Here's the link in Nate's PDF to the proper page for the two doctrines for tonight:
I am currently thinking that a complete life is a mix of pleasures, both short, medium, and long. I think intensity will naturally vary on its own.
That presents the interesting question of how to view our desire for intense pleasure that does not last long. You indicate "naturally vary" but I be we can influence the mix by our choices.
It does seem Epicurus' statement indicates we should weigh intensity in the balance of what we pursue.
I think that's a good point for discussion and will illuminate some of our other issues. I know I often think myself in terms of the longest being presumably the better, but on further reflection I think we have to discard that as a "presumption."
Are you also listing them by "intensity" or "most pleasant"?
Letter to Menoeceus (Bailey)
126] But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.
Yes no apologies necessary. I think we get at least as much out of covering basic issues, and improving our ability to articulate them, as we do in some our speculations about things that we don't have enough information to know about.
Thanks for the graphic Kalosyni!
FYI and FWIW, we are looking at dealing with both PD17 and PD18 this week because 17 references justice but in a very simple way. Probably we would do best to defer a detailed consideration of "justice" until we get to the final ten PDs, so we will keep the discussion of this one limited for the time being.
On the other hand, PD18 is very challenging, and I suspect we can easily devote most of the session to it. We could probably devote ten sessions to it and still not be finished, but one session can serve as a start.
And of course we'll have whatever other general discussion is on the minds of the attendees.
Great to see that Elli!
Wealth for wealth's sake is empty.
I think that formulation can't be repeated often enough.
Any "X" for the sake of "X" is going to be empty, foolish, wrong-headed, or all sorts of negative words.
There is nothing in the rigorous application of Epicurean philosophy (or good reasoning in general, once a goal is defined) that is worth pursuing for the sake of itself other than pleasure.
I think that issue is probably behind a lot of the issues in formulation that we are coming up with. I think Epicurus was rigorously and ruthlessly logical on this point -- NOTHING can substitute for the ultimate goal other than "the feeling of pleasure" because that is the only guide that Nature gave us for what to choose.
I am trying for some time now to construct a real life example where a Stoic and an Epicurean will act fundamentally differently based on the Epicureans focus on pleasure instead of the Stoics focus on virtue in and of itself. In all examples I can think of they act the same.
That's a good way of getting at the difference.
We could go through each one but let's pick justice, because we have the last 10 PDs on that.
I believe Cicero was stating a position the Stoics would agree with when he described the nature of "true law," so a Stoic legislator would strive to enact the same basic laws at all places, all times, and for all people - everywhere - as close to the "will of God" as possible (since "God" is its enactor and enforcer).
An Epicurean legislator would take a totally different approach of basing the laws on local and changing circumstances with the goal of having the people involved live pleasurably as a result, knowing and providing for the change of those laws as circumstances change.
I think you can take each of the major categories of virtues and pretty easily construct examples.
In courage for example a Stoic soldier might take the position that "courage" requires him never to retreat in battle, while a more flexible Epicurean would easily see that effective courage might require temporary retreats in order to live to fight another day in hope of eventually winning the battle.
Ultimately the issue is that a true Stoic orients his view of virtue around his view of the origin of virtue - Divine will and or ideal forms (ultimately the same thing) while an Epicurean considers that to be ridiculous (since they don't exist). The Epicurean executes and judges his actions solely by what he thinks the result will eventually be in terms of the total of the pleasure vs pain that is relevant to him (which includes that of his friends whom he values).
I agree it is useful to think in terms of specific examples and it would be good to discuss hypothetical examples and/or deconstruct these.
This passage irritates me for a number of reasons, not the least is by gosh translate the darn word!!! If this author wants to assert that the "best life" is "ataraxia" then be decent enough to say that "the best life is tranquility" or something else that is understandable in English and makes clear that this writer is committed to the view that the best life is guided by the goal of "ataraxia" rather than "pleasure." If he would just stick with pleasure it would be much easier to reconcile what he thinks are apparent difficulties. If the best life is to be "surrounded by numerous and vivid pleasures" while at the same time with minimal or no pain, then the person who places a high stock in the pleasure of involvement with society is not going to be content with uninvolvement with society. Does that expose him to danger of more pain? Certainly. Is that a "wrong" decision under Epicurean theory? I would assert certainly NOT, for the reasons stated in this article and the quote under discussion.
