Posts by Cassius

Threadstarter post

This link comes from Wikipedia on Thomas Young:

https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=english_theses

(However this sounds like the writer's overlay rather than a cite to Epicurus.)

Another: Reason and Revolution:  The Radicalism of Thomas Young

For me, the real litmus test of whether someone was an "Epicurean Influencer" often comes down to: Did they embrace eternal universe rather than a Deistic clockmaker model? Unless they embrace eternal universe they are hedging on key doctrine. (I don't apply that test quite the same way to people today, because I know that advanced physics has people turned in so many directions its hard to know what to believe anymore. But until that phenomena happened, seems to me the only legitimate position was Epicurus' own position - and of course I myself continue to think it's the best one even now. )

It would be really interesting to know how far Thomas Young went in endorsing Epicurus rather than just a generic deist/clockmaker/materialism model.

Because of course materialism doesn't confirm whether they embraced "Pleasure" as the ultimate goal rather than virtue or some other form of idealism. Thomas Cooper wrote an essay, for instance, giving a way to reconcile materialism with Christianity.

Also interesting that several of these type people were "doctors," including Joseph Priestley and Thomas Cooper.

A long time ago I put together using the website XMINDS this chart of the major figures referenced in "A Few Days In Athens."

A Map Through A Few Days In Athens and the World of Epicurus

www.xmind.net

Over time it would be a great project to put together something similar (better!) illustrating the web of relationships among those who were "significant contributors to the transmission of Epicurean Philosophy" in the English-speaking world.

Not everyone has need for this kind of thing, especially outside the USA, but I think that there are many people in the initial stages of considering their viewpoints about Epicurus, and discussing him with other people, who would profit a lot from having a ready reference to a diagram of past "luminaries" who have embraced Epicurean philosophy.

Labelling Thomas Young as more radical increases the odds he was affirmatively Epicurean. We need to investigate and find out what texts are available!

This is the section I need to reorganize and expand that has this kind of material already:

1700's - 1800's

Nate thanks for that reference:

Quote from Nate

Thomas Young, organizer of the Boston Tea Party,

Back when I was researching that period years of go I started with Paine's Age of Reason and from Paine and found Ethan Allen's book (Reason the Only Oracle of Man) which is a little rough compared to Paine). I also found Elihu Palmer's "Principles of Nature" and the writings of Thomas Cooper.

But I never found a reference to "Thomas Young." Do you know if he wrote anything worth reading? Probably this list of books here deserves a thread of its own for people who would like to research and cite "Founding Fathers" of the USA for reference in advocating Epicurean viewpoints. Even if they were "deists" or didn't mention Epicurus specifically I can imagine this kind of material being useful to lots of people. I didn't orginally consider it but of course now in retrospect I should include Frances Wrights AFDIA in that list too.

Absolutely right to link to Nate's text whenever possible. What you're seeing in some posts going on now is an attempt to reorganize and make it easier to find the forum threads on the individual doctrines such as this one. I added a new link under the "special resources" section on the first place, as currently it's probably not highlighted well enough that these are available. We have the lists of texts under the "Texts" menu, but it's not easy to find the individual forum threads, and we want to avoid too much detail being put in the "comments" section of each doctrine in the "Lexicon." I am trying to add a notice to that effect under each doctrine such as you see now in PD09, but I am afraid that leaves 39 to go and I don't have the time to add those immediately to every Doctrine, Saying, and Fundamental. Will get that done when I can.

Quote from Don

But to wind back to Cassius, I could see a "Sunday School" curriculum being helpful. Some kind of supplemental home study.

Right! Supplemental home study is the main thing I was thinking about, at least for most of us. As usual, depends on the context and what options are available.

Quote from Don

But it shouldn't necessarily be imposed on one's children.

I agree with that and the rest of the paragraph as well. But to some extent we do make lots of choices for our children, so choosing to address the subject shouldn't be ignored. An interesting example to include in a discussion of that would be the example of "Hedea" in "A Few Days In Athens" who seems to stand for the position that formal instruction might not be necessary, but perhaps that is a very unusual case.

Yes we discussed the murkiness of PD09 last night. Anyone else who has a current take on the meaning of PD09 is welcome to join in here. I think Kalosyni is right that there is an "ultimate point" which the doctrine is making beyond the words that are on the paper.

