Posts by Cassius

From the above:

"In this matter as almost everywhere else, the Epicureans appealed to the truth of sense-perception – with the important caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which itself is not guaranteed to be true."

My reason for posting this:

1. I think it's an extremely perceptive sentence.
2. I wonder if Gellar-Goad was correct in including the "almost"(?) Would the sentence be equally or more accurate without the "almost?" Is there any issue in which Epicurus does NOT appeal to the truth of sense-perception with the caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which is itself not guaranteed to be true?
   1. This question might take us into the question of whether "anticipations" and "feelings" (the other two legs of the cannon) should be considered to be "perceptions." It tend to think that the answer to that is "yes," but I can see how it would be argued "no." For purposes of this question, however, I do tend to think that we "perceive" anticipations and feelings.
   2. I really like the qualifier "perception based judgement" as a way of emphasizing that Epicurus warned against relying on logic divorced from real evidence.
   3. I also really like that qualifier "which itself is not guaranteed to be true!" That's an important reminder that while Epicurean philosophy is the best philosophy we have, using it doesn't make us ominiscient or omnipotent. It's very possible even through rigorous application of Epicurean reasoning to be mistaken, especially when we simply don't have access to the raw data we want and need to be correct. The claim "Christians aren't perfect, just forgiven!" would become something more like "Epicureans aren't perfect, just doing the best it's possible for humans to do!"

Equally or more important:

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Size of the Sun as Didactic Challenge

Getting to this state of reasoned aporia is no simple task, as my ruminations above indicate. The text of DRN presents what can be taken on a simple surface reading to mean that the sun is the size of a soccer ball, a claim that may strike ancient and modern readers alike as patently ridiculous. I suggest that the complication and the seemingly questionable wording are part of the point of the passage, a call for us to apply our Epicurean philosophical and critical thinking to a knotty problem. In this respect, the Lucretian presentation of the size of the sun can be compared to the role of hunting imagery throughout the poem (Whitlatch: 2014) or the final-exam interpretation of the plague scene at the poem’s end (e.g., Clay: 1983, 257-266). Each of the three constitutes a didactic challenge to the reader, whose successful progression through the Lucretian narrator’s didactic plot entails solving the riddle it presents.

A principal element of the response to the solar challenge is to think about optics and perspective when it comes to figuring out the size of the sun. Contrary to Barnes’ claim that “there is virtually no evidence on how the Epicureans understood the perception of size,” recent scholarship on perspective in the atomic theory of Democritus gives ample clues for Epicurus’ own thinking, which can in turn be confirmed as Epicurean by examination of relevant passages elsewhere in Lucretius’ DRN. Kelli Rudolph’s study of Democritus clarifies the theoretical function of eidola in the perception of size in relation to distance. Rudolph also explores the importance of Democritus’ metaphor of wax impressions for his atomic theory of vision: Because “a wax impression is an isomorphic copy of the original, but never an exact replica” (2011, 79), the eidolic-vision theory of Democritus allows for “epistemic uncertainty in the images we see” (80). Since, according to Democritus, sight consists in the physical reception of physical emissions from viewed bodies, the objects so viewed and visions of them should not be considered identical, because the εἴδωλον of the thing is never the thing itself. For Epicurus and his followers who have adopted Democritean atomism and optics, therefore, visual sensation – though it may (inasmuch as it is a sense-perception) be infallible – requires active cognition in order for sensations to be properly related to and with their sources.

We can verify that some such theory of vision at a distance is in force in DRN by considering passages that deal with perspective in the treatment of simulacra in Book 4. The main description of how we are able to judge distance by sight appears at 4.244-255. In essence, the image emitted by the perceived object to the viewer pushes the intervening “air” (aer, 247-251) past the viewer’s eyes, and the quantity of the air is directly proportional to the distance between viewer and viewed. That the sun falls into the category of distant objects requiring intentional perspective-taking along these lines is arguably obvious, but is also suggested by the Lucretian speaker’s explanation, shortly thereafter in the same book, of the sun’s blinding power (4.325-328). According to the Lucretius-ego, the sun is endowed with great power even though it is shining from on high (vis magnast ipsius . . . alte, 326); the sun’s simulacra, therefore, as they travel through air (aera per purum, 327, a phrase that looks back to the importance of air in 4.244-255), can strike the eyes heavily enough to harm their atomic compounding. From these lines the reader can determine that the sun is not entirely a special case, but is subject to the same air-based perspectival adjustments as are other observable objects.

