Posts by Cassius

Nate what do you interpret that to mean? I have a lot of respect for Haris, and don't think he gets the credit he probably deserves for his books.

But I am not sure about the use of the word "true" in that sentence you quote. If what is meant is that a concept of a thing (concept taken to be the equivalent of thoughts, musings, plans) does not correspond with the reality of a thing unless the concept is closely connected with our senses, emotions, and anticipations of that thing, then I think I agree.

But I am concerned that some of our thoughts on the subject of abstractions may not be worded as well as could be hoped. If the point is that a concept needs to correspond to reality to be true, then again, yes. But must all concepts be "true" in order for them to have significance to us? If a concept generates great pain or pleasure, it still may have significance to us, just like (maybe) the images seen in a dream.

I have probably just lost the flow of the conversation but if our subject is the meaning of anticipations, what does the observation you quote tell us? Would you take it to mean that all anticipations must be "true" to be anticipations? That is ruled out, correct, by the observation that Epicurus makes that the views of the gods are anticipations but also are false (?) I think I am concerned that we are not being clear about the nature of anticipations and when and how to consider them to be "true" -- because we don't see the data received from the feelings or the 5 senses to be "true to all the facts all the time" and I don't think we should go in that direction as to anticipations either, correct?

In other words, I think there is a strong temptation to see anticipations as "true by nature" in the sense of interpreting anticipations as ideas that we hold to be true because nature gives it to us. I think that would open up all sorts of problems if we were to interpret Epicurus as saying that, so I don't think that is what he means. Is Haris saying that in this quote?

This is such a complex subject i am mainly trying to make sure we're all clear about what we are discussing.

As I post this new comment to an old thread we're in the process of revisiting the "absence of pain" issue in several threads, and in looking at the list of old threads the title of this one caught my eye.

We didn't explore this quote at the time, but at some point in the future I would expect someone to do that. In the meantime I would particularly recommend Jefferson's "Head and Heart" letter to recent additions to our forum, especially Kalosyni and others who are exploring this topic. You have to first get your bearings on what is going on in the letter before you can fully appreciate it, but by the time you get to the end I think you'll appreciate that Jefferson does a good job of giving both sides of the "head vs heart" (a good proxy for Stoic/Platonic/Aristotelian vs Epicurean") debate.

And I think you'll agree that he comes down firmly, and for very good reasoning, on the side you would expect. (At least, the side you'd expect if you're read Jefferson's letter to William Short.)

I have not had a chance to review this recent post - it is possible there is discussion of it in the older threads.

What I recall is that Christos has done a very nice job of combining surviving text references into a coherent play for presentation.

As such, I would expect most and maybe all of it to conform to the texts - but just like the texts the message can be misunderstood when some parts are viewed in isolation. I think Christos' intent was to produce an overview of the major concepts, and no doubt he succeeds with that.

(It is interesting to compared this to "A Few Days In Athens", which targets a different audience and is much deeper.)

I gather that what is quoted above is only a part of the text. And not the whole(?). What I recall being concerned about was the effect of sections such as from th letter to Menoeceus, which as I contend regularly can be misleading to us today when read outside of the full context of the philosophy.

Those are the sections I would want to look at more closely.

You are indeed correct Godfrey. When I went back to check G&T on the "replenishment" theory I was overwhelmed (again) by the depth of the discussion.

G&T have exhaustively researched in great detail the full history of Greek philosophy's attitude toward pleasure, and their credentials are sterling, yet they are infrequently (at best) cited by the current crop of contemporary writers (no need to slam them by name - just check the list of cites in any of them for G&T and DeWitt.)

This is not accidental. It is G&T's thorough analysis of the issue that led then to first question the allegation that Epicurus emphasized the katastematic / kinetic distinction, which in turn led to Nikolsky tracking down the Carnaedes roots of that issue in DL.

I am afraid that the very depth of their research and soundness of their analysis is what has led them to being ignored - their conclusions do not fit the preferences of the "absence of pain" crowd, and the only response that crowd can take is to ignore their work. I would feel embarrassed for them but for the fact that they have no excuse for their error, given what G&T have tracked down.

Quote from Pacatus

But why are "limits" a sign of imperfection? (That 2nd quote seems to be question-begging.) It can be recognition of t

Right I think Godfrey has this correct. Though it may be counterintuitive at first glance, the Seneca/ Platonic argument is that a thing must have a limit to be perfect. - i.e. being the "best" is itself a limit, according to the argument.

