Posts by Cassius

Now of course "images" do not appear to be the same thing in the texts as what we see, BUT it seems fair to say that the things that we see do generate images as well as visible sights. So is it possible that we are talking about picturing things so as to summon up the images that are received directly into the mind?

Duh. I should have brought this question up earlier too (I hope i didn't and have forgotten)!

What would be the relationship, if any, between this discussion and the flow of "images" that is discussed extensively in Book 4 of Lucretius?

I gather from our discussion of book 4 (which I think took place before your arrival in the podcast Don) that Epicurus was suggesting that many of our thought processes derive from our minds selectively receiving some from among many of the "images" that are constantly floating in the air. This is specifically suggested too by Cicero in his correspondence to Cassius Longinus and in Cassius' subsequent reference to "spectres."

To what extent would an idea of "setting before the eyes" be related to selectively tuning your attention to certain images as part of the thought process.

One of the reasons the images discussions seem to be largely ignored by modern commentators is that Epicurus seems to have been suggesting that these images were intimately involved in our thoughts, which we tend to reject today. I can't imagine that Philodemus departed too far from Epicurus on that, so is it possible that the Epicurean view of images is related to issues involving setting before the eyes?

10.2********Letter from Cicero to Cassius, written from Rome, January of 45 B.C.

DXXX \(F XV, 16\)

TO C. CASSIUS LONGINUS \(AT BRUNDISIUM\)

ROME \(JANUARY\)

I think you must be a little ashamed at this being the third letter inflicted on you before I have a page or a syllable from you. But I will not press you: I shall expect, or rather exact, a longer letter. For my part, if I had a messenger always at hand, I should write even three an hour. For somehow it makes you seem almost present when I write anything to you, and that not “by way of phantoms of images,” as your new friends express it, who hold that “mental pictures” are caused by what Catius called “spectres” – or I must remind you that Catius Insuber the Epicurean, lately dead, calls “spectres” what the famous Gargettius, and before him Democritus, used to call “images.”

Well, even if my eyes were capable of being struck by these “spectres,” because they spontaneously run in upon them at your will, I do not see how the mind can be struck. You will be obliged to explain it to me, when you return safe and sound, whether the “spectre” of you is at my command, so as to occur to me as soon as I have taken the fancy to think about you; and not only about you, who are in my heart’s core, but supposing I begin thinking about the island of Britain – will its image fly at once into my mind? But of this later on.

I am just sounding you now to see how you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall say more and demand that you be restored to the sect from which you have been ejected by “violence and armed force.” In an injunction of this sort the words “within this year” are not usually added. Therefore, even if it is now two or three years since you divorced Virtue, seduced by the charms of Pleasure, it will still be open for me to do so. And yet to whom am I speaking? It is to you, the most gallant of men, who ever since you entered public life have done nothing that was not imbued to the utmost with the highest principle. In that very sect of yours I have a misgiving that there must be more stuff than I thought, if only because you accept it. “How did that come into your head?” you will say. Because I had nothing else to say. About politics I can write nothing: for I don’t choose to write down my real opinions.

## ****10.3********Letter from Cassius to Cicero, written from Brundisium, January, 45 B.C.

I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

Ok I looked back at 16 and 27 but I still don't see much more there than an allusion or idiom referring to "confronting" a person with the consequences of their thoughts or actions, which seems to me to be a fairly ordinary thing that anyone of any philosophy would do in making a point.

Do you see Philodemus saying more than that in those passages?

What I am reading seems to be something like:

"If someone has a problem confront them by discussing with them the consequences of their actions and fleshing those out in detail."

Ok, if so, that makes sense.

But is there more than that?

Now the specific aspect of telling them to "picture it" might be significant, but wouldn't it be significant only if there is something special in the Epicurean view of how "picturing"relates to thinking?

So I gather that is what we are talking about, some kind of special relationship between thinking and picturing (?)

if so, what is that special insight of Epicurus that makes this significant?

Welcome @jonathan !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

So see I am not at all resistant to pursing the implications of "ante oculos" and that reminds me too:

1 - Is "ante oculos" what we are discussing?

