Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

I think Godfrey 's point that desires (επιθυμία ) and pleasure (ηδονή ) are two different things is a very important one, and conflating the two is part of the trouble in discussing this topic.

I think we had a good discussion about some of this last night.

I think most people will have no problem understanding that pleasure and pain are feelings.

But what are "desires"? I presume you are saying that they may generate feelings if met or unmet, but are not feelings themselves?

So how in plain English do we suggest Epicurus was considering desires to be described? Are they goals? Opinions? Thoughts? Will?

And how would this relate to the apparent use of the terms choices and avoidances?

I didn't think we disagreed on that - so very good.

I keep coming back in my mind to one of the biggest challenges here being the over-restrictive definition of pleasure that we live under today.

It's almost as if people today think that if you aren't presently engaged in sex or drinking bouts or massages then you aren't experiencing pleasure, and they INSIST on separating out what we might call "intellectual" or "emotional" feelings of satisfaction and other "background feelings" as something other than "Pleasure."

I think that extended quote from DeWitt is right on point with this, and its something with which I think everyone here on the forum basically agrees: that if you feel ANYTHING at all (and we are constantly feeling lots of things as part of being alive) then those feelings are either (1) pleasure or (2) pain.

This isn't psychological babble based on Epicurus having an "ebullient" personality like a child or a puppy or cat who is "easily amused."

It's the foundational understanding about a universe in which there isn't a god to tell us what to do, and there aren't absolute ideal forms of right and wrong to go by. The only stop and go standard given us by nature is Feeling (pleasure and pain). All good and evil comes to us through sensation, meaning what we feel, and the realization that this is the true foundation of morality is such a huge "fight" to get people to understand and accept that all the rest can sort of fade into the background.

As DeWitt points out, it was apparently argued in the ancient world (and still is today) that Feeling/Pleasure-pain can't serve as the guide of life because it isn't always available -- sometimes we're just numb -- and to what do we look when we are just feeling numb?

That's a decent argument against looking to Pleasure as your ultimate guide, so Epicurus had to meet it. And I think it's a good argument to point out that there are an innumerable number of types of pleasures, and some or other are "always" available in life -- even if it's only closing your eyes and remembering good things from the past. But the "always" has to be put in quotes because there are times when pain becomes so sharp and overwhelming and with no hope of relief that you do in fact choose to "exit the stage" under those circumstances. Epicurean philosophy isn't magical and can't fix every problem - which is why you do work hard to plan ahead and set future goals (as you're saying) to work toward future pleasure even when you're in a lot of pain.

And I feel confident that we should label that feeling that comes from looking ahead to future pleasure as - itself - a pleasure.

Maybe in the end Cicero realized the importance of this argument and that's why he shot so many barrages at it and tried to make it look ridiculous.

Remember to join us tonight if you can:

I took that as a statement that pleasure is not always ever-present in one form or another, meaning that pleasure might not always be available as a guide.

This next section is directly relevant to what we have been discussing, and shows how DeWitt was on top of this issue and did not consider it a problem at all. He point out that Epicurus endorsed BOTH types of pleasure, and did not pursue one to the exclusion of the other. Instead of obsessing over the static/active issue like the modern commentators do, DeWitt never skips a beat: but simply incorporates the issue into the main body of the philosophy under "Pleasure" as the word is normally understood, and goes on down the road. This is well before Gosling & Taylor produced their analysis or Nikolsky produced his refinement. That's one of the reasons I continue to advocate that new people read this book first, even before they wade into Wikipedia or any of the other Cambridge or other "handbooks."

I am kind of surprised that you take that position so I need to reflect on it, but given that we are positing that the healthy state of the body is itself pleasurable, and that some degree of pleasure is always available mentally (through memories at least) I would think it is true that "some" degree of pleasure is always available, even if it is drastically offset by a particular pain.

We probably need to discuss PD03 in this context (The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.) but I think in past discussions most people have agreed that PD3 does not mean that different parts of the body and/or mind cannot be experiencing pleasure and pain at the same time, with the classic example being that of Epicurus taking pleasure in his friends and memories even though he was dying from a painful physical disease.

I think this is also referenced in the "I call you to continuous pleasure" passage and perhaps others.

EAHP Page 66:

EAHP Page 226:

EAHP Page 239:

I *think* this is the place we get into the issue of what is a concept and what is a feeling.

Pleasure can be thought of as a feeling which serves as a guide because it is ever-present in one form or another.

