Posts by Cassius

Happy Birthday to Scott! Learn more about Scott and say happy birthday on Scott's timeline: Scott

Thanks for pointing out the broken link camotero - fixed now.

Cooper was a good writer and it's a same he's unknown today.

Quote from Godfrey

First aspect: at first it makes sense that in in an infinite universe there would be perfection as well as imperfection. But on further thought, how is perfection defined?

Exactly my view too. DeWitt is being too loose in using the word "perfection" without defining it. I do think he makes clear that the gods are not eternal, just "deathless," and that's a good hint that the Epicurean gods are not everything that we today would invest in the term "perfect" (such as omnipotent or ominiscient). The word perfect in this context has to be contextual and limited, like "the perfect basketball player." DeWitt drops the ball here by not making that more clear. (But on the other hand, how many writers have you seen carry the ball nearly this far?)

Quote from Godfrey

Isn't this a mental concept rather than something inherent in a material universe?

It may indeed be a mental concept, but that, in itself, is not a total disqualifier from consideration as part of an evidentiary chain, because we do regularly refer to and use mental concepts if we can reasonably extrapolate from sensory evidence to back them up. We predict atoms exist due to mental concepts which we derive from what we think is good physical evidence. The speculations we're talking about now are not arbitary and groundless, but based on observations here on earth, one example of which is the "nature never creates only a single thing of a kind (which is in Lucretius too).

Quote from Godfrey

But the key point in my mind is that perfection is a value judgment, and therefore has no place in describing a material universe.

Yes that's the definitional issue. "Perfect" is far too broad and loose a term. One way to get into this deeper would be to check the Latin word that was used. I wouldn't be surprised if its more related to "blessed" than what we are thinking today (ominpotent; omniscient) due to the corruption brought about by Abrahamic religion.

Quote from Godfrey

The second aspect, that the number of gods must equal the number of mortals, makes absolutely no sense to me. Can someone explain this?

Do I not recall that DeWitt says that strict numerical equivalence is not the point, but rather "equitable distribution," which is in itself a loose term?

The way I have always thought of all this that makes sense to me is:

1 - We look around us here on earth and we see "life" in many forms.

2 - We see that Nature never makes only one single thing of a kind.

3 - Some of those life forms are "primitive" single cell organisms, and some of those life forms are extremely complex and powerful and intelligent (let's say Epicurus, or Don, for example )

4 - As I see it we have a mental tendency to organize in our minds a spectrum of these life forms from "lowest" to "highest" in terms of abilities. I personally think that that "tendency" would involve the faculty of anticipations in some way. The anticipation would not be the "concept of low to high life forms" but some very basic organizational drive to link things together that appear to be related . It would be important to note that just like seeing and hearing, that tendency does not had us completed concepts in an infallible way. The tendency would just exist report to us a phenomena, just like sight does, and we'd have to regularly and repeatedly test it to verify any conclusions that we decide to draw from those observations.

5 - We extrapolate that in an infinite and eternal universe there are, and already have been, and infinite number of worlds like ours with intelligent beings.

6 - We can reasonably extrapolate that there is no reason that "Epicurus" or "Don" is the most intelligent and physically powerful life form that can possibly exist, and therefore we extrapolate that "higher" (more intelligent and more powerful life forms) have, do, and will continue to exist.

As for their number, I agree that saying that the same number of mortals and gods exist is pretty "out there." However, over an infinite universe with infinite number of living beings in it, maybe it does make sense to say that the numbers of both are the same, because they are both "infinite."

All this is aggressive speculation but as per the Velleius material and other material DeWitt cites, it does seem well founded in the texts. And that doesn't even include the reference in Lucretius that seems to contemplate a Nietzsche-style "eternal recurrence" when he asks whether it would make a difference to us if our atoms would at any time in the future rearrange themselves in the same way they are now.

I don't think any of this is necessary to believe as core Epicurean philosophy. Some people, following the Frances Wright model, just aren't interested in this kind of big-picture speculation, and if someone is that way and not troubled by these issues, then there is no reason for them to be concerned about them.

But it seems to be natural for a large number of people to want to have *some* kind of reasonable perspective on the "big picture," and this direction does, it seems to me, provide a reasonable framework for those people to have a position on "the big picture" that stops them from being in fear that the lack of ANY explanation exposes them to the oppression of the priests.

Editing has been slow but is finally coming along and this one should be out soon.