2- Did we yet pull out the actual quotes from Philodemus (rather than Voula Tsouna's paraphrases or opinions)? That's what I was really concerned about, that we were speculating based on relying on Tsouna rather than on reading the actual reliable-grade texts themselves.

Right now I can picture at least two sections of Lucretius that might be relevant to a "picture this" idiom or method of explaining, but I don't have a firm picture of anything specific from Philodemus.

So I am not asking you (Don) to do it since we are all covered with work, and I don't have the time right now to offer to do it myself, but that would be a good goal for us at some point to pull together at least some preliminary English version of those cites for this project.

And if the texts are so fragmentary that all we can put together in English is Tsouna's conjectures as to the meaning of corrupted sentences, then we can do that, but then at least we can have them clearly labeled as such.

As usual my thoughts are clear as mud

Combined with a half-memory of reading something in "On methods of inference."

I think the key word for any potential relationship would be what I think is translated as "inconceivability.". That might sound like a logical concept at first glance, but since proof of anything is grounded in the senses, and there is probably a major role for "picturing" things in Epicurean views of thought processes, we might have a related issue.

Also long ago in the Lucretius podcast I think we ran into reason to discuss the extent to which memories constitute stored pictures, and I think there was resistance to that view, but that might factor in too if our emphasis on the use of words is clarity of meaning in a "picture" sense.

Do you have the picture of what I am suggesting yet?

I am sure by now you are getting the picture.

I had more to say on this earlier today and I should have pulled off the road to post it, but this is the best I can reconstruct hours later:

When I think of telling someone one to "set this before their eyes" I think of telling them to "picture this" in their minds.

Telling them to "picture this" is pretty close to asking them "Can you picture this?"

The reason I bring that up is that it seems to me that some of the epistemology sections refer to what may be a test of "can you picture this?" For example, I am thinking of Lucretius' suggesting that we imagine throwing a javelin toward the edge of space. and picturing whether anything might ever stop it.

It's my impression that Lucretius/Epicurus is suggesting that it is impossible ("inconceivable?") to imagine anything stopping the javelin, or that there is a wall or limit or end to outer space.

So where I am going is that as we examine passages which talk about "setting before the eyes" we might want to be on the alert for epistemological test aspects to the exercise.

If we can picture something in our minds, that might be an indication that the thing "might" at least possibly exist. If we cannot even picture it, that might be an indication of "inconceivability." Maybe I am picking up that"inconceivability" word in Philodemus On signs and it has no relation to the current discussion, but it seems to me to be something to be on the alert for as we read whatever material may exist. Because we clearly have Lucretius using the term "ante oculos" in one part of book one, plus we have him suggesting that we imagine the flying javelin as a technique of impressing the lesson on the student.

I am rushed for time so I will have to read the article later. I presume we will eventually want to move this to the Canonics section, but I am not able in a few seconds to figure out his point. Is there a way to briefly summarize why this looks like it could be relevant to Epicurean reasoning? By no means am I saying it's not, I am just not quickly grasping the major idea of his suggestion(?) Is this related to probability vs "certainty"?

Is this the essential point?

Quote

Including a qualifier or a rebuttal in an argument helps build your ethos, or credibility. When you acknowledge that your view isn’t always true or when you provide multiple views of a situation, you build an image of a careful, unbiased thinker, rather than of someone blindly pushing for a single interpretation of the situation.

Quote from Matt

I too follow his principle in that I’m linked to my kids preservation, therefore if I die I won’t be present for them to continue my fatherly duties, but I would die for them if no options presented themselves. But I won’t be performing any uncalculated heroic acts of bravery for strangers, for my children’s sake.

I can't remember which conversation we were in but I recall someone (Joshua or Don) addressing the hypothetical of whether a young person would die to save the life of their 99 year old grandfather. Every situation is different and even there I would not suggest a uniform rule, but even with people we know it is plain (at least to me) that we would not always give up our lives even for people who are close to us, depending on the circumstances.

When you extend that reasoning the idea of dying for "humanity at large" when you might have a chance to save or alleviate the suffering of your child or spouse or someone close to you is pretty breathtakingly abstract and (at least for me) a non-starter on the gut-level scale of the way I think I would personally act. And I suspect that Epicurus would well understand that argument.