I am not even sure that i have seen many articles on this topic but we need good review of it:

PD09 - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Thread

PD09 - General Discussion of PD09

Thread starter for general discussion of PD09 . Please post detailed discussion here rather than in the "comments" section of the PD09 alternate translations.

Cassius

June 16, 2022 at 10:19 AM

Thread starter for general discussion of PD09. Please post detailed discussion here rather than in the "comments" section of the PD09 alternate translations.

Quote from camotero

I do find that my older child is benefitting from me trying to help him understand the world rather than thinking magically, but also I worry it will make him an odd child in a very religious society like the one my family lives in. He's definitely not going to catholic school, and I found a school that is more in line with humanism values, so there's hope there.

I have no expertise in this subject whatsoever, so take this with that caveat. And I would not send a child to a religious school, all things being equal. But I question whether many "public" schools are any better. I would think the end result is that parents have to devote a lot of attention to "deprogramming" whatever is being taught to their children. An Epicurean "home schooling curriculum" for young people (or for any age ) would be highly desirable and ought to be a long term goal.

Another good meeting with two new visitors - thanks everyone!

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty Seven of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles, with a look at the formation of "worlds." Joshua is away today, so let's now join Don reading today's text:

BAILEY

A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion: it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered, or any kind of shape. For all such conditions are possible, seeing that no phenomenon is evidence against this in our world, in which it is not possible to perceive an ending.

[89] And that such worlds are infinite in number we can be sure, and also that such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void, and not in a large empty space quite void, as some say: this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in from a single world or interworld, or from several: little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place, as it may happen, and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of receiving additions.

[90] For it is not merely necessary for a gathering of atoms to take place, nor indeed for a whirl and nothing more to be set in motion, as is supposed, by necessity, in an empty space in which it is possible for a world to come into being, nor can the world go on increasing until it collides with another world, as one of the so-called physical philosophers says. For this is a contradiction of phenomena.

Sun and moon and the other stars were not created by themselves and subsequently taken in by the world, but were fashioned in it from the first and gradually grew in size by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts, either windy or fiery or both, for this is what our sensation suggests.

HICKS

A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible: they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned.

[89] That there is an infinite number of such worlds can be perceived, and that such a world may arise in a world or in one of the intermundia (by which term we mean the spaces between worlds) in a tolerably empty space and not, as some maintain, in a vast space perfectly clear and void. It arises when certain suitable seeds rush in from a single world or intermundium, or from several, and undergo gradual additions or articulations or changes of place, it may be, and waterings from appropriate sources, until they are matured and firmly settled in so far as the foundations laid can receive them. For it is not enough that there should be an aggregation or a vortex in the empty space in which a world may arise, as the necessitarians hold, and may grow until it collide with another, as one of the so-called physicists says. For this is in conflict with facts.

"The sun and moon and the stars generally were not of independent origin and later absorbed within our world, [such parts of it at least as serve at all for its defence]; but they at once began to take form and grow [and so too did earth and sea] by the accretions and whirling motions of certain substances of finest texture, of the nature either of wind or fire, or of both; for thus sense itself suggests.

From the above:

"In this matter as almost everywhere else, the Epicureans appealed to the truth of sense-perception – with the important caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which itself is not guaranteed to be true."

My reason for posting this:

1. I think it's an extremely perceptive sentence.
2. I wonder if Gellar-Goad was correct in including the "almost"(?) Would the sentence be equally or more accurate without the "almost?" Is there any issue in which Epicurus does NOT appeal to the truth of sense-perception with the caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which is itself not guaranteed to be true?
   1. This question might take us into the question of whether "anticipations" and "feelings" (the other two legs of the cannon) should be considered to be "perceptions." It tend to think that the answer to that is "yes," but I can see how it would be argued "no." For purposes of this question, however, I do tend to think that we "perceive" anticipations and feelings.
   2. I really like the qualifier "perception based judgement" as a way of emphasizing that Epicurus warned against relying on logic divorced from real evidence.
   3. I also really like that qualifier "which itself is not guaranteed to be true!" That's an important reminder that while Epicurean philosophy is the best philosophy we have, using it doesn't make us ominiscient or omnipotent. It's very possible even through rigorous application of Epicurean reasoning to be mistaken, especially when we simply don't have access to the raw data we want and need to be correct. The claim "Christians aren't perfect, just forgiven!" would become something more like "Epicureans aren't perfect, just doing the best it's possible for humans to do!"

