Posts by Cassius

I look forward to hearing comments from you Pacatus as you read Lucretius. It's a common situation -- lots of people I have come across who say they embrace Epicurus have never bothered to read more than a line or two of Lucretius.

I really think Lucretius is helpful. What he's writing about are the issues that he saw in his time and world to be important, and he was much closer to the original texts than we are, so through him we have an excellent check on what was really important to the ancient Epicureans vs what we think today is important after 2000 years of indoctrination and filtering through Christian and Stoic commentators.

So please if you start reading through it don't hesitate to start new threads on whatever topics interest you in it no matter how small.

Quote from reneliza

I can happily agree with all of this if I just swap out the word "desire" for "interest" or "motivation" (although technically motivation is WHY you want to do a thing, not just what you want to do - I think it still works here and is sometimes even more useful to know) but I still get hung up on the one word.

Can you explain that a little further? We probably need to focus on using the word "desire" since that is the word with the explosive connotations that people are used to debating about, but I would like to be sure I understand your concern.

There is an awful lot of discussion of "confidence" but not all of it would clearly be applicable. This one jumps out at me first as applicable - is this not a current thought of future pleasure?

VS34. It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as it is the confidence of their help.

This is Torquatus rather than Epicurus but might well be relevant. I think there are others.....

(1) Some have denied that pleasures affecting our friends are in themselves to be desired by us in the same degree as we desire our own pleasures. This doctrine is thought by some critics to undermine the foundations of friendship; however, its supporters defend their position, and in my opinion have no difficulty in making good their ground. They argue that friendship can no more be sundered from pleasure than can the virtues, which we have discussed already. A solitary, friendless life must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends; their possession gives confidence, and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy, and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment in the present, and it inspires us with hopes for the near and distant future.

Quote from reneliza

Does he ever say anything about thinking ahead to future pleasure as a form of pleasure? (Or anything remotely related)

I am thinking that the passages about "confident expectation of continuance" might be applicable, and there is also the passage in Diogenes of Oinoanda about the sequence in which pleasure comes. I started to quote that earlier but will add that here in a moment:

Not really sure this applies directly, because he is talking about cause and effect, but it MIGHT be stretchable to cover the point. Probably better to go to the "Confident expectation" passages.....

Fr.33

... such virtues ... pleasure ... and [of virtues] ... feels [much] pain ... the evil [is] ... [from] all virtues ... apart from tension ... pleasure, but these quibblers admit ... often found not ..., [and Zeno] himself [proposes] the opinion ..........., just as if he means virtue when he has said «pleasure,» and that men run to them. And again elsewhere having forgotten this hunger ([for they did] not [say that] ........) ... of this ... so that ... it ... in no way .... is able, as these people lay it down, like a bait, for all human beings, to draw them, like birds or fish, open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes ........ itself ... [illusions (?). And you are] not ashamed, [you] wretched people, [of contradicting both yourselves and] one another: [for indeed, employing puerile] wit, [you reject] pleasure, while cleverly agreeing [with us about sensation], so that you not [prevented from] passing through [an area in safety], when you venture to climb crags.

Well now, I want to deflect also the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip —an error that, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts:] we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink wine and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, without awaiting the future.

[As for causes that follow, an example is expecting] to win praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray.]

Too bad one person can't use multiple reaction icons -- I would have used a thank you AND a LOL icon

It is unclear to me exactly how Godfrey and I ended up on close to the same page, but it appears to me that is the direction things are taking.

Quote from Godfrey

For me, desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both.

Just to keep things lively, I would carry that forward and say "For me, desire is intricately tied to life itself."

If you don't actively have desires, you aren't alive, and I would analogize the absolute minimizing of all desire to being on the very doorstep of death - such a person might still be be breathing and conscious, but if he has no desire of any kind, not even for the continuation of life, then that is what I would expect to observe in a hospital who has lost the battle against some disease and who is totally ready to die. (Leaving aside for the moment that such a person might indeed desire death.)

That's why it is essential to establish the initial presumption that not all desire is inherently painful and something to be minimized.

So therefore I would say that the Epicurean gods have desires as well -- all of which are presumably met. Which is not to say that Epicurean gods are omnipotent and can do anything and everything, but that they are smart enough not to have desires for things which are impossible by nature.

This is my vote for best summary statement so far:

Quote from Godfrey

For me, desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both. My practical Epicurean take is that desire provides the stimulus to action, while pleasure/pain provides guidance in how to act. Practice involves being aware of and responsive to all of these: desire, pleasure, and pain.