In the meantime, I noticed an interesting exchange on Martin's wall about "entropy" and how issues revolving around the eventual destruction of our world (but not of the universe as a whole!) can be a little depressing to think about.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?user/173-martin/#wall/comment398/response169

I think Martin did a good job with the point, and I mark it here in this thread because we talk about that issue to some degree in this podcast episode too.

I don't think I was able to cite it specifically in the podcast, but there are a couple of references in DeWitt that I think are well-reasoned and applicable:

Quote

Out of this teaching arises a perplexing question. Was Epicurus, in making of Nature a judge, and incidentally a teacher, involuntarily ascribing to her a certain purposiveness and by so doing admitting himself as a believer in teleology? On the face of it this would be going contrary to his fundamental teachings. In his cosmos a single primary cause was recognized, the downward motion of the atoms. In the overall picture it was true that the good prevailed over the bad, but this was a deduction from the infinity of the universe and the infinity of time; in the individual worlds the forces of destruction eventually prevailed over the forces of creation but never in the universe at large. This ascendancy of the good over the bad, however, does not signify purposiveness or some far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves. For such teleology there was no room in the cosmos of Epicurus.

But primarily the reference I want to point out is the following extended quote, which is wrapped up in isonomia and the Epicurean theory of divinity. All of this has to be taken with the understanding that it is DeWitt's reconstruction of the doctrines of Epicurus from the remaining evidence, and we can differ on the details of the reconstruction. But it seems to me that this material is well-founded because there is a lot of textual evidence from Cicero and others in support of it, and very little if any that would be to the contrary. So at least for me I think this line of reasoning makes sense, perhaps not so strongly in the part that talks about the gods and numbering them, but definitely in the fundamental point that the universe as a whole is never destroyed (and therefore in a sense "prevails over the forces of destruction") which is the important point for addressing the "attitude" we should take about birth and death. In the end the birth and death of "worlds" is not a lot different from birth and death of animals, individuals, nations, continents, etc. But while individuals and planets come and go, the "universe as a whole" continues forever (in the Epicurean worldview).

Quote

It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called *isonomia,* a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it *aequabilis tributio, * "equitable apportionment." 70 The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.

The term *isonomia* itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word *prolepsis.* To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to *eunomia,* government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.

Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.

That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed."71 The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." 72 Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.

It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." 73 One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled *On Evidences,* "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." 74 Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." 75 This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.

The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.

At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.76 The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.77

In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." 78 This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.

It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite."79 This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called *intermundia,* where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

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So thanks to Marco and Martin for having the discussion that prompted me to find this.

Quote from Root304

or do we take the idea of an Epicurean Soul to mean the total package of human experience; our context, emotional and sensory depth, our passions and interests, our challenges, our relationship to ideas and people, our broadening and changing understanding as we journey through life, our histories and our relationship to that history and the core memories that shaped us.

I think it is absolutely clear that this is what Epicurus meant, and it is logically compelled by dividing all feelings into either pleasure or pain.

But you are right to highlight this as something that needs to be examined and repeatedly stated, because the number one attack on Epicurus IMHO is based on NOT admitting this wide definition. Those people argue that Epicurus was talking about what we might refer to as immediate bodily sensations, and that he did not mean to include mental / emotional issues at all. I think "those people" are clearly wrong, but this issue cannot be taken for granted, and it needs to be hammered home anytime there is any doubt as to whether the people in a discussion understand this point.

It's been three years since I started this thread, and we have a good number of new people who may not have seen it - and I think it is worth keeping in mind the name "Hieronymus of Rhodes" who is relatively obscure but useful as a contrast against Epicurus's views

I won't try to repeat all that was posted earlier in the thread, but it's worth keeping this name in mind. The bottom line is that there WAS a philosopher who explicitly promoted "absence of pain" as the ultimate goal of life, and who accordingly held that pleasure was not the highest goal. That philosopher wasn't Epicurus -- it was Hieronymus of Rhodes.

Cicero - On Ends:

Cicero - Academic Questions:

Quote from Kalosyni

That bit about pains in brackets is not in every translation above, which I find interesting.

That reminds me to memorialize what we talked about last night, that I think this has multiple levels of meaning, one of which is not the most obvious but may be among the most important:

That because we experience nothing after death, there is a limit to the pain which we need fear, and that is very liberating as it frees us from the threats of religion. Citing Humphries this morning:

You may,

Yourself, some time or other, feel like turning

Away from my instruction, terrified

By priestly rant. How many fantasies

They can invent to overturn your sense

Of logic, muddle your estates by fear!

