Posts by Cassius

The riddle background:

As the Wikipedia article also cites, the major modern source for this argument is David Hume’s formulation in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:

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“Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”

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“[God’s] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?”

The basic foundation of the argument is found in Lactantius “On The Anger of God,” Chapters 3 and 4.

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For when Epicurus thought that it was inconsistent with God to injure and to inflict harm, which for the most part arises from the affection of anger, he took away from Him beneficence also, since he saw that it followed that if God has anger, He must also have kindness. Therefore, lest he should concede to Him a vice, he deprived Him also of virtue. From this, he says, He is happy and uncorrupted, because He cares about nothing, and neither takes trouble Himself nor occasions it to another. Therefore He is not God, if He is neither moved, which is peculiar to a living being, nor does anything impossible for man, which is peculiar to God, if He has no will at all, no action, in short, no administration, which is worthy of God. And what greater, what more worthy administration can be attributed to God, than the government of the world, and especially of the human race, to which all earthly things are subject?

With the availability of Thomas Stanley’s English version of Gassendi’s work on Epicurus, we can see on page 174 the argument presented in intermediate form almost as adopted by Hume:

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“Moreover, I think it may not be ill argued thus: Either God would take away ills and cannot, or he can and will not, or he neither will nor can, or he both will and can. If he would and cannot, he is impotent, and consequently not God; if he can and will not, envious, which is equally contrary to God’s nature; if he neither will nor can, he is both envious and impotent, and consequently not God; if he both will and can, which onely agrees with God, whence are the ills? or why does he not take them away?”

UPDATE 11-4-22 - See Kalosyni's post here about the possible source of this being Sextus Empiricus: Sextus Empiricus

We need to include as background material both the "Riddle" and also the sections from Diogenes of Oinoanda. I will paste them here as I find them:

Fr. 19

[Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks [all sorts of nonsense] about them, [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear,] as well as inducing the craftsmen to produce inappropriate portrayals. Some statues of gods shoot arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them.

Well, then, you people, let us reverence the gods [rightly] both at festivals and on [unhallowed occasions, both] publicly [and privately], and let us observe the customs [of our fathers in relation to them and let not the imperishable beings be falsely accused at all] by us [in our vain fear that they are responsible for all misfortunes], bringing [sufferings to us] and [contriving burdensome obligations] for themselves. [And let us also call upon] them [by name] ...

Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.

On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more?

So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [not does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], .................

For god [is, I say], a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having complete [self-sufficiency]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have beings as fellow-citizens.

And there is this further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man — I do not say «god» —, having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

Let its divide the discussion into two —the world and men themselves. And first let us speak about the world.

[If indeed] all things are well arranged for men and nothing is antagonistic to them, our situation is like that of creatures made by a god. But let it be agreed first ....

It makes 100% sense to me that we should take pleasure in little if little is all we have. Seems to me that it's very hard to quibble with that.

The tougher rhetorical issue seems to me to be "Is it inherent within the expression of that thought that little is 'good enough' and therefore we should not act to seek more than little?"

I think a lot of people jump to that conclusion, perhaps influences by Stoic and many other sources of ideas, but I do not at all think that conclusion is necessarily implied, and I get the idea that most of the ancients and all of the Epicureans would think such a suggestion to be absurd, because it is natural for all life to pursue as much pleasure as is open to it to obtain without undue hardship.

I write this because Don if you see anything in that article or Horace which bears on that subject please bring it up. Epicurus makes it plain in the letter to Menoeceus that we do not set our sites on "little" but on "pleasure" , and I bet there are other instances of the same thought out there in other texts.

When Horace said "Seize the day" he didn't say "Seize little" or "Seize only what will keep you alive."

Reneliza I think your math brain is very very useful in this discussion because I think that these doctrines are intended to be highly logically sound.

I also think that in addition to that perspective we have to be sure that we aren't hobbled by other perspectives that we have inherited from Christianity and other viewpoints.

