Posts by Cassius

Thank you Martin! I read so far the first half of Chapter 2 from your link. There is a lot to like in it but I am taken aback by this following section. It is not entirely clear to me how to read this. Maybe in the end it does acknowledge that the ranking is individually subjective. But it sure looks like he is saying we can add up the opinions of the greater number of people and from that "majority vote" attain (he even uses the word "suffrage") what amounts to an objective decision - at least one that is considered as such. Hopefully there is more that makes clear that this is not his conclusion, but the attribution to the utilitarians the term " greatest good of the greatest number" sounds like it may apply here too.

Maybe he explains somewhere why (social concerns?) he reaches such a conclusion. Or better yet, maybe he backs away from this later.... I understand that Aristotle suggested that we look to the majority of leading citizens for our standard of ethics, but I know nothing in Epicurus which indicates that rankings of pleasure and pain could or should be decided by the greatest number of people. Maybe this is the kind of "practical" thing that one is "forced" to do when someone tries to develop a system of government among people of widely varying natures, but it sure does not strike me as philosophically defensible or accurate to "the truth" of the way real people actually feel.

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.

Quote from Kalosyni

Cassius --It does seem to be listed, and maybe this is the only location

Is it listed in the same way such that it appears to be parallel or could have been included in the original listing?

Quote from Kalosyni

In other words the highest form of sensual pleasure (at it's height) will also be free from mental pain (we will be free from worry and fear).

Let me ask a question about this for Kalosyni or anyone:

We have from three separate sources this well-attested statement of Epicurus about knowing "the good":

Quote

Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: Not only Aristippus and his followers, but also Epicurus and his welcomed kinetic pleasure; I will mention what follows, to avoid speaking of the “storms” {of passion} and the “delicacies” which Epicurus often cites, and the “stimuli” which he mentions in his On the End-Goal. For he says “For I at least do not even know what I should conceive the good to be, if I eliminate the pleasures of taste, and eliminate the pleasures of sex, and eliminate the pleasures of listening, and eliminate the pleasant motions caused in our vision by a visible form.”

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.6: It is observed too that in his treatise On the End-Goal, he writes in these terms: “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.18.41: Why do we shirk the question, Epicurus, and why do we not confess that we mean by pleasure what you habitually say it is, when you have thrown off all sense of shame? Are these your words or not? For instance, in that book which embraces all your teaching (for I shall now play the part of translator, so no one may think I am inventing) you say this: “For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man. Nor indeed is it possible to make such a statement as this – that it is joy of the mind which is alone to be reckoned as a good; for I understand by a mind in a state of joy, that it is so, when it has the hope of all the pleasures I have named – that is to say the hope that nature will be free to enjoy them without any blending of pain.” And this much he says in the words I have quoted, so that anyone you please may realize what Epicurus understands by pleasure.

If "freedom from pain" amounts to the highest sensual pleasure, would you expect that "freedom from pain" or "freedom from disturbance" could just as easily have been listed among these (taste / sex / sound / dance) that Epicurus chose to list? If so, why? If not, why not?

Quote from Cassius

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures)

I would think the really big issue that these two sentences do not address is whether Mill was arguing that these qualitative differences are in any way "absolute" / "intrinsic" and apply to all people at all times or whether he was clear that the differences are subjective/ relative to the individual under particular circumstances.

That would be a huge distinction. I hope to read up and find the answer myself but if anyone knows where he clarifies this please feel free to post.

Episode 139 - The Letter to Menoeceus 06 - On Pleasure (Part Two) - is now available!

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Forty of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our discussion of Pleasure in Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus. Now let's join Kalosyni reading today's text:

BAILEY:

[133] For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

[134] For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it.

[135] He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man’s actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance.

Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself; and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like unto a mortal being.

HICKS:

[133] Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.

[134] It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil.

[135] He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.

Exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is like unto thee; then never, either in waking or in dream, wilt thou be disturbed, but wilt live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.

Comes from my spear...? Meaning what?

David in case someone comes along later and asks cen you provide a link to a cite on that? Sounds like a fragment that might not be easy to track down.

