Posts by Cassius

Cicero's "Torquatus," from On Ends, Book 1. [54 - Rackham] "If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure."

Diogenes of Oinoanda Fr. 32... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Today I rotated the first of these two quotes to the top of the home page because I regularly come back to it as one of the most clear statements of "Pleasure" as the Epicurean goal of life.

Although I value these for their clarity, it seems to me that reading them compels an obvious followup question as to "which pleasures" (I'll presume for a moment that we take for granted that we accept pleasure as a feeling, and that this feeling is given to us directly by nature without need or possibility of a simple single definition).

It always seems to me that the immediate and necessary answer to that question involves explaining that "Pleasure" is a sweeping concept which includes everything we feel to be pleasurable in life, which includes every instance of mental and physical pleasurable experience. Maybe one of the most important points to clarify here is that we don't mean just immediate physical or even mental "stimulation," but also any other way we would like to define our physical or mental consciousness of an experience that we find pleasurable rather than painful.

All that introduction is to introduce this question: What "authoritative" textual references do people think it makes sense to cite to establish that when Epicurus spoke of Pleasure he was speaking in sweeping terms of ALL pleasurable experiences, mental and physical?

The first that I always remember is where Diogenes Laertius says at 34: "The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined." To me, I think that sentence makes a direct case that "if you feel it, it is either pleasure or pain" and from that it is easy to extrapolate "if you feel it..." to "if you feel anything."

But are there other good references that say something similar that can be used to buttress this point that when Epicurus was talking about "pleasure" he was referring to a sweeping set of mental and physical experiences and not just to ones which are caricatured as sex and drinking and fine food?

Lets list in this thread the best passages usable for this point. In talking to people new to Epicurus, I would think that this is one of the first and most important points to establish.

Started July 26, 2022:

"If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure." Cicero's "Torquatus," from On Ends, Book 1. [54]

michelepinto - Do you have a page somewhere where you have photos and videos from the event?

I see this page, https://epicuro.org/sentenze-vaticane/

but am wondering if you have posted photos and videos

Also to be clear here, what I maybe should have written rather than "there is no 'non-violence' principle in Epicurean philosophy" would be something more like "there is no absolute rule against the initiation of violence in Epicurean philosophy as there is in Libertarian philosophy."

That's more clear, and makes it easier to think of the example of Cassius Longinus in helping assassinate Caesar, which Cassius saw not only as not prohibited by Epicurean philosophy, but a logical conclusion of it in his circumstances.

Quote from Kalosyni

Then moving to laws of the land which are firmly established: is it wrong to kill a person unless there is some extreme case of self-defense. I would assert that this should be held as an "absolute law" but it exists because of the rational thinking mind and it is based on Nature's goal of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. Knowing that if someone were to try to kill me, that it would be very terrible and very painful and something I would not want, then I take on the idea of this as something to not do -- so this is the "golden rule". (The golden rule is do unto others as you would have done unto you or don't do what you wouldn't want done unto you).

Then going further there is the "platinum rule" which is a variation of the "golden rule". Following the "platinum rule" means thinking about and checking with people to know how the people around you would want to be treated. The platinum rule asks that you: "Do unto others as they would want to be done unto them." But again this is all about Nature's goal of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and thinking about and checking in to see what others would want.

I think what you are talking about here is probably best called something like "civil law." It is a law because the society has "agreed" in some way to make it so, and it 's going to vary widely by society. For example, most everyone agrees that there are certain instances in which there is "justification" for killing someone else (they are about to kill you). But evaluating all the circumstances of justification and killing is extremely complex. Who does that and how? It's my understanding that in Europe many more decisions are made by judges rather than juries, but here in the USA most decisions like this would be made by juries, given only very broad "rules" by the court.

So the point I think I am making is that yes all senses of "right" and "wrong" are ultimately going to derive from Nature through pleasure and pain (and perhaps anticipations?) but the actual implementation of them is a "civil" matter to be chosen (or not) by the people involved in a particular society.

So maybe the point also is that these golden and platinum rules ultimately derive from senses of pleasure and pain, but because they are implemented according to circumstance in different ways by different people, it's necesary to be careful in designating any particular human law as "natural."

I think this is a key theme of Joshua as well.

Great post Smoothiekiwi!

