Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

Epicurus embraced all pleasure in his philosophy.

Yes agreed. And if I were looking for a text to quote for a potential example of mental thoughts and attitudes and processes (through a sound philosophy) bringing pleasure in the midst of difficult circumstances, in addition to the example of the last days of Epicurus I think I would cite the opening of book two of Lucretius, the start of which is:

Quote from Lucretius Book Two

'Tis pleasant, when a tempest drives the waves in the wide sea, to view the sad distress of others from the land; not that the pleasure is so sweet that others suffer, but the joy is this, to look upon the ills from which yourself are free. It likewise gives delight to view the bloody conflicts of a war, in battle ranged all over the plains, without a share of danger to yourself: But nothing is more sweet than to attain the serene 'tho lofty heights of true philosophy, well fortified by learning of the wise, and thence look down on others, and behold mankind wandering and roving every way, to find a path to happiness; they strive for wit, contend for nobility, labor nights and days with anxious care for heaps of wealth, and to be ministers of state.

O wretched are the thoughts of men! How blind their souls! In what dark roads they grope their way, in what distress is this life spent, short as it is! Don't you see Nature requires no more than the body free from pain, that she may enjoy the mind easy and cheerful, removed from care and fear?

Quote from Don

This, to me, points to the "source" - "the sound state of the flesh" (to sarkos eustathes *katastema*) - being a more confident source -- according to Metrodorus himself -- of pleasure than "objects" (kinetic pleasure) outside of ourselves. It does NOT say the source "in ourselves" is "better (more value)" just that we can be more "sure" of its continuance because we have control over it

I completely agree with this paragraph. We need understanding through philosophy within ourselves to be confident of our situation and our happiness.

Quote from Don

It's not change vs "non-change".

Unfortunately that point is where the great majority of commentary and the connotations of these wordings in English seem to be focusing. I don't know if they are right or wrong in doing so, but the implications of change vs non-change as being the distinguishing factor are causing all sorts of problems. Personally I don't have any problem considering "resting" to be an activity in and of itself, just like sleeping is necessary. But sleeping can't well be thought of as the purpose of life, nor can any way of living life that is not moving or changing over time (in contrast we do assign an unmoving and unchanging description to a concept or an abstraction, such as "happiness").

I have been thinking recently about the map/territory and forest/trees examples lately. Only the territory and the trees have atomic structure (leaving aside the paper of a map) but we do consider that both forests and maps really exist. I don't have any problem with thinking that whatever is being described as pleasures of rest also exist for us, but perhaps in the same way as maps and forests, as mental sums or constructs, rather than in separate moment by moment experiences.

Quote from the article

But we may as well admit at once that the distinction is vague.

Very much agreed on that point!

That reasoning sounds about as a logical as any as an attempt to unravel things. But in my own view I can't get past he view that ......

Quote from article

If 'kinetic' refers to change, then 'katastematic' refers to non-change,

and it seems to me that in life there really is no such thing as "non-change." "Sustainability" is one thing, but if we are alive, then we are changing, and I have a hard time thinking that a characteristic ("non-change") which can't really apply to living things at all constitutes something that Epicurus would be seriously concerned about. It strikes me almost like a concept such as "omnipotence" or "omniscience" -- which are concepts that might arguably apply to divinities or something else that is non-human, but which doesn't ring true in discussing humans.

Even as the article discusses, a condition of "satisfaction" (such as being full after a meal) does not truly last very long, and relatively quickly recedes into the background and becomes hard to distinguish from working up a new appetite. And in that sense to me, being "satisfied" (full after a meal) is just another pleasure, not some special state that is separate in kind from the whole hunger-eating-satisfaction-hunger cycle. One might as well look at any other part of that cycle as being just as important as any other.

At any rate, I don't think there's a problem in Epicurus with all this -- the only problem is with living people today who try to turn the whole philosophy into a dissertation on "katastematism."

Epicureanism as "Katastematicism" is not the right direction and doesn't add anything except more syllables

Thanks again Nate!

Quote from Don

Aristotle has been this all-powerful bugaboo of Western Civilization, I expected to be in awe or something.

Which is exactly the message that is drummed into the minds of anyone who reads the work of Ayn Rand and her supporters. "Underwhelming" is the best way to describe my reaction to the Aristotle I have read. I presume (or hope) that in context and in the original he was better. And he seems to have pushed back against Plato and deserves a lot of credit for that. But is he worth being held up as the paragon of Western thought? I can't see that at all.

My opinion of Socrates is a ditto as well. Many of the other philosophers listed by Diogenes Laertius seem to have been just as sharp, and much more helpful, than this Socrates-Plato-Aristotle axis that we are supposed to worship as the best the west has to offer.

There is some well known characterization I which readinf Aristotle is like eating straw, right? Excellent dramatization Godfrey ... and now to read what Don wrote!

