What did you think about what I gather is Sedleys major point, that this is targeted at the cyreniacs and is meant to emphasize the point that virtue brings pleasure as it is engaged in and is not necessarily painful (as the cyreniacs argued)?

To make sense of this I think we have to consider that the Epicureans we're using a more flexible / relativistic definition of "virtue.". (And if that is so then this ends up being good support for the argument that the virtue of the Epicureans is different from the absolute virtue of the other Greeks.)

Sigh. I see I downloaded this article two years ago. Maybe we have already discussed this and I have forgotten. Maybe I should be thinking about old age being the cause that precedes forgetfulness!

OK so the writer of the article is suggesting that the target is not the Stoics but the Cyreniacs:

As we have seen, we are looking for a school which shares the Epicurean doctrinethat virtue has instrumental value as a cause of pleasure, but which differs in making virtue an antecedent cause of pleasure, itself not intrinsically pleasant but instead related to pleasure more in the way that surgery is (VI 4—11). As far as I can see, the only possible candidates are the Cyrenaics. Apart from the Epicureans, they are the only ancient hedonist school, and, more specifically, the only school to recommend virtue on the grounds that it produces pleasure. But given that the Cyrenaics share the Epicurean view that arete is of instrumental rather than intrinsic value, is there enough of a gap between the two schools to permit the present disagreement?

Yes, and a crucial one.

Epicurus insists strongly on the simultaneity and inseparability of virtue and pleasure. As the Epicurean doxography at DL10.138 puts it, 'Epicurus also says that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, while other things, such as food, do get separated from it.'

Partly answering my own question here is one article and of course (I should have expected) it is by David Sedley:

Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic ethics

Diogenes of Oenoanda on Cyrenaic ethics

www.academia.edu

Smith s general idea about the passage is as follows. It is in its entirety an anti-Stoic polemic, and focuses on the Stoic concept of oikeiosis our natural affinity for ourselves and others.

The Stoics, he thinks, are first accused of offering oikeiosis or perhaps more specifically self-love, as a bait to lure people into virtue. Then, after a gap at IV which Smith leaves unreconstructed, they are accused of self-contradiction, in that they reject pleasure, yet at the same time agree with the Epicureans about the reliability of the senses, with Diogenes joking that they do this in order to ensure their own right to take the safest route when climbing crags. The alleged self-contradiction, Smith suggests, lies in the fact that the Stoics deny that pleasure is the end, yet endorse the senses, which in fact (according to the Epicureans, at least) provide the evidence that pleasure is the end. Then starting from V 2 Diogenes, after referring at lines 4-5 to a Stoic doctrine of self-love, adds a new charge: the Stoics think that all causes are antecedent, not realising that some are contemporaneous with their effects and some later than them. Why should this complaint be apposite to the Stoics? Smith s answer is that the Stoics are being accused of failing to grasp the Epicurean insight that virtue is the simultaneous cause of pleasure, and failing to grasp it because they mistakenly think all causes must precede their effects. He accepts the objection that this, if so, is a mistaken interpretation of Stoicism, which certainly held many causes to be contemporaneous with their effects; but he argues that Diogenes is quite capable of misrepresenting his opponents, and that there are Stoic doctrines - such as the doctrine that every event has an antecedent cause - which do lend themselves to the misinterpretation. (Of course, from the authentic Stoic premise that every event has an antecedent cause it does not follow that each event has exclusively antecedent causes. But perhaps Diogenes thought it did, Smith suggests.

We are considering the possibility of including this fragment in the podcast discussion for this week, but it's a difficult one and we need to call for public input. Diogenes argues that this error of the Stoics "more than any other" leads them astray. But I confess this one gets past me, so let's discuss if we can: What is the issue being discussed here?

Quote from Diogenes of Oinoanda

Fr. 33

Well now, I want to deflect also the error that, along with the feeling of self-love, has you in its grip —an error that, more than any other, further inflates your doctrine as ignorant. The error is this: [not] all causes in things precede their effects, even if the majority do, but some of them precede their effects, others [coincide with] them, and others follow them.

