Posts by Cassius

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-Four of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we begin our discussion of Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus. Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Bailey:

[122] Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

Hicks:

[122] Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.

Yes Godfrey I pretty much agree with that, but at the same time I would argue that many people are being sickened by the sloppy prescription of "natural and necessary" without a proper framework. Not here or by you, of course, but until a clear presentation of these issues is articulated I don't see that we are making the progress we need to make

"The desire for perfect health" is a great example Godfrey. Perfect health is unlikely for most of us, especially after s certain age. But we still want health "as close to perfect as possible."

What I am wanting to see here is a good explanation of how we can recognize that while an extreme of a good may be unobtainable, a lesser amount of that good is definitely desirable and working hard to get, and any formula we develop has to take that into account.

This is why I still am not sure I see anything in the natural and necessary categories beyond what Torquatus pointed out as the reason for it, which is a good reason (as a tool of analysis). But this is a tool that in the wrong hands is being used to bludgeon the philosophy of pleasure into submission in the modern world. At this point I am still at the point of thinking that in today's discussions (the world at large I mean) we are finding ourselves devoting more time to containing the damage it does in the wrong hands to the benefit it provides us in aiding our analysis.

Whoever Cicero got that Torquatus material from seems to me to have been pretty sharp. As he says, only an idiot (my overlay) pursues pain for the sake of pain, and people need to smarten up and examine their actions so as to predict whether a course of action will produce more pleasure or pain. The more extravagant the goal, the more likely it is that extra pain will be involved. And considering whether a goal is "natural" and "necessary" helps us predict the amount of pain likely to be encountered.

Now no doubt we can use the categories to give all sorts of examples, but in the end the examples get very particular and specific very fast, so the general rule remains something like "be prudent in the way you pursue pleasure."

Quote from reneliza

I think this is the most practical/applied difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism, at least in the modern world.

Which may be deceptively simple at first glance, but is really about as different as can be:

It's the difference between (1) the virtues have absolute meanings that are the same for all people, all places, and at all times, versus (2) the virtues have no meaning except contextually as the represent tools or activities to be engaged in for the sake of pleasant living.

The stoics and similar would probably say that (2) means "you don't believe in virtue at all!" but I don't think that's a fair criticism: Epicurus just has a perspective on virtue that is logically consistent with what he has identified as the ultimate goal - living pleasurably - and it's the Stoics whose view mutates "virtue" into "doing what the gods have established to be done."

I am well and glad to see you check in here Elli! I talk a lot about you to our new friends here and hope you will drop by more frequently. You are our only contact with Epicurus' homeland!

Quote from reneliza

The only thing that has been kind of inferred in this conversation, but I haven’t seen explicitly stated: it’s my thought that the void/fruitless/vain desires are those that are infinite and therefore unquenchable. These are desires that are by definition impossible to satisfy, because of the lack of any limit.

Quote from reneliza

This is exactly where the limit of pleasure conversation comes in. Pleasure can’t be the goal itself because it is unlimited. Until Epicurus asserted that there IS a limit to pleasure, and it’s the point where you have no pain in the mind or body.

I am in general agreement with the recent line of discussions about pleasures / desires that have no limit.

But I don't think we have a complete picture until we address the question of "how much" and/or "how" to pursue those pleasures / desires that are potentially unlimited.

Let's take "power" for example. That's pretty unlimited in the abstract, and the power to rule the world on its face would be very very difficult to justify as a goal. But the power to exclude burglars or murderers from your house is highly desirable. It would be very easy to start playing word games with these issues, so the questions need to be more clear, and I am not sure it is possible to get much more specific than Torquatus did when he stated "the principle of the classification" being that some categories are more difficult to obtain than others.

Once we identify the relative difficulties, I doubt we can get much more specific as to a "rule" to apply given individual differences in preferences and circumstances.

I apologize I have not had time to read most of the linked articles so I should probably keep my mouth shut but at risk of saying something stupid:

Quote from Kalosyni

I'm having a hard time wrapping my mind around this phrase: "the Epicurean who tries to force out and run from all forms of pleasure already in their life in their quest for that "greatest" pleasure that is ataraxia." I think that is a rare person, and certainly not an Epicurean -- Forgive me, I may have totally misunderstood the meaning here.

As this leaves out another option of seeking and making effort daily to have as much pleasure as one can (yet with wisdom to avoid incurring much worse pains). -- this would be the fullness of pleasure model of pleasure -- which is different than the ataraxia is the goal.