The image most often cited by scholars examining the Lucretian treatment of perspective is that of the tower seen from far away (4.353-363), which is square but appears at a distance to be round. According to the speaker’s explanation for the apparent roundness of the tower’s “angle” (angulus, 355), “while the simulacra are moving through a lot of air, the air with constant collisions forces it [the angle] to become dull” (aera per multum quia dum simulacra feruntur, | cogit hebescere eum crebris ostensibus aer, 358-359). As a result, “every angle all at once has escaped our perception” (suffugit sensum simul angulus omnis, 360). That the tower appears round does not make it round; that the tower is in reality square does not invalidate our perceiving it as having a round appearance from a distance. The fact that the Lucretian discussion of the size of the sun invokes readers’ sense-perception (with videtur at 5.565, inter alia) prompts them to think back to the Lucretian discussion of perception at a distance, and to recall from the tower example that data derived from visual perception degrades over distance along with the simulacra themselves. We know intuitively that the sun is farther away than such a tower, and thus we know that we need care in assessing the size of the sun, just as we would in assessing the size (and shape) of a far-off tower.

Finally, there must be perspective-taking on our tactile sensation of warmth as well as on our sight. The heat emitted by a candle, by a bonfire and by a burning building fades away at profoundly different distances – an important piece of evidence in figuring out just how big the sun appears to be. Similarly, the Lucretian speaker’s explicit introduction of heat into the Epicurean doctrine on the size of the sun may suggest to readers that they ponder as well the difference in perceived heat transmitted by the sun and the moon, despite the roughly equivalent percentage of the sky they fill – attested by, among other things, the moon’s ability to eclipse the sun for terrestrial viewers. Vision alone, it appears, is insufficient for solving the puzzle.

So the implied prompts to remember the role of heat in addition to light, and to apply our understanding of perspective to the question of the size of the sun, amount to another current in the didactic airstream of DRN. The Lucretian speaker, rather than merely parroting a ruthlessly ridiculed doctrine, instead pulls his student-readers into the process of inquiry. It becomes the didactic audience’s task to receive data from sense-perception, and to use lessons learned earlier in the poem (as about perspective and distance, cf. 4.239-268, 353-363) in making correct rational judgments based upon that sense data. Asmis reminds us that for the Lucretius-ego “there is no clash between the judgment of the senses and objective reality, because the type of fact that seems to be in conflict with sense perception does not fall within the province of sense perception at all, but belongs to an entirely distinct domain of reality . . . judged by reason.” As Demetrius Lacon writes of a related solar question, “the sun does not appear stationary, but rather it is thought to appear stationary” (Greek omitted, PHerc. 1013 col. 20.7-9; cited by Barnes: 1989, 35-36 n.36). Tricky cases such as the size of the sun, where sense data is incomplete, may require suspension of such reasoned judgment, until enough evidence becomes available to evaluate our hypotheses through the process of ἐπιμαρτύρησις, until which point the opinion must remain a προσμένον.

In the Epicurean and Lucretian account of reality, the senses themselves are infallible. The Lucretian speaker’s assertion that the sun is just as big as it is perceived to be by our senses must therefore also be infallible – just as the perception that the sun is bigger when it is close to the horizon at sunrise and sunset must be infallible, without our having to believe that the sun actually changes sizes dramatically during the day. But our interpretation of what exactly that assertion entails about the sun’s actual size is a matter of judgment, and as such is fallible and uncertain indeed. As with the argumentation presented by the Lucretius-ego throughout the poem, and as with the gripping, awful plague scene at the end of Book 6, we must be keen-scented, relentless and detached from mundane concerns and fears in order to reckon and judge accurately in cosmic matters.

