Here's an explicit reference in Lucretius Book 2 as to the essentially positive view that the forces of destruction do not forever prevail:

[541] But still, let me grant this too, let there be, if you will, some one thing unique, alone in the body of its birth, to which there is not a fellow in the whole wide world; yet unless there is an unlimited stock of matter, from which it might be conceived and brought to birth, it will not be able to be created, nor, after that, to grow on and be nourished.

Nay, in very truth, if I were to suppose this too, that the bodies creative of one single thing were limited as they tossed about the universe, whence, where, by what force, in what manner will they meet and come together in that vast ocean, that alien turmoil of matter? They have not, I trow, a plan for union, but as, when many a great shipwreck has come to pass, the great sea is wont to cast hither and thither benches, ribs, yards, prow, masts and swimming oars, so that along all the coasts of the lands floating stern-pieces are seen, giving warning to mortals, to resolve to shun the snares of the sea and its might and guile, nor trust it at any time, when the wiles of the windless waves smile treacherous; even so, if you once suppose that the first-beginnings of a certain kind are limited, then scattered through all time they must needs be tossed hither and thither by the tides of matter, setting towards every side, so that never can they be driven together and come together in union, nor stay fixed in union, nor take increase and grow; yet that each of these things openly comes to pass, fact proves for all to see, that things can be brought to birth and being born can grow. It is manifest then that there are, in any kind of things you will, infinite first-beginnings, by which all things are supplied.

[569] And so, neither can the motions of destruction prevail for ever, and bury life in an eternal tomb, nor yet can the motions of creation and increase for ever bring things to birth and preserve them. So war waged from time everlasting is carried on by the balanced strife of the first-beginnings. Now here, now there, the vital forces of things conquer and are conquered alike. With the funeral mingles the wailing which babies raise as they come to look upon the coasts of light; nor has night ever followed on day, or dawn on night, but that it has heard mingled with the baby’s sickly wailings, the lament that escorts death and the black funeral.

.....

[991] And so, we are all sprung from heavenly seed; there is the one father of us all, from whom when live-giving earth, the mother, has taken within her the watery drops of moisture, teeming she brings forth the goodly crops and the glad trees and the race of men; she brings forth too all the tribes of the wild beasts, when she furnishes the food, on which all feed their bodies and pass a pleasant life and propagate their offspring; wherefore rightly has she won the name of mother. Even so, what once sprung from earth, sinks back into the earth, and what was sent down from the coasts of the sky, returns again, and the regions of heaven receive it.

Nor does death so destroy things as to put an end to the bodies of matter, but only scatters their union. Then she joins anew one with others, and brings it to pass that all things thus alter their forms, and change their colours, and receive sensations, and in an instant of time yield them up again, so that you may know that it matters with what others the first-beginnings of things are bound up and in what position and what motions they mutually give and receive, and may not think that what we see floating on the surface of things or at times coming to birth, and on a sudden passing away, can abide in the possession of eternal first-bodies. Nay, indeed, even in my verses it is of moment with what others and in what order each letter is placed. For the same letters signify sky, sea, earth, rivers, sun, the same too crops, trees, living creatures; if not all, yet by far the greater part, are alike, but it is by position that things sound different. So in things themselves likewise when meetings, motions, order, position, shapes are changed, things too are bound to be changed.

Someone said to me recently something that I think is an important part of this discussion:

"To an introvert, everything that the extrovert likes would seem to create anxiety and pain."

I think that's correct, and similarly:

To an extrovert, everything that the introvert likes would seem trifling and oppressively boring.

You can come up with all sorts of Mars v. Venus analogies.

The point is that the pleasures of one nature are going to pains to another nature, and vice versa, and that is why we are always going to get into trouble unless we philosohically reach for the higher ground, which is that it is "Pleasure" not "My kind of pleasure" which has to be identified as the best description of the ultimate goal of life philosophically.

Epicurus therefore embraced BOTH active and static pleasures, and did not obsess over ranking one higher than the other, because he knew that people and circumstances differ.

Identifying the generic goal of pleasure leads to the philosophic understanding that the real contest is not types of pleasure against types of pleasure. The real philosophic contest for all the marbles is pleasure vs "virtue" and "religious piety" and capital "R" "Reason."