And in case it's not clear, the argument is that pleasure can always be made better by adding more to it, thus it cannot ever reach the state of being "best."

Epicurus shows the fallacy of that argument. -- shows that pleasure indeed has a limit -- by pointing out that there are only two finds of feelings, and as soon as ALL OF YOUR FEELINGS are pleasurable, you have hit that limit.

Over time I am coming to see that some people think this argument is so trite and abstract that they don't think the ancients could possibly have been consumed with its importance, so they dismiss this and go back to "Epicurus must be talking about a different kind of pleasure when he refers to absence of pain."

I think those people are wrong, and in failing to see how much importance Plato placed on it, they fail to accept that this is likely the entire reason for the absence of pain discussion.

We're it not for the need to refute Plato's argument Epicurus would never have had need for the absence of pain argument and he could have stopped with "Look at the newborn of all species" and "we perceive pleasure to be desirable just as we perceive honey is sweet and snow is white."

It seems likely that this project would lend itself toward setting up a Google Doc (where multiple shared editing is easier) and the next issue would be that of setting up a format.

Just as a very quick place to brainstorm:

The Daily Epicurean

January February March April May June July August September October  November December

docs.google.com

(this is currently set to anyone with the link can comment, but if we actually get started then those who really want to work on it can be added as full editors)

Note: Rather than extend the background research part of this question here, I have set up a thread: Collecting Ancient Instances of the Argument: "Pleasure Cannot Be The Highest Good Because It Has No Limit"

If PD3 and much of Epicurus' discussion about "the limit of pleasure" (extending into the references to "absence of pain") is a response and refutation of earlier logical objections to viewing pleasure as the highest good, it would be expected that this argument should be found in a number of ancient writers. The purpose of this thread is to collect those instances and look for more, which will assist everyone in consideration of this issue. (Note: A recent example of this argument is here.)

As a start we can find two very clear instances: the first and primary in Plato's Philebus. We can also find the argument stated very clearly in Seneca, who of course post-dates Epicurus, but who would probably the first to say that he did not claim originality, and that his own ideas reflected those of the earlier philosophers. Plus, Seneca formulates the argument with crystal clarity: "The ability to increase is proof that a thing is imperfect.”

I will list those two here in this post, and keep this first post up to date as others can find and suggest more. Please keep this question in mind and when you come across other instances of this argument in the future, please post them to this thread.

The argument that "pleasure is insatiable" is probably a subset and closely related to this same argument, so references to that argument would also be welcome in this thread. Simply stating that pleasure is insatiable does not give a complete argument, however, but I bet there are instances where that argument is made in more expansive form that would definitely be relevant here. A similar observation goes for the "purity" argument, in which smaller quantities of something that is pure are asserted to be superior to larger quantities of adulterated versions of the same thing.

I will update these with better hyperlinks but here are the two I have already collected in my "Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure" article:

1. Plato (Philebus) (here is a link to the following excerpt as found in Perseus - designated as 26b)

2. Seneca (Letters)

Plato's Philebus:

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Here is an excerpt from Philebus as a finding aid to the full discussion where the argument can be researched:

SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul. — What think you, Protarchus?

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?
… … PROTARCHUS: Most justly.

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Seneca:

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Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits.

Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”“THE ABILITY TO INCREASE IS PROOF THAT A THING IS IMPERFECT.”

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Please add your suggestions for other instances to this thread. I am sure that there are likely to be others out there, especially in Cicero and likely numerous Stoic references.

Quote from camotero

Are you, or somebody, so kind as to tell me why is the quantity of pleasure relevant to us; and how is this particular doctrine helpful? (Other than recommending you to believe that for pain to go away you must seek pleasure).

This is a perfect example of the problem we are discussing - that of understanding the depth of the issues without first having sufficient background.

The issue of quantity of pleasure relates directly to the critical issue of the LIMIT of quantity of pleasure. Plato and others had firmly established (such as in Philebus) that the "highest good" must have a limit. Plato's argument is that in order for something to be considered "the highest" that thing must be something that cannot be improved - because it has a highest "limit" of which their is no higher - no greater quantity. This is a definitional word game but it makes sense in a defintional way if you think about it.

PD3 therefore refers to the limit of quantity of pleasure - and asserts that that limit is reached when every ounce of your experience is pleasurable (which means, by definition, that all pain has been expelled from your experience).