My gosh there are reasonable arguments that he said something about living alone, and away from the crowd, and not paying attention to their lack of understand. I seriously doubt he would entertain the idea that he ought to be willing to give up his life for any number of strangers when he could preserve those of his family and friends.

Quote from Matt

however my personal revulsion is not based necessarily on the fact that my own society considers these acts as unlawful nor because of an ad populum argument that because the majority of the world rejects them as wrong or unlawful, I do as well…my own internal instinct tell me it’s “wrong” based on my natural experiences and empathetic reaction.

This point made by Matt here strikes me as essentially the exact same argument made by, and extended in great detail, in Jackson Barwis' "Dialogues Concerning Innate Principles" (his response to John Locke on the blank slate theory). I continue to recommend that to anyone interested in developing the argument. Here he makes Matt's point in other words:

Quote

The innate principles of the soul, continued he, cannot, any more than those of the body, be propositions. They must be in us antecedently to all our reasonings about them, or they could never be in us at all: for we cannot, by reasoning, create any thing, the principles of which did not exist antecedently. We can, indeed, describe our innate sentiments and perceptions to each other; we can reason, and we can make propositions about them; but our reasonings neither are, nor can create in us, moral principles. They exist prior to, and independently of, all reasoning, and all propositions about them.

When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.

Possibly that's one of my favorite quotes of all time, because it not only hits against Aristotle's blank slate, but it also in my view hits on the heart Epicurus' argument against improper logical reasoning:

"we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions:"

In my view this is an exact echo of what DeLacy says in his book on Philodemus On Signs about Epicurus' critique of Aristotle's position:

I am thinking that this issue can be summarized as:

"We are not convinced of truth by forming it into logical propositions."

And that applies with special force in issues of ethics and morality.

Quote from Kalosyni

If civilization ended and cannibalism became the only way to survive, I can imagine that an Epicurean would sacrifice themselves or give themselves up for another's food because at that point "the party is over" meaning that a joyful life wouldn't be possible anymore, and it would also be chosen since "death is nothing to us".

I agree with that, but with the critical caveat that the issue would not turn so much on "civilization" but on those who are our family and "friends" (which would be an interesting issue to tackle as to who fits that). In other words there are people whose existence are critical to us, and people who we have essentially no relationship to, so it would be important to make that distinction. But in the sense of "the world of living human beings" for example if the entire earth were being destroyed by a meteor there wouldn't be much to argue about

Article from Academia.com  Probably lots of good research in it that will be helpful on this topic, but I haven't read it - only long enough to word search "DeWitt" and find no hits

Here's the final paragraph:

Quote

Thus, Lucretius’ account of APT and simulacra supports the following view: all sensations (dreams

and hallucinations included) are truth-conducive (TCR), and their object is typically distal. Illusion

about distal objects is never stricto sensu perceptual but depends on the informational integration by

our doxastic activity; only in hallucinations and dreams is the object not a solid but the very floating

simulacra (distal view plus disjunctivism), but this does not undermine truth-conduciveness, because

the difference between solid and non-solid objects is phenomenologically appreciable, except when

dreaming. However, even in this last circumstance it is not the case that dreamed contents are not

truth-conducive, as it is their very truth-conduciveness that cannot be appreciated due to the inactivity

of senses, so APT is safe and consistently grounds an objectivist epistemology.

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So you may want to read the article, or else read Chapter 8 in DeWitt as to the multiple meanings of "true" and consider which is more clear and useful.

Quote

While Epicurus was adamant in his determination to defend the validity of the sensations as being the means of direct contact between man and reality and as possessing precedence over reason, he exhibits no desire to defend the individual sensation. The fallacies of those who impute to him belief in the infallibility of sensation lie partly in their failure to observe the ambiguity of the word true and in their confusion of ~'truth" with "value."

It is not difficult to differentiate the various meanings of true and it is essential to right understanding. For example, when Epicurus declared that "the phantasms seen by the insane and in dreams are true," he meant that they were "real" and existed independently of the madman or the dreamer, because "they act as a stimulus and that which does not exist does not deliver a stimulus." 13 These phantasms, however, are not "true" in the sense that a sensation experienced by the waking observer is true. The dreamer may have a vision of a centaur but no centaurs exist in real life. If the waking man sees an ox, then the sensation is true because the stimulus is delivered by a living ox.