For example Dewitt comments that Epicurus is pointing to a way to console us for loss of immortality (presumably as alleged by religious viewpoints). I am not so sure about that, and in fact I wonder if we fail to grasp some of what Epicurus is saying because we are trying to fit his perspective into a mold in which life can be viewed as fair to everyone. It could be that Epicureans were flatly so convinced of the universe's total lack of overall plan that they weren't at all thinking about any "perfection" and that they were constantly thinking only on practical terms about how best to spend "the present" whatever that happens to be. This is only a half-formed thought but it comes in part from the discussion of how to view the percentage issues ReneLiza mentioned. Given that there is no absolute judge of which choices to make, it really doesn't make much sense to try to develop a science of judging any particular life against hypothetical standards that dont exist except in our mental gymnastics.

In Dons case abnormal is good!

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Yes, i don't want to imply that there's not value in reading Dewitt 's magnum opus. Dewitt does provide some insightful, helpful, and refreshing insights. It's just his use of references devoid of context, Epicurean-inspired Christianity notions, and similar dross that irks me. Someone needs to do a "Jefferson Bible" job on "Epicurus and his Philosophy."

Don has done a good job of placing his criticisms of DeWitt in context so the only thing I really want to say is to remind everyone that Don has been here a long time; he reads Greek very well; he's read tons of specialized academic articles, and he's far ahead of the curve in understanding the subtleties. He's an expert reader and researcher and he's far from being a novice.

On the other hand, if you are a "normal person" and come to the subject with only a general understanding of philosophy and where Epicurus stands in it, DeWitt's book is the single most valuable place you can start to get a quick and thorough overview of the subject. We can talk about other good books, and there are many, but I would contend that there are none anywhere in DeWitt's league for a through and sympathetic presentation of the whole of the philosophy.

I've seen it time and again and it will continue to happen. If you don't ground yourself in a thorough overview of DeWitt early in your reading, you'll spend a LOT of needless time nursing your former Buddhist or Stoic or Humanist or other positions that you will ultimately conclude (if you stay with the subject long enough) are ultimately incompatible with Epicurus.

Save yourself a lot of time and effort and even heartache and read DeWitt early in your reading process. Then you'll see the forest and you can play with the trees at your leisure for the rest of your life. I have yet to meet the person who, like Don, isn't able to see when DeWitt is going over the line drawing analogies to Christianity, and you can safely ignore those if you don't find them interesting or helpful. (And I do think that there are many people who are immersed in Christian familes and friendships for whom is commentary, especially in St Paul and Epicurus, is helpful.)

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The former only implies that X is greater than or equal to any other pleasures. It does not imply that other pleasures are all less than X or that we're making an ordered list of all pleasures in the universe.

Great point, and one I have not seen made here, as we may not have too many "mathematical hearts"! I am going to have to ask Martin why he hasn't hammered us with this point before! Martin I presume you agree with Reneliza?

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Variation is not generally preferable, it comes down to the individual.

As to this point I generally agree with it (the only word that I think we can rely on as always preferable in itself is "pleasure." But I wonder if "variety" is not something of such general significance that it merits mention in a sort of "natural and necessary" kind of way. Is not boredom a pretty general human problem?

Yes I do think you and Godfrey both are largely in agreement with DeWitt here.

In this case I think his Christian allusions are maybe better placed than in some other areas.

For example he seems almost theological with

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Only the possibility of having enjoyed all pleasures to the full in this life can counterbalance the relinquishment of the hope of enjoying eternal pleasures in the afterlife

I do think that Epicurus was aiming for something like that - an explanation that is not only logical but rises to an emotional level of satisfaction necessary to combat the emotional lure of false religion.

Even Dewitts cite of

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He liveth long who liveth well

And

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It is not growing like a tree, in bulk,

Doth make man better be

Seem pretty good to me.

In virtually all of what we are doing we are looking to lock in confidence in the conclusion, and if we don't phrase the argument in an understandable and even gripping way it's hard to accomplish that goal.

Epicurus' example of picking not just the bulkiest but the most tasteful food at a banquet is really good for that, I think. It's real world and we can immediately grasp its attractiveness in combatting the maybe more immediate thought of looking for the "longest" rather than the "most pleasant.". There may not be a universal ranking of pleasures in terms of desirability, but I think we have to clearly identify in our minds that duration or time is only one aspect of our perception of pleasures, and not the most important aspect of our ranking. If we internalize even that simple observation I think that carries us a long way to the understanding we need.

