Posts by Cassius

Just in case someone reading this thread is not thoroughly familiar with these passages that are critical to this conversation:

First Epicurus quoted by Plutarch:

Quote

U423

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

Second Torquatus in Book One of On Ends, implying that he himself (Torquatus) disagrees with Epicurus as to what kind of proof is necessary:

Quote

IX. ‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations.

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that re is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings.

Another way of stating the issue:

If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."

But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"

As I wake up this morning I think it is important to address Don's argument about "Why the hesitancy?"

I am sure I have said written many times in the past, and will in the future, that pleasure is the greatest good. So why the hesitancy now?

It's not just a matter of wanting to agree or disagree with DeWitt, that's for sure. I think what we are sensing as we drill down on the question is that we need to figure out why Epicurus seemed to be treating this question carefully, which even Torquatus seems to admit when he said that Epicurus denied the necessity to construct a logical argument that pleasure is good (if that was the point of Torquatus comment).

Something similar seems to run through several questions. How can a thing be judged "good" unless it bring pleasure? Is virtue itself a pleasure, or is it something that brings pleasure?

No one would argue, I think, that the words pleasure and good mean exactly the same thing. They don't . We define pleasure as a feeling (I think) but what is it that tells us that something is "good"? Is there some other quality besides feeling pleasure that defines good? If so what is it?

I think Epicurus would clearly say that pleasure is the guide of life because we feel it to be so just like we see or hear.

But to say that pleasure is "good" or especially "the greatest good" seems to require some other criteria - almost mystical in nature - which I can see good reasons to be careful about.

Yes it is clear that pleasure is the only thing desirable in and of itself, and if we want to define "good" as desirable in and of itself" then pleasure is not only the highest but the only good. But is that so clearly what we mean by the word "good?

We have the word guide which is clear. What is added by calling it "good" or calling pain "evil"?

When talking to Plato and Stoics who insist on talking about good, it is natural to answer "pleasure".

But very possibly Epicurus did not want to let THEM set the terms of the debate? And perhaps we should be careful as well?

As a categorical answer for philosophical debate, I agree with you. And as a statement of the *guide* of life I would agree even more. But as a practical and discrete definition of "greatest good" that an average person can apply, I don't think that the single word is sufficient to convey the full meaning that Epicurus would convey if he were here to explain it in greater detail. And I am not yet convinced that he would even attempt to do so, beyond providing the example that he then used to show the futility of the Peripatetics efforts.

Also, in discussion tonight on chapter 3 of A Few Days In Athens, Kevin brought up that it was the Stoics who postulated a single unified and unitary good - virtue - which is something that in his view even Aristotle did not do. (Kevin suggested that Aristotle spoke in terms of many goods in Nichomachean Ethics.)

That makes me more concerned than ever that the search for a "greatest good" might not be Epicurean at all, despite Torquatus' framework.

Then there is the question of whether pleasure is a "unity" such that pleasure can be considered singly in a way similar to the way the Stoics considered virtue to be a unity. And that would implicate the PD which refers to "if pleasure could be condensed.....". I am still not confident what that saying means at all, much less whether he is implying an affirmative or negative answer.

I think this question probably has an answer that we can eventually come to terms on, but I am now thinking that being confident would require more knowledge of what the earlier philospher had done with the issue of single versus multiple goods than I presently have myself.

When I combine the Lucretian reference to pleasure as a guide with what I see in the letter to Menoeceus, I see much more foundation for seeing pleasure as the GUIDE than I do for a specific "greatest good" analysis.

Cause frankly I am pretty sure I know what a "guide" is, but I am not at all sure I know what a "greatest good" is.

Thanks for this deep analysis!

