain so as to obtain a greater pleasure, or to avoid a worse pain.

This is the continuing problem of labels like "hedonism" and accepting the negative stereotype that the Epicurean is going to be a slacker and pursue momentary or lesser pleasures rather than to undergo the pain and effort that are often required to obtain more important goals. Epicurus makes very clear that that is not true, but calling him a "hedonist" or a "pleasure-seeker" obscures the big picture given the corruption of the language.

I agree with what Kalosyni wrote.

Also:

Quote from Kalosyni

So in some sense happiness and joy are a product of peace. It would not be safe to spend too much time "seeking happiness" in an unsafe environment.

And in other cases happiness and joy can be the product of war, if under the circumstances war is necessary to obtain or preserve the peace.

My point to emphasize would be that in the end there is nothing - not even "peace" which is desirable in and of itself other than pleasure, and everything else has to be considered a contextual tool that may or may not be appropriate to choose at a particular moment.

"Ultimately" the goal is pleasure, but at any particular moment our context may demand that we choose actions that are for the moment painful.

Yes that is what I was thinking Don. I am thinking the general thread underlying all of this is that we must keep alert to a dual level of "existence" - (1) the level on which we exist, which is very real to us, and in which we experience an "up or down" and at the same time (2) our understanding of the "global" picture in which our reality is not absolutely the same to everyone, but others have different ups and downs relative to their location.

To me at least one of the main parts of the significance of the line of reasoning is that it acclimates us to realize our own reality is important and yet that ours is not the only reality and we have to be aware of both.

As I am on the alert to campaign against nihilism what this signifies to me personally is that while we can agree with Democritus that if you drill deep enough you find nothing but atoms and void, that does not mean that the level at which we experience our world is less "real" or "important" or "meaningful" than the level of the atoms.

I don't think it's possible to keep an even perspective on both realities unless you're aware of this relationship so I see this as directly practical from that point of view.

So we keep aware that only the atoms have eternal and unchanging properties, but that from that basis we derive the changing qualities which we experience at our level of existence.

Joshua hit on this in the episode that we recorded two days ago, that that relationship between the properties and qualities would explain how some things are possible and some are not, the deepset boundary mark set forever between what can be and what can not.

A good extra quote from that source - thanks Don!

For not only does "he who has least need of the morrow," as Epicurus107 says...

Plutarch • On Tranquillity of Mind

Here's the article / commentary I would like us to consider as part of our final session and recap of our Book Review of A Few Days In Athens. Let's also use this thread to record comments and reactions after completing the chapter-by-chapter review. In the case of our Zoom review from the spring of 2022, let's specifically try to include this in our discussion for Sunday May 22.

As we've done throughout the book review, let's be sure to include comments from both of these perspectives (1) How faithful is the book to Epicurus - meaning how useful is it as a method of discussing Epicurean Philosophy? and (2) What do we think about Wright's message itself?

Thread

Problems in Frances Wright's "A Few Days in Athens"

I have dragged my feet on reading Frances Wright’s fictionalized account of a student in Epicurus’ Garden, partly because the language is so flowery that the passages I’ve seen quoted put me off. I’ve finally tackled it, and I have some thoughts to share. My main conclusion is that there are too many serious flaws to recommend it as a representation of Epicurean Philosophy without any accompanying commentary.

Misleading Implications about Pleasure as Restraint

Frances Wright has Epicurus say…

Elayne

October 22, 2020 at 3:08 PM

For some reason I had this fragment on my mind this afternoon. I was thinking that I had read some commentary on it somewhere (I think by Sedley) but I couldn't find it before posting this -- and I had a hard time finding even this following text. At the very least I'll highlight the passage to start a thread on it, because I think it makes a point that we don't discuss often:

U555

Plutarch, _On Peace of Mind,_ 2 p. 465F (Johannes Stobaeus, _Anthology,_ 29.79):

For this reason not even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.

I hate it when I look for a section during a recording and can't find it. Here is what I was looking for in regard to Frances Wright suggesting that Epicurus' views would allow even for alien visitation to Earth, which - even if true - would still not be relevant to supernatural creation of the universe.

Quote

Of the sentient beings comprised in the infinity of matter I know but those which I behold. I set no limits to the number of those which I behold not; no bounds to their power. One or many may have given directions to the elementary atoms, and may have fashioned this earth as the potter fashions its clay. Beings possessing such power may exist, and may have exercised it. All-powerful still they are not, or being so they are wicked: evil exists. I know not what may be — but this my moral sense tells me cannot be — a fashioner of the world I inhabit, in his nature all-good and all-powerful. I see yet another impossibility; a fashioner of this world in his nature all-good and fore-knowing. Granting the possibility of the attributes, their united existence were an impossible supposition in the architect of our earth.”

Our discussion of Chapter Fifteen of A Few Days In Athens is now available:

Cites relevant to today's topic:

U244

**Sextus Empiricus, _Against the Logicians_ II (_Against the Dogmatists,_ II).9:** Epicurus said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is _real._ And that is why, in giving a formalization of the _true_ and the _false_, he says, “that which is such as it is said to be, is true” and “that which is not such as it is said to be, is false.”