On an individual level it is esssntial that we know our own selves and identify what types of pleasure are most valuable to our own natures. But in the game of Philosophy vs. Philosophy, we can't let the enemies of Pleasure divide us amongst ourselves by suggesting that only certain types of pleasure are acceptable. That's the old "divide and conquer problem, and that is exactly what "they" have done to Epicureans and Epicurean philosophy for 2000+ years.

Admin Note: A long sidebar on katastematic pleasure has been moved to its own thead in the Ethics section: Do Pigs Like Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)

I see my links have disappeared. Will try to reconstruct them.

OK Did the best I could. I will now add the conclusion statement. Does this help anything at all? We are now supposed to consider katastematic pleasures as all pleasures concerned with removal of pain and therefore "necessary" pleasures and kinetic all other pleasures and therefore "unnecessary"? I don't think that makes any sense at all.

Now on the last comment there Godfrey I think probably Cicero's description is literally true but the sarcastic tone (which really was present) comes from the cultural bias against pleasure. This is also very similar to what Torquatus says in the "proof" sequence where he says imagine the life filled with pleasures of every kind and no pain - can we imagine anything better?

As for abiding to some extent maybe the issue is "confidence" or "attitude" which is something that seems to stay on over time.

As for the DL references to rest / katastematic, as you probably saw in G&T there had been a long history of Greeks talking about replenishment and active and resting pleasures, so Epicurus certainly would known of the terms and could have used them. So the issue is not whether he ever used the terms at all - the issue is more "Were these terms of significance to Epicurus as a focus and centerpiece of his philosophy?". We don't see Epicurus very often talking about types of pleasure, but he does so only occasionally.

It is really only the "alleged" linkeage between katastematic pleasure (which occurs very rarely) and " absence of pain" (which does seem to be an important term, as it describes the limit) that allows these commentators to put katastematic pleasure in a special class.

Once that linkeage is exposed as a mirage, the DL comments take on much less significance.

Again, any focus on a single "type of pleasure" as especially important is going to have this same logical problem - the focus on that pleasure tends to expand to "take over" the whole philosophy. The true focus seems to be that all pleasures are desirable, and personal to the person who feels them, and the only caution in pursuing them is that you need to be aware of their price in pain, because if you aren't willing to pay that price then "don't make the purchase!"

We can list all sorts of pleasures, and the price that they cost in pain, but in a non-fated non-supernatural world the choice of which to pursue is always going to be contextual. When you are lying on the train tracks and hear a whistle in the distance, it's not the "pleasures of rest" that you want but the pleasures of "action."

But I do agree - you always want to keep the attitude of confidence that you understand the basic scheme of things with you, and this is going to make you a much stronger person than those who believe in myths. You want to build that into your frame just like you exercise to build muscles. And that's clearly something that Epicurus encouraged and wanted. But is there any real profit to be gained in calling that " katastematic pleasure," or evidence that when Epicurus discussed those attributes of confidence and strength of mind that he used that term?

Lucretius Book Five, Starting Line 564 (Bailey):

[564] Nor can the sun’s blazing wheel be much greater or less, than it is seen to be by our senses. For from whatsoever distances fires can throw us their light and breathe their warm heat upon our limbs, they lose nothing of the body of their flames because of the interspaces, their fire is no whit shrunken to the sight. Even so, since the heat of the sun and the light he sheds, arrive at our senses and cheer the spots on which they fall, the form and bulk of the sun as well must needs be seen truly from earth, so that you could alter it almost nothing to greater or less.

[575] The moon, too, whether she illumines places with a borrowed light as she moves along, or throws out her own rays from her own body, however that may be, moves on with a shape no whit greater than seems that shape, with which we perceive her with our eyes. For all things which we behold far sundered from us through much air, are seen to grow confused in shape, ere their outline is lessened. Wherefore it must needs be that the moon, inasmuch as she shows a clear-marked shape and an outline well defined, is seen by us from earth in the heights, just as she is, clear-cut all along her outer edges, and just the size she is.

[585] Lastly, all the fires of heaven that you see from earth; inasmuch as all fires that we see on earth, so long as their twinkling light is clear, so long as their blaze is perceived, are seen to change their size only in some very small degree from time to time to greater or less, the further they are away: so we may know that the heavenly fires can only be a very minute degree smaller or larger by a little tiny piece.

