I think the best presentation of this issues is going to be in the section of DeWittt's book starting here, although it is covered in a lot of other places in the book too. I am not citing this to say "you should believe it because Dewitt said it" but as a starting point for anyone lurking who might want to follow the argument.
Hmm...disagree, but not sure how to proceed beyond this point.
Is reason fallible, of course. But it's our only tool for judging, and that's what is being done here.
Yep it is difficult or impossible to bridge that divide, and it seems to me that the issue of the proper place of "reason" led to much of the revolt of Epicurus against the positions of Plato and Aristotle.
the cradle argument takes a particular part of nature, and elevates it above the rest.
Yes, the part of nature before human reasoning, with its potential for error, has weighed in with its first opinion - that its own opinion itself can supply a guide to life superior to the feelings of pleasure and pain.
Right, but if that it is the only issue, then you could look to the "uneducated" for ethical guidance.
Indeed so, as Thomas Jefferson said to Peter Carr in 1787, and as I read it Epicurus would agree with this:
Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.
I would say that the 'nature as the norm' position is foundational to Epicurus position, so I agree with your comment here that we have to look to the question of whether we should look to Nature or not.
To give a (hopefully) non-controversial example, one of the assumptions in any kind of "look to nature" argument is that nature is the right place to look. I don't think I've ever heard anyone explain why nature is the right place to look. It's taken for granted. I'm fine with that, because nature IS usually a good place to look, and there aren't too many alternatives.
If we conclude through our observations and Epicurean reasoning that there is no world of forms or essences or "true world" beyond this one, and that all knowledge is based on the evidence of the senses, then what other foundation would support a conclusion of looking anywhere else for the norrm? Because we have the capacity to revolt against nature, does that mean that we should? It's certainly possible to argue that we should, but on what foundation? Not on a foundation of gods or abstract logic, surely?
My problem is with the implicit assumption that any deviation from the original state of nature is necessarily for the worse.
I would say that is not implicit Epicurus' position at all. He was certainly in favor of living in civilization and seems to have enjoyed a good life under the Athenian system, which is not at all a state of nature.
If the point is that pleasure and pain are the only faculties that Nature has given for ultimate determination of what to choose and what to avoid, what other or higher faculty would you suggest? Certainly not "reason" because why would anyone choose reason if it did not bring pleasure?
If you want an "anti-life" or "anti-nature" argument it seems to me that there is nothing more pure than that men can invent for themselves a faculty of choice better than what nature has provided.
I sure am glad we split this off into a new thread!
Faunus I would say it would probably be better to view that as something like:
The evidence of the senses is never 'wrong' but the opinions we draw from the evidence certainly can be. in this case there is some evidence and some argument that the universe is finite (what you are referring to) set against other evidence that the universe has no end (every time we expand the reach of our observation we find more).
This is the constant question in lots of areas - where the evidence conflicts we have to entertain multiple possibilities or wait before attaching ourselves to a single opinion. But the one conclusion to avoid above all is that the senses are ultimately untrustworthy and that we therefore have no capacity to be confident of anything. If you fall to that level you will walk off the precipice and your life will be unsustainable.
but I'll need to try to collect my thoughts a bit more to keep this from becoming a rambling stream-of-consciousness on my end.
Don't let that worry you too much!
Also:
To me what you are bringing up reminds me of this which Frances Wright addresses in her Chapter 15. I am not at all sure that what she is writing is what Epicurus would say, and in fact I think she goes significantly further and off in a different direction than Epicurus did. But the description of the topic I think is very much on point, and deciding whether what she says is right or consistent with Epicurus might help people think about what is really involved in the question of "theory" in the first place. Is this correct? - "In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing."
“I admit the truth of the metaphor,” said Theon. “But may we not simplify too much as well as too little? May we not push investigation beyond the limits assigned to human reason, and, with a boldness approaching to profanity, tear, without removing, the veil which enwraps the mysteries of creation from our scrutiny?”
“Without challenging the meaning of the terms you have employed,” said Metrodorus, “I would observe, that there is little danger of our pushing investigation too far. Unhappily the limits prescribed to us by our few and imperfect senses must ever cramp the sphere of our observation, as compared to the boundless range of things; and that even when we shall have strained and improved our senses to the uttermost. We trace an effect to a cause, and that cause to another cause, and so on, till we hold some few links of a chain, whose extent like the charmed circle, is without beginning as without end.”
“I apprehend the difficulties,” observed Leontium, “which embarrass the mind of our young friend. Like most aspirants after knowledge, he has a vague and incorrect idea of what he is pursuing, and still more, of what may be attained. In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.
