Posts by Cassius

It's been an interesting thread and whether it is over or just starting, it is an important question. I take it your ultimate question is probably "Why" should we look to nature at all, regardless of whether we look at children or any other phase of life?

Why does "is" give rise to "ought"? And you definitely have another step in that process in getting from is to ought.

Of the alternatives in Torquatus it seems to me that "anticipations" makes some sense to look to as a foundation of pleasure, but why does pleasure exist at all for us to follow?

I think we're on very important territory here and the resolution comes very close to (paraphrasing Nietsche) whether we choose to say "yes" to nature or "no". Nature allows us to do either and it is ultimately up to us to decide and pay the price / reap the consequences for our decisions.

Regardless of what we as individuals decide, Epicurus seems clearly to have chosen to say "yes" to a view of nature based on sensation/ feeling, rather than abstract logic, as the standard of a proper human life.

So how would you restate your concern Todd, that looking to examples of people who have not had the time or exposure to ground their actions on "abstract reasoning" is a poor idea for getting at examples of the calling of Nature?

Why is that a poor way of looking at the question? Because they are not "educated" in some goal other than the one they were born with?

So as to the question of whether the cradle argument is reasoning, we have the cradle argument being a form of " direction of attention" rather than "proof and formal argument."

".. no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"

just so we have the text in front of us:

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings

I think the best presentation of this issues is going to be in the section of DeWittt's book starting here, although it is covered in a lot of other places in the book too. I am not citing this to say "you should believe it because Dewitt said it" but as a starting point for anyone lurking who might want to follow the argument.

Quote from Todd

Hmm...disagree, but not sure how to proceed beyond this point.

Is reason fallible, of course. But it's our only tool for judging, and that's what is being done here.

Yep it is difficult or impossible to bridge that divide, and it seems to me that the issue of the proper place of "reason" led to much of the revolt of Epicurus against the positions of Plato and Aristotle.

Quote from Todd

the cradle argument takes a particular part of nature, and elevates it above the rest.

Yes, the part of nature before human reasoning, with its potential for error, has weighed in with its first opinion - that its own opinion itself can supply a guide to life superior to the feelings of pleasure and pain.

Quote from Todd

Right, but if that it is the only issue, then you could look to the "uneducated" for ethical guidance.

Indeed so, as Thomas Jefferson said to Peter Carr in 1787, and as I read it Epicurus would agree with this:

Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.

I would say that the 'nature as the norm' position is foundational to Epicurus position, so I agree with your comment here that we have to look to the question of whether we should look to Nature or not.

Quote from Todd

To give a (hopefully) non-controversial example, one of the assumptions in any kind of "look to nature" argument is that nature is the right place to look. I don't think I've ever heard anyone explain why nature is the right place to look. It's taken for granted. I'm fine with that, because nature IS usually a good place to look, and there aren't too many alternatives.

If we conclude through our observations and Epicurean reasoning that there is no world of forms or essences or "true world" beyond this one, and that all knowledge is based on the evidence of the senses, then what other foundation would support a conclusion of looking anywhere else for the norrm? Because we have the capacity to revolt against nature, does that mean that we should? It's certainly possible to argue that we should, but on what foundation? Not on a foundation of gods or abstract logic, surely?

Quote from Todd

My problem is with the implicit assumption that any deviation from the original state of nature is necessarily for the worse.

I would say that is not implicit Epicurus' position at all. He was certainly in favor of living in civilization and seems to have enjoyed a good life under the Athenian system, which is not at all a state of nature.

If the point is that pleasure and pain are the only faculties that Nature has given for ultimate determination of what to choose and what to avoid, what other or higher faculty would you suggest? Certainly not "reason" because why would anyone choose reason if it did not bring pleasure?

If you want an "anti-life" or "anti-nature" argument it seems to me that there is nothing more pure than that men can invent for themselves a faculty of choice better than what nature has provided.

I sure am glad we split this off into a new thread!

Faunus I would say it would probably be better to view that as something like:

The evidence of the senses is never 'wrong' but the opinions we draw from the evidence certainly can be. in this case there is some evidence and some argument that the universe is finite (what you are referring to) set against other evidence that the universe has no end (every time we expand the reach of our observation we find more).

