Posts by Cassius

Good video! And how does he recognize sensory adaptation? By the evidence of the senses!

I only had a chance to watch the intro so not sure where he ends up.

Quote from Martin

Within Epicurean physics, atoms are hard bodies. If they were large and not emitting anything, they would at least be visible as shadows.

Yes that makes sense too, which is along the lines that they ought to be "touchable."

I also think that as raised earlier a very precise discussion of this would need to account for the apparent Epicurean position that "images" (at least some of them) are or can be invisible.

(I know I am addressing only part of Martin's comments here but I don't have comment yet on the rest.)

If you come up with some good summary observations, be sure to post them. This issue - that mathematics is a model but not reality itself - can be stated all sorts of ways but it is difficult for a lot of people to grasp, and new ways to make the issue more clear are always welcome.

Quote from SimonC

A thought on the inconceivability of visible atoms: according to Epicurus, things are visible because they constantly emit thin films of atoms. But a single atom can't emit a film smaller than itself and is therefore not visible in the ordinary sense.

I think that's a really perceptive observation SimonC as to single atoms not giving off images!

As to the basketball size single atoms, maybe one answer there is that while such a thing might not give off an image, such a thing would (presumably?) be very "touchable" and we would be able to "feel" its presence even if it didn't give off particles to see, hear, or smell (?)

But I really like your observation that a single atom would not give off an image. I think that sounds right to me - anyone disagree?

As of today we'd presumably look at the issue differently and talk about light bouncing off things, and I really don't know that Epicurus rejected the issue of light bouncing either. But to the extent we would talk about receiving "images" I think your logic is sound - a single atom couldn't give off an image from its surface.

Then of course we'd have to consider whether every use of the word "image" is really the same thing. Epicurus seems to talk about "receiving images" as different from "seeing things" (at least at times) so maybe what we're really observing is that a single atom would not give off an "image" that could be "perceived directly by the mind" as opposed to "seeing it" with our eyes.

Now I am rambling but this kind of thinking really strikes me as "thinking like an Epicurean." I bet if we turned this over in our minds just a little we could develop a coherent set of observations about this, but it would need to take into account the difference between "receiving images" and "seeing things" which I don't think to be exactly the same thing.

Quote from Don

And I see what Clay was trying to do, I think, in calling the article after Epicurus's will. He's trying to say that even though Hermarchus is his philosophical heir, it is actually Lucretius who ends up being his "heir" because we get Lucretius's whole poem to carry on Epicurus's philosophy. Yeah, that's a little arcane.

Yep "arcane" is a good word. I think Clay is a good guy and I am well disposed toward him, but maybe becoming an Epicurean afficianado makes one "arcane" However of course I show no such tendencies myself

I started to write this earlier and pulled back. Now I have more time ---> In reading Diskin Clay's article on the "Last Will" it seems to me that he is potentially overly negative about certain aspects. The take-away I get is that he is "presuming" that the evidence indicates that Epicurus really spent most of his time writing letters to his inner circle that were disorganized and filled with jargon, and that it wasn't til near the end of his life that he really decided to systematize anything clearly.

Now I am reading Clay too harshly, probably, but maybe I would be interested in what Eikadistes has to say about Clay if he has read several of his articles (I note Nate already said that Clay's lists weren't consistent ) And one thing I have always taken away from the "Last Will and Testament" article is to say to myself "Diskin, you're saying Epicurus was unclear, when you entitle your paper something that barely reflects the subject matter?"

I think we see all the time that the personality of the writer of things gets projected onto Epicurus. DeWitt takes everything in a "sympathetic" way, other writers seem to strain to be as unsympathetic as possible, and the evidence in all likelihood isn't strong enough to say for sure which is right. It's a problem to guard against.

Yes looks like DeWitt started off looking for twelve and relied on Lucretius to come up with that number. I think he's making reasonable presumptions, and in fact most of what he comes up with lines up with Diskin Clay, but certainly not everything.

As usual we're largely on our own as to what is reasonable to presume and what is not. Almost like we're similar to Theon in "A Few Days In Athens" -- piecing things together over time.

link to DeWitts list:. https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/index.php?…tals-of-nature/

01 Matter is uncreatable.

PN 02 Matter is indestructible.

PN 03 The universe consists of solid bodies and void.

PN 04 Solid bodies are either compounds or simple.

PN 05 The multitude of atoms is infinite.

PN 06 The void is infinite in extent.

PN 07 The atoms are always in motion.

PN 08 The speed of atomic motion is uniform.

PN 09 Motion is linear in space, vibratory in compounds.

PN 10 Atoms are capable of swerving slightly at any point in space or time.

PN 11 Atoms are characterized by three qualities: weight, shape and size.