The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us: finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”
“This explanation is new to me,” observed Theon, “and I will confess, startling to my imagination. It is pure materialism!”
“You may so call it,” rejoined Leontiurn, “But when you have so called it — what then? The question remains: is it true? or is it false?”
“I should be disposed to say — false, since it confounds all my preconceived notions of truth and error, of right and wrong.”
“Of truth and error, of right and wrong, in the sense of correct or incorrect is, I presume, your meaning,” said Leontium. “You do not involve moral rectitude or the contrary in a matter of opinion?”
“If the opinion have a moral or immoral tendency I do,” said the youth.
“A simple matter of fact can have no such tendency or ought not, if we are rational creatures.”
“And would not, if we were always reasoning beings,” said Metrodorus; “but as the ignorance and superstition which surround our infancy and youth, favor the development of the imagination at the expense of the judgment, we are ever employed in the coining of chimeras, rather than in the discovery of truths; and if ever the poor judgment make an effort to dispel these fancies of the brain, she is repulsed, like a sacrilegious intruder into religious mysteries.”
“Until our opinions are made to rest on facts,” said Leontium, “the error of our young friend — the most dangerous of all errors, being one of principle and involving many — must ever pervade the world. And it was because I suspected this leading misconception of the very nature — of the very end and aim of the science he is pursuing, that I attempted an explanation of what should be sought, and of what can alone be attained. In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing. Truth is but approved facts. Truth, then, is one with the knowledge of these facts. To shrink from inquiry, is to shrink from knowledge. And to prejudge an opinion as true or false, because it interferes with some preconceived abstraction we call vice or virtue, is as if we were to draw the picture of a man we had never seen, and then, upon seeing him, were to dispute his being the man in question, because unlike our picture.”
“But if this opinion interfered with another, of whose truth we imagined ourselves certain.”
“Then clearly, in one or the other, we are mistaken; and the only way to settle the difficulty is to examine and compare the evidences of both.”
The discussion goes on further from there but that part is probably the heart of the question. What is the proper attitude toward "theory"?
I think I will go ahead and break this into a new thread....
Another highly relevant text reference:
[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.
[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.
Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.
Todd I think the direction you are talking about would make for a really important discussion but we probably ought to branch it off from this thread on the Austin book. If you get time could you tee up that question under a new title, because I think it would help a lot if we had a thread on it - especially since you've had time to think about the issues for several years now, - would make for a good discussion that should be findable in the future.
A theory grounded in reality, of course, but still a theory. This is might be a corrosive desire.
I don't think that's a corrosive desire at all -- at least it's not corrosive to consider the question and try to come to a resting place on what is possible and what is not.
This from Pythocles seems applicable:
[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.
[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.
Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.
On topics like this I like to refer to what I think is one of the most under-rated sections of the texts, Lucretius Book 4. I see the discussion of "images" as not something to skip over as obsolete, but the place where we are going to find some of the most important insights into how to think when evidence is conflicting or illusory or not as plentiful as we would like it to be. (As to illusions, for example, how do we detect the truth? Not by jettisoning confidence in the senses, but by making more observations and then harmonizing them, and not by jumping to abandon everything about which we are already confident. We "wait" before holding an opinion to be true, when appropriate, until we can bring both old and new data all into a consistent whole.)
Here is one of the most important sections (starting around line 462) in the Brown translation):
And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.
And here that same section is in greater context:
Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.
Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.
And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?
But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.
And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.
Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.
Martin can give you a better answer than I can, but I can give you one that I think is compatible with classical Epicureanism:
First of all, who is "research" and what would give "research" the ability to conclude that there is a limit to the size of the universe (and therefore the number of atoms that it contains)?
I expect the answer would be that you could name some number of names of scientists who take the position that the universe as a whole is finite in size, while I expect that there are others who did or do still maintain that the size of the universe is limitless.
How does one choose between them to decide that Epicurus was "wrong"? Do you have to have the same level of scientific research background yourself in order to judge? Can you hope to attain such experience in your lifetime? Can you count the number of atoms yourself? If not, you are basically placing your confidence in some number of men whose opinions differ from others in the past and from whom - if the past is any guide - others in the future will differ too.
So you can say "I just don't know" or 'I choose to believe the majority of current "experts," and that may be a fine answer for you and cause you no doubts as to a possible supernatural origin of the universe or your ability to navigate within life.
