Posts by Cassius

For example, this from Book 4 of Lucretius. There are many similar references to images which are not of the "seeing" variety, but nevertheless impact our minds. I am not saying that I believe this, or that the same phenoma could not be equally explained by stored images in the mind that are agitated when we are dreaming or hallucinating. I don't think it's important that Epicurus explained them "correctly" in our view, but that he suggested natural explanations that take them out of the realm of the supernatural, Theories like this allow us to explain what has happened to us without fearing that they are supernatural:

[26] But since I have taught of what manner are the beginnings of all things, and how, differing in their diverse forms, of their own accord they fly on, spurred by everlasting motion; and in what way each several thing can be created from them; and since I have taught what was the nature of the mind, and whereof composed it grew in due order with the body, and in what way rent asunder it passed back into its first-beginnings: now I will begin to tell you what exceeding nearly concerns this theme, that there are what we call idols of things; which, like films stripped from the outermost body of things, fly forward and backward through the air; and they too when they meet us in waking hours affright our minds, yea, and in sleep too, when we often gaze on wondrous shapes, and the idols of those who have lost the light of day, which in awful wise have often roused us, as we lay languid, from our sleep; lest by chance we should think that souls escape from Acheron, or that shades fly abroad among the living, or that something of us can be left after death, when body alike and the nature of mind have perished and parted asunder into their several first-beginnings. I say then that likenesses of things and their shapes are given off by things from the outermost body of things, which may be called, as it were, films or even rind, because the image bears an appearance and form like to that, whatever it be, from whose body it appears to be shed, ere it wanders abroad. That we may learn from this, however dull be our wits.

In both cases I am attempting to carry out the texts to their conclusions.

As to consciousness conscious only of itself, I don't think that Epicurus would say that that is something that would not apply to us humans, because we are aware of who we are because our our past experiences through the senses, as per the Thomas Jefferson passage. I am not aware of the details or theory of mindfulness mediation, but we aren't the kind of consciousnesses who have arisen from hypotheticals that are conscious only of themselves.

As to dreaming, that is to my understanding attributed by the Epicureans to the influx of images while we are asleep, which would be related to their impact on us while we are awake as well, for example as given in the exchange between Cassius and Cicero about "spectres." I presume that in modern terms we would think that the mind is operating on stored memories, but I personally would not entirely rule out of court the possibility that we are in fact affected by things going on around us. We are affected by what we eat or drink or how cold or hot things are while we are sleeping, and I would not rule out undiscovered aspects of how our brains are impacted by our environments. But especially as to dreams and hallucinations the point is only that they are "real to us" not that they are really happening to us, or even the mechanism by which they occur.

That last part is what I see as the important point. It looks to me like Epicurus is saying that our reality derives from the actions of our senses, anticipations, and feelings, and our mind reasoning on the inputs from those things, and that we need to consider what is going on with those things to be real to us, and work with them, and not look to imaginary worlds of ideal forms or supernatural beings or any of that stuff which Platonists or religionists assert to exist without evidence. Dreams and hallucinations are what they are - things which have an impact on our thoughts - but that doesn't mean that they have any external reality beyond what is going on in our minds.

To me all this comes down to an attempt to explain that *this* world is all that we have, and we need to explain the things that present themselves to us in natural terms, and not look to supernatural or other-worldly (meaning Platonic idealism) sources for those things.

Also from the article Don cited, it is interesting to see Sedley disagree so strongly with Bailey's interpretations. This kind of disagreement leads me to conclude that while I am not ready to die on the hill of whether there were only three or actually four criterion of truth, the real issue is the deeper question of making sure that the criterion come to us "naturally" and "without opinion" and can therefore serve as data which Nature programs us to accept as a given. That's the problem with most versions I see that attempt to describe a "fourth" leg. Like Don is saying, suggestions as to a fourth seem to be describing a process of evaluation, not a mechanism for receiving raw unfiltered data.

To me the danger zone is anytime you cross that line into thinking that something you have developed in your own mind, after evaluation, has to be taken with the kind of acceptance you grant to what you see or hear or touch. I've always read Bailey as indicating that the thinks that conceptions which we develop in our minds can serve as a criterion of truth, and in fairness to him Diogenes Laertius can be read that way.