Examples of causes that precede are cautery and surgery saving life: in these cases extreme pain must be borne, and it is after this that pleasure quickly follows.

Examples of coincident causes are [solid] and liquid nourishment and, in addition to these, [sexual acts:] we do not eat [food] and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we drink wine and experience pleasure afterwards, nor do we emit semen and experience pleasure afterwards; rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, without awaiting the future.

[As for causes that follow, an example is expecting] to win praise after death: although men experience pleasure now because there will be a favourable memory of them after they have gone, nevertheless the cause of the pleasure occurs later.

Now you, being unable to mark off these distinctions, and being unaware that the virtues have a place among the causes that coincide with their effects (for they are borne along with [pleasure), go completely astray.]

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Whether it is the translation or something else, there is something missing here. I presume that there is a logic controversy of some kind with the Stoics that is probably also being hidden by loose wording or translators who don't understand the issue and so misstate it. Also when I say logic controversy I mean more of an inside baseball stoic technical argument that we don't recognize than a generic logic issue.

I give Diogenes the benefit of the doubt that he was not talking nonsense or in riddles, but in all honesty I can't figure out the point being made here.

Is anyone aware of any articles on this topic or other explanations for what is being discussed here?

Maybe the word being translated as "causes" has some more subtle meaning? "Motivation" perhaps? That suggestion doesn't seem to be good enough to address the issue. Why were the Stoics even concerned about the timing of causes? And why would the Epicureans have been interested in debating this issue?

Were the Stoics carrying over this argument as to timing of causes from their physics arguments that the universe must have a divine origin / starting point? Perhaps arguing that all "results" (things we observe) must come from prior causes, as an argument against the eternal universe theory (of the Epicureans)?

The issue seems to go to the issue of the nature of virtue and why someone would pursue it, but if there was a Stoic argument about timing that is relevant I am not sure what it is.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Forty-Four of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we will complete our discussion of the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Fr. 29

[There are many who] pursue philosophy for the sake of [wealth and fame], with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals or from kings, by whom philosophy is deemed to be some great and precious possession.

Well, it is not in order to gain any of the above-mentioned objectives that we have embarked upon the same undertaking, but so that we may enjoy happiness through attainment of the goal craved by nature.

The identity of this goal and how neither wealth can furnish it, nor political fame, nor royal office, nor a life of luxury and sumptuous banquets, nor pleasures of choice love-affairs, nor anything else, while philosophy [alone can secure it], we [shall now explain after setting the whole question before you. For we have had this writing inscribed in public] not [for ourselves,] but [for you, citizens, so that we might render it available to all of you in an easily accessible form without oral instruction.]

Fr. 30

... time ... and we contrived this in order that, even while [sitting at] home, [we might be able to exhibit] the goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who are called «foreigners,» though they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world. I am not pressurising any of you into testifying thoughtlessly and unreflectively in favour of those who say «[this] is true» for [I have] not [laid down the law on] anything, [not even on] matters concerning the gods, [unless] together with [reasoning.]

Fr. 32

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.

Episode 143 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Our topic is Diogenes of Oinoanda on the Superiority of The Epicurean Viewpoint on "Gods." This episode is one of our most direct discussions on how the Epicureans did not consider themselves to be atheists, but at the same time denounced supernatural viewpoints about the nature of "gods."

