Posts by Cassius

Thanks to Don for this link, which appears to have a lot of good information in it!

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

www.academia.edu

Here's the point that appears to me to behind everything:

Given that the only "unchanging reality" in Epicurean terms is at the level of the atoms and void, and that's clearly NOT what Plato was taking about, the contention that our attention should be drawn away from the world around us to "an unchanging reality" that does not exist -- those are fighting words, and a very damaging thing to teach to children or adults! So I would fully expect Epicurus to want to upend the entire issue by drilling down to separate what might be helpful in geometry from what would be a damaging fiction.

It seems to me that rigorously speaking *nothing* should be considered to be a goal on its own other than "pleasure" or "pleasurable living" (if the word "living" is needed, which it's really not).

This is one of those issues that I can see Epicurus wanting to nail down so emphatically and repeatedly that lots of people would think he's overstating the point, but truthfully it can't be said often enough because people don't understand the implication:

"Ultimately" - NOTHING is "good in itself" or "a goal in itself" other than pleasure.

Anything that we set up as an interim goal, if that process and pursuit causes us to lose sight of the ultimate goal, becomes an obstacle to our progress rather than a help.

Yes I have only read a page or two. I detect a conclusion that is probaby more harsh than it needs to be as to whether Epicurus was "wrong" but I will reserve judgment til I read the whole thing. The basic point he's addressing as to the relationship between geometry and reality is a big one and this paper looks like a great addition to our past discussions on this.

Don that article you cite from Sedley needs a thread of its own!

Heres a reference to a quote I could not remember in the podcast:

When the Facts Change, I Change My Mind. What Do You Do, Sir? – Quote Investigator

Episode 126 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we begin the discussion of Epicurus' letter to Pythocles, and we discuss many aspects of the basic approach of Epicurus toward the study of nature. This is one of our longer - but probably also one of our more important - episodes, so we hope you enjoy it and we invite your comment. Of special note: Don rejoins us for several special episodes!

We went with a modified size graphic this time -- join us Wednesday night if you can.

This is spurred by the new book ""Epicureans In Rome" linked by Joshua here: "Lucretius on the Size of the Sun", by T.H.M. Gellar-Goad

Chapter Two of that Book is: "Sint Ista Graecorum: How to be an Epicurean in Late Republican Rome – Evidence from Cicero’s On Ends" and the writer (Geert Roskam) says:

Quote

"In the second book of On Ends, Cicero blames Torquatus for an embarrassing inconsistency. Whereas Torquatus claims to do everything for the sake of pleasure, he cannot possibly maintain this stance while addressing the senate (2.74 - 77). On such occasions, he prefers to dwell on duty, fair-dealing, moral worth and so on; in short, to switch to the vocabulary of the Stoics and Peripatetics. And not without reason, for to be honest about his real political motivations when talking to the senators would almost surely ruin his later political career (.). And thus, Cicero concludes, Torquatus is forced to employ artificial language in order to conceal what he really thinks, or “change his opinions like his clothes,” confining his true convictions to a small circle of intimate friends and defending counterfeit opinions in public (.). This, to my mind, is one of the strongest arguments in Book  of On Ends. Cicero knew very well what kind of discourse was usually heard in the Roman senate and saw an obvious contrast with Torquatus’ Epicurean ideals. The whole passage is characterized by a strong rhetorical tone, but also makes a valid philosophical point, on the basis of the specifically Roman political context. What could Torquatus say in reply to this challenge? (emphasis added)

Roskom goes on and gives some discussion that takes the edge off this, but I don't think we need to admit that this is even a strong agument I think it is in fact easy to recast stand Stoic calls to "honor" and "duty" and "virtue" into the framework of "love of country" and "love of friends" and "the pleasures that we value in our community" in ways that make clear the ultimate argument that everything we value stems from the pleasure that it brings us.

Roskom also seems to fault Torquatus for not having much to say on this point, but I think in all issues like that we have to go first to the point that this Torquatus and this conversation were not real, and we would not expect a lawyer/advocate like Cicero to "play fair" and give his opponent the last and best word.

I think it would be easy and fun as an exercise to take most any of Cicero's famous speeches to the Senate (and the Phillipics come to my mind first) and recast / rewrite them as if Cicero were an Epicurean and if he were using Epicurus' arguments in the Senate.

When I can find the time I will take one of these Phillipics and rewrite it, asking for the same things Cicero was asking for from the Senate, but writing it in Epicurean terms:

M. Tullius Cicero, Orations, The fourteen orations against Marcus Antonius (Philippics), THE FOURTEEN ORATIONS OF M. T. CICERO AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS, CALLED PHILIPPICS., section 1

Something else I want to check:. I believe this article is one of those situations where we can point out that Dewitt did not defend Epicurus strongly enough! I seem to remember but need to check that Dewitt hints at this analysis but in the end considera Epircurus to have been wrong on this issue. If so then this current article will definitely supercede Dewitt's analysis on this issue.

Ok as I write this I will try to restrain my enthusiasm:

This is an OUTSTANDING article. I completely agree with the author's analysis and direction, and if this is an example of the very latest Epicurean scholarship then we are definitely moving in the right direction.

The writer builds IMHO a very strong case that the summary viewpoint "The sun is the size that it appears to be" is an Epicurean "litmus test" of a proper understanding of the philosophy, akin to "Death is nothing to us" or "nothing can be created from nothing."

As we are currently discussing in the podcast, reaching conclusions about things we see in the sky presents a difficult issue of limited evidence, and the worst thing we can do is to affix ourselves to a single position when multiple options are possible.