But I think it's beyond dispute that Epicurus was looking to develop a theory of the tools which Nature gave to us by which to evaluate our conclusions. If so, questions like whether "images" fit within the canon, and whether the canon has three or four or fourteen legs, are not nearly as important as avoiding considering our own thoughts as criteria of truth. But Nature does not give us full-blown conceptions either at birth or at anytime later, at least under any interpretation of Epicurus that I can find to be reasonable.

Considering our own conclusions to be criteria of "truth" seems to me very much like what Plato was doing in suggesting that our minds can make contact with ideal forms. And if you get to that point of agreeing with Plato there, then you get to the point (which we regrettably left out of our most recent podcast) that Plato could hold that you could never really know whether the thing in front of you is a horse, but that you *can* know the ideal form of "horseness."

That Platonic position is at the very least impractical, if not in fact total nonsense.

Quote from Nate

the entire Allegory of Plato's Cave is, itself, actually inside of a metaphorical Cave in the Epicurean world, and the light of day into which the Epicurean walks is the light of particles that allows us to physically see.

With the Platonic gang being the one chaining everyone down, persuading the innocent normal people to think that they have no way to verify what the truth really is --- unless the Platonic gang itself loosens the chains (which the gang itself placed). The whole thing is an ultimate game of manipulation which encourages the exploited to see their exploiters as saviors -- a kind of "Stockholm Syndrome."

At some point in the future I hope we can put together more of an index or table of contents of each episode. For the time being, we have the episode titles to go by, and the thread for each of them which can be word searched. However in this thread I would like to make note of episodes of special significance, because it regularly occurs to me to ask: "If I were suggesting someone new listen to some particularly important episodes, where would I direct them?"

So my first suggestion for this list is the current episode: Episode One Hundred Fifty-Five "Epicurus And His Philosophy" Part 11 - The Canon, Reason, and Nature 02

I've just been listening to the finished product and I think this is a particularly good one, addressing Chaos, the Relationship of Reason to the Canon and to the senses in particular, and several other basic points. Some of the episodes flow better than others, but I think this one has to be ranked among a list of our best.

If others who are reviewing older podcasts find some to be particularly worthy of note I would appreciate them adding this to the thread so at some point we can come up with a "best of" series.

Started January 10, 2023

"And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the events or properties of such existences." Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus at 40.

----

This is the Bailey version with the exception that I have replaced Bailey's "accidents" with "events" as used in the Brown translation of the analogous passage in Lucretius. For purposes of this header it seems to me that "event" is less distracting and does not carry the baggage of "accidental" which is a very deep topic in and of itself. It seems to me that questions of random vs. determinist causation (an issue implied in "accidental") is beyond the major point to be made here in this header, which is that no ideal forms or other types of eternal existences exist other than bodies and space which arise / emerge from "atoms and void."

Humphries' term "by-products" is also good and maybe even the most faithful and clear of all, but the Latin of Lucretius is "eventa / eventum" so I am going with "events" that rather than "by-products" for the moment.

Lucretius Book one at 450: Nam quae cumque cluent, aut his coniuncta duabus rebus ea invenies aut horum eventa videbis.

Munro: For whatever things are named, you will either find to be properties linked to these two things or you will see to be accidents of these things.

Brown: All other things you'll find essential conjuncts, or else the events or accidents of these. I call essential conjunct what's so joined to a thing that it cannot, without fatal violence, be forced or parted from it; is weight to stones, to fire heat, moisture to the Sea, touch to all bodies, and not to be touched essential is to void. But, on the contrary, Bondage, Liberty, Riches, Poverty, War, Concord, or the like, which not affect the nature of the thing, but when they come or go, the thing remains entire; these, as it is fit we should, we call events.