Quote from Kungi

As far as I interpret PD5 there is no difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism in regard to the connection between virtue and the pleasurable life. The difference lies only in the goal.

Ah but that is such a huge difference, and the "only" can make it appear that the difference is slight. Further, the essential point is that the goal of life is pleasure, then what makes up each of the virtues turns on what is in fact successful living that pleasurable life, not the standard definition of those virtues given by the ancient Stoics. As I see it, the definition and role of "virtue" in Epicureanism could not be more different from that of the Stoics. You will not in fact know what is virtuous from what is the reverse of each of those virtues unless you judge them from the perspective: "Do they lead to plesasure?"

Quote from Kalosyni

I would say that the Epicurean "moral path" or the best way to live, is to consider one's actions carefully, because if you cause harm to others, then that leads to many bad results 1) the harmed person will seek justice. 2) there will be a loss of trust, because others will no longer trust you. 3) if you do things repeatedly which harm others, then you could create habits of acting or thinking which eventually will catch up with you (as in the previous two points). So the Epicurean is motivated by what creates the best life, and not by some abstract rule of right or wrong.

I agree with that, but I think to be clear there is also something like a (4) to the effect that if you harm others, you may be forced into taking action to prevent them from harming you in return, which you may or may not want to do. In other words, the meaning of "harm" needs to be very clear. Sometimes you are going to restrain others from harming you, as Torquatus says, and in the case of those who are unwilling or unable to enter into no-harm agreements with you, there is no "justice" involved, and you act in accord to your interests, which may or may not involve violence.

There is no "non-violence principle" in Epicurean philosophy such as Libertarians assert in their viewpoint. If you choose to engage in violence for reasons that you deem satisfactory, you simply have to be aware of the possibility or likelihood of blowback, and make your decisions accordingly.

I say this mainly to emphasize the point that I have seen libertarians draw the line on, because they hold to an absolute non-initiation of violence principle. I would argue that there are no such absolute principles in Epicurean philosophy of any kind - there are simply sets of circumstances which you must navigate and ask yourself always "What will happen if I engage in this course and what will not." There is no absolute morality of any kind in Epicurus other than that Nature gives all living things the goal of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. There are no absolute rights and wrongs that apply to humans any more than in the animal world, where killing is a way of life. Humans, however, have the ability to enter agreements that are mutually beneficial and lead to much better results for all concerned, and that is something that would normally always be preferred. But even there, there are no supernatural gods or enforcing mechanisms that say something is right or wrong -- there is no set of defined "Natural Laws."

Exactly -- as usual we look like we are sparring and really close in agreement.

I think these conversations are extremely helpful regardless of how they look. The recent emphasis on "desires" as the word used in some of these places is also extremely helpful.

If we keep hammering at these issues we'll be in a good place to better present a clear alternative to the "academic consensus/ Okeefe" position.

See I read that differently. I think he's saying not saying that everyone has to avoid those things completely, but that everyone has to evaluate their circumstances and options and preferences and decide exactly how much partying and fine food is going to be what they wish to pursue - for the more they pursue, if their circumstances do not allow it - the more pain they will suffer in cost. I put key emphasis on the "endless" adjective.

That's why I see this as included: " reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble."

That's not a flat rejection of the activities listed, because those are the ways Epicurus has said he knows the good. Instead, he is saying to prudently deliberate how much of it to engage in considering your own resources and your own preferences and tolerances for pain.

It is not the activity itself which is inherently wrong - that would not be maintainable under the big picture of the philosophy - but the manner of engaging in it (constant / endless) as opposed to the right amount (which may be none or a lot) depending on your circumstances. And no activity is going to have the same amount of pain and pleasure in it for everyone in every circumstance - not even for the same person at different times.

Reading that quote as a flat prohibition or even a sweeping preference would create a list of absolutes that would not be consistent with VS63 or more importantly with the absence of fate and supernatural gods and ideal forms - it would be handing down a list which applies to everyone, which violates the most basic view of how the universe operates.

Quote from Don

So... One is looking for pain with too much frugality or too much "sex, drugs, and rock and roll

Ha - All things being equal in terms of the pain measurement, as implied in the hypothetical, I am pretty sure I know which option I would take!

But all humor aside that would surely seem to be a matter of personal preference and individual circumstance and it would be critical to make that point.

