Posts by Cassius

Don that article you cite from Sedley needs a thread of its own!

Heres a reference to a quote I could not remember in the podcast:

When the Facts Change, I Change My Mind. What Do You Do, Sir? – Quote Investigator

Episode 126 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we begin the discussion of Epicurus' letter to Pythocles, and we discuss many aspects of the basic approach of Epicurus toward the study of nature. This is one of our longer - but probably also one of our more important - episodes, so we hope you enjoy it and we invite your comment. Of special note: Don rejoins us for several special episodes!

We went with a modified size graphic this time -- join us Wednesday night if you can.

This is spurred by the new book ""Epicureans In Rome" linked by Joshua here: "Lucretius on the Size of the Sun", by T.H.M. Gellar-Goad

Chapter Two of that Book is: "Sint Ista Graecorum: How to be an Epicurean in Late Republican Rome – Evidence from Cicero’s On Ends" and the writer (Geert Roskam) says:

Quote

"In the second book of On Ends, Cicero blames Torquatus for an embarrassing inconsistency. Whereas Torquatus claims to do everything for the sake of pleasure, he cannot possibly maintain this stance while addressing the senate (2.74 - 77). On such occasions, he prefers to dwell on duty, fair-dealing, moral worth and so on; in short, to switch to the vocabulary of the Stoics and Peripatetics. And not without reason, for to be honest about his real political motivations when talking to the senators would almost surely ruin his later political career (.). And thus, Cicero concludes, Torquatus is forced to employ artificial language in order to conceal what he really thinks, or “change his opinions like his clothes,” confining his true convictions to a small circle of intimate friends and defending counterfeit opinions in public (.). This, to my mind, is one of the strongest arguments in Book  of On Ends. Cicero knew very well what kind of discourse was usually heard in the Roman senate and saw an obvious contrast with Torquatus’ Epicurean ideals. The whole passage is characterized by a strong rhetorical tone, but also makes a valid philosophical point, on the basis of the specifically Roman political context. What could Torquatus say in reply to this challenge? (emphasis added)

Roskom goes on and gives some discussion that takes the edge off this, but I don't think we need to admit that this is even a strong agument I think it is in fact easy to recast stand Stoic calls to "honor" and "duty" and "virtue" into the framework of "love of country" and "love of friends" and "the pleasures that we value in our community" in ways that make clear the ultimate argument that everything we value stems from the pleasure that it brings us.

Roskom also seems to fault Torquatus for not having much to say on this point, but I think in all issues like that we have to go first to the point that this Torquatus and this conversation were not real, and we would not expect a lawyer/advocate like Cicero to "play fair" and give his opponent the last and best word.

I think it would be easy and fun as an exercise to take most any of Cicero's famous speeches to the Senate (and the Phillipics come to my mind first) and recast / rewrite them as if Cicero were an Epicurean and if he were using Epicurus' arguments in the Senate.

When I can find the time I will take one of these Phillipics and rewrite it, asking for the same things Cicero was asking for from the Senate, but writing it in Epicurean terms:

M. Tullius Cicero, Orations, The fourteen orations against Marcus Antonius (Philippics), THE FOURTEEN ORATIONS OF M. T. CICERO AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS, CALLED PHILIPPICS., section 1

Something else I want to check:. I believe this article is one of those situations where we can point out that Dewitt did not defend Epicurus strongly enough! I seem to remember but need to check that Dewitt hints at this analysis but in the end considera Epircurus to have been wrong on this issue. If so then this current article will definitely supercede Dewitt's analysis on this issue.

Ok as I write this I will try to restrain my enthusiasm:

This is an OUTSTANDING article. I completely agree with the author's analysis and direction, and if this is an example of the very latest Epicurean scholarship then we are definitely moving in the right direction.

The writer builds IMHO a very strong case that the summary viewpoint "The sun is the size that it appears to be" is an Epicurean "litmus test" of a proper understanding of the philosophy, akin to "Death is nothing to us" or "nothing can be created from nothing."

As we are currently discussing in the podcast, reaching conclusions about things we see in the sky presents a difficult issue of limited evidence, and the worst thing we can do is to affix ourselves to a single position when multiple options are possible.