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This post and the next are the two final sections of this article, for those who don't have access to the full thing. I consider this to be little short of a brilliant summary of the issue:

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Size of the Sun as Epicurean Shibboleth

The Epicureans did not believe that the sun was the size of a human foot. They distinguished between the sun’s actual size and the size of its appearance, the latter of which was the only magnitude measurable from earth with the technology available. In this matter as almost everywhere else, the Epicureans appealed to the truth of sense-perception – with the important caution that discerning reality from appearance requires perception-based judgment, which itself is not guaranteed to be true. In Lucretius’ poem, the discussion of solar magnitude adds more detail to Epicurus’ original conception, especially with the introduction of the sun’s heat into the passage. Complicated style emphasizes how full of hedges and conditioned claims the Lucretius-ego is, and his thorny exposition of the doctrine amounts to a didactic challenge that sends readers elsewhere in his work, to ponder perspective and to hunt down a proper understanding of this aspect of the natural world.

By staking out a stance of aporia conditioned by sense-perception and reasoning thereupon, the Epicureans did in fact prove to be less wrong than everyone else. Algra emphasizes that “all ancient estimates of the size of the sun, including those put forward by the mathematical astronomers, were false.”The failing of ancient mathematical science in estimate- making was pervasive since, Geoffrey Lloyd notes, “an important recurrent phenomenon in Greek speculations about nature is a premature or insecurely grounded quantification or mathematicisation.” Epicurus and his school, in avoiding a concrete statement of the sun’s size, avoided being concretely wrong, in contrast to Eudoxus and all the rest. The sun passage in DRN pushes the reader towards non-commitment rather than risking such a misjudgment.

In closing I argue that the size of the sun is an Epicurean shibboleth. In Epicurus,in Lucretius and in Demetrius,we see the same nostrum repeated, with progressive elaborations that do not fully clarify the basic precept. The persistence of Epicureans in this formulation is not so much the result of reflexive dogma or pseudo-intellectual obscurantism as it is a passphrase, a litmus test. Think like an Epicurean, and you will figure out that the sun’s appearance and the sun itself are two related but distinct things with two different sizes; that you must keep the infallible data of the senses, tactile as well as visual, in proper perspective when making judgments about your perception; and that the available data is insufficient to estimate the sun’s magnitude to an acceptable degree of confidence (compare Barnes: 1989, 36). Think that Epicureans believe the sun’s diameter is a foot,that they are absurd,and you have exposed yourself as un-Epicurean. The first/second-century AD Stoic doxographer Cleomedes, who as Algra points out “nowhere takes account of the Epicurean principle of multiple explanations,”likewise fails this test when he mocks Epicurus’ position on the size of the sun.

Thinking like an Epicurean – rather than figuring out the actual size of the sun – is, I suggest, the point of the Lucretian passage on the size of the sun, as it is indeed the fundamental point of Epicurean natural philosophy generally. Constantina Romeo suggests that Epicurus’ moral program of liberating humankind from the fear of death motivates his followers’ ardent defense of his claims on the sun’s size. Since Epicurus presented understanding of the natural and celestial world as essential for a life of ataraxia, “nel momento in cui lo Stoico ritiene di avere dimostrato l’errore di Epicuro nella scienza della natura, sostiene pure che Epicuro non ha dato nessun conforto di fronte alla morte” (“in the moment in which the Stoic [Posidonius] thinks he has shown Epicurus’ mistakes in natural science, he also claims that Epicurus has provided no comfort in the face of death”).

Yet Posidonius has actually failed the test, has misunderstood the stakes of the debate. Precise measurement of the sun’s size is not what is at issue for the Epicureans, and so proof of scientific error does not vitiate Epicurus’ moral philosophy. The Epicureans pushed back so fiercely against their opponents’ (mis)characterizations of Epicurus’ position because of the underlying epistemological and phenomenological principles. It does not matter to Epicurean ethics or to ataraxia whether the size of the sun is known. After all, the Epicureans did not even need to afix a certain size to the sun to accomplish their core epistemological objective: to remove anxiety about divine control over cosmological phenomena. What matters, and the underlying reason for this Epicurean shibboleth, is a readiness to use careful reasoning and good judgment to embrace uncertainty about the nature of things without succumbing to the anxiety-inducing fear of death.