It is only by identification of this logical limit that Epicurus can defeat the logical argument that pleasure cannot be the highest good since (Plato alleges) pleasure has no limit.

This argument is not familiar to most of us today because we do not read Philebus and the details of Plato and we do not know of this argument against pleasure being the highest good.

And in my view this is why people go wrong and think that Epicurus has identified some new kind of pleasure that is the highest good - which is not what he is saying at all. But if u out don't know why he i talking about a limit of pleasure it is easy to make that mistake and go totally off course - and think that he is identifying tranquility as the goal of life, which is not the case at all. Epicurus never takes the focus off pleasure, but if you think he is doing that in PD3, then you also conclude that he must be redefining pleasure as equal to tranquility in every respect, which is absurd, but is what many modern writers have concluded.

This - the subtlety of even the third doctrine on the list - is not going to be readily understood by most nonprofessional modern readers because they are not familiar with the argument in Philebus. Thats why I assert that it is best to start with DeWitt to acquaint yourself with the issues Epicurus was combatting. And on this specific issue, which relates to the "katastematic" issue, I also urge you to read Nikolsky.

I am glad you raise these points because this is a discussion that needs to happen at the earliest possible stage with every single person who tackles reading Epicurus. And this problem is not limited to the Doctrines - it applies especially to the letter to Menoeceus too.

Quote from camotero

Should I read something else before I keep going down these PDs?

I agree with Don that it is good to acquaint yourself with the PD s and even the Vatican sayings early on. The lists are short and quick to read.

BUT I firmly think that anyone and everyone would profit from reading DeWitt overview before you worry over the details of any doctrine or think you fully understand any of them. Even the most straightforward have many subtle implications, and several have no straightforward meaning at all.

And I will go so far as to say that unless the you first read a competent summary, like DeWitt, which acquaints you with the philosophic views Epicurus was working on reforming, most people will come away from reading the Doctrines with a highly distorted view of Epicurus.

Elli it is so good to see you post again. Please drop by you as often as you can - we have a good group of very smart people who could learn a lot from your insights into the Greek language and the current state of Epicurean thought in Greece!

You guys are funny

By the time we combine DL with Lucretius and with Torquatus and with Oinoanda and with Seneca's Epicurean quotes and with Plutarch amd Philodemus we should be looking at two or three years!

Camotero I went looking back in Gosling and Taylor for a succinct summary of this "replenishment" issue but i found that there are a huge number of references to it and the issue is very complex. If you are interested in it I hope you pursue it in detail. but one of the ways we can help each other on the forum here is to save each other time and try to warn them of dead ends.

As G&T state here even Plato gave up on replenishment as the basis of his view of pleasure (which was an attack on it) but the reasons were very abstract and logic-based. Here is one reference, but I am afraid to pursue this to completion would be more than we can easily do without your digging in to it and then bringing up specific points for discussion.

Also, I realize that clip is about Plato and Aristotle rejecting the replenishment theory rather than Epicurus I would argue that these reasons apply even more strongly to Epicurus.

And I think this may be an example of starting point for analysis. If I recall, DeWitt hardly at all, if at all, goes down this rabbit hole, and someone starting with DeWitt would not likely be too concerned about it. i don't say this as criticism of your comments, but as part of a constant lookout to find news ways to help people more efficiently.

Have you read deWitt, and did you find something in that which led you to entertain the replenishment angle? If so that would be very helpful for me to know as it may help in advising others in the future.

Yes it would, with the goal of *not* relying on quotes outside the "canonical" texts. I am pretty sure especially if we did it by collaboration that that would be very doable, and the main question would be what organization, if any, to give to it.

It's an idea that has been discussed often before but - to my knowledge - no one has ever implemented.

Glad to see you back - drop in anytime!

Quote from camotero

So, since pleasure is clearly a function of relieved pain, i

I am going to have to come back later but this is clearly not a full and correct statement of the issue. Some pleasure is indeed such, but much pleasure is not. There is a long discussion of this in Gosling and Taylor and if I recall correctly they show that not even Plato eventually took that position (that all pleasure arises from loss of pain). There is a classic example of the smell of a rose when walking through a garden -- that is clearly pleasurable, but the pleasure does not arise from any kind of pain existing prior to smelling the rose.

As to the gas tank analogy, that arises from there being only two feelings -- the gas in the tank does not derive its essence from the "air" in the tank any more than the air derives its essence from the gas.

and there is a place where Cicero ridicules Epicurus for his comment on a wise man under torture -- we will find that and add that here too.

