Posts by Cassius

Todd I think this is a fair implication of what is stated in the letter to Herodotus and in Book One of Lucretius, but I too question whether it is sufficient to address the ultimate issue that concerns us. I think the point Epicurus wanted to drive home is that while both levels are "real," our level of reality is no less real than the atomic level. Our reality comes through the senses, without which we have death, and that is what is important to us and why we don't give in to Platonic arguments about a "true world" beyond our senses, as if ours is inferior and we should long to be somewhere else.

If you're not familiar with the Book One discussion of the Trojan war and properties and qualities, you will want to look that up.

Quote from Joshua

Delight is a gray area. Pleasure is subversive.

Yep "delightful" sounds like a tea party description of ice cream. "Pleasure" sounds like you are going to a movie rated PG - or worse!

I presume we are seeing a little roughness in the Greek to English translation, but aside from that what do you make of the list Nate? The "confirmed" and "cannot be confirmed" by the senses, but harder to tell about the "valid / invalid" labeling.

An illustrator of the multiple philosophical paths problem would do well to follow what amounts to Lucian's ultimate point:

Lycinus. At least your chagrin will be considerably lessened by the thought that you are not alone in your disappointment; practically all who pursue philosophy do no more than disquiet themselves in vain. Who could conceivably go through all the stages I have rehearsed? You admit the impossibility yourself. As to your present mood, it is that of the man who cries and curses his luck because he cannot climb the sky, or plunge into the depths of the sea at Sicily and come up at Cyprus, or soar on wings and fly within the day from Greece to India; what is responsible for his discontent is his basing of hopes on a dream-vision or his own wild fancy, without ever asking whether his aspirations were realizable or consistent with humanity. You too, my friend, have been having a long and marvelous dream; and now reason has stuck a pin into you and startled you out of your sleep; your eyes are only half open yet, you are reluctant to shake off a sleep which has shown you such fair visions, and so you scold. It is just the condition of the day-dreamer; he is rolling in gold, digging up treasure, sitting on his throne, or somehow at the summit of bliss; for dame How-I-wish is a lavish facile Goddess, that will never turn a deaf ear to her votary, though he have a mind to fly, or change statures with Colossus, or strike a gold- reef; well, in the middle of all this, in comes his servant with some every-day question, wanting to know where he is to get bread, or what he shall say to the landlord, tired of waiting for his rent; and then he flies into a temper, as though the intrusive questioner had robbed him of all his bliss, and is ready to bite the poor fellow's nose off.

As you love me, do not treat me like that. I see you digging up treasure, spreading your wings, nursing extravagant ideas, indulging impossible hopes; and I love you too well to leave you to the company of a life-long dream—a pleasant one, if you will, but yet a dream; I beseech you to get up and take to some every-day business, such as may direct the rest of your life's course by common sense. Your acts and your thoughts up to now have been no more than Centaurs, Chimeras, Gorgons, or what else is figured by dreams and poets and painters, chartered libertines all, who reek not of what has been or may be. Yet the common folk believe them, bewitched by tale and picture just because they are strange and monstrous.

I fancy you hearing from some teller of tales how there is a certain lady of perfect beauty, beyond the Graces themselves or the Heavenly Aphrodite, and then, without ever an inquiry whether his tale is true, and such a person to be found on earth, falling straight in love with her, like Medea in the story enamored of a dream-Jason. And what most drew you on to love, you and the others who worship the same phantom, was, if I am not mistaken, the consistent way in which the inventor of the lady added to his picture, when once he had got your ear. That was the only thing you all looked to, with that he turned you about as he would, having got his first hold upon you, averring that he was leading you the straight way to your beloved. After the first step, you see, all was easy; none of you ever looked round when he came to the entrance, and inquired whether it was the right one, or whether he had accidentally taken the wrong; no, you all followed in your predecessors' footsteps, like sheep after the bell-wether, whereas the right thing was to decide at the entrance whether you should go in.

Perhaps an illustration will make my meaning clearer: when one of those audacious poets affirms that there was once a three-headed and six-handed man, if you accept that quietly without questioning its possibility, he will proceed to fill in the picture consistently—six eyes and ears, three voices talking at once, three mouths eating, and thirty fingers instead of our poor ten all told; if he has to fight, three of his hands will have a buckler, wicker targe, or shield apiece, while of the other three one swings an axe, another hurls a spear, and the third wields a sword. It is too late to carp at these details, when they come; they are consistent with the beginning; it was about that that the question ought to have been raised whether it was to be accepted and passed as true. Once grant that, and the rest comes flooding in, irresistible, hardly now susceptible of doubt, because it is consistent and accordant with your initial admissions. That is just your case; your love-yearning would not allow you to look into the facts at each entrance, and so you are dragged on by consistency; it never occurs to you that a thing may be self- consistent and yet false; if a man says twice five is seven, and you take his word for it without checking the sum, he will naturally deduce that four times five is fourteen, and so on ad libitum. This is the way that weird geometry proceeds: it sets before beginners certain strange assumptions, and insists on their granting the existence of inconceivable things, such as points having no parts, lines without breadth, and so on, builds on these rotten foundations a superstructure equally rotten, and pretends to go on to a demonstration which is true, though it starts from premises which are false.

