Posts by Cassius

I have already forgotten when we said in the podcast to some extent, but what I meant by respectable was that I got the impression what Joshua was saying was that the statement might have been put in the mouth of a character in a play, rather than made as a direct statement by the playwright.... With the implication that if so the statement might have been made by a character in a context which the playwright was clearly not advocating the comment himself.

So if Theogonis is the author (and we did not cite him) then we need to explicitly clean up what we said - maybe in this week's episode.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-Eight of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our discussion of Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus, and we discuss ___________ with ___________ reading today's text:

BAILEY:

We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life.

[128] The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul’s) freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfill the good of the soul and the good of the body. For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure.

[129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

[130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

HICKS:

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live.

[128] He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure.

[129] Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned.

[130] It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good.

So Don on the point we were debating - is that position truly being advocated by a respectable character or writer?

Quote from Don

That's my own photo taken mere minutes before I posted.

Wait what? You are in DC? Then will we see some photos of you at the Jefferson Memorial?

Episode 137 - The Letter to Menoeceus 03 - On Death (Part One) - is now available!

Excellent thank you! do you have the link for that image? I think I was aware that he had Creech, but I would love to confirm that he had the 1743 Daniel Brown edition, which IMHO is so much better written than the 1682 Creech.

Yes a table of comparisons would be good, especially if it would help us prioritize the differences in order of importance.

I have always considered the "Cyreniacs want pleasure NOW" difference to be overstated - I would have to think that if they were here to defend themselves we would find that that allegation is an oversimplification and that they would have an answer for the criticism.

More to the point is that I would gather than being closer to Socrates, they were probably more theistic and not at all into the atomism that forms the basis of the Epicurean affirmation that there is no supernatural realm and no life after death. Where the Cyreniacs stood on epistemology is also something of a mystery.

It's impossible for me to believe that Epicurus was taking a step "backward" into any form of asceticism. More likely, he was developing and extending the arguments against other Socratic/Platonic positions, while keeping the emphasis on pleasure and pain as the guides of nature, and extending the emphasis to ALL kinds of pleasure and pain, including mental as at least as significant as physical pain and pleasure.

Yes as to the last post. Here is the excerpt from one of Jordan's posts that we discussed this past Wednesday night:

Quote

Indeed, it was through Epicurus that I discovered and became attracted to philosophical hedonism as a pragmatic way of life. However, like many others, I eventually grew disappointed with Epicurus’ philosophy because of his strange and paradoxically ascetic hedonism — for Epicurus, pleasure is merely the absence of pain, particularly the mental pain of anxiety. In other words, Epicureanism is a form of negative hedonism which values the avoidance of pain over the seeking of pleasure. Whatever merits an analgesic philosophy like this might have, it certainly wasn’t my ideal of hedonism. Indeed, I was delighted when I read that a contemporaneous hedonist school made fun of Epicureanism by saying that this state of absence of pain is the condition of a corpse!

And that witticism is how I discovered the Cyrenaic school.

I think Jordan is wrong in that paragaph to characterize Epicurus the way he does, but Jordan is in good company - it's my understanding that this is the reasoning that led Nietzsche away from Epicurus too.

The phrase "strange and paradoxically ascetic hedonism" is the key. Yes, there is something "strange and paradoxical" going on, but the issue is not in Epicurus, but in the mainstream way he is interpreted. Yes you can isolate a couple of passages in the letter to Menoeceus and conclude that Epicurus taught "valuing the avoidance of pain over the seeking of pleasure." But when you read the WHOLE philosophy and the many texts that do not at all support such an interpretation, then it becomes possible to see that those passages in the letter to Menoeceus are not really saying what it appears in isolation that they are saying.

Quote from Don

From the information above, it looks like there are parallels as well as divergences between Epicureanism and Existential Therapy.

I am still not sure how to get my head around the full picture. I think we all have a fairly good understanding of the positions that Epicurus took.

But do we even have a beginning list of what positions "Existential Therapy" takes. Where do we look for such a list, and what authority defines it?

Quote

Existential thinkers avoid restrictive models that categorise or label people. Instead, they look for the universals that can be observed transculturally.

This kind of statement is usually as far as I have ever gotten in reading. I think I follow what this statement means and it makes sense to me.

The issue I presume looms large, however, is that Epicurus takes many specific positions on issues such as life after death, supernatural gods, and absence of ideal forms which would define Epicurus' take on the nature of existence.

Is it fair to presume that an "Existential Therapist" also takes positions on basic questions about the nature of existence?