Except I would delete the "for me" and render it more firmly something like:

Quote from "Collective Genius" of the EpicureanFriends Forum

Desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both. Desire provides the stimulus to action, while pleasure/pain provides guidance in how to act. Epicurean practice involves being aware of and responsive to all of these: desire, pleasure, and pain. The advice of Epicurus to consider whether desires are natural and necessary is a call to consider the full results of pursuing any desire so as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, not a call to minimize all desire.

Edit: I checked Don's post 36 to see if there is anything in that list that needs to be added to such a really simple summary statement. On first glance I don't know that there is. There are some important points in 36 about voluntary vs automatic but I am not sure those really fit in addressing the main point, which is the issue of how to avoid the implication that ALL desire needs to be avoided/minimized. However if Don or someone sees something pithy to add, please say so. I would eventually like to take a paragraph like the above and add it to the summary outline on page one. We can link to this thread for the full discussion of the extra details of the varying opinions. Link to post 36: RE: Episode One Hundred Thirty Eight - Letter to Menoeceus 5 - Pleasure Part One

My dim recollection of JS Mill comes from reading "On Liberty" many years ago. I remember liking it at the time, but I can't really remember why. I definitely have never read through his work with an eye toward how he was interpreting Epicurus, or making points similar to Epicurus. That's probably well worth doing and anyone who has done it or wants to do it and has pointers would be very welcome to post in this thread!

Quote from reneliza

It's a lot easier to eliminate pain once you understand this. I am on the Epicurean subreddit and see many people trying to avoid both pain and pleasure (out of fear that pleasure will cause long term pain), and that's simply not possible. The only way to eliminate pain as they are trying to do is to move toward pleasure.

I think that is very close to identifying the real issue we are working to combat here. That's a very widespread notion. Why love (desire!) anything or anyone when you know that you could lose them or they could die before you do and cause you all sorts of pain? This is the topic Frances Wright tackled in Chapter 10. I am not sure she is correct to argue that we would not appreciate the good without the bad, but there is a lot to think about starting with "Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good?"

Quote from Frances Wright

But there is yet a pain, which the wisest and the best of men cannot escape; that all of us, my sons, have felt, or have to feel. Do not your hearts whisper it? Do you not tell me, that in death there is yet a sting? That ere he aim at us, he may level the beloved of our soul? The father, whose tender care hath reared our infant minds — the brother, whom the same breast hath nourished, and the same roof sheltered, with whom, side by side, we have grown like two plants by a river, sucking life from the same fountain and strength from the same sun — the child whose gay prattle delights our ears, or whose opening understanding fixes our hopes — the friend of our choice, with whom we have exchanged hearts, and shared all our pains and pleasures, whose eye hath reflected the tear of sympathy, whose hand hath smoothed the couch of sickness. Ah! my sons, here indeed is a pain — a pain that cuts into the soul. There are masters that will tell you otherwise; who will tell you that it is unworthy of a man to mourn even here. But such, my sons, speak not the truth of experience or philosophy, but the subtleties of sophistry and pride. He who feels not the loss, hath never felt the possession. He who knows not the grief, hath never known the joy. See the price of a friend in the duties we render him, and the sacrifices we make to him, and which, in making, we count not sacrifices, but pleasures. We sorrow for his sorrow; we supply his wants, or, if we cannot, we share them. We follow him to exile. We close ourselves in his prison; we soothe him in sickness; we strengthen him in death: nay, if it be possible, we throw down our life for his. Oh! What a treasure is that for which we do so much! And is it forbidden to us to mourn its loss? If it be, the power is not with us to obey.

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”

Quote from reneliza

Having just looked up PD26 (which I've read but then forgot) in preparation for next week, I'm more certain than ever that Epicurus was working with a different definition of desire than I am, since he says that the unnecessary desires cause no pain when unmet!

Great observation!

Yes let me place that thought in this thread. Given that by coincidence we are taking up PD26 at 8:30 PM eastern next Wednesday night, let's specifically invite everyone here to attend if they can so that we can have a major "DESIRE" extravaganza!

Thread

September 14, 2022 - Epicurean Zoom Gathering Topic - PD26 - "DESIRE"

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“All desires that lead to no pain when they…

Cassius

September 8, 2022 at 10:27 AM

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)

“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)

“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)

“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)

“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)

“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)

“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)

“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)

“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)

“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)

“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)

“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)

“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)

“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)

“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)

Quote from reneliza

I see the concern here, but my thought is that "moving toward pleasure" and "moving away from pain" are not just closely related concepts, but literally exactly identical. If pleasure and pain are the only two feelings, then having less of one means more than the other. The only way to remove pain is to add pleasure. The only way to add pleasure is to remove pain. There is no neutral state in between. There is no intermediary. So life can't be motivated by pleasure without being motivated by pain as well (more of one, less of the other)

But if it's disturbing to think of being driven by a negative, then by all means say that you're motivated to move toward the pleasure found in fulfilling desire rather than ending the pain of desire. Because they're wholly equivalent, one just feels more positive because of perspective.