[592] This, too, is not wonderful, how the sun, small as it is, can send out so great light, to fill seas and all lands and sky with its flood, and to bathe all things in its warm heat. For it may be that from this spot the one well of light for the whole world is opened up and teems with bounteous stream, and shoots out its rays, because the particles of heat from all the world gather together on every side, and their meeting mass flows together in such wise, that here from a single fountain-head their blazing light streams forth. Do you not see too how widely a tiny spring of water sometimes moistens the fields, and floods out over the plains?

[604] Or again, it may be that from the sun’s fire, though it be not great, blazing light seizes on the air with its burning heat, if by chance there is air ready to hand and rightly suited to be kindled when smitten by tiny rays of heat; even as sometimes we see crops or straw caught in widespread fire from one single spark.

[610] Perhaps, too, the sun, shining on high with its rosy torch, has at his command much fire with hidden heat all around him, fire which is never marked by any radiance, so that it is only laden with heat and increases the stroke of the sun’s rays.

[614] Nor is there any single and straightforward account of the sun, to show how from the summer regions he draws near the winter turning-point of Capricorn, and how turning back thence, he betakes himself to the solstice-goal of Cancer; and how the moon is seen in single months to traverse that course, on which the sun spends the period of a year as he runs. There is not, I say, any single cause assigned for these things.

[621] For, first and foremost, it is clear that it may come to pass, as the judgement of the holy man, Democritus, sets before us, that the nearer the several stars are to earth, the less can they be borne on with the whirl of heaven. For its swift keen strength passes away and is lessened beneath, and so little by little the sun is left behind with the hindmost signs, because it is much lower than the burning signs. And even more the moon: the lower her course, the further it is from the sky and nearer to earth, the less can she strain on her course level with the signs. Moreover the weaker the whirl with which she is borne along, being lower than the sun, the more do all the signs catch her up all around and pass her. Therefore, it comes to pass that she seems to turn back more speedily to each several sign, because the signs come back to her.

[637] It may be too that from quarters of the world athwart his path two airs may stream alternately, each at a fixed season, one such as to push the sun away from the summer signs right to the winter turning-places and their icy frost, and the other to hurl him back from the icy shades of cold right to the heat-laden quarters and the burning signs. And in like manner must we think that the moon and those stars which roll through the great years in great orbits, can be moved by airs from the opposite quarters in turn. Do you not see how by contrary winds the lower clouds too are moved in directions contrary to those above? Why should those stars be less able to be borne on by currents contrary one to the other through the great orbits in the heaven?

[650] But night shrouds the earth in thick darkness, either when after his long journey the sun has trodden the farthest parts of heaven, and fainting has breathed out his fires shaken by the journey and made weak by much air, or because the same force, which carried on his orb above the earth, constrains him to turn his course back beneath the earth.

[656] Likewise at a fixed time Matuta sends abroad the rosy dawn through the coasts of heaven, and spreads the light, either because the same sun, returning again beneath the earth, seizes the sky in advance with his rays, fain to kindle it, or because the fires come together and many seeds of heat are wont to stream together at a fixed time, which each day cause the light of a new sun to come to birth. Even so story tells that from the high mountains of Ida scattered fires are seen as the light rises, and then they gather as if into a single ball, and make up the orb.

[666] Nor again ought this to be cause of wonder herein, that these seeds of fire can stream together at so fixed a time and renew the brightness of the sun. For we see many events, which come to pass at a fixed time in all things. Trees blossom at a fixed time, and at a fixed time lose their flower. Even so at a fixed time age bids the teeth fall, and the hairless youth grow hairy with soft down and let a soft beard flow alike from either cheek. Lastly, thunder, snow, rains, clouds, winds come to pass at seasons of the year more or less fixed. For since the first-beginnings of causes were ever thus and things have so fallen out from the first outset of the world, one after the other they come round even now in fixed order.

[680] And likewise it may be that days grow longer and nights wane, and again daylight grows less, when nights take increase; either because the same sun, as he fulfills his course in unequal arcs below the earth and above, parts the coasts of heaven, and divides his circuit into unequal portions; and whatever he has taken away from the one part, so much the more he replaces, as he goes round, in the part opposite it, until he arrives at that sign in the sky, where the node of the year makes the shades of night equal to the daylight. For in the mid-course of the blast of the north wind and of the south wind, the sky holds his turning-points apart at a distance then made equal, on account of the position of the whole starry orbit, in which the sun covers the space of a year in his winding course, as he lights earth and heaven with his slanting rays: as is shown by the plans of those who have marked out all the quarters of the sky, adorned with their signs in due order.