Just so you, when you have granted the principles of any school, believe in the deductions from them, and take their consistency, false as it is, for a guarantee of truth. Then with some of you, hope travels through, and you die before you have seen the truth and detected your deceivers, while the rest, disillusioned too late, will not turn back for shame: what, confess at their years that they have been abused with toys all this time? so they hold on desperately, putting the best face upon it and making all the converts they can, to have the consolation of good company in their deception; they are well aware that to speak out is to sacrifice the respect and superiority and honor they are accustomed to; so they will not do it if it may be helped, knowing the height from which they will fall to the common level. Just a few are found with the courage to say they were deluded, and warn other aspirants. Meeting such a one, call him a good man, a true and an honest; nay, call him philosopher, if you will; to my mind, the name is his or no one's; the rest either have no knowledge of the truth, though they think they have, or else have knowledge and hide it, shamefaced cowards clinging to reputation.

Focused like a laser on this very point is one of the very best of Lucian's dialogs: HERMOTIMUS - Or, The Rival Philosophies

Lycinus. So you have not solved my puzzle; I know just as little as before which traveler to trust; I find that each of them, as well as his guide, has tried one only, which he now recommends and will have to be the only one leading to the city. Whether he tells the truth I have no means of knowing; that he has attained some end, and seen some city, I may perhaps allow; but whether he saw the right one, or whether, Corinth being the real goal, he got to Babylon and thought he had seen Corinth—that is still undecided; for surely every one who has seen a city has not seen Corinth, unless Corinth is the only city there is. But my greatest difficulty of all is the absolute certainty that the true road is one; for Corinth is one, and the other roads lead anywhere but to Corinth, though there may be people deluded enough to suppose that the North road and the South road lead equally to Corinth.

Hermotimus. But that is absurd, Lycinus; they go opposite ways, you see.

Lycinus. Then, my dear good man, this choice of roads and guides is quite a serious matter; we can by no means just follow our noses; we shall be discovering that we are well on the way to Babylon or Bactria instead of to Corinth. Nor is it advisable to toss up, either, on the chance that we may hit upon the right way if we start upon any one at a venture. That is no impossibility; it may have come off once and again in a cycle; but I cannot think we ought to gamble recklessly with such high stakes, nor commit our hopes to a frail craft, like the wise men who went to sea in a bowl; we should have no fair complaint against Fortune, if her arrow or dart did not precisely hit the centre; the odds are ten thousand to one against her; just so the archer in Homer—Teucer, I suppose it was—when he meant to hit the dove, only cut the string, which held it; of course it is infinitely more likely that the point of the arrow will find its billet in one of the numberless other places, than just in that particular central one. And as to the perils of blundering into one of the wrong roads instead of the right one, misled by a belief in the discretion of Fortune, here is an illustration:—it is no easy matter to turn back and get safe into port when you have once cast loose your moorings and committed yourself to the breeze; you are at the mercy of the sea, frightened, sick and sorry with your tossing about, most likely. Your mistake was at the beginning: before leaving, you should have gone up to some high point, and observed whether the wind was in the right quarter, and of the right strength for a crossing to Corinth, not neglecting, by the way, to secure the very best pilot obtainable, and a seaworthy craft equal to so high a sea.

Quote from Kalosyni

So would this be considered a much more clear (and modern) understanding of what Epicurus was beginning to present, by his looking to nature? When we use science correctly, is it a much more complex system compared to Epicurean philosophy? Maybe it might be good to have a table to graphically show similiarities between Epicureanism and modern science.

It might be more complex, but that wouldn't necessarily make it more useful. Joshua was referring to this issue recently too in referring to the letter to Pythocles.

Quote from Letter to Pythocles

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways.

And again I think a paraphrase Diogenes of Oinoanda helps make the point:

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «SCIENCE» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while SCIENCE, which is inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

You could put most any tool in that paragraph, and no matter how attached we are to the tool, we need to realize that it is just a tool and not an end in itself.

Quote from Todd

I can easily recall the words to songs I liked (or even dumb TV commercials) from 25 years ago.

Absolutely positively without doubt correct. And they connect emotionally even when the original topic is long obsolete, because they somehow hold some deep emotional connection.