All these discussions are shot through with nervousness and anxiety for the simple reason that they are committed to the view that Epicurus thought that no one would accept any pain that wasn't absolutely necessary for remaining alive, and that's a ridiculous interpretation of the philosophy as a whole, the life that Epicurus chose, and the life that leading Epicureans chose for the next several hundred years.
Here is a KEY passage that we'll want to be sure to keep in mind and discuss:
But just what sort of person would place himself in the position of king given the natural end of pleasure with which all humans should identify (Epic. Men. 128–9; Cic. Fin. 1.42), and to which political life is typically not conducive? A comment from Plutarch may hold the key to answering this question:
οὐδ’ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι
πολιτευομένους καὶ πράσσοντας τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ
φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπ’ ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι καὶ
κακοῦσθαι πεφυκότας, ἂν ὧν ὀρέγονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν.
(Plutarch, De tranquillitate animi 465f-466a)
Epicurus does not think that it is necessary for the lover of honour and the lover of fame to be tranquil but to employ their nature in political participation and prosecuting public business because, given their nature, by not taking part in public matters they are harmed and disturbed more, if they do not obtain the things which they seek.
Although Epicurus calls everyone to a life of tranquillity and abstention from public affairs (e.g., fr. 548 Usener), Plutarch reports that he advocates political participation for those who are by nature positively disposed towards fame and honour. Immediately following this comment, Plutarch claims that it is absurd for Epicurus to urge the most eager people who are unable to lead a tranquil life rather than the most qualified to enter politics (ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἄτοπος οὐ τοὺς δυναμένους τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν προτρεπόμενος ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν μὴ δυναμένους, 466a). It seems, however, that Epicurus could readily defend himself from such criticism. One can envisage an argument along the following lines: in the current socio-political conditions it benefits the Epicureans to have the lovers of fame and honour rule, even though it is the Epicureans who know best how to rule. On the one hand, this allows the Epicureans to avoid active participation in politics and pursue a tranquil life, although they can still reap the benefits such as security provided by political institutions. On the other hand, as Plutarch himself states, this situation also benefits the lovers of fame and honour: owing to their nature, they would be more disturbed by doing nothing and so they are actually increasing their calm and happiness by involvement in public life. Thus, they too can be seen as applying correctly the ‘hedonic calculus’ (Epic. Men. 129–30) 56 given their specific circumstances (cf. Lactantius Div. Inst. 3.6) and everyone wins. 57 But clearly there are some important outstanding issues.
First, why are there people with this special nature who warrant a different sort of advice from the norm? Secondly, why should we think that letting these eager but unqualified people rule will be beneficial rather than detrimental?
It is striking that Plutarch’s report contains a clear distinction between those people who have a nature disposed towards fame and honour and who should pursue such things, and those ‘normal’ people, of a nature suited to be Epicureans, who should eschew fame and honour. If we accept that Plutarch’s report is accurate, then it seems
that Epicurus did acknowledge that there are two distinct sorts of people: some just have a certain natural (τῇ φύσει, πεφυκότας) disposition for fame and honour, which leadership can provide, and will never be satisfied without fulfilling it; some people are unable to live a tranquil life, the life of the Epicurean, and should instead practise
politics. However, in the normal context of Epicurean ethics, the man who wanted fame or power would be misguided—he would desire an empty end, have an unnatural and unnecessary desire (Lucr. 3.995–1002, 5.1131–5). Moreover, such a twisted view on the world should always be able to be cured by reason, meaning the innate part of one’s nature will not influence one’s pursuit of ataraxia (Lucr. 3.307–22). In order to reconcile these conflicting claims, we need to look more closely at what ‘nature’ means in Plutarch’s report.
Just going to include the opening part of the introduction to this section on "The Epicurean ideal king."
In this final section I argue that the Epicureans were not content simply to identify that kingship might or might not be a good thing: they also developed a sophisticated prescriptive account of how the political institution of monarchy could successfully realise goods, for both kings and Epicurean subjects, in the present sociopolitical conditions.