As for what the "goal" is - is not the "goal" something more conceptual that is not presently with us and may never be reached?

I don't profess an answer to that but we've seen a good many discussions about how "happiness" might be thought of as more of a concept.

And back on DeWitt's point, these discussions also remind me of what I think is (to me) the most clear and unmistakeable way of referring to pleasure -- as "the guide" of life more so than "the good."

Lucretius Book 2

At quidam contra haec, ignari materiai,

naturam non posse deum sine numine reddunt

tanto opere humanis rationibus atmoderate

tempora mutare annorum frugesque creare 170

et iam cetera, mortalis quae suadet adire

ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas

et res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent,

ne genus occidat humanum.

So I tend to think of DeWitt's point being that life is our greatest "good in terms of an 'asset'" while pleasure is the "guide" for what we do with that asset.

Pleasure as "the guide" seems a lot more compelling to me in many cases. Trying to decide what "the good" is often seems like a word game that never has an end, sort of like Epicurus' talking about walking around endlessly harping on the meaning of good.

But seeing pleasure as "the guide" of life is (to me) a lot more clear. I know what a guide is. And I know that even with a guide I can make mistakes, or get sick, or for any number of reasons fail to reach my destination. It's like that cliche we hear a lot today about how "the journey is more important than the destination." Yes I want a good idea of what the destination looks like so I can set off with that goal in mind, but for the day to day walking along the path to that final goal, which I may be unlucky enough never to reach, what I want is a reliable GUIDE. Lucretius' "Divine Pleasure, Guide of Life" is really a good phrase for that.

I am glad you reminded me of this section from Lucretius, the opening of book 3. For all the talk we see from the commentators about the intricacy of pleasure analysis, we hardly see any development and dwelling on this issue that after life there is nothing. And that's even among those who say that they know that the soul "consists wholly in the blood" and so these people need nothing else from philosophy on that point. They're just going through the motions, repeating that "death is nothing to us" but then glazing it over and skipping on to doctrines that they think that they can meld with their pre-existing philosophies.

When the truth is these people are not internalizing the real significance of death, when they should be acting on it with urgency and talking emphatically about how important it is to "make hay while the sun shines."

From book 3:

[31] Since then I have taught what are the first seeds and principles of things, how they differ in their figures, and of themselves fly about, beaten by mutual strokes, and from them all beings are produced, the nature of the Mind and of the Soul comes next to be explained in these my lines, and all the terrors of infernal pains banished, and headlong driven quite away, that from the bottom so disturb the life of man, and cover all things with the gloom of death, and leave no place for pure and unmixed pleasure to possess.

For what men vainly talk, that disease and an infamous life are more to be feared than the terrors of death, and they know that the soul consists wholly in the blood, and therefore they want no assistance from our philosophy, I would have you observe that those boasts are thrown out more for the sake of praise and popular breath (if their vanity by chance leads that way) than that they believe any such thing; for let these very men be banished from their country, and driven into a desert far from human sight, stained with the guilt of the foulest crimes, yet they live on, afflicted as they are, with all sorts of misery, and wherever the wretches come, they fall a-sacrificing, and slay black cattle, and offer victims to the infernal gods, and in this deplorable state they, with more than common zeal, apply themselves to the offices of religion.

And therefore it is proper to view men rather under a doubtful fortune, and observe how they behave in circumstances of distress, for then they speak truth from the bottom of their hearts, the mask is pulled off, and the real man shows undisguised.

[59] Besides, covetousness and the blind desire of honors, which compel unhappy men to exceed the bounds of right, and urge on the partners and assistants of their crimes to strive day and night with the utmost pains to arrive at the height of wealth: these plagues of life are chiefly nourished by fear of death; for infamy, and contempt, and sharp want seem far removed from a sweet and pure state of life, and, as it were, hover about the gates of death; and wherefore will men, possessed by a false fear, labour to avoid, and stand at the remotest distance from them, they add to their heaps by civil war, and, insatiable as they are, double their riches, heaping one murder upon another. They laugh with cruel delight at the sad funeral of a brother, and hate and fear the entertainments of their nearest relations.