[696] Or else, because the air is thicker in certain regions, and therefore the trembling ray of his fire is delayed beneath the earth, nor can it easily pierce through and burst out to its rising. Therefore in winter time the long nights lag on, until the radiant ensign of day comes forth.

[701] Or else again, because in the same way in alternate parts of the year the fires, which cause the sun to rise from a fixed quarter, are wont to stream together now more slowly, now more quickly, therefore it is that those seem to speak the truth \[who say that a new sun is born every day\].

[705] The moon may shine when struck by the sun’s rays, and day by day turn that light more straightly to our sight, the more she retires from the sun’s orb, until opposite him she has glowed with quite full light and, as she rises, towering on high, has seen his setting; then little by little she must needs retire back again, and, as it were, hide her light, the nearer she glides now to the sun’s fire from the opposite quarter through the orbit of the signs; as those have it, who picture that the moon is like a ball, and keeps to the path of her course below the sun.

[715] There is also a way by which she can roll on with her own light, and yet show changing phases of brightness. For there may be another body, which is borne on and glides together with her, in every way obstructing and obscuring her; yet it cannot be seen, because it is borne on without light. Or she may turn round, just like, if it so chance, the sphere of a ball, tinged over half its surface with gleaming light, and so by turning round the sphere produces changing phases, until she turns to our sight and open eyes that side, whichever it be, that is endowed with fires; and then little by little she twists back again and carries away from us the light-giving part of the round mass of the ball; as the Babylonian teaching of the Chaldaeans, denying the science of the astronomers, essays to prove in opposition; just as if what each of them fights for may not be the truth, or there were any cause why you should venture to adopt the one less than the other.

[731] Or again, why a fresh moon could not be created every day with fixed succession of phases and fixed shapes, so that each several day the moon created would pass away, and another be supplied in its room and place, it is difficult to teach by reasoning or prove by words, since so many things can be created in fixed order. Spring goes on her way and Venus, and before them treads Venus’s winged harbinger; and following close on the steps of Zephyrus, mother Flora strews and fills all the way before them with glorious colours and scents. Next after follows parching heat, and as companion at her side dusty Ceres and the etesian blasts of the north winds. Then autumn advances, and step by step with her Euhius Euan. Then follow the other seasons and their winds, Volturnus, thundering on high, and the south wind, whose strength is the lightning. Last of all the year’s end brings snow, and winter renews numbing frost; it is followed by cold, with chattering teeth. Wherefore it is less wonderful if the moon is born at a fixed time, and again at a fixed time is blotted out, since so many things can come to pass at fixed times.

[751] Likewise also the eclipses of the sun and the hidings of the moon, you must think may be brought about by several causes. For why should the moon be able to shut out the earth from the sun’s light, and thrust her head high before him in the line of earth, throwing her dark orb before his glorious rays; and at the same time it should not be thought that another body could do this, which glides on ever without light. And besides, why should not the sun be able at a fixed time to faint and lose his fires, and again renew his light, when, in his journey through the air, he has passed by places hostile to his flames, which cause his fires to be put out and perish?

[762] And why should the earth be able in turn to rob the moon of light, and herself on high to keep the sun hidden beneath, while the moon in her monthly journey glides through the sharp-drawn shadows of the cone; and at the same time another body be unable to run beneath the moon or glide above the sun’s orb, to break off his rays and streaming light? And indeed, if the moon shines with her own light, why should she not be able to grow faint in a certain region of the world, while she passes out through spots unfriendly to her own light?

[772] For the rest, since I have unfolded in what manner each thing could take place throughout the blue vault of the great world, so that we might learn what force and what cause started the diverse courses of the sun, and the journeyings of the moon, and in what way they might go hiding with their light obscured, and shroud the unexpecting earth in darkness, when, as it were, they wink and once again open their eye and look upon all places shining with their clear rays; now I return to the youth of the world, and the soft fields of earth, and what first with new power of creation they resolved to raise into the coasts of light and entrust to the gusty winds.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty Nine of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles and we look at the implications of the Epicurean position on the size of the sun. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

BAILEY:

[91] The size of sun (and moon) and the other stars is for us what it appears to be; and in reality it is either (slightly) greater than what we see or slightly less or the same size: for so too fires on earth when looked at from a distance seem to the senses. And every objection at this point will easily be dissipated, if we pay attention to the clear vision, as I show in my books about nature.