The ideal Epicurean society is one in which every person is an Epicurean, a situation that ensures justice, tranquillity, and peace for all (KD 40; Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 56). 38 The next best situation seems to be one in which most people act in accordance with the utility of justice (like Epicureans) and those that do not appreciate the utility of justice are kept in check by fear of punishment, 39 a scenario that the Epicureans presented as having been historically realised (Hermarchus ap. Porphyry, De abs. 1.7.1–8.5). 40 In this situation, a knowledgeable ‘governing’ body ensures compliance and punishment via legislation, thus promoting the good of those in the society (Hermarchus ap. Porphyry, De abs. 1.10.4–11.2). 41 However, in the present circumstances the Epicureans were small communities, minority groups within wider societies. 42 They may have thought about how they might maximise the goods accruing from this less than ideal situation. 43 They clearly made an effort to live in harmony
with the wider society, by, for example, encouraging involvement in state festivals (Diog. Laert. 10.120). Although we do not have any extant evidence confirming this, there might also have been some consideration of existing political structures most conducive to Epicurean life. 44 At any rate, we can attempt a credible reconstruction of
Epicurean views.
Although not always desirable and certainly not ideal, monarchy is, pragmatically, a very attractive political option for the Epicurean. Democracy or a republic, for example, would require involvement of the citizens every so often in the political process—something the Epicurean does not want to do if it can be avoided (SV 58).
Even if other systems provided the same benefits, the deciding factor would be the need for personal involvement in public affairs. To be sure, an oligarchy in which the Epicurean citizens are not politically involved would be a viable option, but equally so would be monarchy (or any form of autocratic rule). 45 Since it seems that monarchy was a political system singled out for particular attention by Epicurus himself, let us leave aside the possibility of oligarchy and focus on monarchy.
Excerpt starting page 182:
The view that the Epicureans had an emphatically conditional stance towards the good of kingship contrasts with both sides in a recent scholarly dispute. Gigante and Dorandi take the acknowledged benefits of monarchy further and argue that Epicurus had a genuinely positive attitude towards kingship. 16 To establish their claim, they focus on an important passage in Diogenes Laertius’ account of the Epicurean wise man, which I have delayed discussing until this point. Here is the orthodox presentation and translation of the text:
χρηματιεῖσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα. καὶ
μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν.
(Diogenes Laertius 10.121b)
He will make money, but only from his wisdom, if he is hard up. He will on occasion pay court to a king. (tr. Long and Sedley 1987)
The passage is traditionally interpreted as saying that the wise man will make money, but in the exceptional circumstance of poverty and only from the source of his wisdom; also, in exceptional circumstances he will pay court to a king. Extraordinary circumstances and actions are the key concerns. This traditional interpretation sits
well within the context of the conditional view I have been advocating: there is no general value judgement made on kingship in this passage, only that the wise man may ἐν καιρῷ (‘at the opportune moment’ or ‘in due measure’) 17 involve himself in kingly rule, perhaps when circumstances are such that benefits will accrue from such an action. The phrase ἐν καιρῷ seems to be strongly indicative of the conditional nature of the Epicureans’ attitudes towards kingship. However, Gigante and Dorandi argue that the traditional way of interpreting this passage is misguided; they claim that it is in fact indicative of quite a different picture.
The key premise in their argument is the emendation of this crucial passage to read: χρηματιεῖσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας εὐπορήσαντα καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν. Their rendering and interpretation of the passage suggests that the wise man will make money as normal practice, but being well-resourced from his wisdom
alone he will pay court to a king at an opportune time. 18
Their interpretation of the text has a number of strengths. In particular, the claim that the wise man will make money as normal practice is supported by Epicurean thought on economics, a very important point that is largely ignored by commentators on this passage. 19 Philodemus, in his economic treatises On Wealth and On Household Economics, for which his major source is Metrodorus, 20 maintains that the Epicurean will make money and acquire wealth as normal practice, at least to some extent. 21
Epicurus states that one must not seek wealth or affluence for its own sake (SV 30); Philodemus also advocates only doing the correct amount of work one must in order to acquire sufficient goods (On Household Economics col. 15.45–16.6, col. 16.44–17.2, col. 18.7–20). 22 There is a balance between sufficient work for survival and mental
tranquillity, but the type of work undertaken does not seem overly significant. Philodemus maintains that basic labour such as tending land, and even commercial enterprise involving slaves and commodities (On Household Economics col. 23.7–22), is sanctioned so long as one does not do too much. He also declares certain avenues of
wealth to be unfitting or base, such as soldiering (On Household Economics col. 22.17–28), horsemanship and mining (col. 23.1–6), and sophistic and competitive discourses (col. 23.22–36). Most significantly, it appears that wisdom is not the sole legitimate source of wealth, as is suggested in the traditional interpretation of Diogenes Laertius 10.121b, although one should unquestionably use one’s wisdom in order to judge proper limits of work and expenditure. 23 Gigante and Dorandi successfully capture this idea in their interpretation; but does their proposed emendation of the text stand up to scrutiny?