I'll just leave the point as is at the moment, because I am not nearly as qualified as DeWitt or even Don to parse the Latin and Greek. I will repeat that I do see differences between "good" and "goal" and I can imagine all sorts of confusion arising from those distinctions. I am reminded of the phrase in Book Two of Lucretius - " ...GUIDE of life, divine pleasure." (ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas)

I am particularly not willing to say that I think DeWitt is definitely right, or definitely wrong, because it does appear to me that Epicurus was cautioning against walking around uselessly harping on the meaning of the good, and I see this as something that other philosophers are harping on rather than Epicurus. The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone. I am not sure that Epicurus accepted any real logical framework other than the observation that nature gives us only two signals by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid, and that is pleasure and pain. Torquatus himself seems to say that even in this same On Ends - only a few moments after he had framed the question in this very way.

Is DeWitt correct to say that pleasure and pain have meaning only to the living, so that without life pleasure and pain are of no consequence to us? Certainly I would say that the answer to that is "yes."

Does that make pleasure or life the "highest good?" I am afraid that I think that is a linguistic exercise that is fraught with many dangers. So at least for the moment I consider that to be a question that cannot readily be answered. And I remain uncertain that the question "What is the greatest good?" was a way in which Epicurus himself liked to frame his philosophy.

Quote from Don

I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?),

I thought we already had it here somewhere, but apparently not. That has been remedied:

I had forgotten that DeWitt marshals in support of this argument his interpretation of VS42, so this article places that in issue too. I have always thought that DeWitt's argument on VS42 makes sense, so it will be interesting to get comments on that too.

File

Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy

The aim of this article is to show how the lack of a definite article in Latin obliterated the doctrine of Epicurus that life itself and not pleasure is the greatest good.

Cassius

February 13, 2022 at 4:00 PM

Oh I am not sure that this will survive the editing phase but I should also mentioned that at first I thought Joshua was saying something not entirely positive about a technique of Don's, but after I got myself oriented it was entirely positive, so I don't want Don to have a heart attack when he hears the reference

@smoothiekiwi once again succeeded in gaining multiple mentions in today's podcast. It's going to take some time to edit, and as usual we didn't make it too far in discussing the new topic (friendship) but there's a lot to cover and I think despite the twists and turns of the discussion that it will be useful to listen to and consider.

Quote from Nate

"And therefore the greatest good has been grasped by the person who has become wise and lived through a certain amount of time. Once his journey has achieved balance and consistency, it would be fitting to prolong it for an unlimited time, if such were possible; but should his life be limited, this will not be the deprivation of what has already been, but [sc. merely] a prevention of its continued presence." (Philodemus, On Death).

Wow this is a great applicable quote and one that I was not on top of -- but we need to cite it every time we talk about this subject. Thank you Nate!

Quote from Nate

A life devoid of pleasure is not Good. I would argue to De Witt that a thing is only Good when Pleasure is present.

We dealt with this again a little in today's Lucretius Podcast (109). I agree with your point in this quote. I think the best way to try to look at DeWitt's comment sympathetically is to consider whether the word "good" has multiple meanings (in the same way that "true" in "all sensations are true" can be interpreted on different levels. DeWitt's formulation definitely is something to treat carefully and not take on face value as being correct, especially until reading the detail of his full argument in his book and his article "The Summum Bonum Fallacy."

This material on friendship is going to take at least two and possibly three sessions to cover, and I wonder if we have had so many comments raised about our last session on skepticism that we need to go slow in starting this session and see if there are any mop-up issues on skepticism to cover first. If you're reading this before Episode 109 is recorded on 2/13, and you have more issues on skepticism you'd like to see addressed, go back to the thread for 108 and let us know those comments there.

Vatican Collection:

VS28 - We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must even run risks.

VS78. The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

Diogenes Laertius:

[122] They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure.

PD27. Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

PD28

The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship. Note: The translation given is by Eugene O’Connor from “The Essential Epicurus.” Bailey's version is: “The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts forever, or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.”

Quote from smoothiekiwi

, but it still cannot replace real life friends.

You are absolutely right, we cannot ever forget that, and so we have to use this place as a start, not an endpoint, and move forward into organizing our local real worlds to find (or make from scratch!) Friends who are Epicureans or at least Epicurean-friendly.