[74] From the same cause and from the same fear, envy often becomes the tormentor of mankind; they complain that one is raised to power before their eyes, another to respect, a third distinguished by shining honors, whilst they lie buried in obscurity, and are trod upon like dirt, and so they pine themselves to death for the sake of statues and a name; and some men, from a fear of death, conceive so great a hatred for life, and the preservation of their being, that in a gloomy fit they become their own executioners; not considering that this fear of death is the source of all their cares, this breaks through all shame, dissolves the bonds of friendship, and in short overturns the foundations of all goodness; for some we see betray their country and their dear parents, striving by that means to deliver themselves from death, and the pains of Hell.

For as boys tremble, and fear every thing in the dark night, so we, in open day, fear things as vain and little to be feared, as those that children quake at in the dark, and fancy advancing towards them. This terror of the mind, this darkness then, not the sun’s beams, nor the bright rays of day can scatter, but the light of Nature and the rules of reason.

[94]First then, I say, the mind of man (which we commonly call the soul) in which is placed the conduct and government of life, is part of man no less than the hand, the foot, the eyes, are parts of the whole animal;

1. Yes feel better soon!

2. I have no real desire to defend the way DeWitt made his point but I do think he was on to something that is significant and not ludicrous. He's following through in the insight that he expressed as pleasure has no meaning except to the living. That's a clear application of all good and evil comes to us through sensation, which only occurs during life, and that point (there IS no afterlife!) Is of huge significance.

As I commented to Nate yesterday, how could anyone who sincerely holds this belief NOT see that every minute of life is valuable in an eternity of nothingness and want to get the most out of life that is possible?

Lucretius has an extended passage on this if I recall - where he points out that some who say that they understand the point still seem to fear death and rush to make sacrifices and worry what happens to their body - because they don't really believe that death is the end.

Life itself is not the guide - that would be circular and Dewitt doesn't say that, as you point out. It's the difference between your greatest "asset" (for most people a house or where they live) and what they do with that house (enjoy life in it).

Dewitts formulation of this in my view isnt clear because he doesn't carry it far enough and defend Epicurus far enough - but as is usually the case in my view, he is "in tune" with Epicurus' overall view of life - because he appreciates it and is attempting to follow it to its logical conclusions - in a way that most writers don't even try.

Most are caught up so much in this "absence of pain" rabbit hole trying to force it into their ascetic or Buddhist or stoic or even judeo+Christian paradigms that they miss the real foundation - that when you die you are gone forever and thus you "seize the day."

Dewitt slips sometimes because he isn't Dewittian (rebellious against the orthodoxy) enough.

More idle chatter from me::

To me personally I have always focused on this issue of mortality of the soul as more than enough - alone - to justify devotion to Epicurean philosophy. For someone who is convinced firmly that you only live once, how could you possibly NOT want to get as much pleasure as you can out of the limited time you have?

So it has always seemed to me as someone truly convinced of personal mortality of the soul that any hint of "asceticism" is little more than absurd and ridiculous, and would have been ruled out of court immediately by Epicurus just as fast as he ruled out gluttony and overindulgence.

Wow thanks for that Nate!

"appear to have been accused of Epicureanism or of the denial of personal immortality during their lives and, by extension, of irreligion and a sceptical attitude towards Christian revelation.”

It's interesting to me that they were focusing well on core issues that are in fact core, rather than arguing about things like gluttony vs asceticism which are almost side issues, but which seem to consume all the attention today.

Great questions Godfrey. No doubt there are going to be differences in emphasis due to who he is talking to and at what stage of life. However I don't think these different things we are discussing are ultimately contradictory -- I think that they all can be reconciled quite well if one just takes a very expansive and sweeping definition of the word "Pleasure" and realizes that all qualifications and types of pleasure are going to come UNDER the umbrella of the main term.

And I do think that's an important point -- I think the motivation of the "Wikipedians" is to reduce the types of pleasure to only those which are "approved" and that makes way for Platonic / Aristotelian categorization into "better or worse" pleasures. And in fact we all do have personal preferences that determine how we personally weight (feel) pleasures and pains, but given that there is no god, no fate, no hard determinism, those are personal choices and not philosophical grounded. We as philosophers aren't gods and there aren't Platonic ideals and we can describe out thoughts to other people, but we can't make them "feel" the we that we do ourselves. The only ranking that works philosophically is that ALL pleasures are desirable / good, it's only that in certain contexts some pleasures cost more in pain than they are worth to the individual involved. If you remember that the ultimate term is Pleasure and that all the different feelings just have to be sorted out personally according to our personal feelings, then you're fine. But if you arrogate to yourself the right to tell everyone that your particular ranking is the "noble" or "worthy" or "divine" one, then you've become a priest and standing in the shoes of the type of supernatural god that we believe does not exist.