The statement that the size of the sun is what it appears to be does not give a single answer, but emphasizes that any or all answers must be based on "appearance" (the senses) which is what EVERY conclusion in life must also be based upon.

The concluding section of the essay goes into this in much more detail and I highly recommend it. I think the position he advocates is where many of us are already on this topic, but this article goes further than Bailey or even Sedley and really nails down a position that I think will serve most of us very well going on into the future. It will also nail us more firmly into the position that the senses are the foundation for all our conclusions about reality, and in fact that is very likely the intended purpose of the formulation.

We may have to designate someone every Twentieth to start the session saying:

"The Size Of The Sun Is As It Appears To Be!"

Yes , thank you for this post. I saw headlines about the article but haven't had a chance to read it.

I think the issue of "artificial intelligence" is definitely of interest in Epicurean studies, because it helps us focus on what "life" really means, and how life is different from "logic" - no matter how complex.

Over time this would be a really good topic to explore so thanks for starting it!

It is apparently Usener 423 citing Plutarch, here from Epicurism.info

Epicurus.info : E-Texts : Epicurea

We talked about some of this in the podcast recording today and it is truly a rabbit chase.

I am not sure the chase can even get off the ground until we decide what we mean by "good", which is well before we put any modifiers on the term like natural or necessary or intrinsic or instrumental or anything else.

And part of answering that question probably means coming to terms with what Epicurus really meant in his warning about walking around uselessly harping on the meaning of good.

Do we end up,as Francis Wright apparently did (need to check the text) concluding that there is nothing good but pleasure, and nothing bad/evil but pain?

I am tempted to say the answer is "yes" but so much depends on the subtle meanings assigned to the words in even that formulation.

I tend to think that whenever someone wants to discuss this, they are suggesting that inseparable from the word "good" is an implicit "always." And if that is the case, I find it very difficult to designate anything as "always good" other than pleasure.

Or do we define the good as Torquatus suggested in On Ends that "everyone agrees...." That as to the "supreme good" ---

"The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations."

One thing that would be good would be to see if we can find examples of where such terms were used in the core texts. This will be a good discussion!

That's because it won't be recorded until tomorrow! I used to put "preproduction" on advance threads to indicate that and I will go back to that habit. Thanks!

Quote from beasain

A few 'reasonable' explanations are enough, and they are not (much) interested in making the science advance.

I too need to read that article, but I will go ahead and state my view of this issue:

As to the first part of the sentence, yes one or a few "reasonable" explanations are sufficient to satisfy our most pressing need, which is to banish the allegations of the religionists that the Sun was divine, or part of a divine order.

But as to the second part of the sentence, when I see that sentiment stated in that way (and we see it often) I think that the wording is too negative and arises from modern prejudices against Epicurus. I see Epicurus as being strictly logical in his approach, which is that once he has determined (through science!) that the end of life is happiness/pleasure, then he is logically consistent and holds the tests of ALL actions in life, including the study of science, to the test: "Does it advance our happiness?" Once you conclude that there are no criteria given us in life by nature other than pleasure and pain, then you apply that conclusion rigorously and without exception.

The negative presumption that is conveyed in "not much interested in making the science advance" is the anti-Epicurean conception that there are ends in Nature which are justified IN THEMSELVES apart from whether they bring pleasure or avoid pain. Such a conclusion is logically ruled out by Epicurean philosophy.

On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy also asserts that since there is only one reason to do anything in life (pleasure/pain) you are going to do everything in life that is practical for you to pursue pleasure. And MOST CERTAINLY the advancement of science is a tremendously useful tool for advancing pleasure and avoiding pain, so MOST CERTAINLY an Epicurean is going to appreciate and pursue the advancement of science as a tool for better living.

So in my view the many times that we see statements like "Epicurus wasn't much interested in science" we are really seeing the complaint that "Epicurus wasn't interested in XXXX for the sake of XXXX itself." That argument makes no sense without realizing that the impetus behind it is the assertion that Epicurus was wrong and that he should have valued "XXXX in itself" (most generally, they are asserting "virtue" or "piety" as goals in themselves).

Therefore I think we ought not be afraid of or concerned about that "Epicurus didn't value science" argument, and instead turn the issue around and use it as a teaching opportunity for explaining why Epicurus taught what he taught.

End of rant!

Episode 125 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we conclude the letter to Herodotus. Next week we begin with the letter to Pythocles.