Even - especially - the analogy of the Alpine climber working to gain the summit is a good analogy. We want very badly to get there and the achievement is tremendously emotional and satisfying, but we don't have to - or want to - stay there very long.

And DeWitt connects this to the "unity of pleasure"

THE UNITY OF PLEASURE

If at this point the attention be recalled to the synoptic view, it may be observed that the telos has been presented under three aspects: first, as a unitary good it is pleasure; second, as a dualistic good it is health of mind and health of body; third, in a seemingly negative aspect it is freedom from fear in the mind and pain in the body. This seeming negativism was spotted by the antagonists of Epicurus as a chink in his armor, and the arrows of their dialectic were concentrated upon it. The weakness alleged was that of calling two disparate things by the one name of pleasure.

It is plain to see how Epicurus was led to switch emphasis to this aspect of pleasure. As usual, he was working his way to greater precision in his analysis of the subject and, as will presently be shown in more detail, he discerned that according to Aristippus and Plato no such thing as continuous pleasure was possible; they recognized only peaks of pleasure separated by intervals either devoid of pleasure or neutral or mixed. From this it followed with inevitable logic that the wise man could not be happy at all times. This conclusion was repugnant to Epicurus as a thoroughgoing hedonist and was repudiated. This repudiation could be made good only by vindicating for freedom from fear and pain the status of a positive pleasure. This in turn resulted in a doctrine of the unity of all pleasure.

Though we certainly fall short of possessing the whole argument of Epicurus, there is ample evidence upon which to construct the skeleton of a case. The Feelings, as usual, are the criterion. It may be recalled how he proved life itself to be the greatest good by pointing out that the greatest joy is associated with the escape from some dreadful destruction. By a similar argument, even if not extant, it could be shown that the recovery of health is a positive pleasure when the individual has recently survived a perilous illness. It would be a positive pleasure also to be freshly relieved from the fear of death and the gods through the discovery of the true philosophy.

To substantiate this drift of reasoning it is not impossible to quote a text: "The stable condition of well-being in the flesh and the confident hope of its continuance means the most exquisite and infallible of joys for those who are capable of figuring the problem out." S6

This passage marks a distinct increase of precision in the analysis of pleasure. Its import will become clear if the line of reasoning already adumbrated be properly extended: let it be granted that the escape from a violent death is the greatest of joys and the inference must follow that the possession of life at other times cannot rank greatly lower. Similarly, if the recovery from a dangerous illness be a cause for joy, manifestly the possession of health ought to be a joy at other times. Nevertheless the two pleasures differ from one another and it was in recognition of the difference that Epicurus instituted the distinction between kinetic and static pleasures. The difference is one of intensity or, as Epicurus would have said, of condensation. At one time the pleasure is condensed, at another, extended. In other words the same pleasure may be either kinetic or static. If condensed, it is kinetic; if extended, it is static.

There is a catch to this reasoning, however; it holds good only "for those who are capable of figuring the problem out." This marks Epicurus as a pragmatist, insisting upon the control of experience, including thought. His reasoning about kinetic and static pleasures is sound, but human beings do not automatically reason after this fashion; they fail to reason about the matter at all. Although they would spontaneously admit the keenest joy at recovery from wounds or disease, they forget about the blessing of health at other times. Hence it is that Epicurus insists upon the necessity of being able to reason in this way. Moreover, this reasoning must be confirmed by habituation. The same rule applies here as in the case of "Death is nothing to us." It is not enough to master the reasons for so believing; it is also necessary to habituate one's self to so believe.37 This is pragmatism.

There is also another catch to this line of reasoning. The conclusion clashes with the teaching of Aristippus and Plato and it also violates the accepted usage of language. It was not usual to call the possession of health a pleasure and still less usual to call freedom from pain a pleasure. It was this objection that Cicero had in mind when he wrote: "You Epicureans round up people from all the crossroads, decent men, I allow, but certainly of no great education. Do such as they, then, comprehend what Epicurus means, while I, Cicero, do not?" 38 The common people of the ancient world, however, for whom Platonism had nothing attractive, seem to have accepted Epicurean pragmatism with gladness. Cicero, being partial to the aristocratic philosophy and having no zeal to promote the happiness of the multitude, chose to sneer.