My interpretation of what Reneliza is saying is that she thinks it is a big error to obsess on ataraxia and thereby miss out on many pleasures that are available. Sort of like "don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good" -- especially since in what we are discussing the alleged "perfect" / "tranquility" is very difficult to grasp.

When Kalosyni says she thinks that is a rare person, I would agree that it is rare in fact, but in "theory" it is the alleged direction that many commentators assert was what Epicurus taught. The difficulties we are discussing are why I don't think that's what Epicurus taught -- and I assert the "error" is with the commentators, though with many of them I don't think it's "error" but intentional misrepresentation.

I doubt I will try to comment on the issue of whether some part of this has analogies in Buddhism, but if I had to guess I would suspect that Buddhist influences are part of why this "tranquility" issue is so mesmerizing to the commentators.

I want a life full of pleasures of all kind, mental and physical, and to such a degree that all pain is crowded out of my experience. And in the process of reaching that and continuing it, I don't want to be disturbed. I don't really think that the issues of aponia and ataraxia are significantly more complicated than that.

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.....

Publius Clodius doesn't have a very elegant or high-sounding name, but I doubt his understanding of Epicurus was very far off the mark.

As for "agreeably" I get the idea that was intended just to be a synonym of "pleasantly" without intending much of a distinction. I don't think I recall anyone asserting that anything significantly different was intended.

(Root304 just as an aside I edited your post to take out the hard-coded font and color which probably were there because you pasted your comment from another editor. We try to avoid that because some people use dark themes and a hard-coded dark font is impossible to read with dark themes. No problem - just noting why I did that.)

This is a good question, although the way it is phrased tend to imply that all of the motivation for discussing the issue was to "solve a problem" that needed to be solved, such that the issue would not have been reached but for a "problem."

Yes no doubt the theory does solve problems, but I tend to think of the entire system as one conclusion flowing naturally from another, such that once you observe life here on earth of varying degrees of advancement, and you deduce the "nature never makes only a single thing of a kind" principle, you're going to be impelled through those and your other deductions about atoms to expect life throughout the universe with some being more advanced than us.

I think that perspective of "following your own observations to their logical conclusions" is a big part of the issue of the gods. Yes if solves problems, but it's also the kind of thing you come up with when you exercise your mind on the things that you observe.

Elli I am sorry that I am not checking in to Facebook every day and I missed seeing it when you first posted it. Graphics like this are great for attracting the attention of casual browsers.

Quote from Kalosyni

The more time I spend thinking on this, the more I think that there really ought to be a list! If you take a step back and think: human beings are a type of animal and what does the human animal need to feel happy?

I agree that would be the way to ask the question. Not necessarily a list of activities that everyone needs to experience , but another sort of list.

Responses at Facebook:

Rasul MammadovBefore Einstein and Heisenberg, Еpicureanism in physics was relevant. In modern physics, the platonic interpretation has won rather.

"Modern physics opposes the position of Democritus, Epicurus and takes the side of Plato, the Pythagoreans."
Heisenberg, "Physics and Philosophy."

Martin HuehneAdmin

I downloaded the book from
http://www.naturalthinker.net/.../Heisenberg,%20Werner%20...
and did not find the quote in there. Whereas Democritus is discussed in detail, Epicurus is not even mentioned.
Can you more precisely locate the quote?

From my memory of reading Heisenberg's memoirs 30+ years ago, I remember that Heisenberg saw indeed a stronger analogy between Plato's symmetries and modern physics than between Democritus' atomism and modern physics but stated as well that seeing these analogies is subjective because there are big differences in both cases.

I guess that Heisenberg did not even know where Epicurus differed from Democritus. The analogy between Epicurus' swerve and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle appears to be more obvious than the analogy between Plato's symmetries and the symmetries in modern physics.

Plato's philosophy rejects the scientific method on principle whereas Epicurus' philosophy anticipates it and is open to revision when observations refute older ideas.

Modern science has its roots in several of the ancient philosophical schools:

There is indeed an analogy between Plato's forms and mathematical models in physics as much as there is an analogy between Democritus' atoms and elementary particles of modern physics.

Skepticism is an inherent part of scientific progress.

By the way, I am a modern physicist and consider Epicurus' philosophy closest to modern physics among the ancient schools.