Thank you Beasain - and again, it was a pleasure speaking with you directly this past Wednesday!

Flying pigs are nice. I wonder why he is portrayed sitting in a pot?

Podcast should be up later today. A few notes in the meantime:

- Around the twenty minute mark (and several places) we talk about possible differences between the attitude of Frances Wright ("observation is everything, theory is nothing") and what Epicurus seems to be saying about determining alternative "explanations" for celestial phenomena (even though we don't have information to say which one of several is correct). I think we might want to expand in the future on this issue: An "observation" is not really the same as an "explanation." Epicurus is telling us that we may have several "explanations" that are consistent with observations, and that we should not choose between them if we don't have sufficient evidence to do so. But it seems to me that here is another example where Epicurus is clearly telling us to USE our observations to come up with rational explanations that assist our happiness and help us to see that supernatural gods are not a necessary explanation of natural phenomena. Whether or not Frances Wright means to be so extreme, she seems to me to differ from Epicurus on this, because several of her chapters can be read to imply (or even state explicitly) that we should never move past observation to reach any "theories" of any kind. Maybe the resolution is to unwind the meaning of the term "observation" as Frances Wright uses it, but on the face of it I can see the way she makes her point to be potentially confusing, or even wrong, from Epicurus' perspective.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty Six of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we begin Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey

[84] CLEON brought me a letter from you in which you continue to express a kindly feeling towards me, which is a just return for my interest in you, and you attempt with some success to recall the arguments which lead to a life of blessedness. You ask me to send you a brief argument about the phenomena of the sky in a short sketch, that you may easily recall it to mind. For you say that what I have written in my other works is hard to remember, even though, as you state, you constantly have them in your hands. I was glad to receive your request and felt constrained to answer it by pleasant expectations for the future.

[85] Therefore, as I have finished all my other writings I now intend to accomplish your request, feeling that these arguments will be of value to many other persons as well, and especially to those who have but recently tasted the genuine inquiry into nature, and also to those who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation. Therefore lay good hold on it, keep it in mind, and go through it all keenly, together with the rest which I sent in the small epitome to Herodotus.

First of all then we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena of the sky, whether they are dealt with in connection with other doctrines or independently, than peace of mind and a sure confidence, just as in all other branches of study.

[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways.

[88] Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth.

HICKS

Epicurus to Pythocles, greeting.

[84] In your letter to me, of which Cleon was the bearer, you continue to show me affection which I have merited by my devotion to you, and you try, not without success, to recall the considerations which make for a happy life. To aid your memory you ask me for a clear and concise statement respecting celestial phenomena; for what we have written on this subject elsewhere is, you tell me, hard to remember, although you have my books constantly with you. I was glad to receive your request and am full of pleasant expectations.

[85] We will then complete our writing and grant all you ask. Many others besides you will find these reasonings useful, and especially those who have but recently made acquaintance with the true story of nature and those who are attached to pursuits which go deeper than any part of ordinary education. So you will do well to take and learn them and get them up quickly along with the short epitome in my letter to Herodotus.

In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm conviction.

[86] We do not seek to wrest by force what is impossible, nor to understand all matters equally well, nor make our treatment always as clear as when we discuss human life or explain the principles of physics in general – for instance, that the whole of being consists of bodies and intangible nature, or that the ultimate elements of things are indivisible, or any other proposition which admits only one explanation of the phenomena to be possible. But this is not the case with celestial phenomena: these at any rate admit of manifold causes for their occurrence and manifold accounts, none of them contradictory of sensation, of their nature.

[87] For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts; for our life has no need now of unreason and false opinion; our one need is untroubled existence. All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them. But when we pick and choose among them, rejecting one equally consistent with the phenomena, we clearly fall away from the study of nature altogether and tumble into myth. Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see how the former really take place, but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for their occurrence may possibly be due to a variety of causes.

[88] However, we must observe each fact as presented, and further separate from it all the facts presented along with it, the occurrence of which from various causes is not contradicted by facts within our experience.

Thank you for the post and for the graphic Kalosyni! Kind of a combo east-meets-west look!

That's a great post and very interesting to read through Simon! If my own guesswork is any guide, looks to me like you're doing a great job absorbing the same material I'm reading!