The irritation which Cicero simulates in the above passage was beyond doubt genuine with those from whom the argument was inherited. They had been nettled by the phraseology of Epicurus, who was mocking Plato. The words "those who are capable of figuring the problem out" are a parody of Plato's Timaeus 4od, where the text reads "those who are incapable of making the calculations" and the reference is to mathematical calculations of the movements of the celestial bodies, which "bring fears and portents of future events" to the ignorant. Baiting the adversary was a favorite sport of Epicurus.

Epicureans at a later time were in their turn subjected to incessant baiting by Stoic opponents, and it may have been these who tried the reduction to the absurd by means of a ridiculous example. If those who are not in a state of pain are in a state of pleasure, "then the host who, though not being thirsty himself, mixes a cocktail for a guest is in the same state of pleasure as the guest who is thirsty and drinks the said cocktail." 39

Cicero, however, had his tongue in his cheek and knew that this was mere dialectical sparring, intended rather to disconcert the opponent than to refute him. He was partial to the New Academy and to Stoicism, both of which tended to turn argumentation into a game and thus make it an end in itself. They could not fail to be intolerant of the procedures of pragmatism, of which action is the primary object and not logomachy.

This extension of the name of pleasure to freedom from fear and pain was not the sole achievement of the new analysis. In popular thought, the correctness of which Plato assumed, pleasures were classified according to the parts of the body affected, eating, drinking, sexual indulgence, philosophical thinking. In respect also of this conventional classification Epicurus exhibited finer discrimination. He not only discerned that the pleasure associated with one organ is brief and intense while that associated with other parts is moderate and extended but also observed that certain pleasures, like that of escaping a violent death, affect the whole organism.

The next step in this new analysis was to declare that this fact of extension or intension was of no fundamental importance. The high value assigned to this principle is indicated by its promulgation as Authorized Doctrine 9: "If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." Positively stated, the meaning would be that pleasure is always pleasure; it is of no consequence that some pleasures are associated with the mind, others with the stomach, and others with other parts, or that some affect the whole organism and others only a part, or that some are brief and intense, others moderate and extended. In other words, it makes no difference that some pleasures are static and others kinetic. Pleasure is a unit. This unity could be expressed in ancient terminology by saying that all pleasure was a kind of motion, kinesis or motio, the ancient equivalent of reaction.

To put the colophon upon this topic it should be added that three Authorized Doctrines, Nos. 8, 9, and 10, deal with pleasure and all three imply the quality of unity. The eighth stresses the fact that the evil attaches solely to the consequences; all pleasures are alike in being good: "No pleasure is evil in itself but the practices productive of certain pleasures bring troubles in their train that by many times outweigh the pleasures themselves."

The ninth Doctrine has been quoted above. In it the item about "condensed pleasure" was pounced upon by Damoxenus of the New Comedy as a good cue for merrymaking; quite aptly he allowed a cook to dilate upon it.40 Some five centuries afterward the frivolous Alciphron testified to the longevity of the theme by assuming it to be still good for a laugh.41

The tenth Doctrine, last of the three, serves to shift all ethical condemnation from pleasures themselves to the consequences: "If the practices productive of the pleasures of profligates dispelled the fears of the mind about celestial things and death and pains and also taught the limit of the desires, we should never have fault to find with profligates, enjoying pleasures to the full from all quarters, and suffering neither pain nor distress from any quarter, wherein the evil lies." Such declarations afforded to enemies of Epicurus a means of besmirching his name, but he was absolutely honest; he did not evade the logical implications of his principles; he flaunted them. By disposition he was a teaser; he drew enjoyment from the squirming of the piously orthodox.

A variation of the same teaching appears in an isolated saying. "I enjoy the fullness of pleasure living on bread and water and I spit upon the pleasures of a luxurious diet, not on account of any evil in these pleasures themselves but because of the discomforts that follow upon them." 42 The net effect of these pronouncements is to put all pleasures in a single class, all being good, irrespective of extension or condensation or of the organ affected or of approval or disapproval, which attach only to consequences. This is an instance where Epicurus exhibited deeper insight than Plato in the latter's own field, discerning the one in the many.

Here is some of the key material on this from DeWitt's chapter on "The New Hedonism". This excerpt starts in the middle of the previous section before the immortality discussion.