And it's probably also significant to note that -- probably because it was written in verse --- the Lucretius poem survives to us while the original, and probably thousands of other Epicurean texts - don't survive.

As far as I can tell the Latin is: Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas, alma Venus, caeli subter labentia signa....

Now every translation I can find uses another word, but the word is in fact VOLUPTAS which we translate as PLEASURE ..... Correct? I know that poetic translators, and even the narrative versions, like to substitute another word, but given the philosophical significance of the issue, it seems to me that we ought to make note that the word involved is "Pleasure" which presumably is the closest Latin translation of Hedone -- rather than some euphemism. The latin dictionaries use "delight" as a second meaning, but would Lucretius have used any other word for the Greek concept we translate into English as "pleasure" if he were trying to be precise?

How to say pleasure in Latin

Latin words for pleasure include voluptas, delectatio, luxuriosi,, luxuriosi and delectationis. Find more Latin words at wordhippo.com!

www.wordhippo.com

pleasure | Etymology, origin and meaning of pleasure by etymonline

PLEASURE Meaning: "source of enjoyment, pleasing quality or thing, that which pleases or gratifies the senses or the… See origin and meaning of pleasure.

www.etymonline.com

ONLINE LATIN DICTIONARY - Latin - English

Brown: MOTHER of Rome, Delight of Men and Gods, Sweet Venus; who with vital power

Munro: MOTHER of the Aeneadae, darling of men and gods, increase-giving Venus,

Bailey: MOTHER of Aeneas’s sons, joy of men and gods, Venus the life-giver,

Humphries: Creatress, mother of the Roman line, Dear Venus, joy of earth and joy of heaven,

Leonard: Mother of Rome, delight of Gods and men, Dear Venus that beneath the gliding stars

MF Smith: Mother of Aeneas’ people, delight of human beings and the gods,

Quote from Kalosyni

I am not looking to convince anyone of anything.

But Lucretius was - and by "song" no less

Quote from Lucretius Book One - Humphries

I am well aware how very hard it is

To bring to light by means of Latin verse

The dark discoveries of the Greeks. I know

New terms must be invented, since our tongue

Is poor, and this material is new.

But I'm persuaded by your excellence

And by our friendship's dear expectancy

To suffer any toil, to keep my watch

Through the still nights, seeking the words, the song

Whereby to bring your mind that splendid light

By which you can see darkly hidden things.

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind

Must be dispelled, not by the sunshine's rays,

Not by those shining arrows of the light,

But by insight into nature, and a scheme

Of systematic contemplation.

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Joshua was talking about use of metaphor in the last podcast, so we probably need his input. And don't forget that Epicurus apparently said something like the wise man won't compose poetry, but will be the only one who can intrepret it correctly. And then we have to incorporate Lucretius into what that statement means.

Quote from Kalosyni

I am not sure we need allegories or parables for explaining Epicureanism. It might be best to be more straight-forward on most ideas within Epicureanism.

We certainly need to be straightforward in explaining the ideas so that the allegories and parables can be developed accurately. The reason allegories and parables are useful, like art and music and the like, is that they help people get a firm grip of the core of the issue and hold onto it confidently when troubles and challenges arise, as they inevitably do. The Michelle Pinto graphic crystalizes the anti-supernatural aspect of Epicurean philosophy in the "one picture is worth a thousand words" way. Music is similarly effective.

That's a good update of the cave allegory, along the lines Todd has been talking about.

But is it clear what the takeaway is or should be? Does it answer that question?

Do they say that you only have one life to live and you better use it or lose it forever?

Do they say that there is no god or anything else telling you that something is absolutely right or absolutely wrong?

Do they say that your senses and your ability to look and see (even look and see smartphones) is you only way out of the exploitation?

Do they even tell you that these cave arguments and social media / cell phones did not just happen by themselves. They didn't just poof! into existence at the will of gods (who don't exist). Those things didn't arise on their own, but from people who have an agenda that the consumers of those things aren't part of (or more accurately, the consumers *are* a part of it - just not a part that they want to realize that they are playing.

So these are great ways to illustrate the problem. How do we illustrate through Epicurean principles how we got here? And how do we illustrate the solution?

In fact Godfrey what you may be describing is probably closer to what DeWitt describes in considering anticipations to be more of an "intuitive" faculty. That would make more sense to me if what is being described is something automatic or involuntary, but I don't get the impression that a generalized fourth leg is meant by its advocates to be that kind of thing. This is definitely a murky subject which is another reason why I resist adding another category which seems so difficult to describe -- anticipations themselves are already difficult enough to describe!

Quote from Godfrey

Also, as I recall epibolai have something to do with grasping (as in understanding?). Both dreams and intuitive leaps are mechanisms for grasping, to my thinking.