Quote from camotero

I also do see the relevance in trying to define for us what would make an ideal state of being fine, as a goal to work towards:

I think that is the key and more -- as a "goal." I think that Epicurus thought it was important not just to be negative against existing errors, but to set out a positive vision of what life "should" be like (at least in general) and for that goal it's probably helpful to visualize how life would be like if we were stronger, longerliving, etc. -- kind of like how we learn in sports from others who are more advanced than we are. In this case we can't observe them directly (apparently) but we can think about how they might be.

Alex thanks for the kind words about the podcast! We will do our best to keep feeding your appetite for our discussions!

I have not read James Warren's book so i cannot comment with authority. I do think I can add something though:

1) i am confident that Warren's scholarship is good and that you will find much good material to consider on the points he is writing about. At the level at which he writes you can be sure that his sources are sound, and you'll no doubt gain a lot of good raw material to think about.

2) I do want to strongly note a general caution: James Warren is in my experience similar to Tim O'Keefe, who I would also make the same point as #1, but would have the same caution I am stating here. They write for an academic audience primarily, and not because they are primarily "advocates" for Epicurus. I don't know what their personal views are, but I find it very significant that you will rarely if ever see them citing DeWitt's analysis in their own books, except perhaps an occasional negative reference. I consider both Warren and Okeefe to be far too influenced by Stoicism, and my reading is that they are both of the view that you will often see criticized on this website as too far into the "absence of pain" viewpoint.

Without going too far down that rabbit hole again, I would urge you to read DeWitt before you read any of the more contemporary or the more specialized books. My experience is that someone at the beginning of their reading gets a good overall grounding in the big picture of Epicurus, especially as to how he opposed so much of Plato and Aristotle, then you will easily see how much is going on in Epicurus' mind beyond the "absence of pain" issue.

The alternative that I see occur far too regularly is that people will start with one of these "contemporary" books that focuses on "absence of pain," and that further pigeon-holes Epicurus in their mind as essentially the same as the Stoics but just with a twist as to word choice. Especially if you have an existing grounding in Buddhism or Stoicism or even just some types of modern psychology, it is easy to get the idea that this "absence of pain" issue is the key to everything else, and In my view that is a huge mistake.

So I would say to you what I would say to everybody: it is far better for you to read DeWitt's "general" treatment of the entire philosophy before you read any of the detailed presentations of the detailed sub-issues (like death, or on the gods, or on ethics of any kind). Maybe the best way to say it is that if you start with one of the sub-topics, you'll almost inevitably be presuming that you understand Epicurus' basic perspective (based on what everyone knows from high school or wikipedia) and you will dramatically underestimate him. I think Epicurus needs to be viewed essentially as a total revolutionary against much of existing Greek philosophy and religion, and it's far better to wipe your attitude of everything you think you know about him at the very beginning. Then as you gather all the additional data you will get from Okeefe and Warren and others you will know how to respond to it, because you'll begin to think as Epicurus did and you'll know what to test the varying opinions against.

I don't think it is JUST "a plain and simple description of a god's nature" although I do think that is by far the most important part. If you accept this and follow it rigorously you'll never be taken in my supernatural religion, and that in itself justifies its position as doctrine one.

But I agree that it states something that we feel through anticipations -- i think it is fair to say that most humans feel naturally that strength in the ability to sustain one's own happiness is something that comes through self-sufficiency (which is not the same at all as asceticism) and that if we are dependent on sustenance from others for our necessities then we are by virtue of that "weak" and easily knocked off balance.

Personally I emphasize that point and would not be overly concerned about "being on the receiving end of their anger." Yes that is a practical part of our situation as humans, but I would not think that that consideration natural extends upward all the way that you may be taking it. I think even Epicurus' conception of godhood means that at some point the "strength' side washes away much concern about being on the receiving end of anything negative. I would think that as a god if you haven't arranged your affairs strongly enough that you are no longer concerned about the wrath of other beings, then you aren't yet at godhood. Yes a god wouldn't do naturally be doing anything to create trouble for itself, but just like in this world where we aren't surrounded by people whose wrath is not always rational, I would anticipate that a true good wouldn't be concerned about being on the receiving end of "irrational" anger either. (I hope that makes sense - the point I am suggesting is that I think an Epicurean god's status of being able to overcome all forces of destruction to itself would imply strength against ALL forces, no matter whether the gods action did something to provoke anger or not).