The strongest case in favour of emending the text rests on the economic considerations attributed to the wise man that immediately precede in the text of Diogenes Laertius, namely that he will not be a Cynic, not beg, that he will be
concerned with his dignity and the future, and that he will acquire the needs of life (Diog. Laert. 10.118–20). 24 Gigante and Dorandi argue that because the wise man has such economic concerns, especially not to live an impoverished Cynic, day-to-day, hand-to-mouth lifestyle, he is allowed to pursue a course of action in accordance with his Epicurean principles that best meets these economic concerns. They claim that the best course is offered by the court of a king since here lies the best chance to secure the economic goods, both now and into the future. The ideal Epicurean relationship to the king would be one of philosophical tutor or advisor, a position in which one
could have an income and productively and pleasurably guide the king’s rule in accordance with Epicurean principles: ‘Il saggio professerà la sua sapienza per procurarsi i mezzi di sostentamento facendo anche la corte ad un monarca ed insieme alla gioia per il progresso morale del monarca riceverà pure un guadagno materiale.’ 25
Their emendation makes sense, they claim, as it ties the idea of money-making with that of tending to the king philosophically, thus uniting the economic and philosophical interests ascribed to the wise man. 26 Thus, they conclude, the Epicureans have a fundamentally positive view of the institution of kingship, even though the
Epicurean himself would not wish to be the king.
We have been talking a lot recently (summer 2022) about the "natural and necessary" distinction, and I think most of us agree that extreme political power is going to be way down on the list of things Epicurus would advise pursuing, regardless of how we classify it. That's why the article I am linking her caught my eye, as it may contain some hints on how Epicurus viewed even such things that are superficially dangerous such as "kingship." Looks to contain some surprising information. Written by Sean McConnell of Cambridge.
Here's a test of just pasting the section, and I am not sure this works. It would really be desireable to have a link to which someone could click and see the particular page for each section. Don do you have this uploaded to Archive.org where we might be able to do that?
Don : Yes. It's now available here:
Going forward, I think we're just going to post links to the pages. But this over we'll cut and paste.
(Note: This is Don editing Cassius 's original post using by document to cut and paste like he initially asked me to do...)
122a: Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν.
This sentence begins with μήτε… μήτε… meaning "Neither… nor…" so we are being set up for two things, both of which are to be negated. These two are:
Epicurus echoes each line, ending them both with forms of φῐλοσοφέω (philosopheō), the word meaning literally "to love wisdom" or what we know as "philosophy." Most modern translations simply use "it" in the second phrase, losing the immediacy and importance of that word. The word also implies not only "loving" but "living" what you love, talking the talk and walking the walk, practicing what you preach, and so on. Epicurus’s decision to use the same word should inform your translation decision. If it was good enough for Epicurus to repeat the word, maybe it would be a good idea to continue that in translation.
Let’s examine our two negated phrases closer:
νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν
I'll use "he" here for the 3rd person singular since the letter is specifically addressed to Menoikeus and the word νέος is masculine; however, I would urge readers to consider Epicurus's practice of welcoming all people into the Garden. He could just as readily, I believe, have used a phrase to include both young men and women with a 3rd person plural verb. But that could have been awkward and clumsy grammatically if he tried to maintain a personal letter to Menoikeus. So, readers are encouraged to remember Epicurus's unprecedented inclusivity in the Garden, to look for universally applicable themes and advice in the Letter but also to remember this is also an intimate letter to one individual that has been preserved for posterity. It was obviously preserved and passed down for its value as an epitome or summary of Epicurus's ethical teaching for the wider Epicurean community, just as the letters of the later Christian apostles to specific people (Timothy) and communities (Corinth, Rome, Ephesus, etc.) were preserved as general teachings for everyone. However, being Epicurus's letter is addressed to one person, the letter shows Epicurus's concern for each individual looking to lead a more pleasureable life. The letter is addressed to one and all at the same time.
μέλλω shows up again in 122f and 125b: διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων· (3rd person plural present active imperative of μέλλω). We'll dissect this in detail later, but we should keep in mind this sense of intention or "about to do (something)" when we reach that section, although this word comes with a wide variety of shades of meaning.
Therefore:
μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν
“Neither must one who is young delay (or be about to engage in) the study and love of wisdom...”
Now, our second phrase to be negated:
γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν.