[92] The risings and settings of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies may be due to kindling and extinction, the composition of the surrounding matter at the places of rising and setting being such as to lead to these results: for nothing in phenomena is against it. Or again, the effect in question might be produced by their appearance over the top of the earth, and again the interposition of the earth in front of them: for once more nothing in phenomena is against it.

Their motions may not impossibly be due to the revolution of the whole heaven, or else it may remain stationary, and they may revolve owing to the natural impulse towards the east, which was produced at the beginning of the world . . . . . by an excessive heat owing to a spreading of the fire which is always moving on to the regions nearest in succession.

[93] The tropics of sun and moon may be caused owing to an obliquity of the whole heaven, which is constrained into this position in the successive seasons; or equally well by an outward impulsion of a current of air, or because the appropriate material successively catches fire, as the former fails; or again, from the beginning this particular form of revolution may have been assigned to these stars, so that they move in a kind of spiral. For all these and kindred explanations are not at variance with any clear-seen facts, if one always clings in such departments of inquiry to the possible and can refer each point to what is in agreement with phenomena without fearing the slavish artifices of the astronomers.

HICKS:

[91] "The size of the sun and the remaining stars relatively to us is just as great as it appears. This he states in the eleventh book "On Nature." For, says he, if it had diminished in size on account of the distance, it would much more have diminished its brightness; for indeed there is no distance more proportionate to this diminution of size than is the distance at which the brightness begins to diminish. But in itself and actually it may be a little larger or a little smaller, or precisely as great as it is seen to be. For so too fires of which we have experience are seen by sense when we see them at a distance. And every objection brought against this part of the theory will easily be met by anyone who attends to plain facts, as I show in my work On Nature.

[92] And the rising and setting of the sun, moon, and stars may be due to kindling and quenching, provided that the circumstances are such as to produce this result in each of the two regions, east and west: for no fact testifies against this. Or the result might be produced by their coming forward above the earth and again by its intervention to hide them: for no fact testifies against this either.

And their motions may be due to the rotation of the whole heaven, or the heaven may be at rest and they alone rotate according to some necessary impulse to rise, implanted at first when the world was made ... and this through excessive heat, due to a certain extension of the fire which always encroaches upon that which is near it.

[93] The turnings of the sun and moon in their course may be due to the obliquity of the heaven, whereby it is forced back at these times. Again, they may equally be due to the contrary pressure of the air or, it may be, to the fact that either the fuel from time to time necessary has been consumed in the vicinity or there is a dearth of it. Or even because such a whirling motion was from the first inherent in these stars so that they move in a sort of spiral. For all such explanations and the like do not conflict with any clear evidence, if only in such details we hold fast to what is possible, and can bring each of these explanations into accord with the facts, unmoved by the servile artifices of the astronomers.

I've never been happy that we have a full statement of the problem in this website. Elayne's article On Pain Pleasure and Happiness is good, and I have my collection of cites in the Fullness of Pleasure article.

At the moment the only cite I would put here is one I always thought was the most clear - from Cicero in a moment of honesty when he was attacking an Epicurean:. That the Epicureans held "that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures."". Which means to me that the situation we find ourselves in when all pains are gone is well described not as being some strange state of transcendance but what ordinary people can well understand as "crammed full of pleasures" (of any kind and combination, both mental and physical).

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.” Note: Here is a link to Perseus where the Latin and translation of this can be compared. The Latin is: “nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus.” See also here for word translations.

So to keep harping on what I think is probably the key point - it is the modern commentators who are equating "pleasures of rest" with "absence of pain" and that is how they are arguing that this "absence of pain /katastematic pleasure" is not what we should consider to be a "real pleasure" at all, but in fact as Elayne says in her article a "fancy pleasure" which is very difficult for normal people to understand, but which is in fact the "true goal" of life rather than pleasure itself.

That linkeage is pretty much a core part of what has to be broken to get back to an understandable theory of pleasure as something we all feel and understand without explanation, which is the real heart and soul of the philosophy - something we don't need "expert academics" to explain to us.