Epicurus thought it was preferable (and better reasoning) to look at this and other questions based on analogies of what we have confidence of here on earth. He therefore constructed thought experiments such as throwing the javelin out through space, and others beyond which I can cite here (including the that a finite number of atoms in an infinite space would never come together to form what we see), which led him to conclude that there was good reason to believe that the universe is boundless in size. Logically he then concluded that if the universe is boundless in size then there is no bound to the number of atoms that constitute it. He thought this was both correct reasoning and a good way to innoculate people against believe in a supernatural dimension or a "true world" beyond this one on the order of Plato.
In the end we have another one of those questions to which we as individuals will never "know" the answer in terms of being able to count them ourselves, so we have to decide where to place our confidence. Likewise we will never "know" that there is any life after death by traveling there and finding out personally, and that ends up again being another question of how you weigh evidence and how much credit to give to speculation where direct evidence is lacking.
Call me a Luddite (or "anti-science" as the Epicureans were labeled) but the real issue as I see it is not one of counting up the number of experts on each side, but of weighing evidence that is available to us and how to assess its credibility. That's an issue of canonics. To me, Epicurus' argument was that we should not allow conclusions based on evidence we observe through our senses here on Earth to be overturned absent equally compelling sensory evidence. And even when new evidence is gathered that does not mean we discard the old evidence - all the evidence must be reconciled.
That argument seems sound to me, and I have seen no evidence that persuades me that he was wrong in thinking that this is the best course. Whatever new evidence is confidently gathered has to be included in any model in which we have confidence, but the devil is always in the detail of "do we have all the evidence we would like to have?" That's why this is not really an anti-science argument, because the "science" in the issue we are talking about is notoriously difficult to determine due to the known limits of our evidence. There is no reason to believe in life after death, but there is every reason to think that if we throw that javelin either something will stop it or it will travel on forever.
What I personally observe in my reading of these controversies in science discussions is that the arguments that seem to say that the universe is finite in size turn on what they claim to be the "observable" universe. It appears to me that when pressed these people hile also seem to acknowledge that the data from our current telescopes and data are necessarily limited in degree, providing no information about what is "beyond" their observation. And to me personally, that is where I think Epicurus' reasonings as to the "universe as a whole" continue to make good sense.
That reasoning may not convince many particle physics experts, but I don't grant to those experts the right to force me to believe a particular experiment or data that they claim to be true over what appears to me to be good reasoning that is consistent with all the raw evidence that is available to me. I would not grant to any priest the right to tell me that I should be concerned about hell because a god revealed it to him, and I would not grant to "research" the right to overturn what appears to me to be a common sense conclusion without a lot more evidence than I am persuaded that "they" have.
Similar questions arise in the issue of whether particles are infinitely divisible or not, whixh is pretty much the same question as to whether there is a limit in the number of "atoms." There are similar questions such as whether the universe as a whole has existed and will always exist eternally in time.
You then get to the issue of whether "in order to be an Epicurean you have to believe XXX." Luckily that's not an issue that we have a right to decide, since Epicurus is no longer here. I know that some people are going to take the position that they are convinced by modern physics arguments and are no longer concerned whether the universe is infinite in size or eternal in time. In fact I think Frances Wright appears to have taken exactly that position.
Since no one gets to define what Epicurus would say were he here today, we each have to make the best we can of these questions. But I think it helps nobody to simply say "Epicurus has been proved wrong by modern science" until we fully and completely grapple with what he was really arguing, and evaluate his method of reaching his conclusions.
Responding on the Epicurus argument, as I understand it it is simply an observation that the command to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is imprinted by Nature, and we know this because we observe through our senses that infants of all living types do it before they are corrupted by arguments in any direction otherwise. And of course in most cases (other than human) no other living being is ever corrupted away from that direction unless clearly by disease or some similar defect.
Now the question of whether we "should" follow nature as adults is something that people certainly have different opinions on, based on all sorts of logic and supernatural revelation. That's the classic argument of Cicero and others that we are not cows - we are somehow "better" than that. But I think Epicurus is saying that it is THOSE arguments which are flimsy. No constructs of the human mind carry the weight by which we should consider them valid to overturn the clear dictate of nature.
Of course people who consider logic and reason to be handed down from on high, or somehow "higher" than nature in any way, will never agree to this form of reasoning. But the observation and conclusion make perfect sense to me, and that's why Epicurus refused to accept that logical reasoning can or should be consulted in order to prove that pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided.