A still different meaning of true may be discerned when Epicurus denominates his system as "true philosophy." He means it is true in the sense that his Twelve Elementary Principles are true or in the sense that the modern scientist believes the accepted calculation of the speed of light to be true. This may be called absolute truth, if there is such a thing.

It remains to speak of the relatively true. The views of a tower at various distances may be cited as examples. Each is true relative to the distance; its value as evidence of the facts is another mauer. This distinction was no novelty to the ancients; Sextus Empiricus sets it forth at some length in a discussion of Epicureanism.

Also worthy of mention is the sensation which is optically true but false to the facts. An example much brandished by the skeptics was the bent image of the oar immersed in the water. 15 Epicurus made logical provision for this difficulty: "Of two sensations the one cannot refute the other,16 because we give attention to all sensations." This statement alone would acquit him of belief in the infallibility of sensation, because it is distinctly implied that some ~ensations are employed to correct others.

The example of the tower will serve as a transition from the topic of ambiguity to that of confusion. When modern scholars seize upon the saying "all sensations are true," which appears nowhere in the extant writings of Epicurus, and stretch it to mean that all sensations are reliable or trustworthy or "that the senses cannot be deceived," they are confusing the concept of truth with the concept of value. They overlook the fact that even a truthful witness may fall short of delivering the whole truth or may even give false evidence. The distant view of the square tower is quite true relative to the distance but it fails to reveal the whole truth about the tower.

To assume that Epicurus was unaware of these plain truths. as one must if belief in the infallibility of sensation is imputed to him. is absurd. It is because he was aware that the value of sensations, apart from their truth, varied all the way from totality to zero, that he exhorted beginners "under all circumstances to watch the sensations and especially the immediate perceptions whether of the intellect or any of the criteria whatsoever."

Obviously. so far from thinking the sensations infallible. he was keenly aware of the possibility of error and drew sharp attention to the superior values of immediate sensations, When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an aistllesis. All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying. "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values. however. range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate.

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Of course Zucca is written for a professional audience so I am sure they will enjoy the jargon employed in the paper.

I see that occasionally Elli is dropping in so it would probably be worth "tagging" her when you have a need for translation support. But I know she's extremely busy so we'll have to take that into account!

Quote from Don

There's some discussion of definitions and the Epicurean aversion to them in Philodemus's On Anger.

Yes Cicero states something similar. I suspect we're going to find that that is an overbroad statement, and that Epicurus used definitions just like anyone else, just with explicit caveats as to their limitations.

Quote from SimonC

It might be better to frame the discussion in terms of "good" vs "bad", or "healthy" vs "unhealthy".

And that reminds me of a significant section in DeWitt's book where he suggests that Epicurus viewed pleasure almost in terms of "food" or at least analogous to health vs disease.

Quote from Matt

Since we are not explicitly talking about this in terms of Epicurean philosophy,

We're going to have to figure out some way of clarifying that. It's like with "Gods" -- the definition is so different in Epicurus vs the non-Epicurean traditions that the words mean dramatically different things. In analogy to Epicurus saying that supernatural gods don't exist, but "real ones" do, we've got a situation where we (and probably Epicurus) refer to "evil" all the time, but do not mean anywhere near the same thing as does society at large. In Epicurean terms I would say there is no such thing as "absolute evil" (other than perhaps "pain" in a generic sense) just as there are no supernatural gods.

Unless we keep this clear the conversations are going to be hopelessly confused.

If anyone wishes to argue or imply that there is such a thing as "absolute evil" (in all circumstances; all times, all places, to all people) it would probably be good for them to state that explicitly so it can be fleshed out.

Welcome Jake cu

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Matt

Yet still…will society still judge the act as evil?

I have pretty well come to peace with that question myself. What "society" thinks is relevant only insofar as society has the power to punish offenses against its collective decision-making. What "society' concludes is often as inverse to the "truth" of a matter (let's say from the perspective of Epicurus for present discussion) as it is accurate to the truth. Society's opinion is of relevance to lots of things, but not to there being any absolute truth of the matter.