Post by Elli at Facebook 07/26/22

True that has been confirmed, demonstrated, established, proven, tested and not contradicted by the phenomena. From Epicurus' LTH : "Nothing exists in the universe except bodies and space. We conclude that bodies exist because it is the experience of all men..." - except Plato who placed - in the supposed one and only created world of ours - a perfect animal that had the need of the company by other perfect animals. All is perfect then, and studying of natural science, and investigating the celestial phenomena, is a waste of time, as Socrates said through Plato again.

From the inscription by Diogenis of Oinoanda, we read:

"For example, it is false to believe that the gods, who are perfect, created this world because they had need of a city, or needed fellow-citizens. Nor did the gods create the world because they needed a place to live. To those who say such naive things, we ask in turn: “Where were the gods living beforehand?”

Those men who hold that this world was created uniquely by the gods, as a place for the gods to live, of course have no answer to this question. By their view, the gods were destitute and roaming about at random for an infinite time before the creation of this world, like an unfortunate man, without a country, who had neither city nor fellow citizens! It is absurd to argue that a divine nature created the world for the sake of the world itself, and it is even more absurd to argue that the gods created men for the gods’ own sake. There are too many things wrong, with both the world and with men, for them to have been created by gods!"

I agree Don -

What does "the smaller the trifle the greater the joy" even supposed to mean?

Makes little sense to me, although I scent a whiff of Bailey's minimalism interpretation and/or outright hostility to various parts of Epicurean ethics.

In putting together this week's episode, for the first time today I see that Bailey has a significant extra clause in line 116 that does not appear in Hicks. Here's the difference:

BAILEY: [116] For not even the lowest animal, although ‘a small thing gives the greater pleasure,’ would be seized by such foolishness, much less one who was possessed of perfect happiness.

HICKS: [116] For such folly as this would not possess the most ordinary being if ever so little enlightened, much less one who enjoys perfect felicity.

I see Bailey's footnote says this:

I am not sure what is going on there, and I don't have time as I write this to track it down, but something seems weird here.

Inwood & Gerson "Epicurus Reader":

Yonge:

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-Three of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we complete our discussion of Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

BAILEY:

Comets occur either when fire is collected together in certain regions at certain intervals of time in the upper air because some gathering of matter takes place, or when at certain intervals the heaven above us has some peculiar movement, so that stars of this nature are revealed, or when they themselves at certain seasons start to move on account of some gathering of matter and come into the regions within our ken and appear visible. And their disappearance occurs owing to the opposite causes to these.

[112] Some stars ‘revolve in their place’(as Homer says), which comes to pass not only because this part of the world is stationary and round it the rest revolves, as some say, but also because a whirl of air is formed in a ring round it, which prevents their moving about as do the other stars: or else it is because there is not a succession of appropriate fuel for them, but only in this place in which they are seen fixed. And there are many other ways in which this may be brought about, if one is able to infer what is in agreement with phenomena.

[113] That some of the stars should wander in their course, if indeed it is the case that their movements are such, while others do not move in this manner, may be due to the reason that from the first as they moved in their circles they were so constrained by necessity that some of them move along the same regular orbit, and others along one which is associated with certain irregularities: or it may be that among the regions to which they are carried in some places there are regular tracts of air which urge them on successively in the same direction and provide flame for them regularly, while in other places the tracts are irregular, so that the aberrations which we observe result.

But to assign a single cause for these occurrences, when phenomena demand several explanations, is madness, and is quite wrongly practiced by persons who are partisans of the foolish notions of astrology, by which they give futile explanations of the causes of certain occurrences, and all the time do not by any means free the divine nature from the burden of responsibilities.

[114] That some stars should be seen to be left behind by others is caused because though they move round in the same orbit they are carried along more slowly, and also because they really move in the opposite direction though they are dragged back by the same revolution: also because some are carried round through a greater space and some through a lesser, though all perform the same revolution. But to give a single explanation of these occurrences is only suitable to those who wish to make a show to the many.

[115] What are called falling stars may be produced in part by the rubbing of star against star, and by the falling out of the fragments wherever an outburst of wind occurs, as we explained in the case of lightning-flashes: or else by the meeting of atoms productive of fire, when a gathering of kindred material occurs to cause this, and a movement in the direction of the impulse which results from the original meeting; or else by a gathering of wind in certain dense and misty formations, and its ignition as it whirls round, and then its bursting out of what encloses it and its rush towards the spot to which the impulse of its flight tends. And there are other ways in which this result may be brought about, quite free from superstition.