I agree with Don's formulation. The only thing I might tweak is to bring what is implied and to explicitly refute the hyper-frugality option by saying:

"My take has been to understand Epicurus's point as "If your circumstances, for some reason, made it so that you *had* to live in a cave by yourself on the barest of necessities, you *could* find pleasure in that since you're still alive and Nature can supply your necessary needs. BUT it is NOT necessary to live this way, nor is it desirable, unless circumstances require. Living among friends, discussing and practicing philosophy, making all your choices and rejections based on practical wisdom and other sound criteria, living neither with too much frugality nor descending into profligacy... That is a pleasurable life."

Ha - I will say on my last reading that I detect some bias in listing "too much frugality" without listing the negative "descending" that is attached to profligacy"

But Don is basically quoting VS63 and that's where Epicurus makes plain that both are errors, and I don't see that he is favoring one error over the other: "VS63. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess."

Note: Once again I wish we had a list of alternate translations of the Vatican Says such as we do with Nate's list of PD'. There just aren't as many alternatives out there, however.

Thanks Kungi.

The Torquatus discussion is here: Cicero's "Torquatus" Presentation of Epicurean Ethics - from "On Ends"

You could start at what is listed there as line 32 and it would make sense, but it would be better just to start at the beginning.

Kungi

Sorry to have hijacked your welcome with natural and necessary discussion. I will move that to a new thread.

As to this:. "Are there more or different virtues in Epicureanism than these? If yes, how are they defined?"

The ultimate answer is that a course of action is counterproductive if it does not lead to pleasure, so actions are judged virtuous or not in that context. You would find the explanation of this issue given by Torquatus in on Ends to be very helpful, because the thrust of his presentation is dedicated to this issue. I will get the link and add it here in a moment.

This is the quote from A Few Days In Athens That I cited Wednesday night and which I think applies to this discussion:

Quote

'Tell us not that that is right which admits of evil construction; that that is virtue which leaves an open gate to vice.’ This is the thrust which Zeno now makes at Epicurus; and did it hit, I grant it were a mortal one. From the flavour, we pronounce of the fruit; from the beauty and the fragrance, of the flower; and in a system of morals, or of philosophy, or of whatever else, what tends to produce good we pronounce to be good, what to produce evil, we pronounce to be evil.

The natural and necessary analysis is being used by OKeefe and others across the Internet to argue that the best Epicurean is the one who most limits his desires to only those which are "natural and necessary." Has Epicurus thrown open the gate to the construction of his philosophy that the best life is the one in which the desires are limited only to those which are natural and necessary? If so, we can quibble about the meanings of natural and necessary all day long, but Epicurus himself has not spelled those meanings out in the letter to Menoeceus, and he could not have failed to anticipate that his words would be interpreted by some to imply that he who limits his desires the most (to only the most basic natural and necessary functions of life) lives the best.

So our current situation is that just such an inference is the leading (in numerical terms) interpretation of Epicurus today. Is it correct? If so we should embrace it clearly, if not, like Lucretius said in another context, we should gird ourselves to battle to fight it and strike it down. Because like it or not this is the defining idea of Epicurus in the minds of many a academic authorities, and someone is very wrong about a very key interpretation.

Here is another way of asking my continuing question on this topic:

I think we can all agree that air, food, water, shelter from the rain, and warmth in the cold, are natural and necessary desires.

I think we can all also agree that one can obtain all of these by living in a cave and never straying far except to gather firewood, kills a few deer or rabbits for food and clothing, and to gather water from a nearby stream.

What guidance does this discussion of natural and necessary desires give us as to what else to aspire for and work for beyond these few things which are natural and necessary for life? Is anyone who seeks more than that cave lifestyle a bad Epicurean?

My position has always been that the principle of the clasification is as Torquatus stated, that the N. And N are easy to obtain without much or any pain, and that those which are neither N. Nor N. can be obtained only with more effort and more pain.

And my view is that nowhere has Epicurus stated that we should confine ourselves to a strict list of N or N - just that we should be prepared to ask what will happen to us and that we be prepared to accept the consequences for our choices and avoidances according to our estimate of the pleasures and pains that will come from them.

If that is all we are talking about here I see no issues at all.

If, however, someone is seeing a suggestion that the best way of life for everyone is to always pursue that course which brings the least pain, regardless of the amount of pleasure obtainable by a person who accepts some pain as the cost, then I think that would be the issue that needs to be discussed much further.