Humphries: Whatever exists you will always find connected To these two things, or as by-products of them;

As Don mentioned in another post, there is this from Lucretius too with the "hunting dog" metaphor, that might be a counter-reference to the Platonic cave problem:

Quote from Lucretius Book One

I could mention many things, Pile up a heap of argument-building proof, But why? You have some sense, and these few hints Ought to suffice. You can find out for yourself. As mountain-ranging hounds smell out a lair, And animals covert, hidden under brush, Once they are certain of its track, so you, All by yourself, in matters such as these, Can see one thing from another, find your way To the dark burrows and bring truth to light. Lucretius Book One Humphries

Yep. I hope this will end up being a long thread and an ongoing process for lots of people to use in the future. That's a very good list of symbols for inclusion, and I suspect the real trick is prioritizing and selecting the issues to be included so any particular image focuses on whatever main points it is trying to convey. There's no necessity to reduce everything down into a single graphic.

As I look at your numbered list, those are good "positive" symbols with which to identify as a goal. I suppose what Plato was doing was taking a more aggressive or argumentative topic indicative of human suffering and dramatizing his proposed solution (escape to a "true world" outside the cave). We need those kind of confrontational graphics too in addition to the pleasure aspect.

Michele's friend's "breaking the chains" graphic is almost a mirrored response to the Platonic cave metaphor. It could be varied thousands of ways, among them going beyond the implicit attribution of the situation to the glowering of the gods above, to somehow conveying (as did Lucretius) that the breaking free comes from exploring the universe with strength and courage of mind with presumably some nod toward the senses.

As we talk about this I have to wonder whether the Platonic cave analogy was in Lucretius' mind when he came up with that passage in Book One.

It is good that we often get very deep in the weeds in important questions (The Canon: Three Legs of Four?; When Was Epicurus Born? What is the nature of Anticipations? etc. etc.). However given several recent podcast discussions I am remembering how important it is not to get lost in those weeds, so I am thinking this thread will be a way to keep us also focused on the big picture.

Plato is often and I think fairly identified with the "Cave" analogy, which leads to fruitful possibilities of illustrating maybe the central aspect of the anti-Epicurean philosophies: that are senses are deceptive and we are chained in a prison of shadows from which we need abstracted reason and logic (brought to us by the expert philosophers) as our only means of escape.

How can we contrast and summarize our place in the universe under the Epicurean worldview? We have a couple of illustrations on the forum already:

(Graphic commissioned by Michele Pinto - see right sidebar of the home page for details).

And Nate's Allegory of the Oasis (see bottom of the EF homepage for link to a description):

Both of these are now several years old, and I see that Nate's graphic was first added here back in 2018 or so.

I think over time it should be a continuing project to develop new versions of graphics which summarize the key role of Epicurus in the history of philosophy. We have allusions like the "hog in Epicurus' herd" from Horace, but most of all we have the opening of book one of Lucretius, which likely played a role in the graphic listed above from Michele (here in the Humphries version):

When human life, all too conspicuous,

Lay foully groveling on earth, weighed down

By grim Religion looming from the skies,

Horribly threatening mortal men, a man,

A Greek, first raised his mortal eyes

Bravely against this menace. No report

Of gods, no lightning-flash, no thunder-peal

Made this man cower, but drove him all the more

With passionate manliness of mind and will

To be the first to spring the tight-barred gates

Of Nature's hold asunder. So his force,

His vital force of mind, a conqueror

Beyond the flaming ramparts of the world

Explored the vast immensities of space

With wit and wisdom, and came back to us

Triumphant, bringing news of what can be

And what cannot, limits and boundaries,

The borderline, the bench mark, set forever.

Religion, so, is trampled underfoot,

And by his victory we reach the stars.

I am not artist myself, but it's easy to take that passage and think of many many different ways to analogize the same point - especially if we combine it with the allusions to Epicurus that start each of the other five books of the poem as well.

So the point here is that while we develop our aptitude in dealing with the details, it's even more important to develop our dexterity with the "big picture." I bet Nate has had many different thoughts about illustrations in the five years since he did his oasis graphic, and the graphic from Michele should have motivated lots of thoughts for alternative illustrations of the essence of the Epicurean approach to life - and that is why it is featured on our home page.

I may pin this post somewhere but as time goes by I hope we can expand this list of pro-Epicurean illustrations much further than we already have.

Edit: Even if you are not an artist yourself, you can still submit "word pictures" to the thread that over time will give ideas for scenarios to other people.