The statement that the size of the sun is what it appears to be does not give a single answer, but emphasizes that any or all answers must be based on "appearance" (the senses) which is what EVERY conclusion in life must also be based upon.

The concluding section of the essay goes into this in much more detail and I highly recommend it. I think the position he advocates is where many of us are already on this topic, but this article goes further than Bailey or even Sedley and really nails down a position that I think will serve most of us very well going on into the future. It will also nail us more firmly into the position that the senses are the foundation for all our conclusions about reality, and in fact that is very likely the intended purpose of the formulation.

We may have to designate someone every Twentieth to start the session saying:

"The Size Of The Sun Is As It Appears To Be!"

Yes , thank you for this post. I saw headlines about the article but haven't had a chance to read it.

I think the issue of "artificial intelligence" is definitely of interest in Epicurean studies, because it helps us focus on what "life" really means, and how life is different from "logic" - no matter how complex.

Over time this would be a really good topic to explore so thanks for starting it!

It is apparently Usener 423 citing Plutarch, here from Epicurism.info

Epicurus.info : E-Texts : Epicurea

We talked about some of this in the podcast recording today and it is truly a rabbit chase.

I am not sure the chase can even get off the ground until we decide what we mean by "good", which is well before we put any modifiers on the term like natural or necessary or intrinsic or instrumental or anything else.

And part of answering that question probably means coming to terms with what Epicurus really meant in his warning about walking around uselessly harping on the meaning of good.

Do we end up,as Francis Wright apparently did (need to check the text) concluding that there is nothing good but pleasure, and nothing bad/evil but pain?

I am tempted to say the answer is "yes" but so much depends on the subtle meanings assigned to the words in even that formulation.

I tend to think that whenever someone wants to discuss this, they are suggesting that inseparable from the word "good" is an implicit "always." And if that is the case, I find it very difficult to designate anything as "always good" other than pleasure.

Or do we define the good as Torquatus suggested in On Ends that "everyone agrees...." That as to the "supreme good" ---

"The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations."

One thing that would be good would be to see if we can find examples of where such terms were used in the core texts. This will be a good discussion!

That's because it won't be recorded until tomorrow! I used to put "preproduction" on advance threads to indicate that and I will go back to that habit. Thanks!

Quote from beasain

A few 'reasonable' explanations are enough, and they are not (much) interested in making the science advance.

I too need to read that article, but I will go ahead and state my view of this issue:

As to the first part of the sentence, yes one or a few "reasonable" explanations are sufficient to satisfy our most pressing need, which is to banish the allegations of the religionists that the Sun was divine, or part of a divine order.

But as to the second part of the sentence, when I see that sentiment stated in that way (and we see it often) I think that the wording is too negative and arises from modern prejudices against Epicurus. I see Epicurus as being strictly logical in his approach, which is that once he has determined (through science!) that the end of life is happiness/pleasure, then he is logically consistent and holds the tests of ALL actions in life, including the study of science, to the test: "Does it advance our happiness?" Once you conclude that there are no criteria given us in life by nature other than pleasure and pain, then you apply that conclusion rigorously and without exception.

The negative presumption that is conveyed in "not much interested in making the science advance" is the anti-Epicurean conception that there are ends in Nature which are justified IN THEMSELVES apart from whether they bring pleasure or avoid pain. Such a conclusion is logically ruled out by Epicurean philosophy.

On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy also asserts that since there is only one reason to do anything in life (pleasure/pain) you are going to do everything in life that is practical for you to pursue pleasure. And MOST CERTAINLY the advancement of science is a tremendously useful tool for advancing pleasure and avoiding pain, so MOST CERTAINLY an Epicurean is going to appreciate and pursue the advancement of science as a tool for better living.

So in my view the many times that we see statements like "Epicurus wasn't much interested in science" we are really seeing the complaint that "Epicurus wasn't interested in XXXX for the sake of XXXX itself." That argument makes no sense without realizing that the impetus behind it is the assertion that Epicurus was wrong and that he should have valued "XXXX in itself" (most generally, they are asserting "virtue" or "piety" as goals in themselves).

Therefore I think we ought not be afraid of or concerned about that "Epicurus didn't value science" argument, and instead turn the issue around and use it as a teaching opportunity for explaining why Epicurus taught what he taught.

End of rant!

Episode 125 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we conclude the letter to Herodotus. Next week we begin with the letter to Pythocles.

Thank you Beasain - and again, it was a pleasure speaking with you directly this past Wednesday!

Flying pigs are nice. I wonder why he is portrayed sitting in a pot?

Podcast should be up later today. A few notes in the meantime:

- Around the twenty minute mark (and several places) we talk about possible differences between the attitude of Frances Wright ("observation is everything, theory is nothing") and what Epicurus seems to be saying about determining alternative "explanations" for celestial phenomena (even though we don't have information to say which one of several is correct). I think we might want to expand in the future on this issue: An "observation" is not really the same as an "explanation." Epicurus is telling us that we may have several "explanations" that are consistent with observations, and that we should not choose between them if we don't have sufficient evidence to do so. But it seems to me that here is another example where Epicurus is clearly telling us to USE our observations to come up with rational explanations that assist our happiness and help us to see that supernatural gods are not a necessary explanation of natural phenomena. Whether or not Frances Wright means to be so extreme, she seems to me to differ from Epicurus on this, because several of her chapters can be read to imply (or even state explicitly) that we should never move past observation to reach any "theories" of any kind. Maybe the resolution is to unwind the meaning of the term "observation" as Frances Wright uses it, but on the face of it I can see the way she makes her point to be potentially confusing, or even wrong, from Epicurus' perspective.