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We certainly agree in your first sentence but I do think there is a "concept" of pleasure which is used as a placeholder in these discussions where the discussion demands a single word that references the full concept.
I don't think all concepts constitute Platonic ideal forms, do they?
Epicurus seems to treat the mental faculties of the mind as a sense organ picking up sensations from subtle images leading to thought and memory.
As I read things there is no doubt about that being part of the big picture of the operation of the mind. Clearly Epicurus says this.
I presume that a tricky part is per Joshua:
but after he knows of it he stops requiring sensation to feel pleasure or pain about it.
Would this be consistent with PD2 relating to absence of sensation being nothing to us? Do the faculties operate so independently that "over here" we have the five senses operating on one set of data while "over here" the pleasure faculty is operating on an entirely different set of data or somehow operating without any data at all?
Are we talking about memory here, to the effect that once a memory is stored the five senses are no longer involved at all? Is not the pleasure or pain from our memory essentially a stored sensation?
In other words for purposes of PD2 and maybe other uses, should we be considering memory of a sensation to be the equivalent of a "new" or "contemporaneous" sensation?
Is "pleasure" like "yellow" - in that pleasure does not exist apart from sensations that are pleasurable just like yellow does not exist apart from things that are yellow? This question I think is particularly important.
Should we ask the same about anticipations? Do anticipations exist apart from sensations and feelings?
Can any of these three faculties be considered to have an independent existence apart from the others?
Would it be concerning if we were to admit that "pleasure" exists apart from "sensations that are pleasurable?" I sense that this question is closely related to the also-troubling contention that katastematic pleasure is some kind of special and higher pleasure, different in nature from any other "normal" type of pleasure, and somehow separate and apart from experience/sensation.
This reminds me of Dewitt's observation that pleasure has no meaning except to the living. "Pleasure" can exist outside the normal functioning living being no more than a soul or spirit can be considered to exist outside the living body, right?
Also: we can choose in our mind to consider yellow apart from a lemon if we prefer, but that doesn't mean yellow exists without our picturing in our mind's eye something that is yellow, does it? This phrase "mind's eye" may be related to the topic. Does our mind have an ear and a nose and a tongue too?
When we say "Imagine something..." Does that mean anything different than summoning up the "image" from storage rather than from the "current" eyeball input? Is summoning up the image from storage so conceptually different for our current purposes such that the result should not be considered to be a sensation? If we close our eyes for just a moment is the pleasure we are feeling from the stored picture in our mind (of the same object while our eyes are closed) so very different in kind? Does the blink of an eye while we are standing in the Louvre change how we should consider the pleasure we feel in appreciating the Mona Lisa?
Seems to me that we are in danger if we don't consider that this discussion has both "biological" aspects and "philosophical" or "conceptual" aspects. Can't (or shouldn't) we conceive of both stored and contemporaneous images as having exactly the same ability to be considered properly as sensations?
PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.
Does that mean that we should consider ourselves to be dead when we stop receiving new sensations from functioning organs, or only after our minds have ceased to function and to be able to *both* receive new *and* operate on stored memories of sensations?
All this interrelationship is why I think it is ridiculous to single out and interpret "katastematic pleasure" or "tranquility" or "ataraxia" or "aponia" or any other particular word as something higher than, or special in kind, or anything more than one among many experiences of (or aspects of or perspectives on) the "Pleasure" that we use as a description of our general goal in living a full human life.
(And when I say I think it is ridiculous, what I mean is I think Epicurus would have thought this interpretation of his words to be ridiculous too.)
It makes much more sense that Epicurus was taking a very general and common sense perspective on life, so that when he was asked "What is the Goal of Life?" the discussion went something like this:
- Can life be considered to have a goal, Epicurus?
- "If you would like to, Yes."
- Is the goal of life Virtue, or living nobly and virtuously?
- "No."
- is the goal of life Piety, or obedience to the Gods?
- "No."
- Is the goal of life Rationality, since the distinguishing factor of man is that he is the rational animal?
- "No."
- Is the goal of life constant partying, as people claim you do?
- "No."
- Is the goal of life Tranquility, or the elimination of pain?
- "No."
- "Is the goal of life Happiness, or eudaemonia, or flourishing, or well-being?
- "No, not in the clearest manner of speaking."
- Then what do you say the goal is, Epicurus?
- "Pleasure - which includes the pleasure that comes from living virtuously, and the pleasure that comes from having holy opinions about the gods, and the pleasure that comes from using our minds rationally, and the pleasure that comes from partying, and the pleasure that comes from tranquility, and the pleasure that comes from eliminating pain, and the pleasure that comes from feeling happiness, and the pleasure that comes from many other types of experiences as well."