This discussion (split from here: What do you mean from the "Golden Mean" of Aristotle? ) reminds me of two other recent things that have been in my mind:

(1) i was discussing with someone a new sort of 'self-help' book that the person was reading, which focuses on what I perceive to be psychological self-help techniques geared toward reaching goals. My comment was to ask whether that person had first identified their real goals, as is makes sense to me that is usually would be appropriate to clarify in one's mind what one's proper goal IS, before launching off into generic goal-achieving activity.

(2) I know I have probably spoken negatively in the past about articles which seem to say that we should not set pleasure or happiness as our goal, but rather something else, and look for pleasure and happiness as side affects rather than going after them directly. I still think negatively of that perspective BUT:

I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions. The word 'happiness' almost definitely is so, and we find "happiness" being used in totally different ways by different people, so much so that it takes fairly elaborate definition-building to be clear what we're talking about.

"Pleasure" has some of the same issues, but it is a word that also more clearly denotes a "Feeling" - and i think that it is as a feeling that it takes its central role in Epicurean philosophy, as a part of the canon of truth by which we grapple with external reality.

But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it.

Epicurus was always clear that the feelings are TWO - pleasure and pain, and that we sometimes choose the pain in order to achieve more pleasure or avoid worse pain. But formulating it that way still requires you to identify in your mind what it pleasurable and what is painful to YOU, and if you don't think through the issues carefully you end up totally wasting your time - or in the words of Torquatus - "Surely no one recoils from or dislikes or avoids pleasure in itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains come upon those who do not know how to follow pleasure rationally."

Here we have to keep in mind that "rationallly" doesn't mean using the syllogistic abstract logic detached from reality that Epicurus criticizes, but does mean "sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit." (Letter to Menoeceus).

So we need to ask ourselves if we have really soberly reasoned through the details and searched out the motives and ways that we find pleasure and avoid pain in our own personal circumstances. If we have adopted faulty opinions from others, or from teachers, or culture, or religion, or whatever, have we banished those from our thoughts and clearly identified what is going to bring to us OUR greatest pleasure and OUR relief from pain?

I gather that this is probably related to what Smoothiekiwi was talking about earlier. It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us, and without banishing into the pit the false opinions about the nature of the universe that lead us in the wrong direction.

VS46. Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

That's why it's not good to think of this philosophy as Pleasurism, or Hedonism.

This isn't either of those. This is EPICURUS.

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I think this is not one of DeWitts best explained positions, and I would agree with it only after caveats that "good" like a lot of other words has multiple meanings.

In this sense, I think his best line is to the effect that pleasure and pain have meaning only to the living, and that therefore being alive is a prerequisite to experiencing pleasure. That's in his explanation somewhere in a place you did not quote.

As he states in the part that you did quote, pleasure is the telos and DeWitt is distinguishing between that and "greatest good.". It seems to me he is stressing the proper differences between the words goal and guide as well.

Ultimately you should also read DeWitts article he entitled the summum bonum fallacy. He is to some extent calling into question, as does Epicurus in his criticism that DeWitt quotes about unsurpassable joy, of the issue of thinking that you are doing something worthwhile by focusing conceptually on defining "the greatest good.". Nature gives pleasure and pain as the feeling / basis for deciding what to choose and what to avoid. Nature does not implant in us a detailed reasoned definition of a "greatest good" nor do we create anything real - anything outside our own minds - by developing elaborate definitions of it.

There is an article called "The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates" by Riley in our files section here that you will want to read Smoothiekiwi. Let me know if you look and don't find it.

Thanks Don - I corrected - i don't think they were acting in good faith (at least the Platonists - don't know so much about Pyrrho)

Quote from smoothiekiwi

. I honestly dont know why you do that- it seems extremely boring to me to talk about stuff you already know-, but I'm glad that you do it.

It depends to a very great degree on who one is talking too, and whether they seem interested and in good faith and appreciative, and whether something is being accomplished by it. Those things (and probably similar that I forget) make all the difference!