While "putting minimal pain above all " might be a perfectly legitimate choice for a person to make, since we each have our preferences and tolerances, I do not at all see Epicurus promoting that as a general rule for everyone, just as he himself chose a course of school leadership which involved himself in regular controversies, in development of a school with legions of followers, in amassing several properties and even a number of slaves, and in promptimg an eventual following of whom none I am aware were reputed in any way to be ascetic or living or promoting a "simplistic" lifestyle.

In sum i clearly see the ascetic / simplistic lifestyle being promoted as the Epicurean ideal in popular writers like OKeefe, but I am wondering if that is the implication of any of the discussion here. That's where I think the ultimate issue lies in this discussion, so that's the point I keep trying to bring out. Is the best Epicurean the one who has so limited his desires that he lives closest to the cave lifestyle? Is that the way we should read the advice to Pythocles?

Torquatus was certainly right that weighing our choices by the N and N scale helps us predict the consequences of our actions, and discussing N and N helps us flesh out those questions. But predicting the consequences is entirely different from laying out a rule as to which consequences are to be chosen, and that's where we need to be very clear as to what we think Epicurus was saying as the general rule of the analysis.

It's that final step of drawing out the observations to their ultimate conclusion that I sense this discussion so far has not yet reached.

Kalosyni you are saying those are the ones mentioned?

Quote from Godfrey

They are desires which are divorced from the limit of the natural homeostatic relationship between pleasure and pain, and thus have become unlimited

Godfrey so you are saying that this is the definition of unnatural desires? And can you spell our further what you mean by "the natural homeostatic relationship between pleasure and pain?

Yes I agree Godfrey it is an important point - a threshold way of getting the terminology right, because it helps clarify that all pleasures are pleasing and in that sense desirable.

But at that point the ball is still in play. Even if Pacatus had stated his comment in terms of only pursuing natural desires, we would still have essentially the same set of problems:

What exactly are these "non- natural desires" and what should be our attitude toward them? Are we to fully banish them from our lives?

This conversation moves us along toward those issues, which I think is where the deepest issues have to be resolved.

Quote from Pacatus

For Epicureans, eudaimonia is a life pleasantly lived. A life pleasantly lived means one in which natural pleasures (mental and physical) outweigh pain and suffering (mental and physical).

I found Pacatus' post in full very good, but I would caution against the formulation "natural pleasures ... outweigh...) That is not the way Epicurus formulated it - he referenced "Pleasure" as the goal without qualification - so this formulation might well lead off in an unproductive direction.

I would say the natural and necessary classifications help us predict the amount of pain that will be required to attain them, but to imply that there is a flat rule that everyone should seek only "natural" pleasures would be going too far.

That's the real reason we debate this issue so much - because people tend to infer "natural and necessary ONLY" from the discussion and I would say that is a major mistake.

We need to continue to talk about how to avoid an overbroad formulation here and what issues arise with this. What exactly are "unnatural" pleasures? Should we seek none of them at all to any degree? If there is such a list then does that list constitute a Platonicly universal list of "Thou shalt nots" like the Ten Commandments?

Please do not take this Pacatus as critical of you personally -- and if you would like to in fact defend that position, please do, as that would help the discussion move forward too.

But any time we leave open the implication that the ideal Epicurean life would be in a cave with bread and water then we create major theoretical problems.

Quote from Nate

Johannes de Nova Domo

Great name. Am I right that that's "John of the New House"?

THANKS Nate as always for great work! I had forgotten that DeWitt had made such a remark, and all the rest is new to me, including some good names to research.

I need to reread the thread to see where we left off last year, but my general impression is that this remains an important and underappreciated issue. I am convinced the Epicurean view does not lead to nihilism ("nothing is real but atoms and void") but to a full appreciation of the dividing line between what is truly real for us and what is really just abstract fantasy and imaginings.

I suspect most people have only a foggy understanding of what is involved, and as soon as the issue is raised they drop it like a hit potato because they are disconcerted by the whole discussion. But when you are comfortable with a world without supernatural control and with only this one life to live, a quick and ready understanding of what is real and what is not real is essential.

Instead of seeing "what is truth?" as an indictment of Pontius Pilate, those blinded by religion need to think about the depth of the question and realize that they need to answer it.

This is a really core point of Epicurean philosophy.