I then clarified that it might be possible to experience pleasure or pain uncaused by sensation, but requiring nevertheless some kind of change in stimulus
Is not the awareness of consciousness itself - of being alive - a "sensation" of some kind? And would that not factor in to the apparent view that so long as pain is not present what is being felt is pleasure, even if it is just awareness of being alive?
I presume these are the kinds of issues this question calls for answering.
Yes to repeat we brought up the subject and then quickly realized that it was going to be very complex and dropped back to continue the podcast without it. So as far as I am concerned we are essentially a blank slate on this topic!
Joshua did I frame this question accurately to the way we were discussing it?
I don't recall that we have addressed this question before and it's full of difficulties. I agree with Don's comments generally with the possible exception as to anticipations. I will need to reread the rest of the chapter and see if there are any academic articles on this topic.
I think my eventual answer is going to be that they all three function together and all the time, but that will move "anticipations" more deeply into the center of all brain activity than I have previously considered it to be. However that may well be possible.
Though Dewitt occasionally uses the term ideas I think reject the view that anticipations are "ideas" of any kind, and I think I prefer the view that they were considered to be by Epicurus some kind of "firmware" or "operating system" process always involved in consciousness (probably involving patten assembly and recognition).
In that I am influenced by the Barwis argument that we are born with "principles of operation" (again genetic or similar methods of functioning) but not with "ideas.". In that I see a strong analogy to pleasure and pain and the senses, in that they are in operation at birth (or some time after conception) though containing no prior experiences.
This morning we recorded the first episode for Chapter 8 and one thing that we came across, but did not deal with yet, led us to consider whether it is possible to experience "feeling" (pleasure or pain) separate and apart and independently of anticipations and feelings. This question arises in discussing the connection and relationship between the three faculties.
This question implicates PD2 (without sensation we are dead) and it is something discussed in the Wenham article which I regularly cite on the kinetic/katastematic issue.
Before we address it (probably episode 161) it would be good to discuss it in a thread. I am initially posting this in 160s notes but will probably move the topic to a separate thread of its own.
Perhaps a better way of asking the question would involve formulations like:
Given the big issues involving what anticipations really are, adding it into the mix may be more trouble than it is worth, but probably the same questions apply:
What of the workings of the mind in all this? Do those workings of the mind constitute or generate sensations?
How do the three work together? DeWitt's formulation starts out with:
The three criteria are neither three aspects of a single capacity nor yet three discrete capacities which function separately from one another. To Epicurus body and soul are alike corporeal; they are also coterminous. Consequently all reactions of the individual to his environment are total or psychosomatic. Thus in the case of every reaction Nature is on the alert to register approval or disapproval by the signals of pleasure and pain. This is the function of the Feelings in the meaning of the Canon.
It is true that in the Greek language all three criteria may be called pathe, in modern parlance "reactions," but they are not identical. It is true also that all three may be components of a given reaction but still they occur in sequence. Sensation is irrational and merely registers a quality, for example, sweetness. It is the intelligence that says, "This is honey," and it is the Feelings that report, "I like it" or "I don't like it." Again, it is positively known that Epicurus postulated the existence of an innate sense of justice and called this an Anticipation. Now injustice hurts and it is the Feelings that register this fact. If a man is condemned to pay an unjust penalty, the pain is a reaction distinct from the aural sensation of hearing the verdict.
Agree? Disagree? Your comments are welcome!
I just finished listening to this episode and I think it is a very good one with lots of thought-provoking discussion. I am not so sure that we ended on as quite as clear a note as we might have, however, on "natural law," so i will see if we can revisit that as we proceed through Chapter 8.
I can see a casual listener wondering how we reconcile the emphasis on nature providing the norm with the cautions about "natural law" at the end. I think the points Joshua raised were correct, but we might need to go back and hit that point again. The point we want to make seems to be (to me) that it is correct to look to Nature in some ways but not in others. It is correct to look to Nature in following the guides of pleasure and pain given us as natural faculties, but it is incorrect to project on Natural a form of "reason" or "logic" and try to deduce from existing circumstances that those circumstances were somehow blessed as "correct" by Nature.
I think we were pretty clear in focusing on the problem rearing its head mainly in societies trying to use "natural law" to enact legislation that applies to all people at all time and all places, which is contrary to the observation that individuals vary widely in what they find pleasurable and painful.
However I can see the possibility that listeners might think we were trying to have our cake and eat it too at the end of the podcast.