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Forty-Five of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we will start a series of podcasts intended to provide a general introductory overview to Epicurean philosophy. For organization purposes we will use the topic structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his "Epicurus and His Philosophy," but we will not bind ourselves to the text.

For the first episode we will begin in Chapter One.

• The Historical Background of Epicurean Philosophy
  • It is important to emphasize that at one and the same time Epicurus was both the most revered and most reviled of all founders of Greco-Roman philosophical schools.
  • For seven hundred years Epicurus was very popular throughout the Greco-Roman world. His images were displayed, his handbooks memorized and carried by students, and on the twentieth of every month his followers assembled in his name.
  • Throughout the same period Epicurus' enemies ceaselessly reviled him, and he was attacked by Platonists, Stoics, and Christians, and his name was an abomination to the Jews.
  • Therefore much of what has been written about Epicurus in both the ancient and modern world is wrong.

Quote

That is, the confirming or 'witnessing' evidence adduced by Epicurus is unable to turn belief into true belief that is not merely accidentally true because there is nothing added to the original presentation that entails the truth of the belief. There is no belief that o, which added to the belief that p, entails q. [...]

Pardon me for being obvious if this is already clear from the context (I haven't had time to study the links) but this phrasing is strikingly similar to that which I remember from DeLacey's appendix to "On Methods of Inference" and his discussion of the difference between Epicurus and the Platonic /Aristotelian line.

This goes to the heart of the issue of Epicurus' criticism of certain types of logic divorced from sensory evidence and seems to be of major importance in understanding Epicurean reasoning, even if we find the subject dry today.

I surely hope that someone someday will have the time and the talent to really dive into this and bring out Epicurus' viewpoint into full view.

Right now we're left with this vague concern that someone Epicurus was anti scientific in being critical of any variation of the term "logic," and it would be a huge advance if we could bring his position out from the shadows.

IMHO we have a huge issue today and we are overbroad if we treat all calls to "science" and "logic" as being unchallengeable, if we don't recognize that true science and true logic have to be validated by the senses in order to be worth following.

Even writing that sentence can cause eyebrows to raise but I am convinced this issue is one of Epicurus' most important points. How else did he see the wisdom in challenging and overturning Plato and Aristotle if he didn't see limitations of their claims in these areas?

Fascinating stuff Nate thank you!!!

It would be good to use this as a thread for references on this issue. Here are some of the main cites that I recall:

1 - Vatican Sayings of Epicurus:

Quote from Vatican Sayings

VS38. He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

2 - Letter to Menoeceus:

Quote from Letter to Menoeceus

125] For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes is but an empty pain in anticipation. So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more. [126] But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant. And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’. [127] For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

3 - Diogenes Laertius:

Quote from Diogenes Laertius

And he will gather together a school, but never so as to become a popular leader. He will give lectures in public, but never unless asked; he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt. In his sleep he will be as he is awake, and on occasion he will even die for a friend.

4 - Torquatus In "On Ends":

Quote from Torquatus in "On Ends"

So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theater, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure.

5 - Lucretius:

There's a lot in Lucretius about death and there may be more about suicide but this is the first that comes to mind:

Lucretius Book 3 (Humphries):

Quote

It goes so far, sometimes, that fear of death

Induces hate of life and light, and men

Are so depressed that they destroy themselves

Having forgotten that this very fear

Was the first source and cause of all their woe.

As children tremble and fear everything

In the dark shadows, we, in the full light,

Fear things that really are not one bit more awful

That what poor babies shudder at in darkness,

The horrors they imagine to be coming.

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind

Must be dispelled then, not by sunshine's rays, -

Not by those shining arrows of the light,

But by insight into nature, and a scheme

of systematic contemplation.

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Quote from Kalosyni

Could we correctly say that Epicureanism actually combines:

a) a life of enjoyment/pleasure

-AND-

c) the contemplative life (contemplating the nature of things)

I would say that the way to express that would have to be that Epicureanism teaches the pursuit of a life of enjoyment/pleasure, of which the pleasures of contemplation are pleasures and therefore are included in the goal of enjoyment/pleasure.

The word "and" is pretty easy to read as "separate goals" in that context and I would think that implication would need to be avoided.

Quote from Don

The thought that comes to mind is: is it our responsibility to convert or to simply evangelize. I don't think those are the same thing. Epicurus seemed to hold a dim view in some regards of the hoi polloi. He made his philosophy available but he wasn't handing out leaflets and screaming on the street corner.

Absolutely right. I am not sure that the Epicureans thought we have a "responsibility" to do either one. My reading of Lucretius and Diogenes both is that they had a benevolent general interest in "getting the word out" for those who were inclined to listen, so that might be akin to "evangelizing." But I definitely don't think they saw a responsibility to "convert" and they specifically seemed to acknowledged that not everyone was "well constituted" (seems I remember that in both Oinoanda and in Diogenes Laertius) so I bet they were clear-eyed about not converting everyone.

