Posts by Cassius

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Sixteen of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey:

[41] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

[42] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

[43] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

[44] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

[45] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

HICKS

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."

[43] The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

YONGE

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. "Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them - out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved - vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."]

[43] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

And here's the graphic by Elli with her commentary:

Posts by Elli at Facebook:

Hi Cassius. this fragment is from Epicurus' epistle to Idomeneus "on the urgent need for action" (survived by Seneca). I remember that I've made this graphic long time ago as I connected this fragment with Odysseus, and how he escaped from the cave of Polyphemus.

This fragment by Epicurus is against "fatalism and apathy", so I made and this post. https://www.facebook.com/groups/EpicureanPhilosophy/posts/1872900069425611/

This fragment is also analyzed in depth, in this work entitled: "The Epicurean viewpoint", by our friend George Kaplanis Γεώργιος Καπλάνης https://www.facebook.com/groups/EpicureanPhilosophy/posts/1918692744846343

Here is a copy of the Kaplanis article, here at EpicureanFriends:

Blog Article

"The Epicurean Viewpoint", by George Kaplanis founding member of the Epicurean Garden in Thessaloniki

bust of EpicurusGREEN.jpg

The Epicurean Viewpoint

by George Kaplanis founding member of the Epicurean Garden in Thessaloniki



Now I ask you: what is the “Epicurean Viewpoint”?

- It is the view that we gain from looking through the Canon of Epicurus.

- If our viewpoint was gained through the Platonic Dialectic, it would have been a Platonic view.

- And if our viewpoint came through the use of Dialectical Materialism, it would be a Marxist view.

And now, where will we look to gain this Epicurean…

Elli

November 22, 2018 at 5:31 PM

Here's the Episode:

I will have the episode posted later tonight. In final editing I do think that we took Frances Wright too much to task, given what is stated in Philodemus "On Anger," so if we have time we should revisit that point in the next episode in light of these quotes.

Based in part on some of the issues discussed in this episode (how to react to one's enemies) I added a new thread in regard to Philodemus' "On Anger":

Thread

Philodemus' "On Anger" - General - Texts and Resources

I have long suspected that a number of people who come to Epicurus from other philosophies or religious backgrounds tend to presume that Epicurus was very passive and frowned on all forms of anger. This topic comes back to mind after our most recent A Few Days In Athens Discussion (on Chapter Eight ) in regard to the exchange between Metrodorus and Epicurus on the subject near the end of the Chapter.

Frances Wright does not develop this issue very far, but I think it's important for us to…

Cassius

April 1, 2022 at 5:36 PM

I've now read to the end of the preserved texts described in the book, and I am reminded of my usual caveat to the Philodemus material: In many cases the text is so damaged that it's little short of speculation to try to derive any meaning from it. Even longer sections that appear to be well preserved could in many cases be sections where opinions he is writing *against* are being stated.

But all in all I am impressed with what I read in the introductory and summary material. The authors are frank in their disagreement with what other authorities (such as Asmis) have written and construed from the material. It appears to me that I am personally in the unusual position of finding commentators (other than Dewitt) with whom I agree - Armstrong and McOsker seem to agree with my take that Epicurus was in many was an "activist" and was much less a passivist as some (including Asmis) make him out to be. The introduction lays out these disagreements pretty clearly.

The conclusion of all this seems to be about as is stated on page 301 of the text (Column 46 of the roll):

So, then, having laid down these things on our own behalf and concerning us, with arguments that prove it, in support of there being a natural kind of anger, we have [indeed] replied that the sage will become angry.

(my emphasis on the last six words)

The main distinction seems to be that the wise person will in fact become angry when the situation calls for it, and will in fact act on his anger, but only after evaluating the situation coolly so as to determine if he does have the capacity to act in a way that will deter future conduct of the same sort. The other significant premise seems to be that the wise man will not let his anger turn into "rage," with the point apparently being that the wise man will feel his emotions deeply, but will not let those deeply-felt emotions interfere with his clear thinking.

All this may appear simple and straightforward enough, but if flies in the face of the Stoic or the "emotion-suppression" model that a lot of people seem to attribute to Epicurus. And it also flies in the face of the view that the Epicurean will above all avoid disturbance. But that should surprise no one, since it is elementary Epicurean doctrine from Menoeceus that:

Quote

Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

Quote from Godfrey

I think of the Oscars last week,

Just to document the thread that's the "assault" incident. I didn't fully read into the details but my first impression was that it would be very hard to analyze the action taken there to have been worthy of an Epicurean sage :-). The motivation for the action seems to have been very slight and the ramifications far worse than any benefits from the action.