I think it is only natural that we would come back to these issues anyway as we go through Chapter 8, but if anyone has any comments on this please comment in this thread and we will incorporate that as we go forward.
I agree with Godfrey's "heart" on Don's post. Thinking it through in such detail like that really brings out the differences in the words.
Being happy in the moment is different than happiness, the state of living a happy life overall.
And when said like that it jumps out even more that "being happy" is a a specific type of feeling of pleasure, while "the state of living a happy life overall" is a definition suitable for use by Merriam Webster but not a specific feeling at all. What I want is my life is feeling, not to be of assistance to Merriam Webster.
Looked at it this way, "happy" is a mushy, ill-defined word that can take on any number of meanings in context. It's like the English word "love"... "I love you" to "I love ice cream." At least Greek had different words for different forms of "love."
And yes I think that's one of the real take-aways of the discussion too.
My current thoughts bouncing of Don't post include:
Pleasure is a feeling of which one aspect is time over which pleasure is experienced. If you are alive you can immediately identify with what is being discussed, and although there are many types of pleasures, you know confidently whether you are feeling it or not, and whether you are feeling it or not is almost an "automatic" function of your being a living being. The definition we give in our minds is assigned mostly by nature.
"Happy" can be viewed as a type of pleasure, but it's more general use is more like the word "American." A useful word, but very slippery, and with a very amorphous and changing definition that is highly subjective and not nearly as automatic. The definition we give it in our minds is assigned almost totally by conceptual thinking.
None of which really lends itself to a pithy reply to a quick challenge in a zoom meeting, but thinking it through begins to help to get there.
Thanks Nate. It's been quite a while since I read it, but I recall reading through Munro's notes to his translation, and in fact I think I was even looking at them each week as a means of dividing up episodes by topic when we were first going through the book on the podcast.
I remember thinking to myself that it was clear to me that Munro was much more "pro-Epicurus" than was Bailey, so that it seemed to me that his translation decisions might be more trustworthy given his seeming sympathy to the material. When we look to compare the commentators on the texts to each other, Bailey probably has a wider range of facts to compare to since he lived significantly later than Munro, but I am thinking that Munro's translation decisions deserve a lot of respect. Going further I suppose that today's editions by Martin Ferguson Smith have even more material to draw from, and he smooths out a lot of the awkward text, but Munro to this day seems to me to be the one who was trying to be the most literal, and that makes him very valuable.
We now have a single youtube video with the entire Emily Austin interview with LucretiusToday here at this link:
Unfortunately we don't have it by video, and at this point I wanted to get it on youtube so it will be findable by people who search there. Further, I have not had time to add any elaborate graphics (ok maybe I should say "any" rather than "elaborate") but we do have a pretty detailed list of time-stamps that will help in finding specific sections of the interview.
We'll post this on Facebook and I hope our people here will find this like useful in the future. Thanks again to Dr. Austin for allowing us to interview her! In the near future we'll find permanent place for this on our EpicureanFriends home page. We tried to do our best with our questions, but regardless of those Dr. Austin did a great job of providing an introductory explanation to key Epicurean issues.
(Over time I will also try to get this on other video platforms. Obviously there are no copyright issues in distributing this, so if any of our readers have video accounts on any platforms feel free to download this from youtube and upload it anywhere you like.
For show notes, follow these links to the two podcast episodes in which we first presented this interview: Episode One | Episode Two
Alternate Links:
Each video platform should have timestamped links to the following sections:
00:51 - Introduction of Dr. Austin.
02:05 - Dr. Austin, tell us about yourself.
03:17 - What got you interested in Epicurus and how did you come to write this book? 06:15 - It's clear that you enjoyed writing your book. Was there any particular reason for that?
08:50 - What are the major aspects of Epicurean philosophy, and what distinguishes it from Stoicism?
18:30 - How do you deal with the objection that "pleasure" cannot be the goal of life?
27:15 - What is the role of a proper perspective on "death" in Epicurean philosophy?
38:50 - Some people see a tension between pursuit of pleasure as opposed to pursuit of tranquility. How do you reconcile that question and summarize the issue of how much pleasure is enough? Was Epicurus an ascetic?
45:00 - Are some pleasures "ok" and some not? What is the difference between the Epicurean and Stoic perspectives on "virtue?"
48:50 - What do you see as the role of physics and natural science in understanding and applying the full the Epicurean world view?
50:30 - Are modern Stoics actually Epicureans? (continuation of answer to the previous question) 56:40 - To what extent can an ancient philosophy like Epicureanism be translated into the modern world?
1:04:02 - Can you use basic Epicurean principles that are clear to fill in gaps where texts are lost or positions are unclear?
