Posts by Cassius

Tonight's AFDIA Zoom Discussion Starts at 8:00 PM Eastern - Link in the Calendar Event - Visitor's Welcome!

I haven't had a chance to look closely at this but might be interesting -

Egypt archaeologists unearth stunning 'Temple of Zeus' dedicated to Greek god

EGYPT archaeologists have made a stunning breakthrough, unearthing the remains of a temple dedicated to the Greek god Zeus.

www.express.co.uk

Chapter 14 is as deep as Chapter 13 is short. We will spend as much time talking about the details in one session as we can. One line however that I don't want to forget to highlight is this one, spoken by Epicurus to Theon:

"But as respects your defense of my philosophy, I am sorry that you presumed so much, where you knew so little."

If that doesn't summarize the state of the majority of modern discussion about Epicurus on the internet today, I don't know what does!

I hope that our book review, and EpicureanFriends.com, and our other efforts are small advances along the way in educating the Theons of today, who think that Epicurean philosophy is about nothing more than being gracious and smiling and "pursuing happiness," will come to understand that this statement given by "Epicurus" applies today as much as it did when delivered to Theon.

So in this chapter, we dive into deep issues such as whether an opinion can ever be morally good or morally evil, how the evidence of the senses should be used as the basis of all our opinions, and - as one of the biggest issues of the chapter - how the evidence provided by the principle of "isonomia" (existence along a spectrum from low to high) and the principle that "nature never makes a single thing of a kind" - though neither principle is named here explicitly) provide the evidence for Epicurus asserting the existence of a type of god, but not the existence of a specific god.

I am going to put most of the notes on the discussion we will have tonight under Chapter 14, where the heart of the discussion takes place, rather than here under Thirteen.

As I was reviewing these two chapters this afternoon, it keep hitting me that maybe the one thing Chapter 13 really stands for (other than setting out the blasphemy charges against Epicurus) is that instead of:

"A Few Days In Athens"

the title could have been:

"A Few Days Spent in Athens By A Young Person And the Mistakes He Makes Conversing With Philosophers While Never Cracking Open A Book!"

Quote from Kalosyni

Back then it was said that Epicurus did not teach publicly.

Quote from Kalosyni

The question is: Did Epicurus actually have people read the teachings themselves instead of giving lectures?

Yes I agree with what both Don and Joshua have written. I too have read the kind of statement you are citing, but I think that's another one of many exaggerations, for exactly the reasons Don and Joshua cite. I think the evidence supports the view that Epicurus was careful in choosing his forums, but there's no reason at all to think that he confined himself to writing, or to only small groups of intimate friends.

Quote from Cassius

Some mathematicians and historians, such as Carl Boyer, hold that Zeno's paradoxes are simply mathematical problems, for which modern calculus provides a mathematical solution.[6] Some philosophers, however, say that Zeno's paradoxes and their variations (see Thomson's lamp) remain relevant metaphysical problems

We just finished recording the podcast and this statement from Wikipedia stands out for me. We did our best to make the issues understandable and relevant, and this quote gets to the issue of why I think Epicurus thought the subject was important: We aren't simply discussing "mathematical problems" - we're illustrating that some very compelling arguments can be drawn up on many issues that would make you doubt your ability to control your life and be confident in reasoning based on the senses. Two other quotes come to mind:

This one I included in the podcast at the end:

[500] And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses. (Bailey)

This one I didn't include but also seems relevant from Book One:

[102] But still I fear your caution will dispute the maxims I lay down, who all your life have trembled at the poets' frightful tales. Alas! I could even now invent such dreams as would pervert the steadiest rules of reason, and make your fortunes tremble to the bottom. No wonder! But if Men were once convinced that death was the sure end of all their pains, they might with reason, then, resist the force of all Religion, and contemn the threats of poets. Now, we have no sense, no power, to strive against prejudice, because we fear a scene of endless torments after death. (Brown)

More links:

Wikipedia: Infinite Divisibility: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_divisibility

Wikipedia: Zeno's Paradoxes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno%27s_paradoxes