Equally or more important:

Quote

Size of the Sun as Didactic Challenge

Getting to this state of reasoned aporia is no simple task, as my ruminations above indicate. The text of DRN presents what can be taken on a simple surface reading to mean that the sun is the size of a soccer ball, a claim that may strike ancient and modern readers alike as patently ridiculous. I suggest that the complication and the seemingly questionable wording are part of the point of the passage, a call for us to apply our Epicurean philosophical and critical thinking to a knotty problem. In this respect, the Lucretian presentation of the size of the sun can be compared to the role of hunting imagery throughout the poem (Whitlatch: 2014) or the final-exam interpretation of the plague scene at the poem’s end (e.g., Clay: 1983, 257-266). Each of the three constitutes a didactic challenge to the reader, whose successful progression through the Lucretian narrator’s didactic plot entails solving the riddle it presents.

A principal element of the response to the solar challenge is to think about optics and perspective when it comes to figuring out the size of the sun. Contrary to Barnes’ claim that “there is virtually no evidence on how the Epicureans understood the perception of size,” recent scholarship on perspective in the atomic theory of Democritus gives ample clues for Epicurus’ own thinking, which can in turn be confirmed as Epicurean by examination of relevant passages elsewhere in Lucretius’ DRN. Kelli Rudolph’s study of Democritus clarifies the theoretical function of eidola in the perception of size in relation to distance. Rudolph also explores the importance of Democritus’ metaphor of wax impressions for his atomic theory of vision: Because “a wax impression is an isomorphic copy of the original, but never an exact replica” (2011, 79), the eidolic-vision theory of Democritus allows for “epistemic uncertainty in the images we see” (80). Since, according to Democritus, sight consists in the physical reception of physical emissions from viewed bodies, the objects so viewed and visions of them should not be considered identical, because the εἴδωλον of the thing is never the thing itself. For Epicurus and his followers who have adopted Democritean atomism and optics, therefore, visual sensation – though it may (inasmuch as it is a sense-perception) be infallible – requires active cognition in order for sensations to be properly related to and with their sources.

We can verify that some such theory of vision at a distance is in force in DRN by considering passages that deal with perspective in the treatment of simulacra in Book 4. The main description of how we are able to judge distance by sight appears at 4.244-255. In essence, the image emitted by the perceived object to the viewer pushes the intervening “air” (aer, 247-251) past the viewer’s eyes, and the quantity of the air is directly proportional to the distance between viewer and viewed. That the sun falls into the category of distant objects requiring intentional perspective-taking along these lines is arguably obvious, but is also suggested by the Lucretian speaker’s explanation, shortly thereafter in the same book, of the sun’s blinding power (4.325-328). According to the Lucretius-ego, the sun is endowed with great power even though it is shining from on high (vis magnast ipsius . . . alte, 326); the sun’s simulacra, therefore, as they travel through air (aera per purum, 327, a phrase that looks back to the importance of air in 4.244-255), can strike the eyes heavily enough to harm their atomic compounding. From these lines the reader can determine that the sun is not entirely a special case, but is subject to the same air-based perspectival adjustments as are other observable objects.

The image most often cited by scholars examining the Lucretian treatment of perspective is that of the tower seen from far away (4.353-363), which is square but appears at a distance to be round. According to the speaker’s explanation for the apparent roundness of the tower’s “angle” (angulus, 355), “while the simulacra are moving through a lot of air, the air with constant collisions forces it [the angle] to become dull” (aera per multum quia dum simulacra feruntur, | cogit hebescere eum crebris ostensibus aer, 358-359). As a result, “every angle all at once has escaped our perception” (suffugit sensum simul angulus omnis, 360). That the tower appears round does not make it round; that the tower is in reality square does not invalidate our perceiving it as having a round appearance from a distance. The fact that the Lucretian discussion of the size of the sun invokes readers’ sense-perception (with videtur at 5.565, inter alia) prompts them to think back to the Lucretian discussion of perception at a distance, and to recall from the tower example that data derived from visual perception degrades over distance along with the simulacra themselves. We know intuitively that the sun is farther away than such a tower, and thus we know that we need care in assessing the size of the sun, just as we would in assessing the size (and shape) of a far-off tower.