Yes I rather suspect the accusation that they spent a lot of money on food is probably correct, at least in the "good times" when there wasn't a war or something else going on to cause the trouble. I strongly suspect that the bread and water reference was one of his regular in-your-face hypotheticals that he COULD live perfectly well on such fare if he needed to do so. But when times were good and they were able to afford better, I feel sure they didn't restrict themselves. No one in the ancient texts (to my knowledge) accused Atticus of inconsistency in living well and still being a devout Epicurean, and there are lots of similar arguments that can be named. In fact, are there ANY actual examples of a living Epicurean from the ancient world living ascetically as an example of their Epicureanism.? If there are I am not aware of them.

Quote from reneliza

The poster said that reading the Letter to Menoeceus (which she described as being about "the absence of desire") in college helped her learn to suppress her desires including actual hunger. She respected Epicurus for living on a restrictive diet of only bread and water - missing the crucial point as Don has brought up before that this was meant to mean ordinary food and not an ascetic or lacking diet - and then binging when invited to a feast.

OMG!

I feel sure if Epicurus were alive he would NOT be happy with how his philosophy is being used! I don't like referring to slaves, and it is not entirely clear how much property Epicurus had (though it appears to be significant) but I think one of the arguments that ought to cause these people to reconsider their positions is to review Epicurus' will and consider whether Epicurus himself was restricting himself to "ordinary food" on all occasions, much less "bread and water. They should also consider exactly how many of multiple pieces of property and how many of multiple slaves are required to live a life of "absence of desire" as they apparently suppose Epicurus to have lived. They would then be confronted with the need to determine whether they really want to take advice from an absolute hypocrite, or whether perhaps their own understanding of his teachings might need adjustment.

And there are many many other arguments to be made, even if we presume that every Roman Epicurean was a "bad Epicurean" which would also be a very very long stretch to assume.

Dare I ask what "first pro-ana" means?

Quote from Don

So, obviously I've missed out on her larger context

You may not have missed it at all - it could be me. I know I read the whole thing years ago so my memory could be failing me but that is what I remember coming away with, but it's possible my memory has been warped by concern over this "All desire is bad/painful" issue.

The excerpts I listed in the past seem mostly concerned with other issues Nussbaum (Martha) - "Therapy of Desire"

Here's a related issue, but I don't have the time to expand it at the moment. I have long had a negative reaction to Martha Nussbaum's book "The Therapy of Desire" https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…erapy-of-desire

To me that title is off in the same way it would be off to say "The Therapy of the Finger." The default position in normal discussion would be that there is nothing WRONG with a finger in general, and only if a fingerhas a specific unhealthiness or lack of functioning does the finger need therapy.

So the book implies from its very title that there is something "Wrong" with all Desire in and of itself - which as we are discussing does not seem to be Epicurus' position at all. It's not "Desire" that needs therapy, but "Unhealthy Desires" or "Painful Desires" or "Impossible Desires" or "Unnatural desires" or something similar.

I have always read the book as a whole, and especially the closing chapters, as expressing some very negative views about Epicurean philosophy, and as taking a pro-Stoic position. But I don't think I have realized before that the very title seems to be taking what appears to me to be an unduly negative view of all desire. I think the title is revealing of something before the cover of the book is evened open. Is all of the rest of non-Epicurean Greek philosophy negative toward all desire? I find that difficult to believe, so is the issue some viewpoint of Nussbaum's herself, or of Greek philosophy.

As for religious influence in that case, I could be wrong but I think Martha Nussbaum is Jewish rather than Catholic. I am not aware of any specific tendency in Judaism to be negative toward all desire, but again I could be wrong there too. Nussbaum's attitudes toward desire in general, if in fact she has a negative one, may have totally different origins or foundations.

reneliza

Quote from Cassius

Were you by chance raised Catholic?

I had second thoughts about that question that as soon as I posted it because sometimes tone doesn't translate well even with emoticons, and sometimes issues are too sensitive to deal with purely philosophically. In my case I have gotten use to Joshua discussing his Catholic background on the podcast and I probably carried that over in this question when others might be less willing to discuss their own backgrounds..

However rather than remove the comment let me just clarify that I don't mean the question in a negative way other than in the general spirit of tracing down modern attitudes, rather than anything "personal." Of course one of the major themes of Epicurean philosophy is that of the problems caused by religion, and it is sort of stereotypical Catholic in my understanding that "guilt" is something that Catholicism seems to teach to people within that church. It would seem to me that Catholic doctrine might contribute toward seeing "desire" in a negative way, in the same way that various religious backgrounds might lead to various tendencies. In my own case I was raised Baptist and no doubt that influences my thought processes negatively even today, after years of trying to unwind those influences.