Just to set the stage on the "three legs of the canon vs. four" issue, the following is from the chapter of the book entitled "Epicurean Gnoseology":

The four criteria of truth include senses, concepts (προλήψεις, “preconceptions”), emotions (πάθη, “passions”) of pleasure and pain and the imaginary imposition of the mind (φανταστική ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας):

...

Preconceptions are concepts stored in the mind and are derived from the senses. These concepts are based on repetitive sensory experiences. They do not need verbal proof since they are evident by observation to all ("universal understanding"), constituting a criterion of correct belief. For example, it is common to all people who have seen a rose, the "clear preconception of a rose", that is, the explicit concept based on observation of this material object. Through preconceptions, the chaotic information of the sensory world begins to assemble into a coherent, structured, and stable entity leading to the emergence of language and consciousness.

...

Imaginary impositions of the mind are representations that the mind captures when it focuses its attention on something. In its singular form, the term has been interpreted as "insightful conception of the mind", "immediate perception of the mind", and "focus of the mind on an impression", but perhaps the best conceptual approach to the term is ‘focusing on a cognitive image’. According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus, in his book “Kanon”, describes the three criteria of truth, senses, preconceptions and passions. At the same time, the imaginary imposition of mind was added as a criterion of truth by the later Epicureans (D.L. X31). However, Epicurus, in his Principal Doctrines (XXIV), mentions: “If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any immediate perception of the mind,

[The discussion of this latter paragraph is taken further, basically in the direction of interpreting impacts of "images" on the mind as constituting a fourth leg. As far as I can tell so far the book does not attempt to take a position on why Epicurus himself did not consider this to be a full leg of the canon, or on why later Epicureans thought he was wrong in failing to do so.]

Welcome to episode 156, a special two-part Episode of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you too find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.Today we are very pleased to bring you an interview with a special guest: Dr. Emily Austin, professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University.

Dr. Austin is author of the book "Living for Pleasure: an Epicurean Guide to Life," which was published in November 2022 by the Oxford University Press as part of its Guides to the Good Life Series. Dr. Austin graduated summa cum laude in philosophy from Hendrix College in Arkansas, and she received her doctorate from Washington University in St. Louis in 2009. Since that time, she has been teaching philosophy at Wake Forest in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Dr. Austin applies both her academic credentials and her teaching skills to the task of showing how Epicurean philosophy differs sharply from Stoicism, and how it stands for a truly positive approach to life that isn't grounded in asceticism, but in a complete understanding of the central and uncompromising appreciation of "Pleasure" in the pursuit of happiness.

Time Stamps:

• 19:15 - How do you deal with the objection that "pleasure" cannot be the full goal of life?
  • People can't describe their view of the good life without discussing pleasure.
  • Some people seem to think that pain is good
  • Discussion of the opening of book 2 of Lucretius - looking out from safety at people who are in distress
  • Cultural problems today arising from Puritanism
• 28:00 - What is the role of one's view of "death" in Epicurean philosophy?
  • Desire for immortal life is corrosive
  • References to "Lonesome Dove"
  • References to Montaigne
• 39:45 - Some people see a tension between pursuit of pleasure as opposed to pursuit of tranquility. How do you reconcile that question and summarize the issue of how much pleasure is enough? Was Epicurus an ascetic?
  • Epicurus is not only about tranquility, and this is a misunderstanding among modern supporters of Epicurus as well as his opponents.
  • Epicurus does not oppose natural and unnecessary desires.
  • Dr Austin had to insist that the word "Pleasure" be in the title of her book.
  • It is a mistake to make Epicurus too much like other tranqulity seeking philosophies, but the first step most people need to take is to deal with anxiety so they can then pursue andprioritize desires more prudently.
  • It is a charitable impulse to say that Epicurus is not about partying all the time, but people over-correct and seem to make Epicurus to be opposed to pleasure.

Godfrey I just finished editing and posting this week's Lucretius Today podcast, and I realized that this issue of the alleged "fourth leg" of the canon comes up at the 56 minute mark of the episode. We didn't get into it in great detail, since I haven't been able to read the new book yet, but thought I would mention this here for future reference because this issue is part of what DeWitt addressed in discussing "The Canon, Reason, And Nature" in his chapter seven.