I could easily be wrong, Godfrey, but what I thought I read in the past was that the 4th leg argument asserted that every "flash of recognition" (every time we made a conceptual connection of any kind) was an example of this fourth leg in action. That seems unlikely to me to be what Epicurus intended, but I could be reading it negatively because of my concern that the argument goes too far. A limited faculty like you are talking about would make more sense, but I think what we are dealing with too is an attempt by some to incorporate Diogenes' Laertius' description of how anticipations work (which I think is probably faulty) and to consider as a test of truth every time something matches one of our preconceived concepts - and I don't think that would be consistent with basic canon theory.

Quote from Cassius

It doesn't seem to me that we should try to force into this model every mental process possible to us.

And that is really what I intuit some are doing by pursuing a fourth leg argument. I mean - surely "conceptual reasoning" - pattern recognition and matching - generating pictures and definitions and testing what we see again them -- all those kind of things seem to me to be obviously part of the reasoning process, and very important for us to consider how to do them efficiently using rules of logic.

But the "canon" or "criteria" is that first part -- the "yardstick" part - the "input" part - and that is where it seems to me that the key attribute is that these faculting operate automatically and without injection of opinion. That is what makes them worthy of being considered primary starting points for the reasoning process that takes place based on them.

I'm thinking that it's important to keep clear a bright line between the data collection, which operates largely or wholly "automatically" - versus what we do with that data after it is gathered. It's only in that second part where conceptual reasoning takes place and we have to judge whether our opinions are true/accurate or false/inaccurate.to the full data set that we have it in our power to collect.

I think Joshua and I crossposted and I just saw what he wrote.

I would say it is important not to look at this discussion as some kind of global description of every possible thought process involved in the brain.

It seems to me that this is really directed toward defeating the claims of skeptics that nothing is knowable, and describing a system by which we can understand how to determine what we think is true about important issues of life. It doesn't seem to me that we should try to force into this model every mental process possible to us.

Quote from Todd

To be clear, I'm referring strictly to the observing of one's own mental processes. The extrapolation to understanding other people's actions definitely involves additional reasoning.

I don't see why the observation of thought processes is anything special or different from making mental note of anything else. For example, writing out one's thoughts and playing with the words - does that require a special aspect of the canon for some reason? I think that as Joshua observed repeatedly during the podcast,what we are really talking about here is contact with the outside world. I don't think Epicurus or anyone else is disputing that we can't in fact direct our mental attention inward for long periods of time. That would include for example recalling past pleasures as we regularly discuss. No one is saying that thinking about thinking can't or doesn't or shouldn't happen. Whatever we think is indeed what we think. I am thinking that this entire discussion is not devoted to introspection, but how we make judgments about things in the outside world. Introspection is certainly an important subject but I don't gather it is really what is in issue here in combating skepticism.

Quote from Godfrey

Am I correct in understanding that "intuitive leaps" are being discussed as a part of this 4th leg?

Is that in the Greek book Godfrey? My reading of this 4th leg in the past was that the assertion is much more broad than that, and essentially would include every time a concept is judged to match something being observed - which would be virtually constantly during thought processes. I have not seen it asserted to be something special such as what you might be thinking there.

For example, this from Book 4 of Lucretius. There are many similar references to images which are not of the "seeing" variety, but nevertheless impact our minds. I am not saying that I believe this, or that the same phenoma could not be equally explained by stored images in the mind that are agitated when we are dreaming or hallucinating. I don't think it's important that Epicurus explained them "correctly" in our view, but that he suggested natural explanations that take them out of the realm of the supernatural, Theories like this allow us to explain what has happened to us without fearing that they are supernatural:

[26] But since I have taught of what manner are the beginnings of all things, and how, differing in their diverse forms, of their own accord they fly on, spurred by everlasting motion; and in what way each several thing can be created from them; and since I have taught what was the nature of the mind, and whereof composed it grew in due order with the body, and in what way rent asunder it passed back into its first-beginnings: now I will begin to tell you what exceeding nearly concerns this theme, that there are what we call idols of things; which, like films stripped from the outermost body of things, fly forward and backward through the air; and they too when they meet us in waking hours affright our minds, yea, and in sleep too, when we often gaze on wondrous shapes, and the idols of those who have lost the light of day, which in awful wise have often roused us, as we lay languid, from our sleep; lest by chance we should think that souls escape from Acheron, or that shades fly abroad among the living, or that something of us can be left after death, when body alike and the nature of mind have perished and parted asunder into their several first-beginnings. I say then that likenesses of things and their shapes are given off by things from the outermost body of things, which may be called, as it were, films or even rind, because the image bears an appearance and form like to that, whatever it be, from whose body it appears to be shed, ere it wanders abroad. That we may learn from this, however dull be our wits.