The signs of the weather which are given by certain animals result from mere coincidence of occasion. For the animals do not exert any compulsion for winter to come to an end, nor is there some divine nature which sits and watches the outgoings of these animals and then fulfills the signs they give.

[116] For not even the lowest animal, although ‘a small thing gives the greater pleasure,’ would be seized by such foolishness, much less one who was possessed of perfect happiness.

All these things, Pythocles, you must bear in mind; for thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand what is akin to them. And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details. But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.

HICKS

Comets arise either because fire is nourished in certain places at certain intervals in the heavens, if circumstances are favourable; or because at times the heaven has a particular motion above us so that such stars appear; or because the stars themselves are set in motion under certain conditions and come to our neighbourhood and show themselves. And their disappearance is due to the causes which are the opposite of these.

[112] Certain stars may revolve without setting not only for the reason alleged by some, because this is the part of the world round which, itself unmoved, the rest revolves, but it may also be because a circular eddy of air surrounds this part, which prevents them from travelling out of sight like other stars; or because there is a dearth of necessary fuel farther on, while there is abundance in that part where they are seen to be. Moreover there are several other ways in which this might be brought about, as may be seen by anyone capable of reasoning in accordance with the facts.

[113] The wanderings of certain stars, if such wandering is their actual motion, and the regular movement of certain other stars, may be accounted for by saying that they originally moved in a circle and were constrained, some of them to be whirled round with the same uniform rotation and others with a whirling motion which varied; but it may also be that according to the diversity of the regions traversed in some places there are uniform tracts of air, forcing them forward in one direction and burning uniformly, in others these tracts present such irregularities as cause the motions observed.

To assign a single cause for these effects when the facts suggest several causes is madness and a strange inconsistency; yet it is done by adherents of rash astronomy, who assign meaningless causes for the stars whenever they persist in saddling the divinity with burdensome tasks.

[114] That certain stars are seen to be left behind by others may be because they travel more slowly, though they go the same round as the others; or it may be that they are drawn back by the same whirling motion and move in the opposite direction; or again it may be that some travel over a larger and others over a smaller space in making the same revolution. But to lay down as assured a single explanation of these phenomena is worthy of those who seek to dazzle the multitude with marvels.

[115] Falling stars, as they are called, may in some cases be due to the mutual friction of the stars themselves, in other cases to the expulsion of certain parts when that mixture of fire and air takes place which was mentioned when we were discussing lightning; or it may be due to the meeting of atoms capable of generating fire, which accord so well as to produce this result, and their subsequent motion wherever the impulse which brought them together at first leads them; or it may be that wind collects in certain dense mist-like masses and, since it is imprisoned, ignites and then bursts forth upon whatever is round about it, and is carried to that place to which its motion impels it. And there are other ways in which this can be brought about without recourse to myths.

The fact that the weather is sometimes foretold from the behaviour of certain animals is a mere coincidence in time. For the animals offer no necessary reason why a storm should be produced; and no divine being sits observing when these animals go out and afterwards fulfilling the signs which they have given.

[116] For such folly as this would not possess the most ordinary being if ever so little enlightened, much less one who enjoys perfect felicity.

All this, Pythocles, you should keep in mind; for then you will escape a long way from myth, and you will be able to view in their connection the instances which are similar to these. But above all give yourself up to the study of first principles and of infinity and of kindred subjects, and further of the standards and of the feelings and of the end for which we choose between them. For to study these subjects together will easily enable you to understand the causes of the particular phenomena. And those who have not fully accepted this, in proportion as they have not done so, will be ill acquainted with these very subjects, nor have they secured the end for which they ought to be studied.

Episode 132 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. This week we continue with the letter to Pythocles and discuss several more issues involving the weather.

Thank you for responding John and we look forward to hearing more from you in the future.

I would say that the entire question of having a "complete" life is troublesome. I've probably used that phrasing but I'm not sure how much sense it really makes, and referring to a life as "complete" or "less than complete" smacks of a more absolutist attitude than I would expect Epicurus to take.

I'm ok with words like "full" and "pure" to the extent that they refer to quantities that are 100% of the respective issue. But "complete" (at least some of the modern interpretations of it) seems to go beyond that, and imply a certain list of activities that everyone should experience in order to call their lives "complete." And I doubt Epicurus would sanction that.

Don do you have thoughts on wording that might bear on "complete"?