This is the constant question in lots of areas - where the evidence conflicts we have to entertain multiple possibilities or wait before attaching ourselves to a single opinion. But the one conclusion to avoid above all is that the senses are ultimately untrustworthy and that we therefore have no capacity to be confident of anything. If you fall to that level you will walk off the precipice and your life will be unsustainable.

Quote from Todd

but I'll need to try to collect my thoughts a bit more to keep this from becoming a rambling stream-of-consciousness on my end.

Don't let that worry you too much!

Also:

To me what you are bringing up reminds me of this which Frances Wright addresses in her Chapter 15. I am not at all sure that what she is writing is what Epicurus would say, and in fact I think she goes significantly further and off in a different direction than Epicurus did. But the description of the topic I think is very much on point, and deciding whether what she says is right or consistent with Epicurus might help people think about what is really involved in the question of "theory" in the first place. Is this correct? - "In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing."

Quote from Frances Wright A Few Days In Athens Chapter 15

“I admit the truth of the metaphor,” said Theon. “But may we not simplify too much as well as too little? May we not push investigation beyond the limits assigned to human reason, and, with a boldness approaching to profanity, tear, without removing, the veil which enwraps the mysteries of creation from our scrutiny?”

“Without challenging the meaning of the terms you have employed,” said Metrodorus, “I would observe, that there is little danger of our pushing investigation too far. Unhappily the limits prescribed to us by our few and imperfect senses must ever cramp the sphere of our observation, as compared to the boundless range of things; and that even when we shall have strained and improved our senses to the uttermost. We trace an effect to a cause, and that cause to another cause, and so on, till we hold some few links of a chain, whose extent like the charmed circle, is without beginning as without end.”

“I apprehend the difficulties,” observed Leontium, “which embarrass the mind of our young friend. Like most aspirants after knowledge, he has a vague and incorrect idea of what he is pursuing, and still more, of what may be attained. In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us: finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

“This explanation is new to me,” observed Theon, “and I will confess, startling to my imagination. It is pure materialism!”

“You may so call it,” rejoined Leontiurn, “But when you have so called it — what then? The question remains: is it true? or is it false?”

“I should be disposed to say — false, since it confounds all my preconceived notions of truth and error, of right and wrong.”

“Of truth and error, of right and wrong, in the sense of correct or incorrect is, I presume, your meaning,” said Leontium. “You do not involve moral rectitude or the contrary in a matter of opinion?”

“If the opinion have a moral or immoral tendency I do,” said the youth.

“A simple matter of fact can have no such tendency or ought not, if we are rational creatures.”

“And would not, if we were always reasoning beings,” said Metrodorus; “but as the ignorance and superstition which surround our infancy and youth, favor the development of the imagination at the expense of the judgment, we are ever employed in the coining of chimeras, rather than in the discovery of truths; and if ever the poor judgment make an effort to dispel these fancies of the brain, she is repulsed, like a sacrilegious intruder into religious mysteries.”

“Until our opinions are made to rest on facts,” said Leontium, “the error of our young friend — the most dangerous of all errors, being one of principle and involving many — must ever pervade the world. And it was because I suspected this leading misconception of the very nature — of the very end and aim of the science he is pursuing, that I attempted an explanation of what should be sought, and of what can alone be attained. In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing. Truth is but approved facts. Truth, then, is one with the knowledge of these facts. To shrink from inquiry, is to shrink from knowledge. And to prejudge an opinion as true or false, because it interferes with some preconceived abstraction we call vice or virtue, is as if we were to draw the picture of a man we had never seen, and then, upon seeing him, were to dispute his being the man in question, because unlike our picture.”

“But if this opinion interfered with another, of whose truth we imagined ourselves certain.”

“Then clearly, in one or the other, we are mistaken; and the only way to settle the difficulty is to examine and compare the evidences of both.”

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The discussion goes on further from there but that part is probably the heart of the question. What is the proper attitude toward "theory"?

I think I will go ahead and break this into a new thread....

Another highly relevant text reference:

Quote from Letter to Pythocles

[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.