ὑπάρχων has a wide variety of meanings, but here connotes beginning, coming into being, arising, springing up.
Therefore:
μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν.
"Nor should one who is old grow tired of studying and loving wisdom."
122b: οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον.
This sentence begins with οὔτε… οὔτε… which, similar to μήτε...μήτε…, conveys negation: "and not… and neither…" Again, we're saying "not this and not that." So, Epicurus is mirroring μήτε … μήτε... from the first sentence thus reinforcing them both. We'll notice this parallel/mirror style in his writing throughout the Letter.
γὰρ. A conjunction meaning variously "for, since, because, etc." According to Liddell, Scott, and Jones' Ancient Greek Lexicon (LSJ), γὰρ introduces the reason or cause of what precedes it. So this sentence will provide the reason for why one is never too young or too old to love and practice wisdom.
γὰρ is required to come after the first word in the sentence in Greek but needs to be translated into English as the first word. We'll be encountering a lot of these kinds of short words and pairs of words in our exploration. They are very common in Ancient Greek. Technically, these kinds of words are called particles, enclitics, proclitics, etc., but I'll try to keep the technicalities to a minimum unless it's going to impact significantly on the meaning. They add much of the complexity and nuance to the language. Small but mighty.
ἄωρος and πάρωρος "untimely, unseasonable" from α- a- "not" + ὥρα (h)ōra (per LSJ) "any period, fixed by natural laws and revolutions, whether of the year, month, or day" or "the fitting time or season for a thing" So, literally "not the fitting time" or "not the season." πάρωρος (parōros) may convey παρα + ὥρα (para + (h)ōra) "out of season, untimely."
οὐδείς (oudeis) "no one, nobody, none, nothing"
πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον
"for the health/soundness (ὑγιαῖνον (hygiainon)) of the the mind/soul/'animating life principle' (ψυχὴν (psykhē))"
If we're discussing the health of the psykhē, what is the psykhē? The psykhē is often spoken of in relation to the physical body: e.g., "the health of the body (τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν) and the serenity of the psykhē (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν (psykhēs ataraxian) from later in this letter). Epicurus also uses psykhē to refer to that which senses so there's an aspect of the mind, albeit spread throughout one's body: καὶ μὴν ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν δεῖ κατέχειν: "Further, we must keep in mind that psykhē has the greatest share in causing sensation" (from the Letter to Herodotus). But remember that the soul/mind or psykhē is composed of atoms and void just like the body but of a very subtle kind to be able to move swiftly so we can sense our sensations. So, just because translators often use the word "soul" for psykhē, do not bring along the semantic baggage that that word has in English. The Epicurean psykhē is definitely not an immortal thing that exists independent of the body that lives on after death or transmigrates to another life as expounded by almost every religion and argued vehemently against by Epicurus.
122c: ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτ’ εἶναι.
We're going to break this down since the combination of ἤ... ἦ... means ‘either... or...’ or ‘whether... or...’ so there are two pairs of ἤ's in that first section. Again, an example of Epicurus's mirror writing style.
ὁ δὲ λέγων "(and) one who says…"
i. ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν "either the season (ὥραν) to love and practice wisdom is not yet arrived"
ii. ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, "or the season (ὥραν) has passed by"
ὅμοιός ἐστιν τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν...
"is like someone who is saying [i and ii below] for eudaimonia…"
i. ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν "either the proper time has not arrived"
ii. ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. "or is no more." (i.e., has passed)
Note how Epicurus again - as he did in the previous section - uses ὥραν "the proper time or season for something" to drive the point home. There is no "proper" time or season to love and practice wisdom. The time is always now!
122d-f. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δ᾽ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων.
122d: ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι,...
122e: τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων,...
This is the first of two parallel phrases to round out this section. We see the μὲν "on the one hand…" setting up the pair of phrases, so we then look for the δὲ "... on the other hand…" and, sure enough, we find that in 122f. This "on the one hand… on the other hand..." is a translation trope for μεν...δε…, but it's also a handy tool when breaking down a larger passage. It doesn't always make sense in the final translation, but it's not a bad starting place. Even though both μεν and δε must come second in their respective phrases (for grammatical reasons too complicated to get into here), they should be considered to be (in English) the introductory word of the phrase.
[μὲν] [ὅπως] τῷ γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
τῷ γηράσκων (tō gēraskōn < geron) "for one who has grown old" (a dative construction, so translate as "to, for"). Consider this as not someone who is just old but someone who has experienced life and has become old.