Finally, there must be perspective-taking on our tactile sensation of warmth as well as on our sight. The heat emitted by a candle, by a bonfire and by a burning building fades away at profoundly different distances – an important piece of evidence in figuring out just how big the sun appears to be. Similarly, the Lucretian speaker’s explicit introduction of heat into the Epicurean doctrine on the size of the sun may suggest to readers that they ponder as well the difference in perceived heat transmitted by the sun and the moon, despite the roughly equivalent percentage of the sky they fill – attested by, among other things, the moon’s ability to eclipse the sun for terrestrial viewers. Vision alone, it appears, is insufficient for solving the puzzle.

So the implied prompts to remember the role of heat in addition to light, and to apply our understanding of perspective to the question of the size of the sun, amount to another current in the didactic airstream of DRN. The Lucretian speaker, rather than merely parroting a ruthlessly ridiculed doctrine, instead pulls his student-readers into the process of inquiry. It becomes the didactic audience’s task to receive data from sense-perception, and to use lessons learned earlier in the poem (as about perspective and distance, cf. 4.239-268, 353-363) in making correct rational judgments based upon that sense data. Asmis reminds us that for the Lucretius-ego “there is no clash between the judgment of the senses and objective reality, because the type of fact that seems to be in conflict with sense perception does not fall within the province of sense perception at all, but belongs to an entirely distinct domain of reality . . . judged by reason.” As Demetrius Lacon writes of a related solar question, “the sun does not appear stationary, but rather it is thought to appear stationary” (Greek omitted, PHerc. 1013 col. 20.7-9; cited by Barnes: 1989, 35-36 n.36). Tricky cases such as the size of the sun, where sense data is incomplete, may require suspension of such reasoned judgment, until enough evidence becomes available to evaluate our hypotheses through the process of ἐπιμαρτύρησις, until which point the opinion must remain a προσμένον.

In the Epicurean and Lucretian account of reality, the senses themselves are infallible. The Lucretian speaker’s assertion that the sun is just as big as it is perceived to be by our senses must therefore also be infallible – just as the perception that the sun is bigger when it is close to the horizon at sunrise and sunset must be infallible, without our having to believe that the sun actually changes sizes dramatically during the day. But our interpretation of what exactly that assertion entails about the sun’s actual size is a matter of judgment, and as such is fallible and uncertain indeed. As with the argumentation presented by the Lucretius-ego throughout the poem, and as with the gripping, awful plague scene at the end of Book 6, we must be keen-scented, relentless and detached from mundane concerns and fears in order to reckon and judge accurately in cosmic matters.

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This post and the next are the two final sections of this article, for those who don't have access to the full thing. I consider this to be little short of a brilliant summary of the issue:

Quote

Size of the Sun as Epicurean Shibboleth

The Epicureans did not believe that the sun was the size of a human foot. They distinguished between the sun’s actual size and the size of its appearance, the latter of which was the only magnitude measurable from earth with the technology available. In this matter as almost everywhere else, the Epicureans appealed to the truth of sense-perception – with the important caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which itself is not guaranteed to be true. In Lucretius’ poem, the discussion of solar magnitude adds more detail to Epicurus’ original conception, especially with the introduction of the sun’s heat into the passage. Complicated style emphasizes how full of hedges and conditioned claims the Lucretius-ego is, and his thorny exposition of the doctrine amounts to a didactic challenge that sends readers elsewhere in his work, to ponder perspective and to hunt down a proper understanding of this aspect of the natural world.

By staking out a stance of aporia conditioned by sense-perception and reasoning thereupon, the Epicureans did in fact prove to be less wrong than everyone else. Algra emphasizes that “all ancient estimates of the size of the sun, including those put forward by the mathematical astronomers, were false.”The failing of ancient mathematical science in estimate- making was pervasive since, Geoffrey Lloyd notes, “an important recurrent phenomenon in Greek speculations about nature is a premature or insecurely grounded quantification or mathematicisation.” Epicurus and his school, in avoiding a concrete statement of the sun’s size, avoided being concretely wrong, in contrast to Eudoxus and all the rest. The sun passage in DRN pushes the reader towards non-commitment rather than risking such a misjudgment.