That's where the dividing line is drawn. If nature provides us no direct leading as to what to avoid and what to pursue other than pleasure and pain, then no amount of argument and no type of logic can ever be accepted to contradict that leadership from nature - if we are to accept nature and not our own brainpower as the ultimate standard.
And this is why the canonics of Epicurus is so important, because it's in this field that we clearly and affirmatively take the position that abstract logical reasoning - divorced from observations based on nature - can never be allowed to trump the clear dictates of nature itself. Ignore the canonics and the physics with which it is intertwined and you''ll never be able to have confidence that this is the right conclusion.
And just so I can go on record as potentially offending everyone in the conversation 
, that's why I have only limited interest in the modern 'research' --
Today we have neuroscientific research, such as Barrett, Lembke and others, to provide the "do." (I don't have more specifics at hand; just seeing if this will advance the discussion.)
No amount of "research' is going to convince me more firmly of the truth of Epicurus' conclusion beyond my own observations of the young of all animals - exactly as Epicurus specified. This research and these arguments are interesting and perhaps helpful to some. But I would say that the dictate of nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is not something that needs to be proven, or really can be "proven," beyond the clear evidence that has been available to everyone to see for 3000 years (and really much longer than that).
This is why discussing these things is so helpful. It's on *this* issue where Epicurus stands or falls as a philosopher, and where he breaks the chains of both supernatural religion and false philosophy. The hedonic calculus and other practical observations on how to view and pursue pleasure are just icing on the cake. *This* - a confident basis for taking the position that we know pleasure to be "the good" - is the issue on which everything stands or falls.
Should have just stuck with the final 2 sentences.
Agreed -- Maybe he was trying to be too cute with the way he phrased that, but clearly there's lots of discernable impact -- albeit negative!
I will add a couple more disjointed comments on the article here:
1. I think it's a well written article-length summary that presents basic facts in very readable form.
2. Under the topic "The Pursuit of Happiness" I would say that this summary suffers from what I complain about ad nauseum as to excessive focus on "absence of pain" while leaving the issue of positive pleasure either floating ambiguously or in fact defined totally negatively. And so it ends up with a negative assessments of "We do not have any of the more detailed works in which Epicurus might have attempted what Jeremy Bentham later called a “felicific calculus”. But, bearing in mind the difficulties that Bentham and the nineteenth century utilitarians found when they tried to move from principles to details, there is no reason to suppose he was more successful." That's probably why i didn't have more to say about the article when I first read it years ago.
3. I see under "Maintenance of Social Control" that he goes into the evaluation of the philosophy from the point of view of how well it helps to 'reconcile the great majority to distributions of property in which they are at a disadvantage.' While the writer may be a libertarian rather than a Marxist, i see that as actually way a Marxist way of looking at the question, evaluating everything by economics. That kind of perspective in my view obscures the central issue that I think Epicurus was pursuing: "What is the truth about our place in the universe?" And I think Epicurus was pursuing that question come hell or high water as to economics -- the answers to questions like chaos and life after death and supernatural religion isn't a matter of economics.
4 -- i think he's just simply wrong here, and that there is no need to ask the second question about "laws of nature beyond the existence and movement of atoms" because Epicurus plainly rejected that: "Then there is an apparent defect in his conception of the atomic movements. Does the universe exist by accident? Or are their laws of nature beyond the existence and movement of the atoms? The first is not impossible. An infinite number of atoms in an infinite void over infinite time will, every so often, come together in an apparently stable universe. They may also hold together, moving in clusters in ways that suggest regularity. But this chance combination might be dissolved at any moment—though, given every sort of infinity, some of these universes will continue for long periods. If Epicurus had this first in view, what point in trying to explain present phenomena in terms of cause and effect? Causality only makes sense on the assumption that the future will be like the past. If he had the second in mind, it is worth asking what he thought to be nature of these laws? Might they not, for example, have had an Author? Since Newton, we have contented ourselves with trying to uncover regularities of motion and not going beyond these. But the Greeks had a much stronger teleological sense. Perhaps these matters were not discussed. Perhaps they were discussed, but we have no record of them in the surviving discussions. Or perhaps they have survived, but I have overlooked them. But it does seem to me that Epicurean physics do not fully discuss the nature of the laws that they assume."
5 - This is not optimally worded, as Lucretius does not suggest this possibility, he's clear that Epicureanism is not impious: "It may be, Lucretius says, that beating down religion is impious and the entry to a life of crime. Much rather, it is religion which has brought forth criminal and impious deeds. He lived before the most notable acts of religious mania. But he was poet enough to know the psychology of enthusiasm."