1:07:34 - How how confident can we be in interpreting Epicurus when there are varying translations of the same texts? Are the Vatican Sayings reliably Epicurean?
1:10:38 - Does someone need to be interested in science in order to appreciate Epicurus?
1:14:21 - Is there an Epicurean equivalent to a "Meditations"-style list of practical suggestions on how to live? Is that what you attempted to provide in the final chapter of your book?
1:21:26 - What do you think Lucretius had in mind for the closing section of his poem?
1:26:45 - Closing
Each version also should have this description:
Welcome to a special two-part Episode of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you too find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
Today we are very pleased to bring you an interview with a special guest: Dr. Emily Austin, professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University. Dr. Austin is author of the book "Living for Pleasure: an Epicurean Guide to Life," which was published in November 2022 by the Oxford University Press as part of its Guides to the Good Life Series. Dr. Austin graduated summa cum laude in philosophy from Hendrix College in Arkansas, and she received her doctorate from Washington University in St. Louis in 2009. Since that time, she has been teaching philosophy at Wake Forest in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Dr. Austin's book has been getting great reviews, in large part due to her combination of philosophical detail with a friendly and engaging approach. Dr. Austin applies both her academic credentials and her teaching skills to the task of showing how Epicurean philosophy differs sharply from Stoicism, and how it stands for a truly positive approach to life that isn't grounded in asceticism, but in a complete understanding of the central and uncompromising appreciation of "Pleasure" in the pursuit of happiness.
We thank Dr. Austin for her time. If you would like to learn more about the topics discussed in this episode, please join us at EpicureanFriends.com in our study and pursuit of the philosophy of Epicurus.
I like that too. Words are tricky though - so I guess we can't really use "Living For Fun!" 
Matteng your post led me back to the Wikipedia on Falsifiability:
Falsifiability is a deductive standard of evaluation of scientific theories and hypotheses that was introduced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934).[B] He proposed it as the cornerstone solution to both the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation.
A theory or hypothesis is falsifiable (or refutable) if it can be logically contradicted by an empirical test using existing technologies. Popper insisted that, as a logical criterion, falsifiability is distinct from the related concept "capacity to be proven wrong" discussed in Lakatos' falsificationism.[C][D] Even being a logical criterion, its purpose is to make the theory predictive and testable, and thus useful in practice.
Popper opposed falsifiability to the intuitively similar concept of verifiability that was then current in logical positivism. His argument goes that the only way to verify a claim such as "All swans are white" would be if one could theoretically observe all swans,[E] which is not possible. Instead, falsifiability searches for the anomalous instance, such that observing a single black swan is theoretically reasonable and sufficient to logically falsify the claim. On the other hand, the Duhem–Quine thesis says that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible[1] and that no scientific hypothesis is by itself capable of making predictions, because an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions.[2]
Are you thinking that there is anything in that Stoic material that gets to the issue of falsifiability of the Epicurean position? Or of the link between virtue and pleasure that Epicurus states? While there is a link Epicurus is very clear that virtue is a tool for pleasure and not an end in itself.
If you are not familiar with The Torquatus position in On Ends, and the statement of Diogenes of Oinoanda in Fragment I think you would find those interesting:
Diogenes of Oinoanda doesn't help to clear up things for me, because it doesn't saying what it means by happiness.
Yep it is too bad we don't have more context at the beginning. But my expectation would be that if we had more of the "point in issue" we would see that this is a very abstract debate being stated in very philosophical, rather than practical, terms.
It seems to me in day to day life we consider "living pleasurably" and "living happily" to be totally interchangeable. But the reason we are having this discussion is that philosophers see a need to plant a flag and reduce everything down to a single word-concept that they can rally and organize around. I think that's a legitimate perspective too.
One way of looking at all this seems to me to be: Everything at the philosophic level seems to revolve around war-games between "Virtue" and "Piety" and "Reason" (or "Logic" or "Idealism"). Epicurus rejected those and decided it made the most sense to designate his flag as "Pleasure." He might well have called his flag "Happiness" but it's not a very good strategy to choose the same flag everyone else is carrying, and "Happiness" and similar words are claimed by everyone from every camp. If you're going to fight a war or make your point clear in philosophy you need a very clear and understandable flag. The choice of the word "Pleasure" both makes the correct point and throws the issue in the face of those who disapprove of it.
A lot of people tend to want to blur all these issues because they want to be polite and diplomatic. That's understandable too, and when the situation calls for that then "happiness" may make sense. But if you forget what context you're talking in, and use the word "Happiness" when you in a philosophical debate, then you don't do much but guarantee that the real point in issue will never be examined and decided.