νεάζῃ (neazē < neos) "to grow or become young again" (in dative to go with τῷ γηράσκων)
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς "for the good things"
This is a significant phrase! Remember the Tetrapharmakos's third line is:
καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον "and, on the one hand, The Good is easy to obtain"
Note our old friend μὲν is setting us up for the δε in the last line of the Tetrapharmakos. So, τἀγαθὸν here is τ- from the definite article + ἀγαθὸν "good", so "The (greatest) good" is being conveyed, which according to Epicurus is pleasure, that to which everything else points. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς here in the Letter to Menoikeus is simply the dative form. So, I strongly contend that we should translate τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς here as "for the pleasures."
...διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων,...
διὰ is a preposition meaning "through" or "by means of."
διά τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων,... "by means of the gratitude (χάριν) of that which has happened, that which has taken place" or, to more poetically paraphrase, "by means of the grace of memories of past events."
Bailey's commentary gives "'by the grateful recollection of the past', ie. of the philosophic truths which he learnt in earlier life." I think Bailey is far too timid and narrowly-focused in his "philosophic truths" comment. Consider Vatican Sayings 17 and 19, both mentioning the "good things" that have happened in the past:
Vatican Saying 17
It is not the young man who is most blessed but the old man who has lived nobly, because, being at his very peak, the young man stumbles around as if he were of many minds, but the old man has settled into old age as if in a harbor, secure in his gratitude for the good things he was once unsure of.
οὐ νέος μακαριστὸς ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκὼς καλῶς· ὁ γὰρ νέος ἀκμῇ πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι τῷ γήρᾳ καθώρμικεν, τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι.
Vatican Saying 19
The one who forgets the good things they had yesterday becomes an old man today.
τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ γέρων τήμερον γεγένηται.
The academic discipline of Positive Psychology has documented the benefits of practicing gratitude. Epicurus expressed this two thousand years ago in this letter and elsewhere in his writings. We should be grateful for the pleasures we have experienced in the past, and, by reliving them in our memory, gain present pleasure from them.
χάριν (accusative of χάρις) is used in Christian texts for "grace (of God)." It also carries this idea of being thankful for or having gratitude for a favor being done. It also shares a root with χαίρειν, the salutation we met at the beginning, and χαρά "joy," one of the "kinetic" pleasures listed with euphrosyne in the (in)famous passage about katastematic and kinetic pleasures.
That was a lot to work, so let's review this "on the one hand" portion that we just dissected:
122e: τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων,...
A *very* literal translation would be:
"On the one hand, in order that 'one who has grown old' can be young through gratitude of the “good things” (pleasures) which have taken place in the past,..."
So that person who has grown old can look back over their life and fondly remember those pleasures - those good things - they have experienced when they were younger, literally making themselves feel young again.
122f: [δὲ] τῷ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων.
Just as one who has grown old can relive past pleasures to feel young again, the one who is young can get the benefits of growing old without living the years yet by being fearless in looking ahead and weighing the consequences of their actions in the future, i.e., seeing themselves as being older and experiencing the consequences of their actions.
122g: μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δέ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
Note in the last two parts of 122g we again discover a μεν...δε… pair:
εἴπερ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν,
ἀπούσης δέ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
[δέ] [εἴπερ] ἀπούσης πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
Note πράττομεν is the present active tense: "We do, make...etc." not "we would, should, might, may do..." There's no equivocation, no hedging: if we don't have ["that which produces eudaimonia"], we do everything to have it.
A quick digression on eudaimonia is appropriate here. εὐδαιμονία is defined by LSJ as "prosperity, good fortune, opulence; true, full happiness."