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Started June 15, 2022:

"For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways. Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, we must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth." - Letter to Pythocles [87]

I just observed that that article was published in 1976 - forty+ years ago. I still haven't had a chance to read the full thing but the date makes me realize that it would be interesting to know whether David Sedley's attitudes towards Epicurus have changed over the years. I haven't tried to figure out where David Sedley is in life (retired? still teaching?) but it would be interesting to hear from him how, if at all, his views of Epicurean philosophy have changed after a lifetime of study -- especially on an issue like how to approach a question (like Epicurus' views on geometry) where the evidence is often from a hostile tradition, and how he approaches deciding whether those accusations are justified.

For example I am really impressed with the analysis of the "Epicurus on the Size of the Sun" essay by Gellar-Goad as an example of how someone sympathetic to Epicurus can take the big picture and put even the most (apparently) questionable position in a much better light.

Thanks to Don for this link, which appears to have a lot of good information in it!

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus

www.academia.edu

Here's the point that appears to me to behind everything:

Given that the only "unchanging reality" in Epicurean terms is at the level of the atoms and void, and that's clearly NOT what Plato was taking about, the contention that our attention should be drawn away from the world around us to "an unchanging reality" that does not exist -- those are fighting words, and a very damaging thing to teach to children or adults! So I would fully expect Epicurus to want to upend the entire issue by drilling down to separate what might be helpful in geometry from what would be a damaging fiction.

It seems to me that rigorously speaking *nothing* should be considered to be a goal on its own other than "pleasure" or "pleasurable living" (if the word "living" is needed, which it's really not).

This is one of those issues that I can see Epicurus wanting to nail down so emphatically and repeatedly that lots of people would think he's overstating the point, but truthfully it can't be said often enough because people don't understand the implication:

"Ultimately" - NOTHING is "good in itself" or "a goal in itself" other than pleasure.

Anything that we set up as an interim goal, if that process and pursuit causes us to lose sight of the ultimate goal, becomes an obstacle to our progress rather than a help.

Yes I have only read a page or two. I detect a conclusion that is probaby more harsh than it needs to be as to whether Epicurus was "wrong" but I will reserve judgment til I read the whole thing. The basic point he's addressing as to the relationship between geometry and reality is a big one and this paper looks like a great addition to our past discussions on this.

Don that article you cite from Sedley needs a thread of its own!

Heres a reference to a quote I could not remember in the podcast:

When the Facts Change, I Change My Mind. What Do You Do, Sir? – Quote Investigator

Episode 126 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we begin the discussion of Epicurus' letter to Pythocles, and we discuss many aspects of the basic approach of Epicurus toward the study of nature. This is one of our longer - but probably also one of our more important - episodes, so we hope you enjoy it and we invite your comment. Of special note: Don rejoins us for several special episodes!

We went with a modified size graphic this time -- join us Wednesday night if you can.

This is spurred by the new book ""Epicureans In Rome" linked by Joshua here: "Lucretius on the Size of the Sun", by T.H.M. Gellar-Goad

Chapter Two of that Book is: "Sint Ista Graecorum: How to be an Epicurean in Late Republican Rome – Evidence from Cicero’s On Ends" and the writer (Geert Roskam) says:

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"In the second book of On Ends, Cicero blames Torquatus for an embarrassing inconsistency. Whereas Torquatus claims to do everything for the sake of pleasure, he cannot possibly maintain this stance while addressing the senate (2.74 - 77). On such occasions, he prefers to dwell on duty, fair-dealing, moral worth and so on; in short, to switch to the vocabulary of the Stoics and Peripatetics. And not without reason, for to be honest about his real political motivations when talking to the senators would almost surely ruin his later political career (.). And thus, Cicero concludes, Torquatus is forced to employ artificial language in order to conceal what he really thinks, or “change his opinions like his clothes,” confining his true convictions to a small circle of intimate friends and defending counterfeit opinions in public (.). This, to my mind, is one of the strongest arguments in Book  of On Ends. Cicero knew very well what kind of discourse was usually heard in the Roman senate and saw an obvious contrast with Torquatus’ Epicurean ideals. The whole passage is characterized by a strong rhetorical tone, but also makes a valid philosophical point, on the basis of the specifically Roman political context. What could Torquatus say in reply to this challenge? (emphasis added)

Roskom goes on and gives some discussion that takes the edge off this, but I don't think we need to admit that this is even a strong agument I think it is in fact easy to recast stand Stoic calls to "honor" and "duty" and "virtue" into the framework of "love of country" and "love of friends" and "the pleasures that we value in our community" in ways that make clear the ultimate argument that everything we value stems from the pleasure that it brings us.