Godfrey I very much like the direction you are going in, but I unfortunately have to demur on "abiding.". I know some people who like that word ( ) but I do not think it adds anything to the discussion. If all it means is "long lasting" then that would be simply the time element that is a part of every pleasure - some last longer than others.

But I detect that it is being suggested as a good word (not tagging you personally) because it has a sort of Biblical flavor to it that implies it means something other and "higher" than "long lasting.". I will deflect from being more specific by saying it is almost the type word Dewitt would use to try to stretch a parallel with Christianity (I don't remember right now but maybe in fact Dewitt *did* use the word - I know others use it today).

But the end result problem is that I don't see any difference in kind from any other pleasure that comes from the confidence we get from studying natural science and understanding the Epicurean worldview (e.g what is said at the end of the letter to Herodotus about these studies making us much stronger than other people).

I would not have any real problem with saying that ALL such pleasures that come from the Epicurean worldview are "abiding" because in fact I do think they are long lasting - that reference to how you can't make a Stoic out of an Epicurean applies.

But the reason I would say away from doing that is that I don't think the texts really support carving out longer-lasting pleasures and calling them "abiding" or anything else, especially since Epicurus warns in the letter to Menoceaus that it makes sense to seek not the pleasures that are longest, but the ones that are most pleasant.

But to repeat I find your direction generally makes sense, other than that it is not likely to help equip Don's "David" to meet the Academic Establishment's "Goliath."

(And though I am not fond of Biblical analogies I think Don is correct in suggesting that it is a very good analogy for the position we are in.)

So what we face here as people interested not only in understanding Epicurus ourselves but popularizing it for others is that out there in the wide world anyone who reads about Epicurus is going to conclude that katastematic pleasure (which DL has mentioned to tell us only that Epicurus held it to be just one type of pleasure) should be considered to be the equivalent of "absence of pain" (which implies nothingness unless you define it much further) and thus that some counterintuitive and ephemeral concept of "nothingness.". Rather than keeping the focus on pleasure as Epicurus always did, people are being given the idea that rather than pleasurable living as ordinary people like you and me understand the term, the real focus and goal of Epicurean Philosophy is some form of nothingness. That may please the Buddhists and Stoics but is 180 degrees from what the clear bulk of the texts teach.

That is what casual readers have been doing for years and thereby ghettoizing is into a community only of those who fancy the idea of living in caves and running from all pain as the real goal of life.

That not only has a bad result, but more important there is good reason to think it is a total misreading of Epicurus, which sets us up for the task of straightening the whole thing out.

All of which leads to this kind of statement at wikipedia: that Epicurus "idiosyncraticlly defined pleasure as absenced of suffering and that the goal of life is not "pleasure" but "atraxia meaning untroubledness.....' No real statement of PLEASURE as the goal either here or in the opening paragraphs of the wikipedia article on epicurus himself.

Plus THIS which identifies katastematic pleasures "as the focal ones to Epicurus."

IT's this kind of thing that is the problem:

Reading Epicurus: Pleasure and pain

For Epicurus, pleasure is nothing but the absence of pain. Pain can further be subdivided into pain of the body and trouble in the soul. This negative…

daily-philosophy.com

Another example which implies that katastematic pleasureis the real objective above Kinetic:

Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' HedonismThrough Plato's Philebus Open Access

Arenson, Kelly E. (2009)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/1r66j156t?locale=en

Published

Abstract

Abstract Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's Philebus By Kelly E. Arenson

Epicurus made a name for himself in the ancient world when he identified pleasure with the absence of pain and proceeded to distinguish it from a second, seemingly different variety of pleasure--that found `in motion' (kinetic). I interpret Epicurus' distinction through the lens of Plato's Philebus and the ancient debates concerning that dialogue. At issue in these debates and the theories that arise from them is whether pleasure is a process or an end and how pleasure ought to be conceived in terms of the harmonious functioning of a living organism. I argue that Plato identifies pleasure with the perceived process of restoration of an organism's natural harmony and that he uses this description to deny that pleasure is the good. Aristotle, rebuking the Platonic position, counters that pleasures are not processes of replenishment but are associated with the activity of an organism's unimpeded functioning. In the Epicurean development of these ideas, kinetic pleasure is the perceived restoration of the natural functioning of a living organism, and katastematic pleasure is painless, natural functioning itself, or health. On this reading, Epicurus considers any perceived affection that does not involve pain to be katastematic and thus the highest pleasure, including everyday sensory pleasures, such as taste. I show that Epicurus' distinction between pleasures serves as a dialectical response to the Philebus and bears the marks of Aristotle's response to the dialogue as well.