It is impossible to whip up a thirst or an appetite superior to that created by natural hunger and thirst. To the youthful Menoeceus Epicurus writes: "Plain-tasting foods bring a pleasure equal to that of luxurious diet when once the pain arising from need has been removed, and bread and water afford the very keenest pleasure when one in need of them brings them to his lips." 22 This is the fixed ceiling for pleasure, which he endeavors to establish in opposition to Plato, who compared the appetitive part of the soul to "a many-headed beast" and held to the opinion that desires increase endlessly and that pleasure defied the fixing of a limit.23

The natural and necessary desires that still await mention are those for clothing and shelter. The authorized teaching concerning these will be made plain by the first half of Authorized Doctrine 18: "The pleasure in the flesh is incapable of increase when once the pain arising from need has been removed but is merely embellished." The Greek word here rendered "embellished" has also been translated by "varied" and by "variegated," but these renderings fall short of revealing the meaning. Seneca does better when interpreting the word as "to season, as it were, and divert."24 This is correct; to luxurious men it is a fact that eating is a way of passing the time. Epicurus himself applies the word poikilmata, "embellishments," to food, Vatican Saying 69: "It is the ingratitude of the soul that makes the creature endlessly lickerish of embellishments in diet."

Cicero, however, happens to be our best guide, because the meaning of his version is made clear by Lucretius. He says "the pleasure can be variari distinguique but not increased." 25 The first of the verbs italicized applies properly to color and the second to needlework, as may be gleaned in the lexicon. Lucretius confirms this: "It hurts us not a whit to lack the garment bright with purple and gold and embroidered with striking designs, provided there still be a plain cloak to fend off the cold." 2«

When once the meaning of poikillo has been fixed as "embellish" and applicable alike to diet, clothing, and housing, the doctrine can be extended with precision. The function of walls is to afford protection from the weather; the enjoyment of this is a basic pleasure, and, being basic, cannot be increased. If the walls are decorated, the enjoyment of them is merely a decorative pleasure. Similarly, the function of a garment is to avert the pain arising from cold and the resulting pleasure is basic and, being such, cannot be increased but is merely embellished if the cloth is gaily colored or brocaded.

The case is not different in respect of diet. The satisfaction of natural hunger is the basic pleasure, which is not increased but merely embellished by richness of diet. Epicurus is recorded by a late doxographer as saying: "I am gorged with pleasure in this poor body of mine living on bread and water." 27 Porphyry records him as saying: "It is better for you to lie down upon a cheap cot and be free of fear than to have a gilded bedstead and a luxurious table and be full of trouble." 28

In the same Authorized Doctrine, 18, in which the ceiling of pleasure for the flesh is defined, the ceiling of pleasure for the mind is set forth: "As for the mind, its limit of pleasure is begotten by reasoning out these very problems and those akin to these, all that once created the worst fears for the mind." These words need not seem enigmatical: the worst fears are created for the mind through false opinions concerning death and the gods, the topic of Authorized Doctrines 1 and 2. These fears rank in point of importance with false opinions concerning pleasure and pain, the topic of Doctrines 2 and 4. The cure for all these false opinions and the fears they entail was dubbed by detractors the tetrapharmacon, or fourfold remedy. It is charmingly elaborated by Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus, which alone of his extant writings possesses literary grace.

In this letter the doctrine of the basic pleasures and the consequent fullness of pleasure is elaborated: "It is for this that we do everything, to be free from pain and fear, and when we succeed in this, all the tempest of the soul is stilled, the creature feeling no need to go farther as to something lacking and to seek something else by which the good of soul and body shall be made perfect."29 In speaking of "going farther" and "seeking something more" he refers to the superfluous or merely embellishing pleasures.

PLEASURE NOT INCREASED BY IMMORTALITY

At the same time that the denial of immortality resulted in placing body and soul upon a parity and required the formulation of a dualistic good, it demanded a doctrinal counterpoise for the surrender of belief in immortality. That this surrender was recognized in the reasoning of Epicurus as a further delimitation of the scope of pleasure is indicated by the position of the Authorized Doctrine in which the remedial doctrine is stated; it is No. 19 and follows that on the ceilings of pleasure: "Infinite time and finite time are characterized by equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason." This is both paradoxical and subtle. It is shocking to Christian feeling and was hardly less so to the pagan of antiquity. To the multitude, as Lucretius observed, it was a gloomy and repulsive thought.30 To Platonists, with their stately, elaborate, and mystical eschatology, it must have seemed like nihilism.