And rightly so, for if we ever saw

A limit to our troubles, we'd be strong,

Resisters of religion, rant and cant,

But as things are, we have no chance at all

With all their everlasting punishments

Waiting us after death.

Letter to Menoeceus:

[125] For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living.

Torquatus from On Ends:

The fear of death plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused many men to betray their parents or their friends, some their country, and very many utterly to ruin themselves. So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theater, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure.

Quote from Kalosyni

It is almost as if this Epicurean principle is an quick and reasonable short-cut to liberation -- no long hours of meditation are required.

Perhaps not "long hours of meditation" but there are numerous references to the need for "study" or "schemes of systematic contemplation, such as from Lucretius Book One:

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind

Must be dispelled, not by the sunshine's rays,

Not by those shining arrows of the light,

But by insight into nature, and a scheme

Of systematic contemplation. So

Our starting-point shall be this principle:

Nothing at all is ever born from nothing

By the gods' will.

Probably it is really important to distinguish between:

(1) Sitting on the floor with eyes closed, lotus style, palms up, evacuating your mind, and humming, as against -

(2) Rigorously and energetically engaging in a systematic and reasoned pursuit of the study of nature, observing numerous facts, evaluating them reasonably to determine views that can be held with confidence, rejecting and even spitting on the worthless and imaginary, holding in contempt those who say that such pursuit is not necessary, and then "never ceasing to speak the words of true philosophy."

Maybe it's just me but I see quite a difference between the two approaches

In the music, does it have words to it? There is lots of religious music I like but would choke on the words that accompany it.

Don thank you for your presentation. Yes this stuff is fun and I hope you will catch a fever to do more of it. I don't know how it would scale if we had more than ten or so people but I do think we have a model here that could do a lot. Combining a quality presentation with making sure people have an opportunity to talk and engage is I think a good formula.

Don since you are sort of the expert on this, I will set the zoom to allow you to share your screen, so if you want to show a slide or graphic or just some text we can do that too. Happy to have you run with that part of the discussion.

Great!!!!

Just in case anyone needs them for the Zoom call tonight, here are the various translations of PD10 (as compiled by Nate):

“If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter.” Yonge (1853)

“If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind—the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain—if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.” Hicks (1910)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires [and of pains], we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.” Bailey (1926)

“If the practices productive of the pleasures of profligates dispelled the fears of the mind about celestial things and death and pains and also taught the limit of the desires, we should never have fault to find with profligates, enjoying pleasures to the full from all quarters, and suffering neither pain nor distress from any quarter, wherein the evil lies." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute were able to drive away from their minds their fears about what is above them and about death and pain, and to teach them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find fault with the dissolute; for they would fill themselves with pleasure from every source and would be free from pain and sorrow, which are evil.” Geer (1964)

“If the causes of the pleasures of the dissipated released mental fears concerning celestial phenomena and death and distress, and in addition taught the limit of desires, we should never have any reason to reproach them [i.e. the dissipated], since they would be satisfying themselves with pleasures from all directions and would never have pain or distress, which constitutes the bad.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If the things that beget pleasure in dissolute individuals could dispel their minds' fears about the heavens, death, and pain, and could still teach them the limits of desires, we would have no grounds for finding fault with the dissolute, since they would be filling themselves with pleasures from every source and in no way suffering from pain or grief, which are evil.” O'Connor (1993)

“If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect's fears about the phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains and, moreover, if they taught us the limit of our desires, then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source—and that is what is bad.” Inwood (1994)

“If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life.” Anderson (2004)

“If those elements that are productive of the pleasures of the debauched released them from the mental apprehensions aroused by natural phenomena, fear of death, and [obsessive anticipation of] pain; if, in addition, they formed their characters in such a way that they knew when to set a limit to their desires, we would then never have anything to censure them about: indeed, they would then be fully actualizing all the pleasures and in no way would they have either what is painful or what is productive of grief in them—and it is this latter condition [which they would be avoiding] that is morally bad.” Makridis (2005)

“If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If the things that produce the debauchee's pleasures dissolved the mind's fears regarding the heavenly bodies, death, and pain and also told us how to limit our desires, we would never have any reason to find fault with such people, because they would be glutting themselves with every sort of pleasure and never suffer physical or mental pain, which is the real evil.” Strodach (2012)