Quote

Existential therapy is a form of psychotherapy that explores the difficulties that an individual experiences but from a philosophical perspective.

So the question is "From WHAT philosophical perspective?" I presume in order for there to be any coherence there much be recognized boundaries on what "Existential Therapy" teaches as to the nature of existence? If so, what are they? I would not be particularly interested in recommending anyone get therapy from someone - even a "professional" - who approaches life from a Platonist or Stoic perspective.

A friend recommended a podcast called expatmoneyshow.com. Like many podcasts** it seems to be pushing a service that is for sale, but I have listened to a couple of episodes (one about Uruguay included) and it is very interesting and well done.

**But unlike the Lucretius Today podcast!

Quote from Kalosyni

As I read this: "You have been nonexistent for an eternity before birth and will be nonexistent for an eternity after you die" -- it had a rather sobering affect on me -- and a feeling that I needed to sit down to make sense of it.

I think a lot of people do that. Even those who call themselves atheists seem to gloss over the issue, because it is so sobering. I think this is one of the best ways to clarify the urgency of the pleasure question. The "live like you are dying" metaphor is really a pretty good one.

We do not disagree - that is why I said "full description."

But there are others out there in the world who insist that "tranquility" IS a sufficient description of the Epicurean goal, and that is my reason for the rhetorical question.

Pleasure as defined by normal definitions includes both joy and delight and tranquility. The reverse is not the case in normal or academic discourse - tranquility is not considered to include joy and delight.

As I see it f we want to convey that we value both goals in the online world of discussing Epicurus, the global word which must be emphasized is Pleasure. If we fail to make clear the sweeping definition of Pleasure, the result is that we imply that Tranquility is a separate and equal or even higher goal. At that point we will be indistinguishable from those who consider joy and delight to be second tier goals and that joy and delight are expendable or merely instrumental toward some supposedly higher word.

That's exactly what the elevation of "katastematic pleasure" has done in many cases - dilute and demote the sweeping nature of the word "pleasure." And whether we like it or not, people who focus on "tranquility" and "katastematic pleasure" as replacements for "pleasure" are everywhere in modern online discussion of Epicurus, so this is an issue to keep constantly in mind.

Every time a young person reads somewhere that Epicurus held the highest good to be "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia," another opportunity to reach someone for the message of Epicurus is jeopardized. Some take the time to get to the bottom of the issue, but my belief is that many do not. Had it not been for my reading DeWitt rather than Wikipedia and the Academics, I would have walked away from Epicurus just like Nietzsche did, and this website would not exist.

(And that's not to equate my level of perception as being anywhere Nietzsche's, but only to observe that I would consider his ultimate assessment of Epicurus as insufficient would be correct, did I not take this position about the relationship between pleasure and tranquility.)

It makes sense to pursue tranquility for the sake of experiencing Pleasure without disruption or distraction, but it does not make sense to pursue pleasure for the sake of "absence of disturbance." In the former, Pleasure is clearly communicated to be the goal, and we can all pursue Pleasure in whatever form we find pleasurable. In the latter, no clear goal is conveyed at all, and we are left to look elsewhere for a clear goal. (And this "left to look elsewhere is IMHO exactly why that formulation is so popular.)

The fact that you (Don) thought it appropriate to clarify what I was saying in the question shows that this is an issue where we have no consensus form of communication even here at EpicureanFriends. By no means do I intend to deprecate the value of tranquility to life - I always consider pleasure to include tranquility.

But outside of here there is a consensus - and the consensus is that Tranquility rather than Pleasure is what Epicurus held to be the ultimate goal. And with that switch in words comes a huge transvaluation in meaning.

To me that is why it is very good that we continue to have this back and forth discussion, and why I am glad you raise it. Otherwise the point would be lost on all but the very few who really dig into the reasons for the terminology issues. If this website is to do anything for the world of discussion of Epicurus on the internet, it will be in keeping this issue front and center.

Quick comment: When Joshua told the story related by Stephen Greenblatt about his mother, Joshua made a comment to the effect that not everyone was a big fan of "The Swerve" (Greenblatt's book). I left the comment in while editing but just to provide background, in the past we've had some debates about the focus of the book (lots of detail on church politics in the middle ages / not a lot of focus on Epicurean doctrine).

It's also possible that Greenblatt overstates the importance of Lucretius to modern science. But I don't think Joshua or I or most of us here would discourage anyone from reading the book if they find the subjects he covers interesting.