Several references we either mentioned in this episode or which are relevant:

1 - The Epicurus.net page on the history of the Epicurean school and its interactions with others: https://epicurus.net/en/history.html

2 - An article by Krystyna Stebnicka- "Superstitious and Abominable...." [Abstract: "A fragment of the Epicurean account of Diogenes of Oinoanda (2nd century AD), which was found in 1997, revealed a mention of the most superstitious and abominable Jews and Egyptians. The fragment is part of A Treatise on Physics and repeats the Epicurean view that gods do not interfere in people’s lives. The aforementioned peoples serve the exemplification that the world of humans is separated from the world of the gods. Both expressions refer to the stereotypical perception of the Jews and Egyptians that is well-known from Greek-Roman literature. However, it seems that the way both ethne imagined their gods – in the form of animals (the Egyptians’ view) and without any cultic statues (the Jews’ view) – was meaningful for Diogenes, who like

other Epicureans attached great importance to the worship of images of gods."]

3 -An article "Ancient Greek and Egyptian Interactions"

4 - Comment by Herodotus about the Egyptians (Histories, 2:37 ) "They are religious excessively beyond all other men, and with regard to this they have customs as follows:—they drink from cups of bronze and rinse them out every day, and not some only do this but all: they wear garments of linen always newly washed, and this they make a special point of practice: they circumcise themselves for the sake of cleanliness, preferring to be clean rather than comely. The priests shave themselves all over their body every other day, so that no lice or any other foul thing may come to be upon them when they minister to the gods; and the priests wear garments of linen only and sandals of papyrus, and any other garment they may not take nor other sandals; these wash themselves in cold water twice in a day and twice again in the night; and other religious services they perform (one may almost say) of infinite number. They enjoy also good things not a few, for they do not consume or spend anything of their own substance, but there is sacred bread baked for them and they have each great quantity of flesh of oxen and geese coming in to them each day, and also wine of grapes is given to them; but it is not permitted to them to taste of fish: beans moreover the Egyptians do not at all sow in their land, and those which they grow they neither eat raw nor boil for food; nay the priests do not endure even to look upon them, thinking this to be an unclean kind of pulse: and there is not one priest only for each of the gods but many, and of them one is chief-priest, and whenever a priest dies his son is appointed to his place."

Ha that's a good one - seems like several of us now have been there!

Quote from Don

LOL! I didn't even know what "calumny" was!

And lol to that too because the number of people who can adequately define "calumny" probably exceeds those who can understand "ataraxia" by a factor of ten! . Can't play to the lowest coon denominator all the time but when to do so is an art it seems.

This latest exchange is why it is so helpful to have people with varying backgrounds - Kalosyni's Buddhism probably causes her to question the amiability of guy wearing a helmet but when we have a good sprinkling of ex-Buddhists with a similar take then that is more persuasive.

We better wait a while before we add in for consideration Epicurus' "enemies of Hellas" remark!

Be sure to note that I have in included lots of in the above !

Quote from Sid

i.e. some things happen deterministically while other happen out of free will.

Sounds like a broadly accurate summary to me.

Hard to believe but I would say that part is true

The Greeks sem to have taken philosophy very seriously!

Quote from Kalosyni

On the subject of the "art of calumny" -- I will simply say that it would not fit well with PD5:

"PD5: It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously."

I gather that you're saying that developing calumny into an "art" might not be a good idea, rather than that all calumny is a bad idea, since Epicurus himself was apparently regularly engaged in it!

Happy Birthday to ChadM! Learn more about ChadM and say happy birthday on ChadM's timeline: ChadM

Quote from Don

That section also shows that Aristotle is NOT a fan of the emotions, Greek παθη pathe. Epicurus includes the pathe (feelings, emotions) of pleasure and pain as part of his Canon of Truth! Aristotle simply says they can’t be trusted and young people get led astray by them. The two couldn’t be farther apart!

Starting around 1095b, Aristotle appears to stake his flag against pleasure as the Good:

“The common run of people and the most vulgar identify [the highest good] with pleasure, and for that reason are satisfied with a life of enjoyment…a life suitable to cattle.”

LOL! Oh, a life of enjoyment! Perish the thought!

He goes on to say that there are really three notable kinds of life:

• The life of enjoyment/pleasure
• The political life (remember, life in service to the polis)
• The contemplative life

However, Aristotle continues to refine his definition of the good and says “the good is a man’s own possession which cannot easily be taken away from him.” It seems to me something could not be more one’s own than one’s feelings of pleasure (and pain).