Zeno's paradoxes are a set of philosophical problems generally thought to have been devised by Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC) to support Parmenides' doctrine that contrary to the evidence of one's senses, the belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is nothing but an illusion. It is usually assumed, based on Plato's Parmenides (128a–d), that Zeno took on the project of creating these paradoxes because other philosophers had created paradoxes against Parmenides' view. Thus Plato has Zeno say the purpose of the paradoxes "is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one."^[1] Plato has Socrates claim that Zeno and Parmenides were essentially arguing exactly the same point.^[2] Some of Zeno's nine surviving paradoxes (preserved in Aristotle's Physics^[3][4] and Simplicius's commentary thereon) are essentially equivalent to one another. Aristotle offered a refutation of some of them.^[3] Three of the strongest and most famous—that of Achilles and the tortoise, the Dichotomy argument, and that of an arrow in flight—are presented in detail below.

Zeno's arguments are perhaps the first examples of a method of proof called reductio ad absurdum, also known as proof by contradiction. They are also credited as a source of the dialectic method used by Socrates.^[5] Some mathematicians and historians, such as Carl Boyer, hold that Zeno's paradoxes are simply mathematical problems, for which modern calculus provides a mathematical solution.^[6] Some philosophers, however, say that Zeno's paradoxes and their variations (see Thomson's lamp) remain relevant metaphysical problems.^[7][8][9] The origins of the paradoxes are somewhat unclear. Diogenes Laërtius, a fourth source for information about Zeno and his teachings, citing Favorinus, says that Zeno's teacher Parmenides was the first to introduce the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. But in a later passage, Laërtius attributes the origin of the paradox to Zeno, explaining that Favorinus disagrees.^[10]

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Eoghan Gardner

In Epicureanism we are giving a lot of realities and principles. Such as pleasure is the goal of life, pleasure and pain are guides to achieve this goal etc...

I think what's lacking (surely due to most of epicurus writings being so far lost) is the prescriptive nature of what to actually do. There is a sense in which Epicurus seems the type of man not to prescribe many exercises as opposed to Stoicism which is almost all prescription.

Anyway my point is from what we know of the man and his garden what do you think epicurus would prescribe as exercises?
I see many think Buddhists meditation but I don't see why epicurus would do something like that.
Maybe a gratitude journal? But keeping in mind the point of it is not to be grateful but for the pleasure gratitude brings.

Si Haves Personally I imagine Epicurus practicing gratitude, perhaps a contemplative practice of some sort maybe sitting in silence sometimes and just being in the moment. I'd to imagine him dancing happily and joyfully in the garden.

Antonio MonteroModerator

I think that the exercise is to be conscious of ourselfs, of our own nature, by making the distinction between the different kind of pleasures it brings an aware of ourself that bring that peace which is ataraxia. By observing nature and losing fear of the gods an death we keep ourselves in the present, not thinking about the suffering of death or the punishment of the gods. And by keeping and nourishing friendship and companion ship, knowing that like us, they want to avoid suffering and pain we can create a healthy society. That's my view and how I try to exercise the epicurean philosophy. Taking care of the garden of our life and our friends.

Nic ReaganHe may have, but it was lost to history. Certainly, the early Epicureans celebrated Eikas on the 20th. So, occasional celebrations/feasts are called for as a practice. I would also classify 'withdrawing from public life' and avoiding the seeking of wealth, fame, and power as a specific 'practice by not-doing'. He also encouraged contemplation of nature, atoms and Void, and their implications for non-fear and non-pain. These are a good starting point. As Epicureans, however, I feel we're free to create our OWN practices within the 'spirit' of Epicureanism, to suit our needs.

David O'ConnellI sincerely think we should discuss forming groups irl to build some sense of Epicurean community. Perhaps that's too long term.

Sherrillynn BarnesDavid O'Connell great idea.

Richard OwenI genuinely believe that Epicurus would bee a big proponent of boardgame nights, intellectual stimulation and good company!