Episode 155 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we continue in Chapter 7 - "The Canon, Reason, And Nature." Our goal is to challenge you to think more deeply about Epicurus, and this week I think we deliver much food for thought on the canon and on "all sensations are true."

Quote from Nate

Everything radiates tiny, sensible particles. (EH 46.1-47.2)

Nate - In regard to this one, I think it would be useful if we could mention -- when the occasion arises in these discussions you are referring to -- the distinction or relationship between (1) the process of seeing or hearing or smelling due to the movement of particles, and (2) the phenomena described as "images."

It seems pretty clear when you drill down that the processing of "images" is not the same thing as "seeing" (or hearing or smelling) but it is very easy to lump all these things together and talk about them as if they are the same. For example the phenomena you are referencing in this item is not necessarily describing sight, yet many readers are likely going to presume that that is what it refers to (especially when we call them "sensible").

Another reason for my comment is that I think this probably plays into the controversy of the "present impressions of the mind." It would therefore be helpful for a number of reasons if we could work to make clear the distinction between "images" and the phenomena we include under the 5 senses (if in fact there is a difference, which I am presuming there is.)

Thank you Godfrey! Yes it would be very helpful to take note of differences of interpretation as that will help clarify things whether we agree or disagree.

The "three" vs. "four" legs of the canon is a great example of that. Diogenes Laertius himself points out that later Epicureans disagreed with Epicurus on this and added the fourth. DeWitt sides strongly with Epicurus on this, but no matter which side we choose it helps to understand why there was disagreement. In discussions from some years ago I recall reading that the current Greek Epicureans take the "four" position, but I don't recall seeing a good clear written explanation as to why they do so.

This is similar to issues pointed out by Torquatus where he himself appears to say that he is deviating from Epicurus. If we can't explain the disagreement then there is no way we can intelligently decide which we think is correct.

Quote from Kalosyni

So this is one in which we should be ready to recognize the signs of this and realize how it will affect all of us -- and make peace with it.

"And make peace with it...". Or first and preferably, to the extent possible, prepare to harden our systems to minimize as best as possible the effect of it. Or, where that is not possible, prepare a spaceship to allow as many as possible to escape the impact. Only when I am facing absolutely certain early destruction (which does happen in many cases) or circumstances such as preventing death of a friend as Epicurus describes) would I make peace with early destruction that might possibly be avoided.

Now I will return to watching my copy of "When Worlds Collide." Excellent movie.

Quote from Little Rocker

Isn't Stoicism, like, transcendentally bad?!

I admit when you put it that way it's hard to disagree!!

Quote from Little Rocker

I find those justice doctrines inscrutable, but it seems that he thinks there's some objectivity at stake and that some laws and contracts are actually better than others.

"Inscrutable" is a good word for me too, but there must be a way to decode it. He spends so much time stressing how things that were previously just become unjust when circumstances change that the whole presentation seems to be weighted more toward establishing the limitations of the abstract concept of justice rather than specific examples of justice in the real world.

And maybe that presentation choice makes sense given how much attachment we have to the idea of thinking that there is an absolute justice, and therefore the need to shake us out of our complacency. I suppose it is important too to point out that since neither gods nor ideal forms create permanent and absolute justice, even we humans, in forming our agreements with each other not to harm or be harmed, don't in so doing create anything that has permanency or absoluteness to it.

But regardless of whether "justice" is involved, i think the faculty of pleasure and pain gives us much of what we want in this department. Just like "normal" people like ice cream, "normal" people find the things most people consider to be benevolent to be pleasing, and most people find things that we ordinarily consider to be malevolent to be painful. And our liking for ice cream and dislike for things that taste nasty is to a significant degree hard wired into us.

The phrasing I like to quote on that issue comes from a 1779 book I found some years ago from Jackson Barwis written against John Locke's version of blank slate theory:

Quote from Jackson Barwis - Dialogues on Innate Principles

When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.

Quote from Little Rocker

I guess I'm just saying that I'm willing to consider going a lot further into traditional hedonism than a lot of people might find comfortable.