Welcome @Yannsousa !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Cassius

Logic in the sense of parsing definitions and categories. It's largely a word game until you connect back to emotions / pain / pleasure.

To restate this, I think this is one of the big aspects of the canon of truth. The senses and pain and pleasure (and presumably anticipations) can present something to us on a perceptual level which is repeatable and therefore verifiable from that standpoint. But is there any OTHER standpoint other than this perceptual level at which something can be considered absolutely the same for everyone at all times and places? I doubt that is possible under Epicurean philosophy, and in fact it's probably pretty clear that it is not.

Are all words (even "pain" and pleasure") purely a matter of definition in our conscious minds, that become locked in only when we attach them to a certain set of perceptions? I tend to think so, especially when we consider that different languages use entirely different words for what we consider to be the same things.

But the whole process of language is not really chaotic or random either. We're all wired in similar ways, and take pleasure and pain in similar things, and see, hear, touch, smell, and taste in similar ways. So it would be natural that we might also process perceptions into opinions (and assign those opions labels) in similar ways.

So there can be expected behaviors within certain natural lanes of travel without there being any intent, or providence, or absolute standard giving rise to "absolutes" in these areas.

Or so it would appear to me today.

I thought I remembered a line in "A Few Days In Athens" where Epicurus said that there was no good but pleasure, and no evil but pain, but so far the nearest I can find is this in chapter three in regard to virtue. This is related, but not quite as direct. Of course Frances Wright is not really to be accepted as an authority on Epicurus' position, but her views are always interesting:

Quote

“Yes, in a great measure, yet not all together: we are all the wooers of virtue, but we are wooers of a different character.”

“And may she not then favor one more than another?”

“That is a question,” replied the Gargettian, playfully, ” that each will answer in his own favor. If you ask me, he continued, – with one of his sweetest tones and smiles, “I shall say, that I feel myself virtuous, because my soul is at rest.”

“If this be your criterion, you should with the stoics deny that pain is an evil.”

“By no means: so much the contrary, I hold it the greatest of all evils, and the whole aim of my life, and of my philosophy, is to escape from it. To deny that pain is an evil is such another quibble as the Elean’s denial of motion: that must exist to man which exists to his senses; and as to existence or non existence abstracted from them, though it may afford an idle argument for an idle hour, it can never enter as a truth, from which to draw conclusions, in the practical lessons of a master. To deny that pain is an evil seems more absurd than to deny its existence, which has also been done, for its existence is only apparent from its effect upon our senses; how then shall we admit the existence, and deny the effect, which alone forces that admittance? But we will leave these matters to the dialecticians of the Portico. I feel myself virtuous because my soul is at rest. With evil passions I should be disturbed and uneasy; with uncontrolled appetites I should be disordered in body as well as mind — for this reason, and for this reason only, I avoid both.”

“Only!”

“Only: virtue is pleasure; were it not so, I should not follow it.”

Theon was about to break forth in indignant astonishment: the sage softly laid a hand upon his arm, and, with a smile and bend of the head demanding attention, proceeded; “The masters who would have us to follow virtue for her own sake, independent of any pleasure or advantage that we may find in the pursuit, are sublime visionaries, who build a theory without examining the ground on which they build it, who advance doctrines without examining principles. Why do I gaze on the Cupid of Praxiteles? because it is beautiful; because it gives me pleasurable sensations. If it gave me no pleasurable sensations, should I find it beautiful? should I gaze upon it? or would you call me wise if then I gave a drachma for its possession? What other means have we of judging of things than by the effect they produce upon our senses? Our senses then being the judges of all things, the aim of all men is to gratify their senses; in other words, their aim is pleasure or happiness: and if virtue were not found to conduce to this, men would do well to shun her, as they now do well to shun vice.”

“You own then no pleasure but virtue, and no misery but vice?”

“Not at all: I think virtue only the highest pleasure, and vice, or ungoverned passions and appetites, the worst misery. Other pleasures are requisite to form a state of perfect ease, which is happiness; and other miseries are capable of troubling, perhaps destroying, the peace of the most virtuous and the wisest man.”

“I begin to see more reason in your doctrine,” said the youth, looking up with a timid blush in the face of the philosopher.

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