I think we're seeing in this discussion the difference between (1) making a philosophically logical point vs (2) making a psychologically helpful suggestion to someone struggling with basic issues of life.

Both have their place and proper circumstance, but if we take the statement that is appropriate for one situation and try to apply it to the other, we end up with something that is confusing, disconcerting, and on the face of it "wrong."

That's exactly what I think has been done with the entire issue of the "absence of pain" passages ever since the time of Cicero. Cicero was a lawyer who opposed Epicurean theory so he intentionally used this technique to score debating points and make it appear that Epicurus was logically inconsistent. Everything that ReneLiza says in her post is logically correct as to the identity of "absence of one" being the same as "presence of the other." That logical observation is helpful and necessary in establishing that there is a limit to the quantity of pleasure - the limit is when all pain is gone. And if you're concerned about the issue "Does Pleasure Have A Limit?" because you're debating pleasure with Plato and you have to establish that pleasure does have a "boundary stone," then you're doing a great job and can feel very satisfied that you have proved your point.

But that kind of philosophical debate is not the way that normal people talk, and if you try to talk with them that way you end up confusing them and looking impractical or even a fool.

So we have to find a way to articulate this problem to people who are reading Epicurus so that they are aware of it and can therefore reason themselves out of the way of the difficulty. People need to understand that many deep issues in Epicurus are not just friendly disagreements among people of good faith who are searching for the truth, but are in fact a philosophical war. Every Epicurean needs a helmet and to be ready to fight in it.

I will never forget the second paragraph of this review from Dewitt:

Cicero was a trial lawyer and in this allegations that Epicurus was being inconsistent he was intentionally misrepresenting Epicurean doctrine. Cicero had a brilliant mind and access to all the texts and Epicurean teachers and he could have chosen to explain Epicurus' viewpoint from a sympathetic and understandable "big picture" viewpoint. Instead, he chose to take these passages we are debating outside of their full context and hold them up as inconsistent and foolish.

If we aren't willing to take a stand ourselves and explain how these interpretations are misrepresenting the truth, then Cicero's arguments will continue to prevail, as they have prevailed for 2000 years already.

Don't let me get this thread off track with this comment about Mill thinking some pleasures are better than others vs Bentham taking an opposing view. I started a new thread for it here: John Stuart Mill on Epicurus

But I think perhaps this witticism from John Stuart Mill is relevant as to the "satisfaction" issue. Probably this is a tangent to pursue in the other thread, but the tension between "happiness" and "contentment" if he developed the argument might be interesting and worth tracking down his full statement of it. I think it is a a very bad idea and dead end to consider any ranking of pleasures as "absolute" (for everyone all the time). But if we use "better" in the relative sense of "I prefer this pleasure right now because it is more pleasing to me than another X pleasure" then I would think the point is very obvious and very relevant to the discussion of whether desiring pleasures other than the ones we hold at the current moment is painful or pleasurable or simply the natural human condition or what. If we feel desires, then at least some desires seem to be pleasurable (they are natural and I can reasonably hope to achieve them) and others painful (they are impossible and yearning for them only brings unfulfillment and pain).

Quote from John Stuart Mill

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures). He distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that, "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."[74]

From Wikipedia:

Higher and lower pleasures[edit]

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures). He distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that, "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."^[74]

This made Mill believe that "our only ultimate end"^[77] is happiness. One unique part of his utilitarian view, that is not seen in others, is the idea of higher and lower pleasures. Mill explains the different pleasures as:

Quote

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference […] that is the more desirable pleasure.^[78]

He defines higher pleasures as mental, moral, and aesthetic pleasures, and lower pleasures as being more sensational. He believed that higher pleasures should be seen as preferable to lower pleasures since they have a greater quality in virtue. He holds that pleasures gained in activity are of a higher quality than those gained passively.^[79]

Mill defines the difference between higher and lower forms of pleasure with the principle that those who have experienced both tend to prefer one over the other. This is, perhaps, in direct contrast with Bentham's statement that "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry",^[80] that, if a simple child's game like hopscotch causes more pleasure to more people than a night at the opera house, it is more incumbent upon a society to devote more resources to propagating hopscotch than running opera houses. Mill's argument is that the "simple pleasures" tend to be preferred by people who have no experience with high art, and are therefore not in a proper position to judge. He also argues that people who, for example, are noble or practise philosophy, benefit society more than those who engage in individualist practices for pleasure, which are lower forms of happiness. It is not the agent's own greatest happiness that matters "but the greatest amount of happiness altogether".^[81]