I agree with Don's comments agreeing with your direction here, and I think your direction is compelled by the philosophy even though it is the place a lot of division occurs and a lot of people eventually drop away. In fact I would say that people who never reach this point of understanding about Epicurus have never really understood the atomist foundations of Epicurean philosophy. They are still stuck in some variation of idealism of which they can't let go.

It's tricky to describe and yet not sound like a "monster," but it seems to me that Epicurus was saying that the universe simply doesn't care about our moralities. We're given pleasure and pain to do with what we will, and while most people are constituted similarly and do generally tend toward the same conclusions about how best to implement those choices, no matter how strongly we feel that "our way" is the best, the moral evaluation can never be more than "our perspective." That's not to say that we shouldn't consider our perspective critically important. I think Epicurus was allowing that we should engage with the world even in politics to the extent it is necessary and leads to a more pleasant life under our own circumstances. I too think that each of us should work as hard as we can to bring the kind of world we would like to live in to reality, at least in our own personal context. But given the atomist nature of the universe, we always have to remember that our perspective remains our own, and now matter how much emotional investment we place in it, that emotional investment never transmutes into the blessing of supernatural gods, ideal forms, or any other kind of unchanging absolute standard of morality.

That chills some people and drives them away, but "it is what it is" if you follow Epicurean philosophy to its logical conclusions. Fudging on this point is what I think leads to disillusionment and disappointment, and I think we are better off biting the bullet and following the philosophy to its logical end point.

Quote from Philosophical Management of Stress based on Science and Epicurean Pragmatism: A Pilot Study

The philosophical approach to stress management comes hand in hand with feasibility, effectiveness, and applicability: it can be offered to everyone, regardless one’s age and educational level. We decided that the key philosophical perspective of this program had to be Epicurean pragmatism (epistemologically) and humanism (morally). Pragmatism is the philosophical outlook that focuses on objective reality, and considers important what may be practically useful. As a consequentialist tradition, pragmatism assumes that stressful thoughts stem from real-life problems, to which practical solutions should be proposed. Any theory or aim should be judged according to criteria such as applicability, practicality and utility. The major figures in this tradition are William James and John Dewey.4 Humanism, in turn, holds that humanity, that is, being human, constitutes the ultimate value, and assumes that the ultimate end of any law-abiding civilized society is to defend basic human rights such as life, freedom, and happiness (eudaimonia). The declared objective of humanism is to defend the dignity and personality of every human, and facilitate the development of our capabilities in such way, as to live harmoniously in any given society, emphasizing that the actual meaning of life consists in the pursuit of happiness. The elaborated moral status of this notion, happiness, can be traced back to the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, while it has also maintained its dominant status during the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Modernity.

This paragraph in particular I think highlights the issue. Although I beat the drum for Epicurean epistemology myself, I definitely do not look outside Epicureanism for ethics or morality. My view would be that to affirmatively state the morality aspect of the study is Humanism rather than Epicureanism takes the approach completely outside of Epicurean philosophy into a "virtue" based orientation. All of the goals being listed of course impress us generally virtuous / desirable, but the only bedrock foundation is pleasure, and context will determine in any particular situation where those generally-desirable objectives fit in the larger and ultimate goal of "pleasure."

Quote from Don

In the end, as I said, I can appreciate his work over the years, but I'm not entirely comfortable with some of his emphasis and his framing

Yes I agree. I think a significant part of the question comes from the attempt to combine Epicurus with "Humanism" and other viewpoints, with the inevitable tensions that that creates.

We all have a very understandable desire to take a "big tent" approach, but we need to be honest with our readers and ourselves as to how far to go in that regard, or else we end up in disappointment and disillusionment. "Humanism" is an even more ambiguous term than "Epicureanism," but I think it is fair to say that whatever we consider "Humanism" to mean, it means something other than a pleasure-based ethics. And in fact the articles we are talking about are pretty specific in defining their ethical goals in terms of Humanism rather than Epicureanism, as if Epicureanism is just a tool to convince people to be Humanists.

A lot of the phrasing I think we are seeing seems to be geared towards "flourishing" and "wellbeing" and similar terms that evoke more of an Aristotelian and even Platonic approach than I think most of us here would conclude us truly compatible with Epicurus. Anytime we start de-emphasizing the term "pleasure" with other wording we are in dangerous territory.