Its subtlety is equally manifest. As will presently be shown, Epicurus maintained that pleasure is not altered in kind by the fact of duration or extension; here he declares that it is not increased in quantity. All pleasures have fixed ceilings and fixed magnitudes. When in the words of the Doctrine he speaks of "measuring the limits of pleasure by reason," he means recognition of the fact that for the body health and the expectation of its continuance is the limit of pleasure, and that for the mind the limit is the emancipation from all fear of the gods or death. The attainment to this state, he now declares, is a condition of one dimension. He seems to think of it as an Alpinist would regard the ascent of an arduous mountain peak. The pleasure would not be increased by remaining on the peak.

THE FULLNESS OF PLEASURE

It is possible, however, to arrive at a higher degree of precision, always a chief objective in the reasoning of Epicurus. This higher precision depends upon discerning the subsidiary doctrine of the fullness of pleasure. For this there is a double logical basis: the first basis is the infinity of time, from which it is deduced that there can be nothing new. As the Epicurean Ecclesiastes expresses it, 1:9: "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." Lucretius reminds us in similar vein "that all things are always the same" and "no new pleasure can be devised."31 From this it follows that the exhaustion of pleasures is feasible and the fullness of pleasure is attainable.

The second basis of this subsidiary doctrine is the existence of natural ceilings of pleasure, which, being thus limited, could be enjoyed to the full. Out of this was begotten the familiar metaphor of the aged sage as taking leave of life like a satisfied banqueter. This theme was chosen by Lucretius for the ringing finale of his third book; he personifies Nature and represents her as rebuking the complainer because he cannot depart "as a guest who has had his fill of life" or "as one who is full and has had his fill of experience." 32 The wise man, on the contrary, can say bene vixi, "I have lived the good life." This is the cry of triumph uttered by old Diogenes of Oenoanda; to quote his own words: "Facing the sunset of life because of my age and on the verge of taking my leave of life with a paean of victory because of the enjoyment of the fullness of all pleasures." 33

If still further precision on this topic be sought, it may be observed that this doctrine of the fullness of pleasure is supplementary to the doctrine that death is anesthesia. The latter may help to reconcile men to the state of being dead but it fails to compensate for the surrender of immortality.

Only the possibility of having enjoyed all pleasures to the full in this life can counterbalance the relinquishment of the hope of enjoying eternal pleasures in the afterlife. This is the "true understanding" of which Epicurus speaks: "Hence the true understanding of the fact that death is nothing to us renders enjoyable the mortality of existence, not by adding infinite time but by taking away the yearning for immortality." 34 What cancels the yearning for immortality is the conviction that the fullness of pleasure is possible in this mortal life. The ingenuity of this argument is undeniable; it means the victory over death and we have proof of its wide acceptance in the vigor with which St. Paul in his ardent plea to the Corinthians champions the resurrection of the dead as a new means of victory over death.

Incidentally, without close scrutiny it is difficult to discern by what sort of logic this doctrine could be reconciled with the perfect blissfulness of the gods. If pleasure is not increased by the length of its duration, how could the lot of the gods seem more desirable than that of the mortal sage? With this problem Epicurus did not fail to deal. The topic must await detailed treatment in the ensuing chapter on the True Piety. Here it will suffice to say that the superiority of the happiness of the gods is represented as consisting in the perfect assurance of its continuance. Involved with this judgment is a startling paradox: what renders the happiness of the gods eternal is this perfect assurance of its continuance; its eternity is a result, not a factor of causation. It is a quality of life.

The paradox that ranks major to this, that happiness is not increased in magnitude by immortality, has found its way into Western thought through the literature of consolation. Obviously, if happiness is not increased by immortality, neither can it be increased by length of mortal life. The philosopher Seneca expatiates upon this inferred aspect of the doctrine, though without mentioning its source, and comforts his correspondent by dwelling feelingly upon the wisdom of measuring a human life by its achievement rather than its length.35 In the course of this homily he compares the long and merely vegetative life to that of a tree and this detail survives for us in the poem of Ben Jonson which begins,

It is not growing like a tree, in bulk,

Doth make man better be.