Todd I think the direction you are talking about would make for a really important discussion but we probably ought to branch it off from this thread on the Austin book. If you get time could you tee up that question under a new title, because I think it would help a lot if we had a thread on it - especially since you've had time to think about the issues for several years now, - would make for a good discussion that should be findable in the future.

Quote from Todd

A theory grounded in reality, of course, but still a theory. This is might be a corrosive desire.

I don't think that's a corrosive desire at all -- at least it's not corrosive to consider the question and try to come to a resting place on what is possible and what is not.

This from Pythocles seems applicable:

Quote from Letter to Pythocles

[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.

On topics like this I like to refer to what I think is one of the most under-rated sections of the texts, Lucretius Book 4. I see the discussion of "images" as not something to skip over as obsolete, but the place where we are going to find some of the most important insights into how to think when evidence is conflicting or illusory or not as plentiful as we would like it to be. (As to illusions, for example, how do we detect the truth? Not by jettisoning confidence in the senses, but by making more observations and then harmonizing them, and not by jumping to abandon everything about which we are already confident. We "wait" before holding an opinion to be true, when appropriate, until we can bring both old and new data all into a consistent whole.)

Here is one of the most important sections (starting around line 462) in the Brown translation):

Quote from Lucretius Book Four

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

And here that same section is in greater context:

Quote

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

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Martin can give you a better answer than I can, but I can give you one that I think is compatible with classical Epicureanism:

First of all, who is "research" and what would give "research" the ability to conclude that there is a limit to the size of the universe (and therefore the number of atoms that it contains)?

I expect the answer would be that you could name some number of names of scientists who take the position that the universe as a whole is finite in size, while I expect that there are others who did or do still maintain that the size of the universe is limitless.

How does one choose between them to decide that Epicurus was "wrong"? Do you have to have the same level of scientific research background yourself in order to judge? Can you hope to attain such experience in your lifetime? Can you count the number of atoms yourself? If not, you are basically placing your confidence in some number of men whose opinions differ from others in the past and from whom - if the past is any guide - others in the future will differ too.

So you can say "I just don't know" or 'I choose to believe the majority of current "experts," and that may be a fine answer for you and cause you no doubts as to a possible supernatural origin of the universe or your ability to navigate within life.

Epicurus thought it was preferable (and better reasoning) to look at this and other questions based on analogies of what we have confidence of here on earth. He therefore constructed thought experiments such as throwing the javelin out through space, and others beyond which I can cite here (including the that a finite number of atoms in an infinite space would never come together to form what we see), which led him to conclude that there was good reason to believe that the universe is boundless in size. Logically he then concluded that if the universe is boundless in size then there is no bound to the number of atoms that constitute it. He thought this was both correct reasoning and a good way to innoculate people against believe in a supernatural dimension or a "true world" beyond this one on the order of Plato.

In the end we have another one of those questions to which we as individuals will never "know" the answer in terms of being able to count them ourselves, so we have to decide where to place our confidence. Likewise we will never "know" that there is any life after death by traveling there and finding out personally, and that ends up again being another question of how you weigh evidence and how much credit to give to speculation where direct evidence is lacking.

Call me a Luddite (or "anti-science" as the Epicureans were labeled) but the real issue as I see it is not one of counting up the number of experts on each side, but of weighing evidence that is available to us and how to assess its credibility. That's an issue of canonics. To me, Epicurus' argument was that we should not allow conclusions based on evidence we observe through our senses here on Earth to be overturned absent equally compelling sensory evidence. And even when new evidence is gathered that does not mean we discard the old evidence - all the evidence must be reconciled.

That argument seems sound to me, and I have seen no evidence that persuades me that he was wrong in thinking that this is the best course. Whatever new evidence is confidently gathered has to be included in any model in which we have confidence, but the devil is always in the detail of "do we have all the evidence we would like to have?" That's why this is not really an anti-science argument, because the "science" in the issue we are talking about is notoriously difficult to determine due to the known limits of our evidence. There is no reason to believe in life after death, but there is every reason to think that if we throw that javelin either something will stop it or it will travel on forever.

What I personally observe in my reading of these controversies in science discussions is that the arguments that seem to say that the universe is finite in size turn on what they claim to be the "observable" universe. It appears to me that when pressed these people hile also seem to acknowledge that the data from our current telescopes and data are necessarily limited in degree, providing no information about what is "beyond" their observation. And to me personally, that is where I think Epicurus' reasonings as to the "universe as a whole" continue to make good sense.