6 - I like his section on Social Contract pretty well but I would differ with this: "As said, we do not have much Epicurean writing on this point. As with the Benthamites, he does not seem to have found any imperative for these ethical teachings. We may ask, for example, what reason there is against my killing someone if I can thereby take possession of his property—or just enjoy the sensation of killing—and if there is no chance of my being caught. The only answers we have are: "Do nothing in your life that will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbour.[xxviii] And: 'The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust is full of the utmost disturbance.[xxix]" If these are attempts at answering the question, they are feeble attempts. That the unjust are invariably unhappy is plainly false. As for the threat of discovery, the opportunities for secret crime have always been everywhere." ---------- I think the problem with that is that Epicurus would say that it is an error to look for an "imperative for these ethical teachings" because - and this is probably the same issue I have in point 4 above, I think Epicurus would say that "imperatives" don't exist and it is error to look for them. Yes in the end the writer is right that "Epicurus believed a stable and just social order could be sustained by the self-interest of individuals" but the emphasis is on the "could." I think Epicurus would say that there's no divine order in the universe and no fate and there's no force that guarantees a "just" result, and we just simply have to acknowledge that if we act rationally we will respect generally respect each others' interests, but that there are no guarantees and we simply do the best we can - because that's the way things are. Epicurus wasn't going to invent non-existent imperatives.
7 - A GREAT conclusion: "We have virtually everything that Plato wrote and almost nothing that Epicurus wrote. Plato, however, has had no discernable impact on the social sciences beyond providing legitimation to various cliques of demented and often murderous intellectuals. But, for all we have so few of his writings, the ideas of Epicurus have survived. And they have made the world a better place."
Having dipped just a little into reading Aristotle, I would say that Epicurus was reacting against basing a philosophy on the polis rather than the individual. Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics and others determined that what was good for the polis was best for the individual, whereas Epicurus determined that the best life results from an understanding of nature and through the experience of the individual
You know things can begin to come into focus pretty easily when you realize that ANYTIME someone suggests a goal other than "pleasure" as an end it itself then the reasoning is going to come to grief. On the other hand, it's as clear as day that when seen as "tools" these other things (virtue, money, even "politics") can have their uses when they are strictly kept on a leash with the ultimate goal in mind, rather than ends in themselves. It really should not be so hard for anyone to understand that "sometimes" it is going to be necessary to engage in political activity, just like in general we choose any tool that helps us toward our goal, and that we even choose pain for the sake of greater pleasure or less pain in the end. Epicurus doesn't reject virtue or anything else as "bad in themselves" except as they factor into the ultimate question of happy living.
Absolutely agreed on all points in post 62. I presume you saw her article focusing on the stoic angle that is linked in the first post of this thread?
Ha my bad memory prevents me from disagreeing with you about my saying something pessimistic!
But maybe what I said then is something I still repeat - that while this is true sometimes, it's unfortunately not always true -
The battle is half won! We don't need to convince people to pursue pleasure.
As per a post I made earlier this afternoon, I think the real heart of Epicurus is not to help everyone go along their same merry way, just better calculating the expectable results in terms of pain vs pleasure (although that is indeed a part).
Unfortunately the battle is far from won against religion and false philosophies to accept that happiness *should be* the goal of life. Far too many people want to ignore Epicurus' views on the nature of the universe and the proper approach to knowledge, and cling to their existing religious and ethical views, and in so doing they miss the thrust and the long term benefit . They still haven't - and refuse to - admit that there is no "good" other than what derives from pleasure. (Which is the danger I think you and I are agreeing on in too easily thinking that our own personal preferences as to politics or anything else are necessarily synonymous with "the good."
And one reason for that is that inevitably in life crises will occur, and the standard calculation of maximizing pleasure over pain becomes very difficult to apply. That's in addition to the many who have already fallen into despair and find that they can't relate to a "pleasure" focus at all. If we aren't prepared on the "physics" and the "epistemology" then the emotional pain of the moment can easily cause us to fall back into despair or nihilism or both far too easily - or fail to climb out of it if we are already there.
Of course I don't think that's a "pessimistic" outlook - but I do think that were Epicurus here today he would stress those aspects of his philosophy as much or more than the psychology. In fact I think he would probably say "Look how little it has gotten you to focus on material wealth and the pleasures of the moment and how you still fail to understand your place in the universe and how to resist logical word games that have you as doubtful as ever about the ability to know anything at all."
Not disagreeing with you as much as using the opportunity to dig in as deep as possible on all the merits of Epicurus.