But the last lines of the poem hark back definitely to Epicurus:

In small proportions we just beauty see

And in small measure life may perfect be.

The sentiment recurs in Christian hymnology:

He liveth long who liveth well.

Such is often the fate of Epicurus, to be quoted anonymously if approved, by name if condemned.

Quote from Godfrey

At least that's my current take. I found these rather baffling before reading this thread, but this seems to me to be the clearest reading.

And that is the point of this thread!

Don how would you restate what Godfrey is saying?

Don has recently emphasized the importance of not reading the Doctrines in isolation from each other, and that the original format probably was not divided into 40 doctrines as we have them.

Let's talk about how they are logically divided in narrative form. Here is a first draft at dividing them logically - can this be improved?

The Principal Doctrines [The Epicurus College Wiki]

Quote from Titus

Personally, I would interpret PD19 in the sense that we should not worry about the idea of infinitive ages but focus on a good standing in our nowadays condition and be happy about it.

Yes i think that is the lesson to be learned, but is there not also in here a "why we shouldn't worry" aspect beyond the fact that it is not possible for us to rival the length of life that the "gods" enjoy?

Quote from Titus

Therefore we should enjoy and not disturb ourselves with unrealistic ideas of perfect and infinitive forms.

And to ask the question the same way, isn't he saying that there is no "need" for a longer or infinite lifespan, because from a certain mental perspective the longer lifespan does not translate into an improvement?

What I am saying is that pretty clearly, as everyone so far is observing, we don't "need" an infinite span of life, even if it were available to us. He's saying there is some mental perspective from which a longer time is not "better" than a shorter time (thus the banquet analogy). Can we not improve our ability to articulate what that perspective is, describing also how "variation" (additional experiences) do not improve the picture?

I would add that I think it would be a major mistake to think that Epicurus would suggest that "word games" can change reality. The reality is that a person who loves 50 years can experience a much larger total number of pleasurable experiences than can a person who loves only 20 years and dies. No fine words from Epicurus or anyone else could hope to change the "inequity" of that situation. Life is not fair - there are no gods or fate to make it so.

But is it not still useful to point out to people that no matter how many years they live, each day is still essentially a repetition in many ways of past days - from a "nothing new under the sun" perspective. And that at some point if we think about it closely enough we can recognize that an endless series of similar experiences would eventually tire us out in a BIll Murray "Groundhog Day" kind of way. And that if we concentrate on filling our jelly bean jars on the days we have available to us, then when our end nears we can understand that we did the best we could with our time, and that if we had longer to live we would not be able to experience a more intense form of pleasure that we had somehow missed out on, but simply more time filling and refilling the same amount of jelly beans in our jar.

At least for me, the older I get the more I do in fact see that doing the same things over an over again does in fact "get old" no matter how much I like them the first times around.

I really think it is useful to talk in terms of picture analogies like the pink circles.

Another useful analogy is the jelly bean jar that is filled to the brim with jelly beans.

Once filled, the jar cannot hold any further beans. But if we force more into it with the result of crowding some out that spill, we have "variation" of the contents of the jar.

Do we agree that variation of the contents is desirable, if not absolutely necessary?

What of the amount of time which the jar survives to hold those beans while they are varying? Is the amount of time the jar holds together not at least relevant in some way to the total number of beans gathered within it over time?

It makes perfect and obvious sense to say that once filled the jar cannot hold more at a single moment.

But I would submit that it makes no sense at all to totally ignore the larger total number of jelly beans that a jar that lasts 50 years can gather over a jar that lasts ten years.

Do not BOTH observations have to be considered in summarizing the big picture?

Godfrey you are saying that he is saying that because human lifespans are by nature finite then it is useless to talk about infinite time(?)

I think that is true and possibly a part of the issue, but for a man who prodes himself on clarity I think Epicurus could have said exactly that had that been the main point he wanted to make. If that was intended to be his main point, that strikes me as a "too cute" way of stating a subject on which he would likely have been deadly earnest.