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This part reminds me of one of the things that I think is most important to stress early and often: that "pleasure" is a sweeping term that embraces every possible experience in life that we find desirable in itself. If it is desirable in itself, it is pleasurable. Once it is established that we are not just talking about immediate sensory stimulation it seems to me that the superiority of the Epicurean position is much more clear. Why would anyone do anything if they do not receive benefit from it, and what is "benefit" if not pleasure (under the Epicurean perspective in which all feelings are either pleasure or pain).

I think if I were in a debate with Aristotelians or any of them, that's a point I would want to stake out almost immediately before going in any other direction.

If the ancients had used it more themselves I would be perfectly willing to us A.U.C. Unfortunately for the Roman substitute I am not very good at remembering sequences of consuls.

Ab urbe condita

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to navigationJump to searchThis article is about the year numbering system. For the book, see Ab urbe condita (Livy).

Antoninianus of Pacatian, usurper of Roman emperor Philip in 248. It reads ROMAE AETER[NAE] AN[NO] MIL[LESIMO] ET PRIMO, 'To eternal Rome, in its one thousand and first year.'

Anno ab urbe condita, rubricated and with a decorated initial, from the medieval Chronicle of Saint Pantaleon.

Ab urbe condita (Latin: [ab ˈʊrbɛ ˈkɔndɪtaː] 'from the founding of the City'), or anno urbis conditae (Latin: [ˈan.no̯‿ˈʊrbɪs ˈkɔndɪtae̯]; 'in the year since the city's founding'),^{[note 1]} abbreviated as AUC or AVC, expresses a date in years since 753 BC, the traditional founding of Rome.^[1][2] It is an expression used in antiquity and by classical historians to refer to a given year in Ancient Rome. In reference to the traditional year of the foundation of Rome, the year 1 BC would be written AUC 753, whereas AD 1 would be AUC 754. The foundation of the Roman Empire in 27 BC would be AUC 727.

Usage of the term was more common during the Renaissance, when editors sometimes added AUC to Roman manuscripts they published, giving the false impression that the convention was commonly used in antiquity. In reality, the dominant method of identifying years in Roman times was to name the two consuls who held office that year.^[3] In late antiquity, regnal years were also in use, as in Roman Egypt during the Diocletian era after AD 293, and in the Byzantine Empire from AD 537, following a decree by Justinian.

Quote from Don

we do have them to "thank" for the Vatican Sayings I suppose.

I dunno. I would prefer to add to the string of zingers.... It's too bad that Epicurus was not around to label the Judeo-Christians as part of this list!

Quote

He used to call Nausiphanes ‘The mollusk,’ ‘The illiterate,’ ‘The cheat,’ ‘The harlot.’ The followers of Plato he called ‘Flatterers of Dionysus,’ and Plato himself ‘The golden man,’ and Aristotle ‘The debauchee,' saying that he devoured his inheritance and then enlisted and sold drugs. Protagoras he called ‘Porter’ or ‘Copier of Democritus,’ saying that he taught in the village schools. Heraclitus he called ‘The Muddler,’ Democritus [he called] Lerocritus (‘judge of nonsense’), Antidorus he called Sannidorus (‘Maniac’), the Cynics [he called] ‘Enemies of Hellas,’ the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’ and Pyrrho [he called] ‘The uneducated fool.’

I guess we do have unflattering commentary on the Christians in Lucian's "Death of Peregrine," but so much more is possible

A reminder of all that has been lost, and that it wasn't just "lost," but intentionally demolished.

I look forward to reading it. FWIW, For some reason the link doesn't seem to work on my phone, but works fine in a browser. Probably just me but if anyone else runs into that Don might like to know.

I agree with that but especially in the context that it is always a matter of comparing the resulting pleasure to the resulting pain and never a strict out-of-context analysis