Much of the criticism comes from academic "experts" who aren't really arguing from the point of view of Greenblatt's intended audience (laymen who are not experts in Epicurus or church history).

I have a copy of the book myself and I wouldn't hesitate to recommend it to a generalist reader, but in doing so I would take care to explain what the book is and what it is not. If you go in with proper expectations that it is a generalist history of the church and manuscript preservation with only maybe one strong chapter on Epicurus, then I would say it's a perfectly fine book.

If you want a general big picture combined with details of Epicurean doctrine, go to DeWitt. That's why I always recommend DeWitt first to a reader who really wants to learn about Epicurus.

If you're looking for a generalist book which might perhaps hook a non-philosopher reader to want to read more about Epicurus then "The Swerve" may well be a good choice. Hey, it's a "best seller" if I recall, so that gives the topic some credibility in literary people who might ordinarily shun straight philosophy.

Lots of good show notes as we complete the section on Death. I will get this edited and postEd ASAP.

A good time to remind everybody that as Kalosyni indicates this issue has many aspects.

For those facing the emotional trauma of losing someone there is also the very well stated chapter in A few Days In Athens about the pain of losing someone.

For those who are looking to pin down the intellectual differences between Epicurus and Abrahamic religion or dealing with the issue of "would it be better to not have been born" there are the quotes that Joshua cited in the show from Sophocles and Ecclesiastes.

For both and everyone this episode is a good way to focus on the answer to the question:. When you and Epicurus both accept that you have been nonexistent for an eternity before death and will be nonexistent for an eternity after you die, do you really think that Epicurus taught that the full description of all you want out of life is to be "calm?"

Someone can also correct this poor rendering of the passage, but Joshua reminds me of the saying that the safest place for a ship is in port but that is not what ships are made for....

So the art of sailing successfully in dangerous waters is a useful analogy for a lot of things

I am going to run out of time for comment right now but these issues also involve the question of "reasoning by analogy" and the issues discussed in Philodemus On Signs / On Methods of Inference

Part of the reason for my own position would also involve the "Nature never creates only a single thing of it's kind" deduction. We have loads of analogies to things which pulsate and go back and forth, but the suggestion that there was once a one-of-a kind event is not made more plausible to be unique by calling it a "singularity"

At the very least this would cause me to deduce an unending series of big bangs, but at the same time I do not accept the plausibility of the universe not being infinite in size, so I do not believe it plausible that the universe can collapse on a "center".

So my own view which is admittedly my own view and nothing more is that the most likely scenario given present observations is an unending series of bangs in unending number throughout an "infinite" space (not sequentially around one center).

I am sure that will get you an F in physics class but that is my personal deduction that I am willing to live my life by given my current reading to date..

And of course that comment raises the issue of how we deal with "experts" and questions of "scientific consensus" and all that, which Ren mentioned above. That in itself is worth a long discussion.

I think Pacatus you have raised the real issue underlying the question - which includes the relationship and use of both direct evidence and "circumstantial" or "indirect" evidence.

Epicurus has no direct observational evidence of atoms or void, but he found strong circumstantial evidence from the observation of other things which he could observe directly. We therefore logically do not require direct evidence on all issues, but we require that any theories be consistent with what evidence does exist.

So when we use words like speculation and evidence we have to be very clear what we are talking about.

As I see it there is a LOT of circumstantial evidence from all else that we observe that "nothing comes from nothing..". We do not have direct evidence of what came before the "big bang" (which itself we infer from circumstantial evidence as we did not see it occur).

It is my personal position that the overwhelming evidence of nothing coming from nothing in all other observations is not invalidated as a good working model of the universe as a whole by the argument that "we have no direct evidence of what came before the big bang."

These are complicated epistemological issues that cannot be resolved purely by demanding "direct evidence* from our own observation. In order not to be accused of blind faith ourselves we have to have an understanding of our own rules of reasoning and waiting and opinion making as in the PDs in the early 20's

I believe this is one, which Munro translates as borders (Book one)

159] If things came from nothing, any kind might be born of any thing, nothing would require seed. Men for instance might rise out of the sea, the scaly race out of the earth, and birds might burst out of the sky; horned and other herds, every kind of wild beasts would haunt with changing broad tilth and wilderness alike. Nor would the same fruits keep constant to trees, but would change; any tree might bear any fruit. For if there were not begetting bodies for each, how could things have a fixed unvarying mother? But in fact because things are all produced from fixed seeds, each thing is born and goes forth into the borders of light out of that in which resides its matter and first bodies; and for this reason all things cannot be gotten out of all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power