As with all our discussions here there is a limit between what we discuss philosophically and what we discuss from our personal lives, so if that question got close to that limit feel free to ignore it or respond as "abstractly" as you care to. The real question for discussion would be whether religious backgrounds of any sort would impact on our view of desires. I think it very probably can and does, and thus can be useful to talk about, thus the comment.

Excellent quote Godfrey! That is one we do not talk about much but looks very relevant.

Quote from reneliza

Really just what I've been saying - that I have no conception of desire that is without any pain

And maybe that is exactly an artifact of the corruption of the modern monotheistic world and misrepresentaton of Epicurean philosophy - that you and a lot of people DONT have such a conception(?). And for that reason that may be why this point needs to be pounded home in modern Epicurean discussion.

Were you by chance raised Catholic?

I look forward to hearing comments from you Pacatus as you read Lucretius. It's a common situation -- lots of people I have come across who say they embrace Epicurus have never bothered to read more than a line or two of Lucretius.

I really think Lucretius is helpful. What he's writing about are the issues that he saw in his time and world to be important, and he was much closer to the original texts than we are, so through him we have an excellent check on what was really important to the ancient Epicureans vs what we think today is important after 2000 years of indoctrination and filtering through Christian and Stoic commentators.

So please if you start reading through it don't hesitate to start new threads on whatever topics interest you in it no matter how small.

Quote from reneliza

I can happily agree with all of this if I just swap out the word "desire" for "interest" or "motivation" (although technically motivation is WHY you want to do a thing, not just what you want to do - I think it still works here and is sometimes even more useful to know) but I still get hung up on the one word.

Can you explain that a little further? We probably need to focus on using the word "desire" since that is the word with the explosive connotations that people are used to debating about, but I would like to be sure I understand your concern.

There is an awful lot of discussion of "confidence" but not all of it would clearly be applicable. This one jumps out at me first as applicable - is this not a current thought of future pleasure?

VS34. It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as it is the confidence of their help.

This is Torquatus rather than Epicurus but might well be relevant. I think there are others.....

(1) Some have denied that pleasures affecting our friends are in themselves to be desired by us in the same degree as we desire our own pleasures. This doctrine is thought by some critics to undermine the foundations of friendship; however, its supporters defend their position, and in my opinion have no difficulty in making good their ground. They argue that friendship can no more be sundered from pleasure than can the virtues, which we have discussed already. A solitary, friendless life must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends; their possession gives confidence, and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy, and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment in the present, and it inspires us with hopes for the near and distant future.

Quote from reneliza

Does he ever say anything about thinking ahead to future pleasure as a form of pleasure? (Or anything remotely related)

I am thinking that the passages about "confident expectation of continuance" might be applicable, and there is also the passage in Diogenes of Oinoanda about the sequence in which pleasure comes. I started to quote that earlier but will add that here in a moment:

Not really sure this applies directly, because he is talking about cause and effect, but it MIGHT be stretchable to cover the point. Probably better to go to the "Confident expectation" passages.....

Fr.33

... such virtues ... pleasure ... and [of virtues] ... feels [much] pain ... the evil [is] ... [from] all virtues ... apart from tension ... pleasure, but these quibblers admit ... often found not ..., [and Zeno] himself [proposes] the opinion ..........., just as if he means virtue when he has said «pleasure,» and that men run to them. And again elsewhere having forgotten this hunger ([for they did] not [say that] ........) ... of this ... so that ... it ... in no way .... is able, as these people lay it down, like a bait, for all human beings, to draw them, like birds or fish, open-mouthed to the names of the virtues, and sometimes ........ itself ... [illusions (?). And you are] not ashamed, [you] wretched people, [of contradicting both yourselves and] one another: [for indeed, employing puerile] wit, [you reject] pleasure, while cleverly agreeing [with us about sensation], so that you not [prevented from] passing through [an area in safety], when you venture to climb crags.

Well now, I want to deflect also the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip —an error that, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts:] we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink wine and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, without awaiting the future.

[As for causes that follow, an example is expecting] to win praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray.]