I ran into this passage (from the Continuing Challenge of Epicureanism by Michael Kenneth Wilson) and at some point I'll move this to a better place to find in the future. Looks like pages 99 and 100 are worth finding and reading

John Stuart Mill observes that the original followers of Epicurus were likened to pigs for making pleasure their chief end. Similarly, Utilitarians, have sometimes been lampooned for reviving such a doctrine. When Epicureans were called pigs they responded that such an accusation assumed that human beings are not capable of any pleasure other than what pigs can experience. Consequently, it was their accusers who were really guilty of degrading human nature. Indeed, Mill recognizes, “…there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasure of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.” 12

11 John Stuart Mill, “Higher and Lower Pleasures” in Philosophy: Basic Readings (ed. Nigel Warburton; London:

Routledge, 1999) 99.

12 “Higher and Lower Pleasures”, 100.

Excellent last three posts. Plus this may be my nomination for quote of the week :

Quote from Godfrey

If desire is a pain, then per PD03 the limit of the magnitude of pleasure would include the removal of all desire. Is this what Epicurus had in mind? Then why would he describe natural and necessary desires? Does he say somewhere that gods have no desires?

That is an excellent observation. Also:

Quote from Godfrey

n other words, we've happened upon a very juicy topic

Yes. I cannot imagine that this topic was not a major one in antiquity. And did it not have a relatively easy explanation in which the very concept of desire is tainted with the negativity of being a pain then I cannot imagine that it would have been embraced by so many Romans.

I don't know if we have the original Greek of the phrase that Martin Ferguson Smith translates as "desires that outrun the limits fixed by nature," and it appears that the "outrun" may be Ferguson's own insertion, but after a couple hours of thought I still think that is a very useful way of looking at it. And if that is the case only the desires for things which are impossible by nature (eternal life, a personal relationship with a supernatural God, etc) are unnatural and intrinsically bad (painful because they are impossible by law of nature to fulfill) and merit to be called "roots of evil." From that perspective, even a desire for the latest iphone or a new Tesla is not "unnatural" even though the ancients never envisioned them.

Don has articulated my concern very well. To consider all desire to be intrinsically linked to pain has to be overbroad. It cannot be true both that all pleasure is good but that all desire for pleasure not currently in our possession is bad.

Looking for additional text references I see this fragment below from Diogenes of Oinoanda. Check the underlined part: which implies to me that the focus - the "roots of all evil" - are not "desires in general" but only those which "outrun the limits fixed by nature."

I think most all of us are already in agreement that desires for things prohibited by nature (eternal life for example) are desires that are by nature harmful. But desiring those pleasures that do not exceed the limits fixed by nature leaves a huge freeway for a spectrum of desires for pleasure which are not only beneficial but also either not intrinsically painful or are well worth the pain they require. To consider for example the excitement of children waiting for Christmas morning to receive their presents to be a state in which they are in pain would I think a highly inverted way of looking at the ultimate reality.

"Outrunning the limits fixed by nature" is a good phrase that helps shift the focus away from the simple observation that we do not yet have the object of our desire to a focus on what we would naturally expect a practical person like Epicurus to focus on: whether the desire is ultimately obtainable, and at what (if any) cost in pain.

Fr. 34

... reasoning ... [of happiness] ................... [is ... hope, after selection of these], and cure of erring emotions. So where, I say, the danger is great, so also is the fruit. Here we must turn aside these fallacious arguments on the grounds that they are insidious and insulting and contrived, by means of terminological ambiguity, to [lead] wretched human beings [astray] ....................... [let us] not [avoid every pain that is present, and let us not choose every pleasure, as the many always do. Each person must employ reasoning,] since he [will not always achieve immediate success: just as] exertion (?) [often] involves one [gain at the beginning and] certain [others as time passes by], so it is also with [experiencing pleasure;] for sowings of seeds do [not] bring [the same benefit] to the sower but we see some seeds very quickly germinating [and bearing fruit and others taking longer] ............... of pleasures and [pains] ........ [pleasure].

And so the .......... [are] ....... If .................. [prudence.]

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.

Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

Please.join us next week and don't regret missing tonight because our session was shortened by my very poor Internet connection tonight,

Plus next week is a PD on DESIRE which is highly topical!

Maybe we ought to be considering the dictionary definitions of "desire" today, and also follow Don's lead and take a position on what we think the word meant exactly to Epicurus. Otherwise we are likely to never gain much clarity.

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/desire

Quote from reneliza

I think "desire" must be a lack of something good (or at least something I perceive as good), and given that we're using pretty broad definitions of "pleasure" and "pain" here, that any lack must be a pain.

Reneliza would you say that your sentence there boils down to "all desire is painful?" Would that cause you any issue to embrace that as a sweeping general statement?