Roskom also seems to fault Torquatus for not having much to say on this point, but I think in all issues like that we have to go first to the point that this Torquatus and this conversation were not real, and we would not expect a lawyer/advocate like Cicero to "play fair" and give his opponent the last and best word.

I think it would be easy and fun as an exercise to take most any of Cicero's famous speeches to the Senate (and the Phillipics come to my mind first) and recast / rewrite them as if Cicero were an Epicurean and if he were using Epicurus' arguments in the Senate.

When I can find the time I will take one of these Phillipics and rewrite it, asking for the same things Cicero was asking for from the Senate, but writing it in Epicurean terms:

M. Tullius Cicero, Orations, The fourteen orations against Marcus Antonius (Philippics), THE FOURTEEN ORATIONS OF M. T. CICERO AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS, CALLED PHILIPPICS., section 1

Something else I want to check:. I believe this article is one of those situations where we can point out that Dewitt did not defend Epicurus strongly enough! I seem to remember but need to check that Dewitt hints at this analysis but in the end considera Epircurus to have been wrong on this issue. If so then this current article will definitely supercede Dewitt's analysis on this issue.

Ok as I write this I will try to restrain my enthusiasm:

This is an OUTSTANDING article. I completely agree with the author's analysis and direction, and if this is an example of the very latest Epicurean scholarship then we are definitely moving in the right direction.

The writer builds IMHO a very strong case that the summary viewpoint "The sun is the size that it appears to be" is an Epicurean "litmus test" of a proper understanding of the philosophy, akin to "Death is nothing to us" or "nothing can be created from nothing."

As we are currently discussing in the podcast, reaching conclusions about things we see in the sky presents a difficult issue of limited evidence, and the worst thing we can do is to affix ourselves to a single position when multiple options are possible.

The statement that the size of the sun is what it appears to be does not give a single answer, but emphasizes that any or all answers must be based on "appearance" (the senses) which is what EVERY conclusion in life must also be based upon.

The concluding section of the essay goes into this in much more detail and I highly recommend it. I think the position he advocates is where many of us are already on this topic, but this article goes further than Bailey or even Sedley and really nails down a position that I think will serve most of us very well going on into the future. It will also nail us more firmly into the position that the senses are the foundation for all our conclusions about reality, and in fact that is very likely the intended purpose of the formulation.

We may have to designate someone every Twentieth to start the session saying:

"The Size Of The Sun Is As It Appears To Be!"

Yes , thank you for this post. I saw headlines about the article but haven't had a chance to read it.

I think the issue of "artificial intelligence" is definitely of interest in Epicurean studies, because it helps us focus on what "life" really means, and how life is different from "logic" - no matter how complex.

Over time this would be a really good topic to explore so thanks for starting it!

It is apparently Usener 423 citing Plutarch, here from Epicurism.info

Epicurus.info : E-Texts : Epicurea

We talked about some of this in the podcast recording today and it is truly a rabbit chase.

I am not sure the chase can even get off the ground until we decide what we mean by "good", which is well before we put any modifiers on the term like natural or necessary or intrinsic or instrumental or anything else.

And part of answering that question probably means coming to terms with what Epicurus really meant in his warning about walking around uselessly harping on the meaning of good.

Do we end up,as Francis Wright apparently did (need to check the text) concluding that there is nothing good but pleasure, and nothing bad/evil but pain?

I am tempted to say the answer is "yes" but so much depends on the subtle meanings assigned to the words in even that formulation.

I tend to think that whenever someone wants to discuss this, they are suggesting that inseparable from the word "good" is an implicit "always." And if that is the case, I find it very difficult to designate anything as "always good" other than pleasure.

Or do we define the good as Torquatus suggested in On Ends that "everyone agrees...." That as to the "supreme good" ---

"The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations."

One thing that would be good would be to see if we can find examples of where such terms were used in the core texts. This will be a good discussion!

That's because it won't be recorded until tomorrow! I used to put "preproduction" on advance threads to indicate that and I will go back to that habit. Thanks!