You know there's another aspect of this discussion that's relevant to the presentation of Epicurean philosophy to "normal people" and we probably ought to consider it now too:

Quote

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things.

Does this mean that Epicurus has said (elsewhere) that he wouldn't know what the good is without the pleasures of sex and other activities which we'd all agree to be very "active" in nature, but that now that he knows what the good is he's going to throw them all out and live as "passively" and "quietly" as possible? That's the way I see this passage being interpreted all the time (again referring to the "modern commentator" world in general, not here.

To me, readings of that phrase that are consistent with the whole of the philosophy, and with the clear statement that he wouldn't know the good without active and indeed joy/delight/exuberant pleasures, is something like this:

"I've told you that "Pleasure" is the goal of life, but note that I have not told you which pleasures too pursue, and I have not told you that having sex 24/7 or having one drink after another 24/7 or partying 24/7 is the ultimate goal of life. If you do those things, any normal person in normal circumstances is going to destroy their lives and suffer much more pain that they will conclude is far worse than the pleasures they gained. What I am telling you is that the best you can do in life is to pursue pleasure prudently. Yes you should pursue the pleasures that allowed me to see what the good is, but pursue them in an intelligent (like I did) so that you don't run yourself into an early grave from all the partying. And when I say pursue those pleasures prudently, I don't mean abstain from them totally, or live in a cave, because the man who engages in too much frugality is making just as bad a mistake as the man who indulges in excess. You can always remember what the goal looks like by this mental exercise: "Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain. What possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement."

Quote from Godfrey

Also something along the lines of "perception/sensations

Yes it always seems there is more to add, and it's always a fun and productive exercise to think about what else needs to be made clear "up front" to introduce someone to Epicurus.

But no matter how long I think about it I can't figure out an appropriate occasion to say "You know all the basic stuff I told you about pleasure? You can now put that out of your mind because what I really want you to pursue is this Greek word that I can't really translate for you exactly into English but it sounds like "catatonic."

Quote from Kalosyni

And I agree on not using the word "katastematic"

That would be a wrong conclusion to draw from my rant.

Ironically it is essential to use the word at proper times and contexts, because otherwise there will be no way to unwind the distortions Of two thousand years.

So I am not saying that we should never use the word, just that we should be clear how we are using it, and maybe above all else be considerate of when and where and how we use it, because virtually no one who is not a professional philosopher will have any clue what it means. Overuse of untranslated words can serve in talking to normal people as a barrier to the understanding of what should be and is a very simple philosophy that is not difficult at all to explain:

- There is no supernatural realm and no meddling God or gods.

- There is no heaven and hell and no existence after death.

- There is no fate and you are not a billiard ball.

-There is no absolute right / wrong / sin/ evil / good / virtue / depravity.

- Nature gave us only pleasure and pain as guides for us to make decisions on how to live.

- Do your best to intelligently maximize the pleasure and minimize pain in your life because you only live once.

I suppose one subtitle for this forum ought to be borrowed from Dewitts article: "Philosophy For the Millions!"

I wake up this morning thinking about this, which is not a response to present interlocutors but to the Wikipedia-Epicureans.

If there is really one major primary and unyielding position I have on the "katastematic / kinetic" pleasure issue, it comes down to this:

I am going to presume that the goal of this website and at least most of our joint work here is to make Epicurean philosophy understandable and practical to a new generation of people. Given that presumption, and that the presumption that they aren't minting too many new people whose first language is ancient Greek, then it is imperative that the word "katastematic" not be left in Greek, but be translated into plain English. "Kinetic" needs the same treatment, but at least given our modern usage of the word "kinetic, that word is not so ambiguous and amorphous. I suspect what we are reading into it given the English version is not faithful to what was really meant philosophically by "kinetic," because Kinetic" today has an implication of "frenzy" which is not positive. But at least "kinetic" is not grossly useless and meaningless and amorphous like "katastematic."

So what are we REALLY talking about in this issue?

Did Epicurus hold that the "healthy functioning of the organism" is a pleasure? HECK YES!

Did Epicurus hold that a background sense of calmness and tranquility is also a pleasure? HECK YES!

Did Epicurus hold that a confident continuation of our present state of pleasure is also a pleasure? HECK YES!