“If the objects that afforded pleasure to profligate men actually freed them from mental fears, namely those that relate to celestial phenomena and death and pain, and also taught them to limit their desires, we would never have any occasion to find fault with such men, since they would then be filled with pleasures from all sides and would be free of all pain and grief—that is, of all that is bad.” Mensch (2018)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute released our minds from fear of celestial things and death and pain, and if they taught us the limit of desire, then we would have nothing to reproach in them, since they would then be replete with pleasures from every source and devoid of pain or sorrow from any source, which are precisely what is bad.” White (2021)

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Good video! And how does he recognize sensory adaptation? By the evidence of the senses!

I only had a chance to watch the intro so not sure where he ends up.

Quote from Martin

Within Epicurean physics, atoms are hard bodies. If they were large and not emitting anything, they would at least be visible as shadows.

Yes that makes sense too, which is along the lines that they ought to be "touchable."

I also think that as raised earlier a very precise discussion of this would need to account for the apparent Epicurean position that "images" (at least some of them) are or can be invisible.

(I know I am addressing only part of Martin's comments here but I don't have comment yet on the rest.)

If you come up with some good summary observations, be sure to post them. This issue - that mathematics is a model but not reality itself - can be stated all sorts of ways but it is difficult for a lot of people to grasp, and new ways to make the issue more clear are always welcome.

Quote from SimonC

A thought on the inconceivability of visible atoms: according to Epicurus, things are visible because they constantly emit thin films of atoms. But a single atom can't emit a film smaller than itself and is therefore not visible in the ordinary sense.

I think that's a really perceptive observation SimonC as to single atoms not giving off images!

As to the basketball size single atoms, maybe one answer there is that while such a thing might not give off an image, such a thing would (presumably?) be very "touchable" and we would be able to "feel" its presence even if it didn't give off particles to see, hear, or smell (?)

But I really like your observation that a single atom would not give off an image. I think that sounds right to me - anyone disagree?

As of today we'd presumably look at the issue differently and talk about light bouncing off things, and I really don't know that Epicurus rejected the issue of light bouncing either. But to the extent we would talk about receiving "images" I think your logic is sound - a single atom couldn't give off an image from its surface.

Then of course we'd have to consider whether every use of the word "image" is really the same thing. Epicurus seems to talk about "receiving images" as different from "seeing things" (at least at times) so maybe what we're really observing is that a single atom would not give off an "image" that could be "perceived directly by the mind" as opposed to "seeing it" with our eyes.

Now I am rambling but this kind of thinking really strikes me as "thinking like an Epicurean." I bet if we turned this over in our minds just a little we could develop a coherent set of observations about this, but it would need to take into account the difference between "receiving images" and "seeing things" which I don't think to be exactly the same thing.

Quote from Don

And I see what Clay was trying to do, I think, in calling the article after Epicurus's will. He's trying to say that even though Hermarchus is his philosophical heir, it is actually Lucretius who ends up being his "heir" because we get Lucretius's whole poem to carry on Epicurus's philosophy. Yeah, that's a little arcane.

Yep "arcane" is a good word. I think Clay is a good guy and I am well disposed toward him, but maybe becoming an Epicurean afficianado makes one "arcane" However of course I show no such tendencies myself

I started to write this earlier and pulled back. Now I have more time ---> In reading Diskin Clay's article on the "Last Will" it seems to me that he is potentially overly negative about certain aspects. The take-away I get is that he is "presuming" that the evidence indicates that Epicurus really spent most of his time writing letters to his inner circle that were disorganized and filled with jargon, and that it wasn't til near the end of his life that he really decided to systematize anything clearly.

Now I am reading Clay too harshly, probably, but maybe I would be interested in what Eikadistes has to say about Clay if he has read several of his articles (I note Nate already said that Clay's lists weren't consistent ) And one thing I have always taken away from the "Last Will and Testament" article is to say to myself "Diskin, you're saying Epicurus was unclear, when you entitle your paper something that barely reflects the subject matter?"

I think we see all the time that the personality of the writer of things gets projected onto Epicurus. DeWitt takes everything in a "sympathetic" way, other writers seem to strain to be as unsympathetic as possible, and the evidence in all likelihood isn't strong enough to say for sure which is right. It's a problem to guard against.