Letter to Herodotus

[51] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses. And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it; and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.

Happy Birthday GilbertoMoncada ! if you're still receiving our messages from Epicureanfriends we'd be happy to hear from you.

I haven't had time to read the article but in response to the topic question, it's according to Epicurus surely "yes you can seek happiness" but perhaps "can you be full of joy" is more difficult. Being 100% "full of joy" might be analytically only something that an Epicurean god can theoretically achieve in the intermundia, because we always have aches and pains that technically prevent us from being "full."

But Epicurus' last statement about the pleasure he was able to achieve even during the process of dying from a painful disease would be an example that as long as we are alive we can always seek and hope to achieve some amount of pleasure, even if it is only pleasant memories.

So it would be my view that the topic question:

Can you seek happiness and be full of joy when there is XXXX?

Would almost always be answered "yes" from an Epicurean perspective. The only exception I can think of would be those situations where you decide that death is preferable to living on, and even in those situations you are still using a pleasure/pain analysis to guide your decision.

I think that's the real "wrong answer" implied by the question -- it's implying that there is some standard of conduct (implicitly religious or humanistic or in some way absolute) to which you must conform that overrides the pleasure/pain calculation under XXXX circumstances.

Happy Birthday to GilbertoMoncada! Learn more about GilbertoMoncada and say happy birthday on GilbertoMoncada's timeline: GilbertoMoncada

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty Two of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue in Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and address some difficult material about the properties and qualities of atoms and bodies and what it means to exist. We probably raise more issues than we answer in this episode, so please review the show notes and we will come back to these issues in the next show.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey

[67] Furthermore, we must clearly comprehend as well, that the incorporeal in the general acceptation of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existence. Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void: and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies. So that those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking idly. For it would not be able to act or be acted on in any respect, if it were of this nature. But as it is, both these occurrences are clearly distinguished in respect of the soul.

[68] Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation and remembers what was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well.

[69] Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that), nor that they absolutely do not exist, nor that they are some other kind of incorporeal existence accompanying body, nor that they are material parts of body: rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together to form it (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them.

All these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished, provided always that the aggregate body goes along with them and is never wrested from them, but in virtue of its comprehension as an aggregate of qualities acquires the predicate of body.

[70] Furthermore, there often happen to bodies and yet do not permanently accompany them accidents, of which we must suppose neither that they do not exist at all nor that they have the nature of a whole body, nor that they can be classed among unseen things nor as incorporeal. So that when according to the most general usage we employ this name, we make it clear that accidents have neither the nature of the whole, which we comprehend in its aggregate and call body, nor that of the qualities which permanently accompany it, without which a given body cannot be conceived.

[71] But as the result of certain acts of apprehension, provided the aggregate body goes along with them, they might each be given this name, but only on occasions when each one of them is seen to occur, since accidents are not permanent accompaniments. And we must not banish this clear vision from the realm of existence, because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it is joined nor that of the permanent accompaniments, nor must we suppose that such contingencies exist independently (for this is inconceivable both with regard to them and to the permanent properties), but, just as it appears in sensation, we must think of them all as accidents occurring to bodies, and that not as permanent accompaniments, or again as having in themselves a place in the ranks of material existence; rather they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be.

HICKS

[67]There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul.

[68] If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

[69]Moreover, shapes and colours, magnitudes and weights, and in short all those qualities which are predicated of body, in so far as they are perpetual properties either of all bodies or of visible bodies, are knowable by sensation of these very properties: these, I say, must not be supposed to exist independently by themselves (for that is inconceivable), nor yet to be non-existent, nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them, though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature.

They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

[70] Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal. Hence, using the term 'accidents'04 in the commonest sense, we say plainly that 'accidents' have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of.

[71]And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident. But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole – by us called body – to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole. Nor, on the other hand, must we suppose the accident to have independent existence (for this is just as inconceivable in the case of accidents as in that of the permanent properties); but, as is manifest, they should all be regarded as accidents, not as permanent concomitants, of bodies, nor yet as having the rank of independent existence. Rather they are seen to be exactly as and what sensation itself makes them individually claim to be.

This coming Wednesday the 18th of May will be the third Wednesday of the month, and in accord with our planning this would be the week that we talk about art and music and poetry. The way we described it at Eventbrite was:

- Third Wednesday of the Month - Epicurean Favorites Art / Music Discussion - Bring music (e.g. a YouTube link) or a poem or short writing that you think best represents some part of Epicurean Philosophy, to share with the group and discuss.

Let's use this thread to make suggestions as to topics to include - which means if you have a suggestion and would like to talk about it, please post it here.

And a word to the wise: Kalosyni has promised that if we don't have enough volunteers she will monopolize the whole time herself! So please let us know you thoughts here.

If you don't get it written it's only because you didn't spend enough time in "Sunday School" to motivate yourself!