It's one thing to choose to blur the issues when you think you are trying to lead someone along gradually to understand the point in issue. But I feel sure it is not lost on those who disapprove of Epicurus that as long as they keep the discussion solely about "Happiness" then no serious philosopher will ever take the Epicurean position seriously.
A book title like "Living for Pleasure" makes a point that a title like "Living for Happiness" never could.
Great addition to the thread EricR! I had never seen that, and it does help frame at least part of the significance of the issue!
This seems problematic to me. And it's also the crux of the issue: is happiness something beyond pleasure?
That's a great way of getting at this question too. And asked that way, it seems to me to be precisely why Diogenes of Oinoanda decided to shout about it. I know his context was defeating the setting of "virtue" as higher, but wouldn't his argument apply not only to virtue but to "happiness?" Wasn't he pitting "virtue" against "pleasure" for exactly the reason so many people try to pit "happiness" against "pleasure?"
Have we quoted him lately?
Fr. 32
... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.
I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.
Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.
Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....
I "feel" like it would be easy for this thread to go off in all sorts of ways that would make it sound like we are really doing nothing but spinning our wheels for the 1000th time. And I think all of us in this thread have in our minds at least a tentative balance where we find both words to be fully desirable.
So I "feel" like it would be good to say: Rather than just think about all the possible ways this issue could be taken, we should probably focus on our experiences in dealing with people are have only a superficial knowledge of Epicurus. Sort of the people that Diogenes of Oinanda and Torqatus thought there were talking to when they ended up emphasizing almost the exact words of "a life of happiness is a life of pleasure." I think we all believe that we ourselves can balance these terms, but why is there an issue with other people not understanding that they go hand in hand and are not in conflct? Why do people see a conflict between happiness and pleasure? And what's the most direct way to get them to see that they are mistaken in presuming that there is a conflict? What's the key to unwinding that perceived discomfort?
I think I remember Torquatus implying that the issue was that people who don't know how to pursue pleasure end up getting burned with lots of pain? But is the issue deeper, and that people that that "pleasure" is sinful or wrong? And that they somehow find "happiness" more socially acceptable?
Future article: "How I came to see 'happiness' as a cheese-eating monster."
Is it true that: You can't have a happy life without pleasure, but you could can have pleasure even if you aren't having a happy life?
I think that is a very interesting way of moving the conversation forward.
Me: Pleasure (artfully chosen)
Host: So, you think the answer is 'pleasure (artfully chosen).' Interesting, and is that your final answer?
[silence, silence, audience squirms because so much is at stake]
Me: Yes, that's my best and final answer, at least for today.
I sense a spirit of rebelliousness in Little Rocker, the reasons for which I think most all of us feel and share, but which we are still struggling to articulate. 
I don't think this is just a "mouse is a syllable so syllables eat cheese" kind of game. There's something much more significant at stake. It's almost as though over the last two thousand years a "book" has in fact devoured our "cheese," and we're mad (or ought to be) and need to act to get it back!
Thank you for posting not only the thoughtful post but because it exposes that the cites supposedly listed in the first post have somehow disappeared! I will work to fix that - thanks!
I think this question has come to my mind in this way because of the quote from Seneca we discussed in the last episode of the podcast as to the definition of "friend" and to the word-splitting game of "mice" and "syllables" and "cheese."
Taking this completely out of context of all our past discussions, it's tempting to equate happiness = pleasure, because both words can be considered to be concepts, and they are concepts that are certainly related. But they can also be considered to be feelings, although the -ness on happiness implies more of a "state" than a discrete sensation.
If this were not a question of some relevance, we probably would not see all the arguments we see which some insisting that one or the other is the real definition of the goal, which the other is a subsidiary concept. We see Epicurus using different words, so we see him use both "happiness" and "pleasure" in varying contexts. But we also see important texts which seem to make a point of considering "pleasure" as the goal, which other texts can be read to point to "happiness."
Seneca is clearly right to be concerned about logical hair-splitting, and it is easy to drop back and say that logical hair-splitting is what the debate between "happiness" (or ataraxia or eudaemonia or whatever) vs pleasure is all about.
But nevertheless there seems to continue to be a sharp debate as to which word is appropriate.
Is the answer to "Happiness? or Pleasure? Why?" simply:
"It doesn't matter - you're just wasting time splitting hairs."
Or for the sake of clarity in talking with people about these issues do we need a concise and clear statement of why two words are being used instead of one?
If so, what is that concise and clear statement?