However it enhances our happiness to have more friends, and helps make us more secure if we at least don't have enemies (unnecessarily have enemies I guess I should say), so I see that as the primary way to describe the motivation to talk about the philosophy with others.

So definitely I would not scream on a street corner. Would I hand out leaflets (which appears to be exactly what the Roman Epicureans were doing)? Probably so, but I would be sure i did it unobtrusively and just mainly made them available.

Yes, I agree with your observation. But for purposes of persuading those of them who may be "well-constituted" or "well-disposed" towards us, I think we probably have different paths of argument for the different groups.

Most every Judeo-Christian I have ever run into, if you push them hard enough, admits that they are following the religion because they want eternal happiness for themselves and their friends, not just because they feel a general duty to be religious.

But for those viewpoints (and I think true Stoicism fits into this, if their ultimate viewpoint is the merging of individual consciousness into divine fire) that seem to contemplate the eventual loss of individuality, I would say they are in a much worse place and would require a different approach for any hope of success in opening their eyes. Lots of them are superficial, but to the extent they really understand their viewpoints and buy into it, they are much worse lost.

So I guess I am saying I see the root of our attachment to life as being our love of it and our desire not to lose it. For this purpose I'm abstracting this life and any other life and giving them the benefit of the doubt that if someone loves "life" then they are open to seeing how short it is and how best to live it.

But for those who wish they had never been born or wish to cease to exist, and buy deeply into that argument, seems to me that's a much harder nut to crack.

Very good point!

Even Christianity ultimately grounds itself in the desirability of eternal life, and that surely means finding pleasure in the reward. I grant that religions or viewpoints (Buddhism, etc?) that seem to call for the extinguishment of individuality or personality do appear to be elevating something other than the experience of pleasure as the goal, but those seem to me to fit in the "better to never have been born" category which I would argue most sane people would reject out of hand (and surely Epicurus rejected that too).

Once we make clear that "pleasure" is a sweeping term that embraces every form of desirable experience (and I think Epicurus is very clear about this) then it seems to me that setting "pleasure" as the goal of life is a compelling argument that is hard to reject by anyone except by rejecting life itself.

Started 10/13/22:

"And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided." Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus

I am familiar with the term minimalism, but "hygge"?

For reference as to our discussion last night, and next week as well, please refer to this material from Cicero for an example of the "opposite" of the Epicurean view of justice:

Thread

Cicero's "Republic" Book III, line XXII - "True Law Is Right Reason In Agreement With Nature"

I refer to his passage from Cicero's "Republic" very often to contrast it as essentially the opposite of Epicurus' view of justice, but I always have a hard time finding it when I need it. This post is just to provide some links and clips to the key passage:

Attalus: {22.} [33] L . . . True law is right reason in agreement with nature , it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it…

Cassius

January 16, 2022 at 12:29 PM

I also really like the implications of this sentence;

"The inseparability of virtue from pleasure, on which Epicurus insisted, lies rather in the fact that the virtues, properly understood, are the skills of pleasure management, both short term and long term."

That "properly understood" hints that he is going in the same direction of seeing Epicurean virtue as tied tightly to practical success in achieving pleasure / avoiding pain, rather than in an absolutist definition. What some allege to be courage may in fact in the Epicurean view be foolhardiness if the action is not properly calculated to lead to happy living.

Also FWIW It gives me great pleasure to watch David Sedley dive into these Epicurean ideas and come up with rational and sympathetic understandings of them. Seems to me that Sedley richly deserves to be considered one of the greatest living positive forces for Epicurean understanding, along with MFS, and it's fascinating to watch when Sedley can exceed even MFS in sympathetic interpretation.

Please join us tonight if you can for the beginning of our review of the very challenging doctrines on "justice."

This is probably a gross oversimplification, but what we have generally understood about the Cyreniacs was that they were focused on immediate pleasures (probably more bodily than mental, but possibly both) and they rejected the idea of calculating out over time the expected benefit from activities that in the short term are painful(??)

This seems to be an articulation of the Epicurean response in which Diogenes was emphasizing that current actions can bring important current pleasure even when the physical results of those actions happen far in the future. Sort of a "time preference" analysis in which the emphasis remains on the total expected resulting pain vs pleasure, but which emphasizes that great pleasure can come from current thinking about actions that will produce results that may be greatly delayed in time (and that might not even come until after our death, but that we get great pleasure in thinking forward about them).

By rejecting this idea the Cyreniacs were locking themselves into "the pleasure of the moment" while the Epicureans were working toward a much more expansive definition and analysis of total pleasures.

Anyone have a thought on whether that is the direction?