Thank you Godfrey that comparison to Bailey sounds intriguing!

Couple more quotes from the Philodemus text:

From page 41 of the Armstrong book:

37.24–39: “the emotion itself, taken in isolation, is an evil, since it is painful or is analogous to something painful, but if taken in conjunction with one’s disposition, we think that it is something that may even be called a good. For it (anger) results from seeing what the nature of states of affairs is and from not having any false beliefs in our comparative calculations of our losses and in our punishments of those who harm us.”

From page 42:

Philodemus explicitly says in On Anger that anger is an evil that is “inescapable, and therefore called natural” (ἀνέκφευκτον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φυϲικὸν λεγόμενον, 39.29–31; cf. 40.18–26). It is something “most necessary and most unpleasant” (ἀναγκαιότατον, ἀηδέϲτατον δέ, 44.19–21), and it cannot be entirely rejected by anyone. Natural anger can suit the third and fourth categories also: it is advantageous, since it prods the Epicurean to self-defense, 111 and it is so-called because the name has the characteristic of “first utterances” or “primal appellations”: “direct, one-to-one correspondence with their objects.” 112

From page 43 (this is commentary but apparently a high-level summary:

The main thrust of On Anger’s argument is that anger for its own sake is never compulsory merely because one supposes oneself intentionally harmed. In a person of reflective disposition, suppositions of intentional harm are always contextualized and submitted to symmetrēsis, which requires knowledge and experience of the world and the possible consequences of anger. Only these can tell us whether our anger is natural and whether we can punish the offender (see 37.32–39). If the answer is no, we can simply profess ourselves “alienated,” hate and avoid the person who wronged us, and drop the relationship (see 42.1–4); hatred and avoidance are available to the sage who has suffered harm but cannot punish the wrongdoer and guarantee her continuing security. If the answer is yes to both questions, then the anger becomes necessary and inescapable in a completely different way: it would be absurd not to punish the wrongdoer.

As we gain wisdom, anger does not disappear from our lives any more than grief or love, but it is more and more framed in protective layers of cognition and reflection; we are more likely to feel natural anger. Of course, there are various ways in which this ideal progression can go astray: most people do not have the calm and awareness of circumstances and causes that the Epicurean sage does, and even sages can make mistakes. That said, a reflective and aware person, and the sage most of all, can reluctantly “accept” (ἀναδέχεϲθαι) anger, however strong one’s resistance to it, and can certainly retaliate under the right conditions with confidence.

And here's more citation to anger as a motivator:

Verification through a cite to the text - that the wise man will be "insane" not to "grit his teeth and come back at him (the offender) in one way or another."

In terms of commentary, the Preface helpfully suggests that those wanting an immediate overview should refer to sections 4 and 5 of the Introduction. I see that section 3 discusses the prior position of Plato and Aristotle, so that looks good too.

Here is a good baseline for comparison with the stoics: The Stoics held that there is no such thing as any kind of rational or natural anger, and this will be different from the Epicurean position, who are apparently going to focus on "vengeance" as a bad thing, but who don't consider all types of anger as bad:

And this is what I expected to find - the Epicurean will take action against the offender (of course this is commentary, so we need the backup to confirm):

I don't know that I agree with the following in its opinion that "punishment for harm done is itself not harm..." -- it may be simply that the harm done to the offender is justified -- I would expect this to be an issue of definitions of "harm"

I have long suspected that a number of people who come to Epicurus from other philosophies or religious backgrounds tend to presume that Epicurus was very passive and frowned on all forms of anger. This topic comes back to mind after our most recent A Few Days In Athens Discussion (on Chapter Eight ) in regard to the exchange between Metrodorus and Epicurus on the subject near the end of the Chapter.

Frances Wright does not develop this issue very far, but I think it's important for us to bring out that Epicurus did not rule out all forms of anger from his philosophy. There's a hint of that already in several aspects of Diogenes Laertius's biography (such as in the passage that the wise man will experience his emotions more deeply than others) and probably in other places at all. But maybe the most extensive material will be found in the surviving portions of Philodemus "On Anger."