Panos AlexiouA philosophy for community not individual supermen made out of stone. Meet friends, have good conversation, live life in moderation etc

Garrett WiseMy hunch is that this is because pleasure and pain are subjective to the individual. The things I need to do so that I minimize my pains are much different than the things that my wife must do, since she has medical issues that I don't.

Similarly, although Epicurus described the three different types of desires, each of us has to go through our own unique process of limiting our desires to those Natural and Necessary ones.

Matt JaxI imagine his prescription was basically to pursue pleasure…to be with friends, to pursue the natural desires of the body with prudence.

Tristan MelloYou know I think we should practice in the way that Epicurus would want. Celebrate friendship. Write a poem for a friend. Tell them you love them and mean it. Practice friendship. You learn from just having a friend. You learn from being a friend... how to be a friend. Like helping our friends. How your friends treat you.

Eoghan - I think a big issue modern people have (and perhaps even the ancient greeks) is that we have been told these truths by Epicurus and his successors but we are so beat down by rules and regulations that we still are looking for a how to guide.

It's kind of like a car that is broke down, a mechanic comes (the teachings of epicurus) and fixes it but sometimes the car needs a push start before it actually can move.

The recording of our session on Chapter Twelve:

For those interested in DeWitt's full thesis as to cross-references between Epicurus and Paul of Tarsus, DeWitt's full book can be read here:

Epicurism.info: http://epicurism.info/etexts/stpaulandepicurus.html

The old archived Epicurus.info: http://web.archive.org/web/2011030101…ndepicurus.html

Note For the AFDIA Zoom Book Review meeting of 5/1/22: Chapter 13 is very short, and both 13 and 14 focus on the issue of Epicurean Gods, so we will combine discussion of the two chapters- so please read both Chapter 13 and 14 for our discussion Sunday May 1.

A Few Days In Athens - Chapter By Chapter Review

Episode 119 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue in the Letter to Herodotus to make additional observations about perception through the mechanism of atoms. Please let us know any comments or questions you have in the thread below, and please be sure to subscribe to the podcast on your telephone or other podcast aggregator.

The podcast subject next up is on the indivisibility of the atom. This has lots of implications that are not necessarily discussed in this section of the text, so if anyone has issues that we should be sure to include, please add them to this thread.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics and discuss issues related to the question of whether matter can be infinitely divided.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey

Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.

[56] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to smaller and smaller parts.

[57] For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.) And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.

[58] We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts. But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view. And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a greater body and fewer in a smaller.

[59] Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness. Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought. For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts of sensible things is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent: but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.

HICKS

Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

[56] But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i. e. that an atom should become visible. "Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i. e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

[57] For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

[58] We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[59] We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

YONGE

Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass and configuration. This must remain.

[55] "For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation. "Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

[56] But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i. e. that an atom should become visible. "Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i. e. the atoms, and annihilate them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

[57] "For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

[58] We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i. e. is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i. e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[59] We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i. e. the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion.

I haven't had a chance to look at it yet but it always confuses me when Plato or another Greek seems to be talking in terms that are almost "monotheistic." That makes it almost sound like Epicurus was more in accord with the common Greek religion (in terms of talking about multiple "gods") than was Plato or someone else who was tending toward monotheism.

My week has been busier than usual but this podcast will be up later today. Here are some notes made during final edit:

We get back in to the issue of eternal and unchanging "properties" of atoms (size, weight, shape) vs transient and changing "qualities" of combinations of atoms that we perceive through our senses.

This is a subject that we discussed most recently in terms of what it means to "exist" here: RE: Eikas Information

For the most part (especially after editing) I think our conversation is pretty clear, but this issue of the best terminology to use to discuss things that are eternal vs things that are not is something we really need to work on! There are a variety of words that get confusing if we don't really make ourselves clear. Here is an effort to organize these into a chart, but it's not complete and needs adjustment, because the "essential conjuncts" list (such things as weight to stones) is not quite the same thing as atomic size, shape, and weight), nor is something like "bondage" quite the same thing as color.