PN 12 The number of the different shapes is not infinite, merely innumerable

Wow thank you for that Nate! I have read the "Last Will and Testament " version but never compared his versions in other works. This is extremely helpful!

Link to the Last Will and Testament article:. "Epicurus' Last Will and Testament" - by Diskin Clay

This coming Sunday we are going to swerve away briefly from the Letter to Pythocles for one week only, and we thought a good one week topic would be a general overview of the "Twelve Fundamentals," a now lost text of Epicurus focused on summarizing the most key aspects of Epicurean physics.

Our text will be two main sources - DeWitts reconstruction in our "Texts" section, and the differing list compiled by Diskin Clay in his article "Epicurus' Last Will and Testament."

If you have any comments or suggestions of points to include, please add them in this thread.

Yes I think Don's answer applies in most cases in the last comment. But I am not sure it is a good idea for us to take the "everyone pursues pleasure whether they admit it or not" too far. Some people do seem to choose pain for the sake of pain, under the influence of warped thinking. EG - "I am a worm and I deserved to be squashed by God.".

I suppose you can reduce that to "It gives him pleasure to think that" but in some cases it seems to me we would be straining too hard to argue that point.

In the end humans have some degree of intelligence and the free will to use it, so I think it's best at some point in some extreme cases to just let them wallow in their stupidity and agree with them:. "Yes sir I accept that you are serious about your framework. You are a bug in the sight of your lord and you deserve to be squashed. Go to it sir but please leave me out of it!"

I agree again with you post Matteng, especially as to the practical effect of Stoicism. The ancient Stoics were more consistent in detaching themselves to the point of a death-like state, and although the modern Stoics try to separate themselves from that, they can't successfully do it, and thus among the modern Stoics there is this uneasily feeling - whether acknowledged or not - that there is something wrong at the root of their philosophy.

Quote from Matteng

Stoic: Hero who embraces every problem / challenge.

Epicurean: avoiding pain like a weak coward.

And indeed as you would expect I think the descriptions are very accurate, but the labels are reversed! It is Epicurus who was the great conqueror of fear and the biggest challenges of them all, "and by his victory we reach the stars."

Space exploration, in fact, is for Epicureans, who seek pleasure from knowledge and new frontiers. Consistent Stoics would rather sit home and contemplate why the universe does not conform to their own preconceived notions of "virtue."

I agree with Don, and I think you are completely on the right track, and it is maddening that the major philosophies have made this question the slightest bit difficult.

Quote from Matteng

In ethics I wonder if Pleasure involves personal values besides the "pure bodily" pleasures

Absolutely yes. Do those actions you describe being you pleasure in performing them or even thinking about them? Then absolutely yes, to you they are pleasures. Epicurus says (per Torquatus) that the pleasures of the mind can be and are often more significant than those purely of the body (but remember Don's caveat, without the body you are nothing,so all pleasures are in that sense "of the body")

Quote from Matteng

(maybe thats the answer, a wide interpratation of pleasure ? )

Yes! And the interpretation is as wide as can be imagined. If something brings you a feeling OF ANY KIND then the feeling is ultimately pleasurable or painful. All human mental and physical activities fall in one of these two categories, no matter how much the abstractionists want to protest that their virtues are higher than pleasure.

Quote from Matteng

Are that "pleasures of the soul" ?

I would definitely say yes. The point to keep in mind is that there is no supernatural soul, so everything "mental" is of the soul, or spiritual, or intellectual, or whatever you choose to label that mental functioning of the body.

And glad to have you posting! These are common questions lots of people have and always good to talk about them!

Quote from Don

* (I'll be bringing that up every time a PD discussion comes up )

We've been referencing it every Wednesday and will continue to do so!

I know PD10 has always been one of Don's favorites!

Great thank you!

I have owned print copies of the Loeb edition, but I have been looking for free downloadable PDF version of this edition for a very long time. Not sure why it took so long to find it, but I find today that Google has digitized it and has it available for free download. I suggest downloading a copy as this is the best and maybe only free side-by-side Latin English version available. Current editions are co-edited by Martin Ferguson Smith, who has extensively revised, added his own material, and even published a separate edition at Hackett Publishing. This download appears to be from the first edition, revised in 1924, and it contains an introduction which I have not seen which may be a good find in itself.

Here is the Wikisource page referencing the entire Loeb Series. Our target is Loeb 0181!

Pressing the "external scan" link takes you to Google.

And clicking the "Download PDF" button starts the download!

At first glance those definitions would seem to be "positive" in the sense of "reveal" rather than hinting at illusions or error.

Great examples Nate! And chapter 4 is full of examples of "illusions" but I don't know the Greek or Latin word for that.

Presumably the issue is that we need to find ways to distinguish our modern concept of "illusions" from what Epicurus was talking about as "perceptions."