I feel sure that some of our other readers (particularly Scott ) will find this material interesting too, especially passages that bear on anger as a motivating force, such as : " (natural anger) is a feeling that is more than enough to motivate a forceful and decisive response (41.2–8)." (from page 40 of the Armstrong / McOsker book).

It looks like the best collection of surviving texts is here: https://www.amazon.com/Philodemus-Ang…d/dp/1628372699

Here is the table of contents:

This is not material I am familiar with, and I need at least a passing understanding of the main topics. I will post here as I go through it and of course I invite others interested in the topic to do the same.

Quote from Don

Did I hear my name?

Just about every episode!

Episode 115 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week, we continue discussing the Letter to Herodotus, and we begin our examination of atoms, void, and basic epistemology issues.

Quote from SimonC

(The list of troops from the sun and moon also implies that they are large, and not the size of a basketball)

I haven't read the True Story in a while so I don't remember that, but it sounds like a good observation to keep in mind!

Would it be correct to say that the implication of a "world" is that it constitutes certain areas out of the totality of things (the universe) which in revolving (?) came together into one unit. If so, would there also be an implication that while the "universe" has no center, a "world" does have a center? Key to that question would be the "revolving" part. I don't see that here in Herodotus, and I can't recall if it is in Lucretius.

Letter to Herodotus:

Quote

And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

[74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

Thank you! I have been confused all week! Plato was so elitist that he was even more elitist than himself! (Fixed now - thanks!)

Rather than add too many more posts to this thread prior to posting the episode, I want to make several points that I will update in this single post:

1 - I think that most all of what we say in this episode is accurate, yet I have a sense that the big picture is still lacking in clarify, especially if someone listens to the first half alone and doesn't go all the way to the end. We're working over some very difficult territory here and this comes across as more of a preliminary discussion rather than a fully-formulated presentation of conclusions.

2 - We make the point that Plato's perspective is much more elitist than Epicurus's. That's a fair and good point, and yet if we were answering the question "List in order of priority the ways that Plato's approach to knowledge differs from that of Epicurus?" I doubt this would be at or even near the top. It gives us some comparative information but doesn't really strike at the heart of the actual process differences.

3 - What I find most at fault at this episode is that I tended to follow a more "Socratic" approach and asked questions in tones that may have been difficult to follow, and that weren't appropriate for this difficult material. I probably created more confusion by using irony when I should have been totally direct. I will work to avoid that problem in the future, but the best way to solve the problem will be to start with some direct and important quotations from each source (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus). We can then have those quotes fresh in our minds and use them to be sure we are on the same page as to each philosopher, rather than look for differences before we have identified at least the broad outlines of each.

4 - One of several quotes that should definitely have been used early in this podcast, but was not, was this from Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Quote

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

5 - I am beginning to assemble some of the key epistemology quotes here, and these need to be part of the discussion as we get into the details: http://epicuruscollege.com/coursematerial/Canonics/

6 - Although we probably don't have the time it deserves to include it as part of the Letter to Herodotus, it would be very valuable to find and review some kind of text material on basic Epicurean Epistemology. We need to look for a single article to see if we can find a starting point. Lacking a better one at this moment, my best suggestion remains the Appendix to DeLacy's translation of Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (I go back and forth on whether to refer to this with Delacy's title, or with Sedley's "On Signs." Sedley's title is probably more direct, but sounds in English like an Astrological Matchmaking Book. "On Methods of Inference" is probably a more accurate description of what is actually being discussed:

Appendix Chapters:

• The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism
• Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology
• The Logical Controversies of The Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics

Those titles of chapters are right on point with what we need to explore further and get a command over. Unless we can come up with a better set of material to use for review, I think I am going to have to propose that we find a way to focus on this material as soon as possible. possibly with a special series of panel discussions.

The first step is to identify where there is any better "course material" that these three Appendix Chapters from DeLacy. These chapters have the great advantage as well that they are public domain and easily accessible to everyone, but if someone knows of something better (focusing on Epicurus) then please comment below.

I know these topics are covered in Chapters 7 and 8 of DeWitt, such as in the excerpt below from page 122. This is good general material and needs to be referenced as well, but DeLacy's material is probably more directly on point with what we need at this point in our discussions. DeWitt doesn't give us citations to Aristotle and Plato and the other key figures, and we need those to confirm our positions.