Quote from Don

Isn't all pleasure a sensation by Epicurean definition?

Yes and that is definitely the starting point of the analysis, and why most of the academic statements strike me as wrong.

What I am really talking about are these articles, for existence the Konstan articles you've cited. I know what these recent writers are saying, and mainly I am trying to figure how to deal with the fact that what they are saying appears wrong, and yet we don't want to be a "ghetto" here where we talk only to ourselves and therefore appear "stupid" to people on the outside who say that the "experts" say something else.

The constant situation is that people are going to read here things that (hopefully) makes sense, but then they go to the current academic articles and read a lot of spaghetti-like speculations that seem to lead nowhere (and ultimately contradict your basic observation that all pleasure is "felt").

That's the point of the Wenham article - Wenham is on our side and he fights that - and also the point of Nikolsky. But they are the minority, so it's a matter of developing the best way to articulate things here while also preparing other readers to recognize that when they go "outside" they will read something else, so that they know what the issues are and why on side makes sense and the other doesn't.

Godfrey's suggestion makes sense as a particular type of feeling of pleasure, and may be workable IF katastematic pleasure can indeed be "felt" under the authorities that talked about these issues.

The real rub is getting a consensus on whether it can be felt and then clearly delineating it from any other type of mental pleasure.

This is one of those areas where I think we just have to be flexible and realize that talking about it rather casually is one thing, but wrestling with the "experts" who have a lot more firepower in their citations is something else.

That's why for me it's a lot easier to take a position in what it is "not" (some special "higher" type of pleasure that is the "true goal" of life) than what it "is."

Quote from Joshua

The first point I would like to see articulated is that Epicurus' opinions about sex and romance—whatever they turn out to be—are just that; opinions. I'm not very likely to consult a dead philosopher at all on these matters, they being so intimate and so personal, and I am especially uninterested in giving my ear to any High Priest of Epicureanism on what I should do, or what I am allowed to do when it comes to interpersonal relationships.

I agree with that too with this different wording:

Epicurus was a "philosopher." He was not a "Life Coach" or a "Sex Therapist" or a "Psychologist," or a "Psychiatrist" except as we choose to think about applying his general rules to our own specific cases.

All we really know about Epicurus' personal life is that he seemed to spend most of his time in studying nature and engaging in philosophical discussions (battles) over conflicting philosophical ideas. We don't know his specific thoughts on a wide variety of specific situations.

Yes his general philosophical deductions do have applications to specifics, but only in a general way. The thrust of his work was at high levels like:

- There are no supernatural gods or life after death so live like you only live once.

- Pleasure and Pain as feels are in a general sense the real guides to life, not virtue or divinities.

- Think about all the results of your choices, long and short term, and make your decisions so as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

- Actions that have a high risk of painful results need to be engaged in very carefully, if you choose to engage in them at all.

I don't think Epicurus meant to be interpreted as being any more specific toward specific people than general "rules of thumb" like that. And it wouldn't make sense for him to try to, because the whole thrust of his worldview is that there is no fate and no hard determinism so everyone has to deal with their own circumstances as best they can.

Even the extended treatment of romantic love in Book Four of Lucretius is really almost just a series of semi-amusing anecdotes which try to impress among people who are intoxicated to be especially careful - not a general rule of "do this" or "don't do that" -- heck the experts can't even agree if he had a general rule for or against marriage itself, and the best unwinding of that always seems to come down to "it depends."

So I see Epicurus' general advice to be "Be Careful."

He's providing the starting point, but he's NOT telling us to take that info and go sit in a cave. He tells us also to gather friends and talk about things and apply the general rules to life, and that's the kind of thing we can do by looking at modern and specific contexts and help each other analyze things and work together as friends to apply the general rules to the specific problems.

Maybe one of the most productive ways to grapple with this involves being very clear what kinetic(active) and katastematic(static) really means, using examples.