Source: Lucretius Book One (Brown)

[430] Besides, there is nothing you can strictly say, “It is neither body nor void,” which you may call a third degree of things distinct from these. For every being must in quantity be more or less; and if it can be touched, though never so small or light, it must be body, and so esteemed; but if it can't be touched, and has not in itself a power to stop the course of other bodies as they pass, this is the void we call an empty space.

Again, whatever is must either act itself, or be by other agents acted on; or must be something in which other bodies must have a place and move; but nothing without body can act, or be acted on; and where can this be done, but in a vacuum or empty space? Therefore, beside what body is or space, no third degree in nature can be found, nothing that ever can affect our sense, or by the power of thought can be conceived.

[449] All other things you'll find essential conjuncts, or else the events or accidents of these. I call essential conjunct what's so joined to a thing that it cannot, without fatal violence, be forced or parted from it; is weight to stones, to fire heat, moisture to the Sea, touch to all bodies, and not to be touched essential is to void. But, on the contrary, Bondage, Liberty, Riches, Poverty, War, Concord, or the like, which not affect the nature of the thing, but when they come or go, the thing remains entire; these, as it is fit we should, we call Events. Time, likewise, of itself is nothing; our sense collects from things themselves what has been done long since, the thing that present is, and what's to come. For no one, we must own, ever thought of Time distinct from things in motion or at rest.

[464] For when the poets sing of Helen's rape, or of the Trojan State subdued by war, we must not say that these things do exist now in themselves, since Time, irrevocably past, has long since swept away that race of men that were the cause of those events; for every act is either properly the event of things, or of the places where those things are done. Further, if things were not of matter formed, were there no place or space where things might act, the fire that burned in Paris' heart, blown up by love of Helen's beauty, had never raised the famous contests of a cruel war; nor had the wooden horse set Troy on fire, discharging from his belly in the night the armed Greeks: from whence you plainly see that actions do not of themselves subsist, as bodies do, nor are in nature such as is a void, but rather are more justly called the events of body, and of space, where things are carried on.

[483] Lastly, bodies are either the first seeds of things, or formed by the uniting of those seeds. The simple seeds of things no force can strain, their solid parts will never be subdued. Though it is difficult, I own, to think that any thing in nature can be found perfectly solid; for heaven's thunder passes through the walls of houses, just as sound or words; iron in the fire grows hot, and burning stones fly into pieces by the raging heat; the stiffness of the gold is loosed by fire, and made to run; the hard and solid brass, subdued by flames, dissolves; the heat and piercing cold passes through silver; both of these we find as in our hand we hold a cup, and at the top pour water hot or cold: so nothing wholly solid seems to be found in nature. But because reason and the fixed state of things oblige me, here, I beg, while in few verses we evince that there are beings that consist of solid and everlasting matter which we call the seeds, the first principles of things, from whence the whole of things begin to be.

I did not recognize that song Matt posted, but when I saw the title and the singers I immediately recognized the name Glenn Yarborough for THIS song below. I have always thought "Baby the rain must fall" was Epicurean-compatible as to the main them, seeking pleasure despite the pain that comes along the way. More of an anthem than the "nobody wants to die song" and maybe more helpful in troubled times. I guess the folk singers tended toward philosophical themes.

Sorry for the partial divergence from the Charles Darwin / death theme, but he does say that he doesn't know and will live with whatever comes (heaven or hell, and he should have offered "none of the above" but it's hard to rhyme that).

Happy Birthday to Susan Hill! Learn more about Susan Hill and say happy birthday on Susan Hill's timeline: Susan Hill

Welcome and we look forward to having your participate with us!

Quote from Kalosyni

(Sometimes brainstorming ideas get a bit carried away, lol, but that is how the best ideas happen, when you just let the creativity flow).

Yes exactly. It's too bad the Aristotelians trademarked the term "peripatetics" because a "walking group" might well fit the bill as a free and healthful activity that could be engaged in as a group and still combine philosophy. Maybe something like meeting at an appointed time at a park, then having a brief talk, then walking together.

(I am afraid my age is showing that "walking" sounds like more fun and more practical than a nudist colony