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57%3Aentry%3Deu)daimoni%2Fa
The word is derived from εὐ- (eu-) "well, good" + δαιμονία (daimonia) "spirit, divine power." This is where English gets the word "demon" but it could be either benevolent (eudaimon) or malevolent (kakodaimon). If you have a good, benevolent in-dwelling spirit, you will lead a prosperous, healthy, flourishing, fortunate life. Socrates claimed to be listening to his daimon for guidance which was used against him at his trial as evidence of impiety. But the term generally in common parlance means what LSJ refers to. However, it encompasses a range of qualities but is often pared down in English to simply "happiness" which is woefully inadequate. It's much more than that, encompassing that and q more. Translators try to convey this with paraphrases like "complete happiness," but our comparative translations just use "happiness." Sometimes it's left untranslated and only transliterated eudaimonia, but this is somewhat of a cheat, too. A cheat I may be guilty of shortly! If you look up that word in Merriam-Webster, it gives "well-being, happiness." So you see we can go in circles. Personally, I think "well-being" is better than "happiness" since it is almost a literal translation with a twist: eu- "well" + daimon "being" (the latter having a little double entendre). So, when you see any of those -- happiness, well-being, flourishing, eudaimonia -- remember that it's that word plus a little more. That's why I advocate using eudaimonia itself. There's a rabbit hole of papers, essays, and websites that convey the deep meaning of εὐδαιμονία if you feel intrepid. Consider this a taste of what awaits you.
Which finally brings us to the end of verse 122!
OK good point. Let's just spend a session entirely on the issue that the goal is happiness, discuss the relationship of happiness to pleasure, etc. We have plenty of time! 
So we will go only with 122.
Couple of notes here as we begin the letter to Menoeceus:
(1) Since the material here is so dense and so important, we probably ought to take it fairly slowly, and try to divide it up by topic, so the text this week is a little shorter than normal. This week contains the introduction and the call the pursue happiness, and what is essentially PD01 as to the reason we believe that there are no supernatural gods controlling the universe.
(2) I will try to post these further in advance than in the past. I want to see Don's work on the translation entered here into the thread for each week, but I am not sure yet whether it is best (and he has the time) for Don to paste it in the thread and add any additional comment he has, or whether I will paste it here. If Don doesn't paste it here before long then I will do so.
(3) I especially want us as we discuss these to keep in mind what we've previously read and discussed in Lucretius and in the letters to Herodotus and Pythocles as discussed in our prior podcast episodes. It seems to me too many people go straight to this letter and think that it contains all they need to know about Epicurean ethics, so both in the podcast and in the discussion I hope we can spend a lot of time relating what we are reading here to what we know from other sources.
Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-Four of Lucretius Today.
This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
Today we begin our discussion of Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus. Now let's join Martin reading today's text:
Bailey:
[122] Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.
Hicks:
[122] Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.
Yes Godfrey I pretty much agree with that, but at the same time I would argue that many people are being sickened by the sloppy prescription of "natural and necessary" without a proper framework. Not here or by you, of course, but until a clear presentation of these issues is articulated I don't see that we are making the progress we need to make
"The desire for perfect health" is a great example Godfrey. Perfect health is unlikely for most of us, especially after s certain age. But we still want health "as close to perfect as possible."
What I am wanting to see here is a good explanation of how we can recognize that while an extreme of a good may be unobtainable, a lesser amount of that good is definitely desirable and working hard to get, and any formula we develop has to take that into account.
This is why I still am not sure I see anything in the natural and necessary categories beyond what Torquatus pointed out as the reason for it, which is a good reason (as a tool of analysis). But this is a tool that in the wrong hands is being used to bludgeon the philosophy of pleasure into submission in the modern world. At this point I am still at the point of thinking that in today's discussions (the world at large I mean) we are finding ourselves devoting more time to containing the damage it does in the wrong hands to the benefit it provides us in aiding our analysis.
Whoever Cicero got that Torquatus material from seems to me to have been pretty sharp. As he says, only an idiot (my overlay) pursues pain for the sake of pain, and people need to smarten up and examine their actions so as to predict whether a course of action will produce more pleasure or pain. The more extravagant the goal, the more likely it is that extra pain will be involved. And considering whether a goal is "natural" and "necessary" helps us predict the amount of pain likely to be encountered.
Now no doubt we can use the categories to give all sorts of examples, but in the end the examples get very particular and specific very fast, so the general rule remains something like "be prudent in the way you pursue pleasure."
I think this is the most practical/applied difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism, at least in the modern world.
Which may be deceptively simple at first glance, but is really about as different as can be:
It's the difference between (1) the virtues have absolute meanings that are the same for all people, all places, and at all times, versus (2) the virtues have no meaning except contextually as the represent tools or activities to be engaged in for the sake of pleasant living.
The stoics and similar would probably say that (2) means "you don't believe in virtue at all!" but I don't think that's a fair criticism: Epicurus just has a perspective on virtue that is logically consistent with what he has identified as the ultimate goal - living pleasurably - and it's the Stoics whose view mutates "virtue" into "doing what the gods have established to be done."