In closing I argue that the size of the sun is an Epicurean shibboleth. In Epicurus,in Lucretius and in Demetrius,we see the same nostrum repeated, with progressive elaborations that do not fully clarify the basic precept. The persistence of Epicureans in this formulation is not so much the result of reflexive dogma or pseudo-intellectual obscurantism as it is a passphrase, a litmus test. Think like an Epicurean, and you will figure out that the sun’s appearance and the sun itself are two related but distinct things with two different sizes; that you must keep the infallible data of the senses, tactile as well as visual, in proper perspective when making judgments about your perception; and that the available data is insufficient to estimate the sun’s magnitude to an acceptable degree of confidence (compare Barnes: 1989, 36). Think that Epicureans believe the sun’s diameter is a foot,that they are absurd,and you have exposed yourself as un-Epicurean. The first/second-century AD Stoic doxographer Cleomedes, who as Algra points out “nowhere takes account of the Epicurean principle of multiple explanations,”likewise fails this test when he mocks Epicurus’ position on the size of the sun.

Thinking like an Epicurean – rather than figuring out the actual size of the sun – is, I suggest, the point of the Lucretian passage on the size of the sun, as it is indeed the fundamental point of Epicurean natural philosophy generally. Constantina Romeo suggests that Epicurus’ moral program of liberating humankind from the fear of death motivates his followers’ ardent defense of his claims on the sun’s size. Since Epicurus presented understanding of the natural and celestial world as essential for a life of ataraxia, “nel momento in cui lo Stoico ritiene di avere dimostrato l’errore di Epicuro nella scienza della natura, sostiene pure che Epicuro non ha dato nessun conforto di fronte alla morte” (“in the moment in which the Stoic [Posidonius] thinks he has shown Epicurus’ mistakes in natural science, he also claims that Epicurus has provided no comfort in the face of death”).

Yet Posidonius has actually failed the test, has misunderstood the stakes of the debate. Precise measurement of the sun’s size is not what is at issue for the Epicureans, and so proof of scientific error does not vitiate Epicurus’ moral philosophy. The Epicureans pushed back so fiercely against their opponents’ (mis)characterizations of Epicurus’ position because of the underlying epistemological and phenomenological principles. It does not matter to Epicurean ethics or to ataraxia whether the size of the sun is known. After all, the Epicureans did not even need to afix a certain size to the sun to accomplish their core epistemological objective: to remove anxiety about divine control over cosmological phenomena. What matters, and the underlying reason for this Epicurean shibboleth, is a readiness to use careful reasoning and good judgment to embrace uncertainty about the nature of things without succumbing to the anxiety-inducing fear of death.

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Started June 15, 2022:

"For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways. Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, we must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth." - Letter to Pythocles [87]

I just observed that that article was published in 1976 - forty+ years ago. I still haven't had a chance to read the full thing but the date makes me realize that it would be interesting to know whether David Sedley's attitudes towards Epicurus have changed over the years. I haven't tried to figure out where David Sedley is in life (retired? still teaching?) but it would be interesting to hear from him how, if at all, his views of Epicurean philosophy have changed after a lifetime of study -- especially on an issue like how to approach a question (like Epicurus' views on geometry) where the evidence is often from a hostile tradition, and how he approaches deciding whether those accusations are justified.

For example I am really impressed with the analysis of the "Epicurus on the Size of the Sun" essay by Gellar-Goad as an example of how someone sympathetic to Epicurus can take the big picture and put even the most (apparently) questionable position in a much better light.

Thanks to Don for this link, which appears to have a lot of good information in it!

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

www.academia.edu

Here's the point that appears to me to behind everything:

Given that the only "unchanging reality" in Epicurean terms is at the level of the atoms and void, and that's clearly NOT what Plato was taking about, the contention that our attention should be drawn away from the world around us to "an unchanging reality" that does not exist -- those are fighting words, and a very damaging thing to teach to children or adults! So I would fully expect Epicurus to want to upend the entire issue by drilling down to separate what might be helpful in geometry from what would be a damaging fiction.

It seems to me that rigorously speaking *nothing* should be considered to be a goal on its own other than "pleasure" or "pleasurable living" (if the word "living" is needed, which it's really not).

This is one of those issues that I can see Epicurus wanting to nail down so emphatically and repeatedly that lots of people would think he's overstating the point, but truthfully it can't be said often enough because people don't understand the implication:

"Ultimately" - NOTHING is "good in itself" or "a goal in itself" other than pleasure.

Anything that we set up as an interim goal, if that process and pursuit causes us to lose sight of the ultimate goal, becomes an obstacle to our progress rather than a help.

Yes I have only read a page or two. I detect a conclusion that is probaby more harsh than it needs to be as to whether Epicurus was "wrong" but I will reserve judgment til I read the whole thing. The basic point he's addressing as to the relationship between geometry and reality is a big one and this paper looks like a great addition to our past discussions on this.