Did Epicurus hold that our ideal state of functioning to be filling our experience pleasures and thereby eliminating from our experience all pains? HECK YES!

And I suspect that we could go on and on, as long as we are clear what we are talking about in our native language.....

However for purposes of explaining Epicurus to other people and even most of us understanding it for ourselves, we need to be clear on what Epicurus did not do:

Did Epicurus hold that he had come up with a semi-mystical concept so subtle and so exotic that no one but a Greek uttering the incantation "katastematic" could understand what he was talking about? HECK NO!

Did Epicurus ever hint that "katastematic" pleasure, even when translated into understandable terms, was a special type of "fancy pleasure" (Elayne's term) which supercedes and transcends all other types of pleasure and is the true goal of life? HECK NO!

It's really only when we constantly talk about a word that no one today truly knows all the shades of (since we are not ancient Greeks) that we find the divide unbridgeable. Explain what is meant in clear terms and we can then agree where possible and reduce the disagreements to clearly defined issues, but until we explain in clear English terms what we are talking about, we just spin our wheels endlessly.

No one here at EpicureanFriends is guilty of what I am complaining about, and just to be super-clear I am 100% confident of the motives of everyone in this present conversation. But the Wikipedia-world is dominated by people who are perpetuating just this kind of confusing, and they are doing it because they will not accede to "PLEASURE" being what Epicurus held to be the goal and guide of life. And getting back to the opening premise, if the goal of the website here is to help explain Epicurus to a new generation of people, then we have to get ready to stand up to the Wikipedia-mindset on this issue.

I had a chance to re-read the G&T and Nikolsky articles over the last 24 hours and one comment that I think is worth making is this:

It is DEFINITELY important to Epicurus to have a sweeping definition of pleasure that includes basically any feeling of any kind that a person feels in any way. That means not only the "exuberant" activities like "sex, drugs, and rock and roll" but also all feels which are conscious in any way of the "smooth functioning" of the organism. This i take to be the meaning of Torquatus' example as to why the hand needs nothing more, because it is not in pain -- it is smoothly functioning, which is itself pleasurable.

It's this wide scope and sweep of the word "pleasure" that is important, because it is fundamental objection to Pleasure as the guide goal to observe that we don't always have the ability to pursue "sex, drugs, and rock and roll." Sometimes in life about all we can do, or should do, is calmly sit still and reflect on things that are mentally pleasurable to think about.

Those "quiet times" have to fall under the term "pleasure" in order for "pleasure" to be available to everyone everywhere except in the most extremely difficult of conditions -- and in those, where no pleasure of any kind is available or to be hoped for, that's where you can "exit the stage when the play ceases to please us.

But what I read in G&T and Nikolsky is pointing up that Epicurus' primary objective was to establish "Pleasure' as the guide/goal, and for that reason he (legitimately) wanted to include each and every and all experience of smooth functioning as under the umbrella of pleasure.

It's therefore a mistake polemically to deprecate any kind of pleasure, "static" or "active", because each have the place and time and appropriateness in life and an appreciation for ALL of them, working together as team, that's necessary in order to uphold "Pleasure" as the ultimate end rather than "virtue" or "godliness" or the other competitors for the title of "highest good."

In fact Don I suspect that after you read them you are going to conclude that their conclusions actually are consistent with yours.

The issue is much more on the level of "perspective" than it is on the details of ways that pleasure can be usefully discussed.

My best estimate of why this issue is significant is that:

- some people focus on the subject as a matter of considering details of types of pleasure, which is useful in itself, yes, but

- some people are focusing on the "polemical" aspect of the debate, in certain aspects of the details can be taken out of context to make it appear that Epicurus was being inconsistent, illogical, impractical, and useless. That's what Cicero was doing in general - attacking Epicurus - and so from the perspective of starting with the basics before moving into the details, these people see that these details can be used as a way to undermine the big picture. The examples from wikipedia are what we face today but it's interesting to note that Nikolsky published his paper in 2001 and thought it accurate to say:

"Practically every modern survey of the Epicurean conception of pleasure begins by saying that Epicurus' concept of pleasure was twofold: in the opinion of researchers, Epicurus distinguished two kinds of pleasure — a `static' pleasure or a pleasure 'in a state of rest' and a 'kinetic' pleasure or a pleasure 'in motion.'"

And G&T Published in 1981 and saw the same issue then.

The problem stretches much further back than that too.

Show notes: The Richard Dawkins article cited in the show:

Edge.org