That reasoning may not convince many particle physics experts, but I don't grant to those experts the right to force me to believe a particular experiment or data that they claim to be true over what appears to me to be good reasoning that is consistent with all the raw evidence that is available to me. I would not grant to any priest the right to tell me that I should be concerned about hell because a god revealed it to him, and I would not grant to "research" the right to overturn what appears to me to be a common sense conclusion without a lot more evidence than I am persuaded that "they" have.

Similar questions arise in the issue of whether particles are infinitely divisible or not, whixh is pretty much the same question as to whether there is a limit in the number of "atoms." There are similar questions such as whether the universe as a whole has existed and will always exist eternally in time.

You then get to the issue of whether "in order to be an Epicurean you have to believe XXX." Luckily that's not an issue that we have a right to decide, since Epicurus is no longer here. I know that some people are going to take the position that they are convinced by modern physics arguments and are no longer concerned whether the universe is infinite in size or eternal in time. In fact I think Frances Wright appears to have taken exactly that position.

Since no one gets to define what Epicurus would say were he here today, we each have to make the best we can of these questions. But I think it helps nobody to simply say "Epicurus has been proved wrong by modern science" until we fully and completely grapple with what he was really arguing, and evaluate his method of reaching his conclusions.

Responding on the Epicurus argument, as I understand it it is simply an observation that the command to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is imprinted by Nature, and we know this because we observe through our senses that infants of all living types do it before they are corrupted by arguments in any direction otherwise. And of course in most cases (other than human) no other living being is ever corrupted away from that direction unless clearly by disease or some similar defect.

Now the question of whether we "should" follow nature as adults is something that people certainly have different opinions on, based on all sorts of logic and supernatural revelation. That's the classic argument of Cicero and others that we are not cows - we are somehow "better" than that. But I think Epicurus is saying that it is THOSE arguments which are flimsy. No constructs of the human mind carry the weight by which we should consider them valid to overturn the clear dictate of nature.

Of course people who consider logic and reason to be handed down from on high, or somehow "higher" than nature in any way, will never agree to this form of reasoning. But the observation and conclusion make perfect sense to me, and that's why Epicurus refused to accept that logical reasoning can or should be consulted in order to prove that pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided.

That's where the dividing line is drawn. If nature provides us no direct leading as to what to avoid and what to pursue other than pleasure and pain, then no amount of argument and no type of logic can ever be accepted to contradict that leadership from nature - if we are to accept nature and not our own brainpower as the ultimate standard.

And this is why the canonics of Epicurus is so important, because it's in this field that we clearly and affirmatively take the position that abstract logical reasoning - divorced from observations based on nature - can never be allowed to trump the clear dictates of nature itself. Ignore the canonics and the physics with which it is intertwined and you''ll never be able to have confidence that this is the right conclusion.

And just so I can go on record as potentially offending everyone in the conversation , that's why I have only limited interest in the modern 'research' --

Quote from Godfrey

Today we have neuroscientific research, such as Barrett, Lembke and others, to provide the "do." (I don't have more specifics at hand; just seeing if this will advance the discussion.)

No amount of "research' is going to convince me more firmly of the truth of Epicurus' conclusion beyond my own observations of the young of all animals - exactly as Epicurus specified. This research and these arguments are interesting and perhaps helpful to some. But I would say that the dictate of nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is not something that needs to be proven, or really can be "proven," beyond the clear evidence that has been available to everyone to see for 3000 years (and really much longer than that).

This is why discussing these things is so helpful. It's on *this* issue where Epicurus stands or falls as a philosopher, and where he breaks the chains of both supernatural religion and false philosophy. The hedonic calculus and other practical observations on how to view and pursue pleasure are just icing on the cake. *This* - a confident basis for taking the position that we know pleasure to be "the good" - is the issue on which everything stands or falls.

Quote from Todd

Should have just stuck with the final 2 sentences.

Agreed -- Maybe he was trying to be too cute with the way he phrased that, but clearly there's lots of discernable impact -- albeit negative!