What Kalosyni said is part of the problem: unless you take the time to study what the Greeks were saying, as Gosling and Taylor do in detail, it is natural to think that "katastematic/static/ataraxia" translates into something like:

"I'm sitting on my porch meditating and clearing my mind and just feeling good without any troubles at all."

I am convinced that if you read Gosling and Taylor's description of the words and the history, you will conclude that even THAT example is an example of a "kinetic" pleasure. It is difficult or impossible to express in normal terms how a human being can experience anything that is unchanging and therefore "katastematic." That is because the Greeks were rigorously defining kinetic to include anything which involves any experience over time at all. Therefore ANY experience over time falls under "kinetic." As a result anything that you want to call "katastematic" loses that title if you can actually "experience" it. (I don't see this in the discussions but presumably you would need to divide PAINS into kinetic and katastematic as well as pleasures, which would also be an interesting way to get at the issues.)

To be katastematic/static under the definitions G&T pull out of Plato et al would involve true and absolute "rest" -- a state of no change whatsoever. That might almost be like a "freeze-frame" in a video -- where a particular set of circumstances exists in totally unchanging form. But such "states" do not exist in an Epicurean universe: everything is a combination of atoms whirling through space, and nothing is ever exactly the same for more than a moment in time.

All this would take a lot of work and study to document adequately, and this is too short an explanation without cites. But I know I remember G&T spending a lot of time on this, and if I recall correctly this aspect -- whether katastematic pleasure can be experienced - is a focus of Wenham's paper we have online here: On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure In Epicurus

Wenham's abstract from that article:

Quote

The standard interpretation of the concept of katastematic pleasure in Epicurus has it referring to “static” states from which feeling is absent. We owe the prevalence of this interpretation to Cicero’s account of Epicureanism in his De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum. Cicero’s account, in turn, is based on the Platonic theory of pleasure. The standard interpretation, when applied to principles of Epicurean hedonism, leads to fundamental contradictions in his theory. I claim that it is not Epicurus, but the standard interpretation that generates these errors because the latter construes pleasure in Epicurus according to an attitudinal theoretical framework, whilst the account of pleasure that emerges from Epicurean epistemology sees it as experiential.

Gosh one more comment. I think this issue HAS to be considered in context of PD18 and PD19, which we hardly ever see discussed.

How can a finite life contain as much pleasure as one that is not time limited? To me the answer to that clearly derives from a way of looking at pleasures ("by reason!") that indicates that we are engaged in a logical battle (presumably with Plato et al) at an abstract level, rather than taking a pure "feeling" comparison of the pleasures of one against the other as we normally think of pleasure.

Everyone would intuitively want the longer portion, so what Epicurus is doing is showing a way of looking at the issue that satisfies us that we are not missing anything new and categorically different by not having the longer time. It to worry about the lack of time. But a way of looking at something does not change what we are looking at - pleasures are pleasures and unless we feel them then we are essentially dead and they are nothing to us.

Bottom line : before someone comes to a resting point on what they think about katastematic pleasure I would suggest they consider how their viewpoint relates to 18 and 19.

This is something that a pig cannot do, but also something that does not appear (to us) to bother the pig. We have the need for the analysis only because it bothers us if we don't.

One thing more - as to a conclusion from all this.

After reading that, my view remains with Nikolsky that the kinetic-katastematic distinction, to the extent it was of significance to Epicurus at all (which is very unclear) arose as a response (as Konstan says) to positions taken by Plato about the nature of pleasure, and needs to be viewed primarily in that context.

Most all of us agree that pleasure is a sweeping word that contains every form of good feeling anyone can describe, and that it isn't possible to rate any kind of pleasure "objectively" as always better than another. If we try to do that (rank one type of pleasure as absolutely better than another, or "best") then we're going to involve ourselves in logical inconsistencies with the rest of Epicurean philosophy that go all the way back to its physics and epistemological bases.

So while I think this is a useful advanced topic to know about so as to navigate the logical debates of Greek philosophy wars, the suggestion that in real life we should deprecate joy and delight and mental pleasures (all of which are KINETIC) in favor of something which arguably is not even an "experience" does not provide a lot of help for us in developing therapies or practices for living real life.

It's really fascinating how this debate arose and why it perpetuates itself, and that's precisely where the Nikolsky article is essential reading.

That LacusCurtius site is great - thank you!