Rather than me be the heavy here and always sound like I am disagreeing maybe the best way to eventually approach this is to round up some volunteer 20 to 30 year olds and run our proposals by them for reaction.

We are far from being finished with our proposals so we need more first, but my personal litmus test is whether those intelligent 20-30 year olds will say that they (1) find the proposed point understandable AND (2) find it convincing given what they know themselves regardless of what they think of Epicurean philosophy.

I am hoping we can draft Charles and reneliza and @smoothiekiwi and @Root304 and DavidN as a start. Who am I missing who is generally in that "youthful" category? If you think of others please tag them here in this thread too. I apologize if I missed someone but I am not sure of all the ages we have here.

No offense to those of us who are "aging out" but I think this is one of those real litmus test questions where people tend to gloss over taking a position by fitting it into the black box of "limit of pleasure is absence of pain", and I think it would help to get a more youthful "vigorous" perspective.

We know that Epicurus has clearly said (to Menoeceus) that we do not pick the largest quantity at a banquet, but the "most pleasant." Do we not therefore think that there is something at work here in PD19 other than a reference to our limited lifespan?

To call up another memory, I suspect that Reneliza's pink circles are relevant here. I wonder if she thinks they are?

Quote from Don

Third, I am becoming firmly convinced that we need to do away with bulleted list of Principal Doctrines and begin to read it as it was written. As a prose text, not a list. If read that way, the answer is in the text. How do we "reason" it out? "the mind, thinking through the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time." We think through what it means for pleasure to have a limit. Well, it seems to me Epicurus is saying that once we have filled every nook and cranny of our minds with peace and pleasure and rid it of fears and anxieties and troubled thoughts and have a sure confidence of not losing that, you're filled up. You can vary your pleasure, but at that point your perspective on life is unassailable, filled with joy, in fact your mind never flees from joy, that is your default mode of being and interacting with the world. Living in that way is what can make one equal to the gods.

I largely agree with this, especially as to the need to read it as a narrative so as to get the full context.

However I observe that maybe the majority of "scholars" out there are happy to read the sentence in the letter to Menoeceus almost as if Epicurus never said anything else:

"When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind."

So I think it would be good training for us to take the most controversial sentences the same way that they are often taken by less-sympathetic writers and look for the best responses.

In this case I do think that the key is going to be found in Epicurus' intent as to the word translated here as "greater." We are regularly hitting a wall in our discussions as to whether one pleasure is "greater" or "better" or "more desirable" than another, and I think the answer is that at least as to the individual, the answer is clearly yes. And as Epicurus said as to the man at the banquet, we don't look for the longest but the "most pleasant."

Ultimately I think we have to dive into the issues involving what "most pleasant" really means. I feel certain that we can eliminate "duration" as the primary meaning, although duration is probably one component of several. We've discussed "intensity" and other words in the past. I think what you have written Don here is key " once we have filled every nook and cranny of our minds with peace and pleasure and rid it of fears and anxieties and troubled thoughts and have a sure confidence of not losing that, you're filled up..." but I think it takes further explanation to really make that clear -- explanation of the issue of "variation" and our proper attitude towards it, for example.

In fact right now I think "variation" is a prime subject to explore, because a lot of our wording seems to deprecate variation further than I think Epicurus probably intended for us to understand his teaching to be.

Let's say we go with this alternate translation Don quoted above, and forget the "for a moment" for the time being:

Quote

"Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning. "

Is a normal person using these words normally and giving them their normal and ordinary meanings expected to understand that a life of 25 years contains the same amount of joy as a life of 50 years?

If so, please explain how that works. If that's not a clear implication of this statement, how is it not?

[Please remember everyone that I am to some extent playing "devil's advocate" here in an attempt to draw this out more clearly. I do think that this can be made to make sense, but I am also convinced that the way that most people will interpret these words superficially will make no sense at all to them and thus be a barrier to their advancing further in studying Epicurus.]

Thanks to everyone who attended our Zoom meeting last night. We had such an in-depth discussion that we went much longer than normal. Rather than try to include that here, I have set up a new thread where the issue is more findable in the future, and I hope we can continue the discussion there: PD19 And The Meaning Of No "Greater" Pleasure