I think we suffer a lot because our wordings tend to imply that Epicurus put stock in mirages or other illusions when that inference is not warranted at all. He goes to great lengths to point out how single perceptions can be "false to the facts" and saying that he accepted all "appearances" without explaining what he meant gives a totally false impression.

That kind of thing may not bother the "experts" because it gives them insider "power" over the subject, but it is a big turnoff to ordinary people to whom Epicurus appealed (and we should too).

Recent discussions have highlighted the importance of texts in which a variation of the term "appear" or "appearances" (as translated in English) are to Epicurean Canonics. For example, in the size of the sun issue, the Epicurean position seems to distill down into something like: "The size of the sun is as it appears to be."

Quote

For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways. Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, we must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth." - Letter to Pythocles [87]

As to the Sun itself in the letter to Pythocles:

Quote

[91] The size of sun (and moon) and the other stars is for us what it appears to be; and in reality it is either (slightly) greater than what we see or slightly less or the same size: for so too fires on earth when looked at from a distance seem to the senses. And every objection at this point will easily be dissipated, if we pay attention to the clear vision, as I show in my books about nature.

The issue is discussed by Lucretius this way in his Book Five (Bailey):

Quote

[564] Nor can the sun’s blazing wheel be much greater or less, than it is seen to be by our senses. For from whatsoever distances fires can throw us their light and breathe their warm heat upon our limbs, they lose nothing of the body of their flames because of the interspaces, their fire is no whit shrunken to the sight. Even so, since the heat of the sun and the light he sheds, arrive at our senses and cheer the spots on which they fall, the form and bulk of the sun as well must needs be seen truly from earth, so that you could alter it almost nothing to greater or less. [575] The moon, too, whether she illumines places with a borrowed light as she moves along, or throws out her own rays from her own body, however that may be, moves on with a shape no whit greater than seems that shape, with which we perceive her with our eyes. For all things which we behold far sundered from us through much air, are seen to grow confused in shape, ere their outline is lessened. Wherefore it must needs be that the moon, inasmuch as she shows a clear-marked shape and an outline well defined, is seen by us from earth in the heights, just as she is, clear-cut all along her outer edges, and just the size she is. [585] Lastly, all the fires of heaven that you see from earth; inasmuch as all fires that we see on earth, so long as their twinkling light is clear, so long as their blaze is perceived, are seen to change their size only in some very small degree from time to time to greater or less, the further they are away: so we may know that the heavenly fires can only be a very minute degree smaller or larger by a little tiny piece.

It would probably be helpful to look into the number of locations where that kind of formulation occurs in the text, and see what Greek (and Latin) words were used in the originals.

Since I am more familiar with the Latin, here is a section from Lucretius:

Quote

Nec nimio solis maior rota nec minor ardor

esse potest, nostris quam sensibus esse videtur.

nam quibus e spatiis cumque ignes lumina possunt

adiicere et calidum membris adflare vaporem,

nil magnis intervallis de corpore libant

flammarum, nihil ad speciem est contractior ignis.

proinde, calor quoniam solis lumenque profusum

perveniunt nostros ad sensus et loca fulgent,

forma quoque hinc solis debet filumque videri,

nil adeo ut possis plus aut minus addere vere.

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The Loeb / Rouse / Smith edition translates that as:

Quote

The wheel of the sun and its heat cannot be much greater or less than is perceived by our senses.

The word "Appearance" can have many shades of meaning in English. Several of the major meanings carry negative connotations in English, as if we should presume that anyone who uses the word "appears" is actually "mistaken" or even "deceived." Merriam-Webster:

Quote

Definition of appearance

1a : external show : semblance Although hostile, he preserved an appearance of neutrality. b : outward aspect : look had a fierce appearance c appearances plural : outward indication trying to keep up appearances 2a : a sense impression or aspect of a thing The blue of distant hills is only an appearance. b : the world of sensible phenomena 3a : the act, action, or process of appearing the first appearance of that word in English b law : the presentation of oneself in court as a party to an action often through the representation of an attorney 4a : something that appears : phenomenon b : an instance of appearing : occurrence her first public appearance since winning the award

I doubt strongly that Epicurus intended to attach a "negative" implication to these constructions about the size of the sun. In other words, I don't think he meant to imply that his own formulations were mistaken or deceptive. That would be a subset of the entire question of how to regard the senses and their reliability. I think we need to find the best ways to state this issue in both far and firm terms, so that people can understand what Epicurean philosophy expects from the senses, and what is beyond the limit of their capability.

So I am starting this thread as a placeholder for this conversation, because I think if we look at the instances in the texts where references like this occur, we can get a better understanding of the degree of firmness which Epicurus is attaching to these statements.

When we see in English that the word "Appearance" is being used, should we substitute (at least in our minds) a form of the word "Perception"?

Such as "The size of the sun is that which we perceive it to be." (?)